Recently, a traffic accident case in Baoshan City, Yunnan Province, has drawn widespread attention after being reported. The case involves common issues in traffic accidents, such as "hit-and-run," "secondary crushing," and the allocation of liability. The incident originated from a drunk driver hitting a car, and the court’s ruling has sparked intense debate among the public.
The court found that at 2:35 a.m. on March 25, 2024, Hua was driving a small, ordinary Toyota passenger vehicle with license plate Yun MZ***7 along Xincheng Road in Longyang District, traveling from west to east. As he approached the intersection of Xincheng Road and Yongchang Road, about 90 meters east of the intersection, he encountered the victim Li, who was standing on the motor vehicle lane, having crossed the central divider barrier and stopped there, facing north to south along Xincheng Road, directly in front of the direction in which Hua’s vehicle was traveling. Hua slowed down and steered to avoid the collision. During the evasive maneuver, Li repeatedly grabbed and pulled at the door handles, as well as the windows and doors of the vehicle driven by Hua. Hua immediately stepped on the gas and sped up. Subsequently, Li was run over by the vehicle’s left rear wheel, causing him to fall to the ground and sustain injuries in a road traffic accident. After sustaining injuries and falling to the ground, Li lay on the road while Hua drove away from the scene along Xinwen Road, heading from west to east.
At 2:37 a.m. that day, Zhu was driving the second vehicle and passed by the scene of the accident. He saw Li’s body lying on the roadway, which runs from west to east along News Road. Zhu then immediately turned around at the intersection ahead and drove back to the scene. Call the police and get out of the car to provide safety warnings to vehicles traveling on this road. 。
At 2:44 a.m. that day, Hua drove back to the scene. Park the vehicle on the roadside on the north side of the on-site road. Get off the vehicle and talk with Zhu. 。
At around 2:46 a.m. that day, Li drove a Changan-brand compact car, license plate number Yun ML***2 (the third vehicle), while not under the influence of alcohol. Along Xinchun Road, traveling from west to east to the location east of the intersection of Xinchun Road and Yongchang Road, where Li was lying on the ground. Seeing this, Zhu immediately stepped forward to warn him, but to no avail. Li then drove his vehicle over Li, who was lying on the road, causing Li’s death at the scene. road traffic accident.
After the accident occurred, Li did not call the police. Later, Hua drove away from the scene and then called the police at 4:01 a.m. that same day. Afterward, the police notified Hua by phone to go to the First Detachment of the Traffic Police Brigade of the Baoshan Public Security Bureau to cooperate with the accident investigation. Around 12:00 on March 25, 2024, Hua arrived at the First Detachment of the Traffic Police Brigade of the Baoshan Public Security Bureau.
According to separate forensic examinations, the vehicle driven by Hua, license plate number Yun MZ***7, was traveling at approximately 32 km/h at the time of the accident; the vehicle driven by Li, license plate number Yun ML***2, was traveling at approximately 53 km/h prior to the accident. The deceased, Li, died from traumatic brain injury caused by blunt force trauma to the head. The samples submitted for examination... The qualitative test of Li’s blood sample (evidence) detected ethanol, and the quantitative test determined its concentration to be 176.03 mg/100 ml. ; Submitted for testing The qualitative test on the non-blood sample (evidence material) of Li Mou detected ethanol, and the quantitative test determined its concentration to be 79.11 mg/100 ml. Human blood components were detected in the bloodstains from the front and rear of the chassis of the Yun ML***2 vehicle submitted for examination. No human blood components were detected in the following swabs: the left-rear tire tread swab, the left-rear door and window swab, the left-front door and window swab, the inner side of the left-rear wheel swab, the right-rear bumper swab, and the right-rear fender swab. The human DNA detected in the bloodstains from the front and rear of the chassis of the Yun ML***2 vehicle under examination was found to have the same genotype as Li’s blood sample at 31 genetic loci, including D3S1358; the likelihood ratio is 2.08 × 10. The submitted samples... No human DNA was detected in the swabs from the following areas: the left-rear tire tread, the left-rear door and window, the left-front door and window, the inner side of the left-rear wheel, the right-rear bumper, and the right-rear fender. 。
After the incident, the First Detachment directly under the Traffic Police Brigade of the Baoshan Municipal Public Security Bureau determined that Hua’s behavior—failing to proceed in accordance with the principle of ensuring safety, failing to immediately stop after the traffic accident, failing to protect the scene, and failing to provide assistance to the injured—constituted a violation of the “Road Traffic Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China” and other relevant laws and regulations. Meanwhile, the driver Li, who was not driving under the influence of alcohol, failed to reduce his speed and slow down when passing through an intersection at night, thereby violating the “Road Traffic Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China” and other applicable laws and regulations. The traffic police made their determination in accordance with the law. Hua bears the primary responsibility for this accident, while Li bears the secondary responsibility for this accident. Li bears the secondary responsibility for this accident. Subsequently, the families of Hua and Li objected to the aforementioned accident determination and requested a review of the traffic accident determination. After review, the Traffic Police Detachment of the Baoshan Public Security Bureau upheld the original determination.
After trial, the Longyang District Court held that Hua had violated regulations governing transportation and traffic management by failing to drive in a manner that ensured safety. After the traffic accident occurred, he did not immediately stop his vehicle, preserve the accident scene, or provide assistance to the injured. Instead, he fled the scene, thereby causing a serious road traffic accident that resulted in one death. Hua bears primary responsibility for the accident. His actions have violated criminal law and constitute the crime of traffic accident liability.
However, regarding the prosecution’s allegation that Hua fled the scene after causing a fatal accident, the court found that after Hua and Li were involved in a traffic accident, Li sustained a head injury with bleeding and fell to the ground, becoming unable to move. According to the autopsy report, Li was fatally injured by blunt trauma to the head, resulting in traumatic brain injury. However, the evidence in the case does not establish whether Li’s fatal injury occurred during the earlier accident or the later one. In other words, it cannot be ruled out that Li had already sustained a fatal head injury in the earlier accident—such that even with prompt medical treatment, his life could not have been saved. Therefore, Hua’s conduct does not constitute “hit-and-run resulting in death,” and this charge was not upheld. At the same time, Hua’s act of fleeing the scene has already been considered as an aggravating factor in determining his guilt; hence, it should not be re-evaluated as an additional aggravating circumstance during sentencing. Given that the defendant Hua has already compensated the victim’s family for part of their economic losses and obtained their forgiveness, he may, in accordance with the law, be given a lighter sentence at the court’s discretion.
On September 30, 2025, the Longyang District Court delivered a first-instance verdict finding the defendant Hua guilty of traffic accident crime and sentencing him to one year and two months of imprisonment, as well as ordering him to compensate the victim’s family for the corresponding economic losses. The co-defendant Li was ordered not to compensate the victim’s family for the corresponding economic losses.
After the first-instance verdict was announced, both Hua and Li filed appeals, dissatisfied with the ruling. On December 10, 2025, the Intermediate People's Court of Baoshan City issued a second-instance ruling dismissing the appeals and upholding the original judgment.
In this case, both the traffic management authority and the court found that after the traffic accident occurred, Hua failed to stop immediately, preserve the scene, or provide assistance to the injured. Instead, he drove away from the scene, thereby being held primarily responsible for the accident. However, whether Hua’s act of leaving the scene constitutes “hit-and-run,” whether there is a causal link between Hua’s actions and Li’s death, and whether Hua should indeed bear primary responsibility all warrant further examination.
The Road Traffic Safety Law requires motor vehicle drivers to drive safely in accordance with operational standards. According to the facts established by the court, after noticing that Li had crossed the median barrier and was lingering in the motor vehicle lane, Hua had already slowed down to avoid him. The speed at which Hua was driving, as determined by expert appraisal, was only 32 km/h, which complies with safety requirements. However, Li, in a state of severe intoxication, not only illegally crossed the median barrier and entered the motor vehicle lane but also, while Hua was slowing down, continuously pulled and slapped the door handles, windows, and doors of Hua’s vehicle, persistently harassing Hua.
Some opinions hold that Li’s actions, such as hitting the car window, constitute ordinary harassment and did not pose an imminent or serious threat to Hua’s vehicle or personal safety. Therefore, Hua’s decision to accelerate and drive away was not a necessary measure to stop the infringement or avoid danger.
However, the incident occurred at 2:35 a.m., when lighting was poor and pedestrian traffic was sparse. Under these circumstances, while driving alone, Hua was unable to quickly determine Li’s intentions or whether Li was carrying any tools or had accomplices—factors that could have posed additional risks. Faced with this sudden situation, Hua instinctively accelerated and left the scene in order to ensure the safety of both his vehicle and himself. This reaction is entirely consistent with the typical stress response of an ordinary person. Therefore, Hua’s actions do not constitute a violation of traffic safety regulations; rather, they reflect an intent and nature of emergency self-defense.
Moreover, even according to the facts established by the court, it was only after Hua accelerated his vehicle that Li was run over by the vehicle’s left rear wheel. Therefore, Hua accelerated and drove away precisely in order to evade the potential danger posed by Li—not after the accident had already occurred—and thus he did not have the intent to flee.
Both the traffic management authorities and the court have determined that Hua’s act of leaving the scene constituted “hit-and-run.” However, the fundamental prerequisite for establishing hit-and-run is that the perpetrator “knew” a traffic accident had already occurred yet deliberately fled the scene in order to evade his duty to provide assistance and legal accountability.
In this case, the court found that, The surveillance video shows that at the time of the incident, Hua slowed down and then accelerated again. Li was running alongside the vehicle on its left side, after which he tumbled and fell to the ground. At that moment, the vehicle driven by Hua jolted slightly. However, no human blood components or human DNA were detected in the swabs taken from the left-rear tire surface, the left-rear door and window, the left-front door and window, the inner side of the left-rear wheel, the right-rear bumper, and the right-rear fender of the sedan with license plate number Yun MZ***7 driven by Hua. Therefore, these findings do not indicate that Li and Hua’s vehicles were involved in a substantial, severe collision or run-over.
In the initial statement, Hua stated that at the time of the incident, he felt a bump in the right rear wheel of his vehicle. , but it then goes on to say, It cannot be ruled out that the bumpiness did not come from the victim but rather from other obstacles. 。
According to the surveillance video, Li was running alongside the vehicle on its left side. Even after he fell to the ground and was run over by the vehicle driven by Hua, the only possible bump felt would have been under the vehicle’s left rear wheel. However, Hua reported feeling a bump only under the right rear wheel—there is no way he could have realized that he had run over Li, who was on the vehicle’s left side. Moreover, the bumps detected directly in the surveillance video alone cannot definitively establish which specific wheel had struck the obstacle. Therefore, based on the surveillance video, swab analysis, and Hua’s initial statement, it is actually impossible to confirm whether Hua’s vehicle caused Li to fall and get injured or whether it had actually run him over.
At the time, the lighting was poor, and Hua, being highly nervous, sped away from the scene. As a result, his primary attention was focused ahead, and he either failed to notice or did not realize that Li had fallen behind the vehicle. It would be unreasonable to conclude directly that Hua knowingly fled the scene after realizing that a traffic accident had already occurred. Furthermore, it is also reasonable that Hua did not return to the scene for several minutes after leaving to confirm whether he had indeed come into contact with Li.
Article 3 and Article 5 of the “Interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Laws in the Trial of Criminal Cases of Traffic Accidents” (hereinafter referred to as the “Interpretation”) both indicate that, “Hit-and-run” refers to the act of fleeing after a traffic accident in order to evade legal accountability. Article 120 of the “Regulations on Procedures for Handling Road Traffic Accidents” (hereinafter referred to as the “Procedures Regulations”) stipulates that: “Hit-and-run” refers to the act of driving away from or abandoning a vehicle at the scene of a road traffic accident in order to evade legal responsibility, as well as the subsequent act of fleeing and going into hiding. 。
According to the above-mentioned provisions, in traffic accident cases, “hit-and-run” refers to an act of concealing the identity of the perpetrator. This can take the form of actively fleeing the scene or passively hiding at the scene (e.g., allowing someone else to take the blame). At its core, evading legal accountability means refusing or avoiding the fulfillment of relevant obligations—provided that the perpetrator could, under the circumstances, have provided assistance to the victim and cooperated with the investigating authorities.
In this case, on the one hand, it remains uncertain whether Hua “knew” that Li had already been injured and fallen to the ground; consequently, it is also uncertain whether Hua intentionally failed to fulfill his duty to assist the victim when he first drove away from the scene. On the other hand, Hua drove past the accident site at 2:35 a.m.; after accelerating away from the scene, he returned less than 10 minutes later and stopped to talk with Zhu, who had already called the police. Hua returned to the scene just two minutes before Li Non was run over by a vehicle, causing Li Non’s death on the spot. It was only after Li Non called the police that Hua finally drove away and, at 4:01 a.m., also reported the incident himself. Subsequently, he contacted the traffic management authorities by phone to cooperate fully in the investigation of the accident.
Judging from the time interval between Hua’s first return to the scene, his staying at the scene to talk with the caller, his subsequent voluntary reporting to the authorities, and his cooperation with the investigation, his initial departure from the scene was more likely driven by fear and panic following Li’s pulling and slapping of his vehicle. It is therefore difficult to confirm that Hua subjectively intended to evade legal accountability.
According to the principle of unity of subjectivity and objectivity, even if Hua engaged in the objective act of driving away from the scene, this alone is insufficient to establish that he “fled the scene.”
In this case, viewed from the three dimensions of time, space, and causality, Li may have been run over twice in succession, thus potentially involving “two separate incidents.” It is certain that in the second incident, Hua did not drive his vehicle over Li, resulting in Li’s immediate death. However, as for whether Hua’s vehicle actually ran over Li during the first incident, based solely on the surveillance video and Hua’s initial statement—that there was a “bump” felt by the right rear wheel—as well as the swabs taken from Hua’s vehicle, which failed to detect any human blood or human DNA, it remains impossible to rule out the reasonable suspicion that the “bump” might have been caused by contact with some other obstacle. Moreover, whether Li fell because he was “pulled down” or “knocked over” while reaching out to grab or slap Hua’s vehicle, or whether he simply lost his balance and “fell” due to severe intoxication, is actually difficult to determine.
In this case, the prosecution accused Hua of “hit-and-run resulting in death.” However, based on the autopsy report and other evidence, the court ultimately found that the available evidence was insufficient to establish whether Li’s fatal injuries had occurred during the earlier or the later accident. The court could not rule out the possibility that Li had already sustained a fatal head injury in the earlier accident, a condition that—even with prompt medical treatment—could not have been reversed. Therefore, Hua cannot be considered to have committed “hit-and-run resulting in death.”
On the one hand, the court held that since it could not be determined whether Li’s fatal injuries were caused by Hua or Li himself, and reasonable doubt could not be ruled out, the finding that Hua did not flee the scene resulting in Li’s death was consistent with both the rules of evidence and legal provisions. On the other hand, however, the court examined only whether Hua could have directly caused Li’s death, but failed to conduct a thorough review of whether Li’s own act of driving over Li had directly led to Li’s death and what role that act played in causing Li’s death.
In this case, the time interval between Hua’s and Li’s non-driving passage through the scene was 11 minutes. Moreover, the potential tortfeasors and the nature of the illegal acts involved in the two incidents were entirely different. Since Hua and Li did not share any common intent or negligence and thus did not constitute joint tortfeasance, their respective responsibilities should be determined separately and specifically. However, the court’s judgment conflated the two incidents, examining only the possible consequences of Hua’s actions without carefully distinguishing the relative contributions of Hua’s and Li’s non-driving conduct to李某’s death. Instead, the court directly concluded that the two drivers “jointly caused the fatal outcome,” thereby overlooking the distinct impacts of the two incidents. This approach effectively resulted in an unclear factual finding and appeared to attribute greater responsibility to Hua, unduly aggravating his liability.
In this case, although Hua’s actions may have caused Li to fall and sustain injuries—thus creating the precondition for Li to be run over by Li Fei’s vehicle—from a causal perspective, Li Fei’s actions should be regarded as a relatively independent intervening factor. These actions were not only sudden and unusual but also likely constituted the single most significant cause of Li’s death. Therefore, the causal link between Hua’s actions and Li’s “secondary crushing” should be negated or at least substantially weakened.
In the determination of causal relationships, An abnormal intervening factor may break the causal link. However, if the occurrence and intervention of the intervening factor were foreseeable by the actor at the time of the act or reasonably foreseeable based on rules of experience, such an intervening factor is considered a normal intervening factor and cannot interrupt the causal relationship under criminal law. 。
In this case, first of all, Li was clearly driving under the influence of alcohol, and his blood alcohol concentration had almost reached the threshold for “driving while intoxicated.” His behavior constitutes a serious violation of traffic laws and is “clearly abnormal” in nature.
Second, the incident occurred on Xinwen Road in Longyang District, Baoshan City. Relevant information indicates that this road is a non-enclosed, urban street with four lanes in each direction. Li’s driving speed at just after 2:00 a.m. was 53 km/h—significantly faster than the posted speed limit. Even after Zhu approached him to offer a warning, Li showed no sign of slowing down. Clearly, his improper driving behavior was also closely linked to his consumption of alcohol.
Third, from the moment Li fell to the ground until he was run over by Li’s unlicensed vehicle, there was a full 11-minute interval. About two minutes after Li fell, Zhu drove past the scene, then returned to the site, called the police, and issued safety warnings to passing vehicles. This indicates that under normal circumstances, a driver could have proactively spotted or avoided Li, who was lying in the lane, thereby preventing further harm to Li. Moreover, from the time Zhu began issuing warnings to the passing vehicles until Li was run over by Li’s unlicensed vehicle, there were nine minutes during which other vehicles also passed by—but none of them caused any harm to Li. This further demonstrates that Zhu’s warnings were effective under normal conditions. However, in the specific case where Li was driving under the influence of alcohol, Zhu’s warnings proved futile. Ultimately, Li’s unlicensed vehicle ran over Li, causing his death at the scene. Given that the driver could have proactively detected Li’s presence and other individuals had already provided effective warnings, Li’s failure to take any measures to slow down or avoid the situation is clearly highly unusual.
The incident occurred between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. Although the lighting conditions may have been relatively dim, there were still very few vehicles and pedestrians on the road. Under normal circumstances, with no obstructions present, a driver would clearly be able to spot someone lying on the ground ahead. However, Li, who was intoxicated, completely failed to notice Li’s condition and showed no reaction whatsoever to Zhu’s warnings; he took no emergency measures at all. This behavior exceeded the foreseeable possibilities of Hua, Zhu, and others. As an intervening factor, Li’s conduct exhibited relative independence and directly caused Li’s death on the spot. Therefore, it should have severed—or at least significantly weakened—the causal link between Hua’s actions and Li’s death.
Before the first accident occurred, Hua was driving normally and had slowed down to avoid a potential hazard, fully complying with driving regulations. It was only after Li’s persistent and severe disturbances while heavily intoxicated that Hua, acting on instinctive self-preservation, accelerated and drove away.
Although Li’s fall occurred after Hua stepped on the accelerator, Hua himself denied that Li’s fall was caused by his driving. Moreover, there is no direct surveillance footage to confirm this claim, and other evidence is insufficient to completely rule out the possibility that Li fell on his own due to intoxication.
More importantly, even if Li fell to the ground only after coming into contact with the vehicle following Hua’s acceleration, it was Li himself who had actively approached and made contact while intoxicated. Moreover, Li crossed the central median barrier and then proceeded to repeatedly pull at and slap the vehicles in the motor vehicle lane, clearly demonstrating a significant degree of fault.
Article 60 of the "Procedural Regulations" stipulates that, If a road traffic accident is caused by the fault of one party, that party shall bear full responsibility. If a road traffic accident is caused by the fault of two or more parties, each party shall bear primary responsibility, equal responsibility, or secondary responsibility, depending on the extent to which their actions contributed to the accident and the severity of their respective faults. 。
In this case, if Li fell because he was severely intoxicated and unable to stand steadily, Hua would not actually have any legal duty to provide assistance; Li himself would bear full responsibility. Even if Li fell after coming into contact with the vehicle as Hua accelerated away, Hua’s decision to accelerate was prompted precisely by Li’s illegal intrusion into the motor vehicle lane and his persistent harassment of Hua. Although Hua’s acceleration may have been improper, the degree of his fault was clearly minor. By contrast, Li’s own unlawful behavior while intoxicated constituted a serious fault, and he should bear full responsibility for the accident—or at least primary responsibility.
In this case, Li may have been “run over a second time” as a result of two separate accidents. Moreover, the court explicitly determined that Li was not driving under the influence when he passed through the road where the incident occurred; after being advised by Zhu but receiving no response, Zhu then ran over Li, causing his death at the scene.
From the perspective of illegality, Li’s act of driving illegally while not intoxicated was intentional, and he exhibited at least gross negligence with respect to the outcome of running over Li, making him highly culpable.
Hua engaged in two separate instances of leaving the scene. The first time, he accelerated away to evade Li’s persistent harassment following Li’s severe drunkenness. Moreover, Hua had already returned to the scene before Li’s brother arrived driving a vehicle. The fact that Li was run over and killed on the spot by Li’s brother’s vehicle had already been severed—by Hua’s return to the scene—such that there was no causal connection whatsoever between Hua’s first departure and Li’s death. As for Hua’s second departure from the scene, this occurred after Li’s brother had already called the police; at that point, Li was already dead at the scene. Again, there was absolutely no causal link between Hua’s departure and Li’s death. Therefore, although Hua did leave the scene twice, objectively speaking, neither of these departures had any causal connection with Li’s brother’s act of driving under the influence, running over Li, and causing Li’s death at the scene.
The court found that “it cannot be established whether Li’s fatal injuries were sustained in the earlier or the later accident.” Consequently, Hua cannot be deemed to have “fled the scene after causing death.” However, in such a situation, in accordance with the principle of “in dubio pro reo” (when in doubt, favor the defendant), not only should Hua’s direct responsibility for Li’s death be negated, but also—given that the cause of death may not have been jointly caused by Hua and Li—when the causal relationship and the extent of each party’s contribution remain unclear, Hua should at most bear liability on an equal footing with Li, who was also a driver.
However, in this case, given that Li Moufei committed the serious offense of driving under the influence and should therefore bear primary responsibility for the second accident—and might even be held directly responsible alone for Li Moufei’s death—the court nevertheless assigned only secondary liability to Li Moufei while attributing primary liability to Hua Mou. This decision makes it difficult to reflect the proportionality between fault and responsibility.
The traffic management department of Baoshan City determined that Hua was guilty of “hit-and-run” and thus bears primary responsibility for the accident. However, this determination of liability is actually based on the “presumption” stipulated in Article 92 of the Implementation Regulations of the Road Traffic Safety Law and Article 61 of the Procedural Regulations—a “constructive” administrative violation liability rather than an “objective” causal relationship grounded in factual evidence.
The case of Liu Mouli, involving a traffic accident (Criminal Trial Reference No. 1642), also indicates that the liability determination contained in the accident report issued by the traffic management department can serve as a basis for determining whether the perpetrator has committed the crime of traffic accident. However, If there is evidence indicating that the allocation of responsibility in the accident report took into account post-accident fleeing or other similar circumstances, thereby resulting in a serious deviation between the causal relationship and the relative degree of causation among the actions of the parties involved at the time of the accident and the resulting harm, the people’s court shall conduct a substantive review and make a judgment on the allocation of liability for the traffic accident in the criminal proceedings. The determination of liability for a road traffic accident in the Accident Liability Certificate serves as the basis for the people’s court to decide whether the perpetrator has committed the crime of traffic accident. However, this determination does not directly substitute for the assessment of liability under criminal law.
In this case, the traffic management authority of Baoshan City effectively presumed that Hua bore primary responsibility for Li’s death resulting from both possible accidents—on the basis of “hit-and-run.” However, considering all the evidence on record, it is insufficient to establish a causal link in the criminal law sense between Hua’s act of speeding away from the scene and Li’s death. Several complex factors are involved, including Li’s own illegal behavior while severely intoxicated, the impossibility of ruling out reasonable doubt regarding the specific cause of Li’s death, the fact that Li did not engage in illegal driving under the influence and directly cause his own death at the scene, and the significantly more serious nature of Li’s and Li Fei’s illegal acts and negligence compared to Hua’s.
In this context, whether Hua should bear criminal responsibility for the traffic accident should not be determined simply on the basis of the administrative liability assigned by the traffic management authorities. Instead, a substantive review and judgment should be conducted—taking into account the relative magnitude of the objective causal factors that led to Li’s death—in order to assess the causal relationship and allocate responsibility accordingly.
Given that Li was involved in two potential accidents and the primary cause of death remains difficult to determine directly, Hua, who was not the driver, committed an offense of a significantly lesser severity than Li, who drove under the influence. Therefore, at most, Hua should bear the same degree of responsibility as Li. Moreover, since the victim Li himself also bore serious fault, Hua should even more appropriately bear only secondary responsibility—at most, equal responsibility.
The court held that Hua’s actions did not constitute “hit-and-run resulting in death.” At the same time, Hua’s act of fleeing the scene had already been considered as an aggravating factor in determining his guilt; therefore, it should not be re-evaluated as an additional aggravating circumstance during sentencing. Taking into account factors such as Hua’s compensation to the victim’s family and obtaining their forgiveness, the court convicted Hua of traffic accident crime and sentenced him to one year and two months of imprisonment.
The court’s ruling—that Hua did not flee the scene resulting in death, nor did it re-evaluate the circumstances of his flight—is commendable; however, the ultimate outcome still raises concerns.
Article 133 of the Criminal Law stipulates three sentencing levels for the crime of traffic accident, covering the basic elements of the crime, aggravating circumstances, and aggravated consequences. In this case, the court ruled that Hua’s “fleeing the scene” did not constitute an aggravating circumstance or an aggravated consequence, but was instead treated as a basic element of the crime.
However, first of all, as previously mentioned, the evidence regarding whether Hua “knew” that accelerating away while evading Li’s repeated harassment had already caused Li to fall and sustain injuries—and whether Hua had the motive and purpose to “flee,” particularly to evade legal prosecution—is not entirely sufficient to establish that his actions constituted “hit-and-run.”
Second, according to Article 2 of the Interpretation, the circumstances constituting the crime of traffic accident include “one death or three or more serious injuries + bearing full or primary responsibility for the accident” and “one or more serious injuries + bearing full or primary responsibility for the accident + fleeing the scene of the accident to evade legal prosecution.”
Therefore, “hit-and-run” as a basic criminal element applies only in cases involving “one to two persons sustaining serious injuries.” In cases involving “one death,” “hit-and-run” can actually serve only as an aggravating circumstance and does not meet the conditions for being treated as a basic criminal element. Consequently, the court’s characterization of “hit-and-run” as an element for establishing guilt is, in fact, inconsistent with the provisions of both the law and judicial interpretations and constitutes an error in the application of the law.
Third, according to the reasoning behind the judgment in the traffic accident case involving Liu Mouli, even if Hua’s conduct is classified by the traffic management authority as “hit-and-run,” when assessing its criminal liability, it is still necessary to make a substantive determination based on the degree of causal contribution of that conduct to the ultimate outcome—namely, the casualties. In this case, Hua’s act of leaving the scene no longer has any objective and substantial connection with the outcome—that Li was not run over and killed instantly. Even if his conduct is characterized as “hit-and-run,” such characterization is merely an administrative finding and does not establish a causal link in the criminal law sense. Consequently, “hit-and-run” should certainly not be treated as an essential element of Hua’s criminal offense.
Finally, even if Hua’s act of speeding away was improper in this case, both Li and Li Fei committed serious violations. Moreover, Hua’s degree of fault was significantly lower by comparison, and therefore Hua should not bear primary responsibility. At most, all three parties could share equal responsibility. Given that only one death occurred, even if Hua were to bear equal responsibility, it still would not constitute the crime of traffic accident causing death.
Therefore, based on the opinion of the traffic management authority, the court found that Hua had “fled the scene” after causing a traffic accident, resulting in one death and bearing primary responsibility for the accident. The court’s ruling that Hua committed the crime of traffic肇事 is inconsistent with both the legal provisions, the objective circumstances, and the substantive requirements for the trial of criminal cases.
In this case, the court may have sought to enhance road safety by strengthening the driver’s duty to provide assistance; however, to some extent, it overlooked the victim’s own significant negligence, the independent tortious acts and serious violations committed by the following vehicle, as well as the driver’s difficult emergency response and psychological state when confronted with sudden circumstances. This has led to a divergence from the public’s common-sense understanding and sparked intense public controversy.
About the Author
.
Yang Qichen
Beijing Xinglai Law Firm
Partner
Bachelor of Laws and Bachelor of Management from China University of Political Science and Law. Practicing mentor at the School of Criminal Justice of China University of Political Science and Law; mining rights appraiser; senior corporate compliance specialist; and holder of securities and futures practitioner qualifications. With many years of experience working in the Beijing Municipal Procuratorate and the Organization Department of the District Party Committee, I have participated in the handling of hundreds of cases involving various types of crimes, including property infringement offenses, crimes against personal rights, crimes endangering public safety, economic crimes, official misconduct, sexual offenses, gambling offenses, drug-related crimes, crimes damaging environmental and resource protection, “organized crime and evil forces” offenses, and compulsory medical treatment proceedings. I possess extensive practical experience in criminal justice.
Since beginning practice, I have handled a variety of major and complex cases, including economic crimes, official misconduct crimes, crimes committed by “evil forces,” crimes endangering public safety, and mining-related crimes. In numerous cases, I have achieved favorable defense outcomes such as non-prosecution, withdrawal or modification of charges, and lighter or reduced sentences.
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