
As one of the eight legally recognized types of evidence stipulated in the Criminal Procedure Law, expert opinions are crucial for resolving disputes, clarifying the facts of a case, and ensuring accurate sentencing due to their specialized nature, authoritative standing, and objectivity. Unfortunately, even this highly important type of evidence continues to face numerous issues under current evidentiary rules, underscoring the urgent need for substantial reform.
The issues with the regulations may stem from systemic inadequacies. On one hand, the landscape of forensic institutions is highly fragmented, with a mix of reputable and substandard organizations. Although the Ministry of Justice has consistently worked to regulate, supervise, and conduct random inspections—resulting in the elimination of numerous institutions outside the "four major categories"—the number of nationwide forensic agencies has steadily declined from over 5,000 a few years ago to around 4,000, and currently stands at 2,977 (according to data from the Ministry of Justice website as of September 26, 2021). Yet, enforcement efforts remain insufficient. The mechanisms governing the establishment and closure of forensic institutions are still imperfect, and the vetting process for both institutional accreditation and individual practitioner qualifications lacks rigor. As a result, the implementation of judicial forensic standards in practice has fallen short of expectations. On the other hand, the issue of "forensic corruption"—whether driven by outright bribery or influenced by personal connections—continues to be a significant concern, further undermining the quality of forensic services. In fact, forensic corruption represents one of the most serious forms of judicial misconduct. Cases involving "money-driven," "favoritism-based," or "fraudulent" assessments have sparked widespread public outrage and triggered intense legal disputes, leading to a growing number of lawsuits targeting forensic institutions. Such controversies not only erode the independence and credibility of the forensic system but also cast doubt on its ability to deliver impartial and reliable expert opinions. A stark example of this predicament is Min Yinlong, the leading forensic expert in Shanghai and Director of the Forensic Science Laboratory at East China University of Political Science and Law—a case that serves as a cautionary tale for the entire field.
In terms of forensic identification rules, the national standards for judicial appraisals have not yet been fully established, leading to significant discrepancies and considerable ambiguity in the analysis and determination process. For instance, the same injury might be classified as "minor injury" by one forensic institution but as "slight injury" by another—just a single word difference that can decisively determine whether charges of intentional injury will stand or not. This is particularly critical, especially in recent years' "anti-organized crime and gang-related" cases, where numerous forensic opinions are often central to each case. As the existing evidentiary rules and systems remain imperfect, these issues have become increasingly apparent, underscoring the urgent need for greater attention and reform.
I. The Issue of Authority to Initiate the Identification Procedure
The initiation of the forensic examination process—specifically, the very start of the appraisal procedure—already faces issues related to unclear and unfair rules.
According to the "General Rules on Forensic Expertise Procedures," forensic institutions are required to uniformly accept forensic appraisal requests submitted by case-handling authorities. Therefore, in criminal cases, decisions regarding initial appraisals, re-appraisals, and supplementary appraisals rest entirely with the judicial authorities—lawyers and parties involved have no right to initiate them. Naturally, they also cannot access the appraisal materials (evidence samples) held by the case-handling agencies, meaning forensic institutions will not accept such requests either. This situation effectively means that whether a suspect or defendant may lack full legal capacity, or whether minor injuries were actually caused, is first determined by judicial personnel, who then decide whether to proceed with an appraisal. In essence, this creates an additional "pre-appraisal review," placing the power of appraisal firmly in the hands of the judicial authorities—and inevitably leading to inherent unfairness.
From the perspective of the investigating authorities, initial forensic assessments are typically commissioned by investigative agencies. However, re-assessments and supplementary evaluations can just as easily be entrusted to the procuratorate or the court. If this approach were consistently implemented, it might even help establish a balance of power between public security and judicial bodies, thereby increasing the likelihood of impartial expert opinions. Unfortunately, in practice, most judicial authorities seem reluctant to "invite trouble" for themselves. Even when they identify issues with an existing forensic report, they often sidestep direct involvement by opting instead for measures like supplementary investigations or delaying trial proceedings—effectively returning the authority to commission a new assessment back to the public security agencies. And then, predictably, the public security forces end up consulting their own internal experts, who inevitably reach the same conclusions as the original assessment. This creates a frustrating, self-perpetuating cycle.
In a Shandong Dezhou organized-crime case I handled, despite the lawyer submitting a request for the expert opinion to be challenged, the court neither notified the prosecution’s expert witness to appear in court as requested, nor allowed the defense’s own expert witness to testify. Instead, it wasn’t until after the trial had begun that the public security authorities were instructed to conduct a re-examination—leading, predictably, to a “repeated” assessment that simply parroted the original conclusions.
So, from the defense's perspective, if an expert appraisal procedure cannot be initiated, are there still any remedies available? Actually, there are options. For instance, the defense could request the court to summon the appraiser to appear in court for cross-examination, or invite someone with specialized knowledge—such as an expert witness (a forensic professional from outside the courtroom)—to help clarify their opinion. Alternatively, the defense might ask the expert witness to provide a formal expert consultation report. However, whether these requests can actually succeed depends entirely on the court’s decision; more often than not, the court rejects the defense’s applications, leaving even this limited remedy unattainable.
Additionally, even when the court allows expert witnesses or forensic experts to appear in person, these individuals are sometimes reluctant to do so. This is because the circle of judicial experts is remarkably small—forensic doctors and public security personnel often graduated from the same institution or even work at the same large organization. Naturally, who would want to risk alienating their peers? I’ve personally witnessed this: clients, lawyers, and even the original expert all agreed that the initial assessment was flawed. Yet, despite reaching out to numerous specialists—from Beijing and Guangzhou to Nanjing—none were willing to step in, whether by testifying in court or simply providing an alternative written opinion. Everyone seemed terrified of crossing paths with someone in the same professional network, for fear of damaging their relationships within the community. As a result, this imbalance in resource availability undermines the fairness and objectivity of the entire expert evaluation process right from the start.
II. The Issue of the Right to Choose the Appraisal Entity
Since the forensic examination is commissioned by the investigating authority, it naturally lacks impartiality in the selection of the examining entity.
For relatively straightforward assessments, such as determining the severity of bodily injuries, public security agencies directly entrust the task to their internal forensic institutions—naturally, this creates a clear conflict of interest. In contrast, when dealing with more complex cases, the public security authorities themselves select the forensic institution, without even seeking input from defense attorneys or the parties involved. As a result, the agency simply chooses whichever institution is willing to cooperate and meet its specific requirements, thereby inherently undermining the neutrality of the evaluation process.
Does it matter who selects the forensic expert? Absolutely—it does. Forensic institutions are supposed to remain impartial, but if the judicial authorities alone monopolize the authority to conduct examinations, the independence of these institutions is inevitably compromised. A practical issue arises: although forensic agencies have a public-service orientation, they are still profit-driven organizations that primarily rely on local public security and judicial bodies for their business. As a result, they naturally fear offending these "clients." For forensic institutions, it might even be acceptable if procedures or conclusions are flawed—after all, their clients rarely hold them accountable. However, if an institution insists on upholding its principles and delivers an expert opinion that contradicts what the client expects, it risks alienating that very same client—and could end up losing future contracts altogether. Under such profit-driven incentives, expecting neutrality from forensic institutions becomes virtually impossible.
In fact, criminal cases can perfectly draw on the approach used in civil cases: both parties—the investigating authorities and the defense—can jointly negotiate and select the forensic expert organization. If there’s a conflict of interest on one side or if the parties fail to reach an agreement, the selection should be made randomly. This not only ensures that lawyers, defendants, and investigative agencies enjoy equal procedural rights but also helps maintain the neutrality and objectivity of forensic evaluations to a certain extent. Such an approach should undoubtedly become a key direction for reforming the forensic appraisal system.
III. Issues in the Analysis and Justification of the Expert Opinion
In addition to the issue of neutrality among the aforementioned forensic institutions and experts, the expert opinions themselves also lack enforceable regulatory provisions regarding their reasoning process.
In practice, many expert opinions simply list basic information such as the materials examined, the objects of evaluation, and the legal grounds for the assessment, then hastily jump to a conclusion—without offering any detailed analysis or reasoning behind that conclusion. As a result, these opinions essentially end up functioning as mere summaries of court rulings. Because of this lack of transparency, parties involved and their defense lawyers are left in the dark about the rationale and origins of the expert’s findings, making it virtually impossible for them to mount a targeted rebuttal. Moreover, when objections are raised, courts often refuse requests for re-examination or for the expert witness to appear in court, citing compliance with established forensic guidelines—and instead rely directly on the original opinion as the basis for their final decision.
Since the expert opinion serves as evidence to help resolve specialized issues involved in litigation and assist judicial authorities in establishing the facts of the case, it must objectively, comprehensively, and unreservedly present the reasoning, analysis, and underlying logic upon which it is based. Otherwise, let’s set aside for now the questions of neutrality and objectivity in the expert conclusion—how could the judicial authorities possibly grasp the specialized issues, and ultimately uncover the truth, if they rely solely on a single conclusion?
Regarding judicial documents, the Supreme People's Court already emphasizes that courts must clearly explain their reasoning behind accepting or rejecting evidence, establishing facts, and determining guilt or innocence—ruling out the possibility of simply endorsing or dismissing such determinations without providing any response. Given this principle, could the same requirement be applied to expert opinions as well? Specifically, should the rules governing expert assessments explicitly state that if an opinion fails to provide reasoned explanations, thorough analysis, or detailed evaluations of the defense’s arguments and evidence, it should not carry legal validity?
The reason such clear regulations are necessary is that, without specific sanctions to back up the principles, these guidelines cannot produce any meaningful impact—ultimately leaving judicial reform merely superficial. As professionals, forensic institutions and experts undoubtedly understand the importance of providing reasoned explanations for both the process and conclusions of their assessments. However, precisely because practical constraints often prevent them from doing so—and since there are no adverse consequences for failing to explain—the institutions naturally opt not to justify their findings, instead simply delivering the outcomes that clients expect. Therefore, it is essential to include enforceable sanction provisions regarding reasoning within the appraisal rules. Only then can we genuinely ensure thorough justification and analysis in forensic evaluations, thereby enhancing the credibility and authority of expert opinions.
The points mentioned above are merely a starting point—our hope is for a comprehensive reform of the rules governing forensic expertise, guiding them back to their core principles of independence, objectivity, and professionalism.
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