Currently, although our country has become a major manufacturing and infrastructure power, it is still far from being recognized as a true manufacturing or infrastructure powerhouse. Over the years, frequent major safety accidents have occurred during production operations—particularly in industries like mining and chemical processing—emerging as a serious societal issue. Just recently, in the second half of 2020, two devastating incidents unfolded: the "11·29" water inrush at Yuanjiangshan Coal Mine in Leiyang, Hunan, and the "12·4" fire at Diaoshuidong Coal Mine in Yongchuan, Chongqing. Fast-forwarding into 2021, within just over a month in Yantai, Shandong, two more catastrophic events struck: the "1·10" massive explosion at Qixia Hushan Gold Mine and the "2·17" significant fire at Caojiawa Gold Mine in Zhaoyuan. These tragedies not only inflicted immense losses on people’s lives, health, and property but also left a deeply damaging impact on society as a whole. As a result, alongside efforts to upgrade production equipment and technological standards, there is now an urgent need to strengthen human management practices. Drawing from the principle that "all natural disasters are man-made, yet all man-made disasters are also natural," it has become critical to minimize human error in production and operational processes—thereby reducing the likelihood of accidents before they occur. In response to these challenges, the 24th session of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress, held on December 26, 2020, adopted the Eleventh Amendment to the Criminal Law (hereafter referred to as "Criminal Law Amendment XI"). This landmark revision introduces significant changes to regulations governing workplace safety, including the establishment of two new offenses: the crime of organizing others to engage in risky, unauthorized operations and the crime of hazardous operations. Additionally, the amendment broadens the scope of individuals who can be prosecuted under the charge of providing false certification documents. These amendments not only expand the legal framework for ensuring workplace safety but also represent a paradigm shift in criminal legislation. By moving penalties for workplace safety violations from post-incident enforcement to proactive prevention measures, the reforms aim to address risks at their source—effectively eliminating potential hazards before they lead to accidents. Ultimately, this approach seeks to create a safer industrial environment by fostering a culture of vigilance and accountability across all levels of production and operation. This article will analyze the background behind these recent amendments to China’s criminal laws on workplace safety, drawing on relevant national policies, regulatory frameworks, and real-world accident cases. Following this analysis, we will explore key judicial application issues that may arise as a result of these updated provisions.

Safe production is a critical issue closely tied to the safety of people's lives and property—it serves as a hallmark of balanced and healthy economic and social development, and it reflects the Party and government's unwavering commitment to safeguarding the interests of the people. Precisely because of this, at least 13 criminal offenses in the Criminal Law—our most powerful tool for maintaining social order and protecting the lives and interests of the public—are directly related to ensuring workplace safety.

According to relevant data, thanks to the consistent efforts and relentless dedication of the Party, the government, and related departments over the past two decades to enhance workplace safety, China’s overall production safety situation has steadily improved. At a press conference held on January 27, 2021, by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate titled "Strengthening the Safety Foundation and Safeguarding Lives and Property," Wu Yanyun, Deputy Director-General and First-Level Inspector of the Department of Policies and Regulations at the National Emergency Management Agency, highlighted that 2002 was the most challenging year for production safety nationwide, with over 1.07 million accidents and more than 130,000 fatalities. However, since then, both the number of accidents and fatalities have continued to decline—dropping to 38,000 incidents and 27,400 deaths by 2020. Meanwhile, major and particularly severe accidents fell dramatically from 140 incidents and 2,556 fatalities in 2001 to just 16 incidents and 262 deaths in 2020. Indeed, for a developing country like ours—a nation characterized by its massive scale and where the growing aspirations of its people for a better quality of life remain starkly contrasted with persistent challenges of uneven and inadequate development—these achievements have been hard-won. Yet, we must remain clear-eyed: these accomplishments do not mean that China has achieved perfection in the realm of production safety. After all, the value of human life cannot be reduced to mere abstract statistics. Even a single death represents the tragic loss of a vibrant individual, while every workplace accident inflicts immeasurable pain on the families left behind. Moreover, even in our seemingly safest year—2020—the death toll still reached 27,400, meaning approximately 750 people lost their lives daily due to production-related accidents.

Notably, when these figures are translated into real-life events, their sheer devastation becomes even more harrowing and shocking. Take, for instance, the catastrophic explosion that occurred in Xiangshui County, Jiangsu Province, on the afternoon of March 21, 2019. This tragic incident claimed the lives of 78 people, left 76 others critically injured, and sent 640 individuals to the hospital for treatment—resulting in direct economic losses totaling 19,863.507 million yuan. What makes this situation particularly regrettable and heartbreaking is that many of these safety incidents could have been entirely prevented if those responsible—or the overseeing authorities—had simply fulfilled their duties with greater diligence and attention. For example, in the case of the devastating collapse of the Xinjia Hotel in Quanzhou, Fujian Province, which occurred on March 7, investigators later determined that the root cause was the hotel’s unauthorized and illegal structural modifications. The building had been unlawfully extended upward, far exceeding the load-bearing capacity of its walls. Moreover, during the unauthorized construction phase, improper work practices led to the destabilization of critical steel support columns, ultimately triggering the building’s catastrophic collapse. Yet, behind this chain of events lay a series of deliberate human errors. First, the hotel owner repeatedly violated regulations by subcontracting construction work to unqualified personnel without obtaining the necessary permits or commissioning proper surveys and designs. Even after discovering that numerous guests were staying on the upper floors, the owner recklessly pressed ahead with the risky, unauthorized expansion, directly contributing to the building’s collapse. Second, local government officials, driven by an overzealous focus on economic growth, inadvertently enabled illegal construction through a controversial policy known as “building houses under special circumstances.” This misguided initiative inadvertently sowed the seeds of a major safety hazard. Third, higher-level regulatory bodies failed to fully recognize the severe risks posed by the widespread proliferation of illegal structures, leading to superficial inspections and inadequate measures to address these dangers. Fourth, various departments within the local government consistently turned a blind eye to the hotel’s ongoing operation despite the lack of required permits—a clear violation of safety regulations. Finally, local fire and public security agencies were lax in both their document-based reviews and on-site inspections, allowing substandard projects to slip through unnoticed and persist unchecked for far too long. In essence, this tragedy underscores how even a small lapse in vigilance—from either the property owners or the relevant government agencies—could have prevented such a devastating outcome.

In fact, as early as after the tragic "8·12" Ruihai Company hazardous-materials warehouse fire and explosion accident at Tianjin Port in 2015, General Secretary Xi Jinping issued important instructions. On December 18, 2016, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the State Council jointly released the first-ever guiding document on safety production issued under the name of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council since the founding of New China—the "Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Promoting Reform and Development in the Field of Work Safety" (Document No. 32 [2016] of the CPC Central Committee) (hereafter referred to as "the Opinions"). The Opinions explicitly stated: "Study and revise relevant articles of the Criminal Law to include illegal acts in production and operation that极易 lead to major accidents within the scope of criminal regulation." Following the release of these Opinions, relevant parties responded enthusiastically. For instance, some experts have suggested amending existing criminal provisions such as the crime of major liability accidents and the crime of risky operations in violation of regulations, proposing the creation of a new offense—namely, the "crime of dangerous operations." The rationale behind this proposal is that most industrial accidents are preceded by one or more underlying hazards. If these risks or unsafe practices could be identified and addressed proactively—before they escalate into full-blown disasters—accidents could be significantly reduced.Therefore, the Criminal Law should place greater emphasis on eliminating hazards and addressing unsafe behaviors, moving away from the current reliance solely on administrative measures. While administrative approaches play a critical role, they often fall short in terms of enforcement力度 and tend to be implemented with numerous compromises in practice, leaving many hazards and violations unaddressed. Moreover, on May 28, 2020, National People's Congress (NPC) deputy Sun Jingnan proposed during the Third Session of the 13th NPC that intentionally concealing major accident hazards should also be brought under criminal jurisdiction, aiming to curb the occurrence of severe and particularly grave accidents. It is against this backdrop that the "Eleventh Amendment to the Criminal Law" introduced partial revisions specifically targeting safety-related issues in production and work settings.

In fact, as early as after the tragic "8·12" Ruihai Company hazardous-materials warehouse fire and explosion accident at Tianjin Port in 2015, General Secretary Xi Jinping issued important instructions. On December 18, 2016, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the State Council jointly released the first-ever guiding document on safety production issued under the name of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council since the founding of New China—the "Opinions of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Promoting Reform and Development in the Field of Work Safety" (Document No. 32 [2016] of the CPC Central Committee) (hereafter referred to as "the Opinions"). The Opinions explicitly stated: "Study and revise relevant articles of the Criminal Law to include illegal acts in production and operation that极易 lead to major accidents within the scope of criminal regulation." Following the release of these Opinions, relevant parties responded enthusiastically. For instance, some experts have suggested amending existing criminal provisions such as the crime of major liability accidents and the crime of risky operations in violation of regulations, proposing the creation of a new offense—namely, the "crime of dangerous operations." The rationale behind this proposal is that most industrial accidents are preceded by one or more underlying hazards. If these risks or unsafe practices could be identified and addressed proactively—before they escalate into full-blown disasters—accidents could be significantly reduced. Therefore, the Criminal Law should place greater emphasis on eliminating hazards and tackling unsafe behaviors, shifting away from the current reliance on administrative measures alone. While administrative approaches play a crucial role, they often fall short in terms of enforcement力度 and tend to be implemented with numerous compromises in practice, leaving many hazards and violations unaddressed. Moreover, on May 28, 2020, National People's Congress (NPC) deputy Sun Jingnan proposed during the Third Session of the 13th NPC that intentionally concealing major accident hazards should also be brought under criminal jurisdiction, aiming to curb the occurrence of severe and particularly grave accidents. It is against this backdrop that the "Eleventh Amendment to the Criminal Law" introduced partial revisions specifically targeting safety-related issues in production and work settings.

"The 11th Amendment to the Criminal Law introduces revisions to the existing Criminal Law regarding crimes related to workplace safety, primarily focusing on three key areas: First, "knowingly failing to eliminate major accident hazards while continuing risky operations" has been added as a new provision under Article 134, Paragraph 2 of the Criminal Law—specifically, the crime of organizing others to engage in illegal and hazardous work practices. Second, a new Article 134-1 has been introduced, criminalizing violations of safety management regulations during production or operations. This includes actions such as shutting down or sabotaging safety equipment and facilities, tampering with, concealing, or destroying critical data or information, refusing to address significant accident risks, and undertaking high-risk production activities without proper authorization. Finally, personnel from intermediary organizations entrusted with safety assessment responsibilities have been explicitly designated as subjects liable under Article 229 for the crime of providing false certification documents. Additionally, if these individuals provide fraudulent safety assessments or environmental impact evaluations for major projects or engineering endeavors involving public safety—resulting in exceptionally severe losses to public property, national interests, or the welfare of the people—their punishment will be intensified to include imprisonment for a term of five to ten years, accompanied by a hefty fine."

(1) The Crime of Organizing Others to Conduct Illegal and Hazardous Operations

The current Article 134, Paragraph 2 of the Criminal Law stipulates that anyone who compels others to perform hazardous operations in violation of regulations, resulting in major casualties or other severe consequences, shall be sentenced to up to 5 years of fixed-term imprisonment or criminal detention. In cases where the circumstances are particularly egregious, the penalty increases to more than 5 years of fixed-term imprisonment. This is precisely the provision defining the crime of compelling hazardous and risky work practices. This offense was established under Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the "Sixth Amendment to the Criminal Law," adopted in 2006. While, in theory, "compelling" generally refers to situations where the influence exerted by the commander’s instructions pushes workers into a state of psychological coercion, forcing them—against their will—to continue production or operations, in practice, the term "compelling" has sometimes been misinterpreted. As a result, certain acts of forcing hazardous and risky work have been wrongly categorized as ordinary negligence-related crimes, leading to disproportionately light sentences and undermining efforts to effectively punish such offenses. To address these issues, the "Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Legal Issues Concerning the Handling of Criminal Cases Endangering Production Safety" (Fa Shi [2015] No. 22), commonly referred to as the "Interpretation," provides an expanded definition of "compelling hazardous and risky work." Specifically, Article 5 states that if someone knowingly continues hazardous operations despite recognizing existing safety risks, they shall be deemed to have "compelled hazardous and risky work" if they engage in any of the following actions: 1. Using organizational, commanding, or managerial authority to force others to violate operational rules; 2. Employing threats, coercion, intimidation, or similar tactics to compel others into unsafe practices; 3. Intentionally concealing safety hazards while organizing others to carry out risky tasks; 4. Other instances where individuals forcibly instruct others to undertake hazardous and risky work.

However, even with this extensive interpretation of "forcibly ordering hazardous operations," it remains difficult to encompass cases where the perpetrator neither concealed safety hazards nor employed threats, coercion, intimidation, or exploited organizational, commanding, or managerial authority to compel others into unsafe practices. This becomes particularly clear when examining the case of Zi Moumou, who was convicted of a serious crime involving responsibility for an accident. From March to September 2008, while serving as the deputy director of a coal mine in Yuzhou City, Zi Moumou defied the safety oversight and management directives from higher authorities. Despite significant accident risks at the mine—and despite receiving official notices from his superiors demanding an immediate halt to operations—he continued to organize underground workers to carry out mining activities. What’s more, even after clear signs of imminent water seepage emerged, he stubbornly persisted in forcing miners to undertake dangerous tasks, ultimately leading to a catastrophic water-inrush incident. The tragedy claimed the lives of six miners, left 12 others missing, and resulted in direct economic losses totaling 15.4418 million yuan. In response, the court ruled that Zi Moumou, as one of the mine’s key officials responsible for overseeing coal extraction, had deliberately disobeyed management protocols and violated established rules by forcefully ordering workers to engage in risky, unauthorized operations. His actions directly caused a major accident with severe casualties, and given the particularly egregious nature of his conduct, the court found him guilty of a serious crime involving responsibility for an accident. As a result, Zi Moumou was sentenced to three years in prison, though with a three-year suspended sentence. Yet, in this case, the defendant’s subjective intent clearly cannot be classified as mere negligence; rather, it should be characterized as intentional misconduct. Specifically, Zi Moumou knowingly exposed himself—and potentially others—to the peril of a water-inrush accident, yet he deliberately allowed such a dangerous outcome to unfold, ultimately resulting in the devastating consequences described above. Under these circumstances, the perpetrator’s mental state should at least be deemed as indirect intent. Surprisingly, however, the court ultimately categorized his actions as a negligent offense—specifically, the crime of "serious responsibility for an accident"—a classification that seems unduly lenient and somewhat forced given the gravity of the situation.

The crime of forcibly ordering hazardous and risky operations typically occurs in relatively harsh and dangerous industries such as chemicals and mining. In these sectors, frontline workers engaged in production tasks are often those with lower educational levels, weaker competitiveness in the job market, and an inherently disadvantaged position. When forced into unsafe practices, perpetrators exploit these vulnerabilities, employing various tactics to push workers into perilous situations. Among these tactics, "abusing organizational, command, or managerial authority to compel others to perform unsafe tasks" and "intimidating, coercing, or threatening employees" are the most common methods of coercion. Meanwhile, "deliberately concealing safety hazards while still organizing others to engage in risky work," though less severe than the first two methods, involves actively covering up—disguising or hiding—the true nature of existing risks, thereby luring workers into hazardous conditions. However, this interpretation clearly fails to fully encompass cases like the recent Yuzhou mine disaster, where the perpetrator, Zi Moumou, knowingly continued to organize miners into dangerous operations despite being aware of significant safety risks and having already received official stop-work notices from higher-level management. Therefore, introducing a new offense specifically targeting the act of organizing others to undertake hazardous and risky work—without necessarily involving the concealment of safety hazards—becomes not only practically necessary but also essential from the perspective of ensuring proportionate sentencing. This becomes particularly evident when comparing it to Article 138 of the Criminal Law, which addresses crimes related to major safety accidents in educational facilities. Under this article, if a person is aware that school buildings or other educational infrastructure pose a danger yet fails to take corrective measures or promptly report the issue, resulting in a serious accident with casualties, the directly responsible individual faces imprisonment of up to three years or criminal detention. In cases where the consequences are especially grave, the penalty escalates to a prison term of three to seven years. From the standpoint of balancing punishment with culpability, it seems inconsistent that, in industries outside education, merely knowing about and failing to eliminate safety hazards—or even deliberately continuing risky operations—should be treated under the same framework as the more serious crime of "major responsibility accidents." By contrast, in sectors like chemicals and mining, where workers are inherently more vulnerable due to their socio-economic circumstances, perpetrators often exploit these weaknesses to manipulate workers into high-risk situations. Thus, amending the law to explicitly criminalize the act of organizing others to engage in hazardous work, even without concealing underlying risks, serves both to address this critical loophole and to ensure that justice is served equitably across all industries.

When determining "knowingly organizing operations despite being aware of significant accident hazards without eliminating them," it's important to pay attention to the following two issues:

First, what exactly is a "major accident hazard"? Before delving into "major accident hazards," it’s essential to first understand what an "accident hazard" entails. According to Article 3 of the Interim Provisions on the Identification and Management of Safety Production Accident Hazards issued by the State Administration of Work Safety (Order No. 16 of the State Administration of Work Safety, hereinafter referred to as the "Provisions"), an accident hazard refers to potential dangers in the production process that could lead to accidents. These hazards specifically manifest in three key areas: hazardous conditions of equipment or materials, unsafe human behaviors, and deficiencies in management practices. Accident hazards are further categorized into two types: general accident hazards and major accident hazards. The former refers to hazards that pose relatively minor risks and are easy to address—typically those that can be promptly corrected once identified. In contrast, major accident hazards involve more significant risks and challenges in remediation. Such hazards often require either a complete or partial suspension of production and operations, along with an extended period of corrective measures before they can be eliminated. Alternatively, they may stem from external factors that make it particularly difficult for the organization itself to resolve the issue effectively.

Any accident is preceded by warning signs or indicators—and safety-related incidents are no exception. According to the well-known Heinrich's Law in the aviation industry, behind every major aviation accident lie 29 preceding symptoms or minor incidents. And each of those symptoms is itself linked to 300 near-misses and 1,000 potential hazards. In essence, an accident is merely the culmination of a series of unresolved safety risks that have accumulated throughout the production and operational processes. Therefore, identifying and addressing potential safety hazards before they escalate into full-blown incidents is critical—not only for ensuring safe operations within enterprises but also for directly influencing their financial performance. Under the provisions of the *Safety Production Law*, government departments at or above the county level are mandated to oversee and urge production and business entities to establish robust systems for identifying and addressing safety hazards, effectively eliminating significant risks (Article 38). Moreover, if a company is found to harbor major safety hazards, authorities may order it to suspend production, halt operations, cease construction activities, or discontinue the use of specific facilities or equipment until the risks are fully mitigated (Article 67).

It must be noted that Article 3 of the Regulation, which addresses significant accident hazards, provides only a general guideline. In reality, the industries and sectors in which enterprises engage in production and business activities are diverse and highly complex, making it challenging to establish a uniform standard for all of them. Recognizing this practical reality, Article 113, Paragraph 2 of the Work Safety Law stipulates that the competent departments under the State Council shall, according to their respective responsibilities, formulate specific criteria for identifying major accident hazards within their respective industries and fields. Accordingly, relevant government agencies—including the State Administration of Work Safety—have issued industry-specific standards and guidelines for assessing critical safety risks, tailored to the sectors they oversee. These include documents such as the "Criteria for Identifying Major Production Safety Hazards in Coal Mines (2020 Edition)," the "Criteria for Identifying Major Production Safety Hazards in Industrial and Commercial Sectors (2017 Edition)," the "Trial Criteria for Identifying Major Production Safety Hazards in Metal and Non-Metallic Mines," the "Trial Criteria for Identifying Major Production Safety Hazards in Chemical and Hazardous Chemical Enterprises," the "Trial Criteria for Identifying Major Production Safety Hazards in Fireworks and Firecracker Enterprises," as well as the "Major Fire Hazard Identification Standards (GA653-2006)" (hereinafter referred to as the "Standards"), the "Methods for Determining Major Fire Hazards" (hereinafter referred to as the "Methods"), and the "Ministry of Transport Notice on Reporting Major Safety Hazards in Ships," among others.

According to the industry standards outlined above, when identifying significant accident hazards—i.e., unsafe factors—the primary consideration is whether they violate relevant laws or technical regulations. Only after this assessment is it determined whether these hazards pose a risk of causing human casualties or property damage. As clearly stated in the introduction of the "Method," so-called major fire hazards refer to potential unsafe factors that contravene fire safety laws and regulations or fail to meet fire safety technical standards. Such hazards could either lead to fires or exacerbate fire risks, potentially resulting in severe or even catastrophic fire incidents—or triggering significant societal impacts. The identification of major fire hazards must strictly adhere to the guidelines provided in the "Method," ensuring scientific rigor, factual accuracy, and impartiality throughout the process. This involves procedures such as on-site inspections, collective discussions, and expert technical reviews. Although the process for identifying major fire hazards under the "Method" is indeed intricate and complex, it is designed specifically for assessing extremely rare and high-risk scenarios. Importantly, this does not mean that every fire hazard requires such an exhaustive evaluation. Instead, according to the "Standards," certain types of major fire hazards can be directly identified without going through the full, complicated procedure: 1. Facilities—including factories and warehouses—that produce, store, or handle flammable and explosive chemicals are located in non-urban areas or in relatively isolated, safe zones. 2. Class A or B production facilities are situated in underground or semi-underground spaces within buildings. 3. Class A or B production facilities, warehouses, or Class C facilities are integrated into the same building as densely populated areas, residential units, or dormitories. 4. Safety exits and stairwell configurations in public entertainment venues, shops, and other underground spaces with high occupancy levels do not comply with prescribed standards. 5. Hotels, public entertainment venues, shops, and underground spaces with dense populations lack mandatory automatic sprinkler systems or automatic fire alarm systems as required by law. 6. Storage tanks (or tank farms) containing flammable or combustible liquids or gases fail to be equipped with fixed fire suppression and cooling systems as mandated by regulations. Conversely, certain situations may be explicitly excluded from being classified as major fire hazards: 1. Hazards that can be immediately rectified. 2. Hazards arising solely due to revisions in national standards (unless explicitly prohibited by law). 3. Hazards that have already undergone rigorous fire safety technical assessments as required by law, accompanied by the implementation of appropriate mitigation measures. 4. Hazards where the likelihood of a fire occurring is too low to result in a catastrophic incident or significant societal impact. Only those cases that fall somewhere between these two extremes—neither easily dismissible nor definitively categorized as major hazards—require the comprehensive, multi-step evaluation process to determine whether they qualify as significant fire risks.

In this context, Article 3 of the "11th Amendment to the Criminal Law" defines "knowingly failing to address a significant accident hazard" as referring to the perpetrator's awareness of hazardous conditions—such as dangerous physical states in production processes, unsafe human behaviors, or managerial deficiencies—that could potentially lead to an accident. Whether a situation constitutes a significant accident hazard typically depends directly on the relevant regulations specific to the industry in which the individual operates; however, in more complex cases, it is essential to convene qualified experts who will assess the issue according to legally mandated procedures.

Second, how should we interpret the phrase "knowingly organizing operations despite being aware of a significant accident hazard that has not been eliminated"? First, it must be clear that as long as the perpetrator is aware of a major accident risk and proceeds to organize work activities without addressing or removing it, the crime is established—no additional act of actively "failing to eliminate" the hazard is required. Here, "failing to eliminate" constitutes a pure form of omission, meaning no actual physical action is necessary to constitute the offense. Second, "organizing operations under risk" refers to planning, deciding, directing, or coordinating workers to carry out tasks while the significant hazard remains unaddressed. It does not imply resorting to coercive, threatening, or intimidating tactics to "force" employees into compliance. Finally, what constitutes an "accident hazard" is a situation where the potential for harm—though currently hidden, concealed, or latent—has not yet become fully apparent or detectable. At this stage, whether the hazard will actually lead to a harmful outcome remains uncertain; in fact, the situation might even remain at the level of mere risk, never escalating into a real disaster. Crucially, "organizing operations under risk" can only occur when such hazards are still present and unresolved. However, if the hazard has already reached a point where its occurrence is highly probable—essentially on the verge of becoming a real threat—then organizing others to proceed with risky work would, in effect, place them directly in harm's way. In such cases, the act of organizing these risky operations would no longer qualify as "violating safety regulations"; instead, it could potentially amount to the crime of intentional homicide, given the extreme danger posed to others.

It’s important to note that after adding "knowingly organizing risky operations despite being aware of significant safety hazards that have not been eliminated" as a new crime—specifically, the offense of organizing others to perform hazardous work—the challenge arises in distinguishing between rescue-oriented "risky operations" and acts of emergency self-defense. There was once an inspiring story: A patient’s heart had already stopped beating, and without immediate open-heart surgery within five minutes, the patient would suffer irreversible damage and die. At that moment, it was already too late to transport the patient to a proper operating room for the procedure. Instead, the doctor made a split-second decision to perform the life-saving surgery right there—in the emergency room (note: not in an actual operating theater). After what felt like an eternity, the painstakingly delicate heart repair was finally completed. To everyone’s relief, the patient’s "broken" heart began beating normally again, and the medical staff who had been anxiously working on the case could finally breathe a sigh of relief. Thanks to this courageous act, the patient was ultimately saved. This incident sparked a broader debate about whether, in high-stakes situations involving life-and-death decisions, prioritizing human lives takes precedence over strict adherence to established procedures. In fact, similar scenarios often arise during industrial operations as well. For instance, imagine a fire breaking out at a workplace. According to Article 44 of the Fire Protection Law, any organization facing a fire must immediately mobilize resources to extinguish it—and neighboring entities are obligated to provide support. Yet, in such moments, responders inevitably confront uncertainty: What specific dangers might still lurk inside the burning building or adjacent structures? Similarly, consider a mining disaster where workers are trapped deep underground. On-site commanders may lack critical information about the exact cause of the accident—or even remain unaware of additional risks hidden beneath the surface. Despite these unknowns, the overriding priority remains clear: saving lives. In such high-pressure situations, when time is of the essence and eliminating every possible hazard seems impossible (or simply impractical), on-site leaders may feel compelled to make urgent decisions—such as sending other workers into the dangerous environment to carry out rescue efforts. But here’s the question that arises: If, unfortunately, firefighters lose their lives while battling the blaze, or if miners perish during the rescue mission, should those responsible for making these critical decisions still face criminal charges under the newly defined offense of "knowingly organizing risky operations despite existing safety hazards"?

From the perspective of this article, while such an occasion may indeed involve organizing operations despite unresolved risks—potentially making the organizers' actions appear risky—it doesn’t necessarily mean those actions can be treated as criminal offenses. This is because the situation could fall under what criminal law theory refers to as "defensive emergency relief." Defensive emergency relief occurs when someone takes action against a source of imminent danger in order to prevent harm from occurring. For instance, imagine Zhang San and Li Si out hunting in the mountains. Suddenly, Li Si is attacked by a bear, collapsing to the ground and struggling desperately in a life-or-death struggle. Seeing no other option, Zhang San fires his gun at the charging bear to save Li Si. Tragically, the bullet strikes Li Si—who was already entangled with the bear—causing his death. In this scenario, Li Si was clearly facing certain death due to the ferocious bear attack. Meanwhile, Zhang San was confronted with two choices: either stand by and let Li Si perish, or risk shooting at the bear to rescue him. Though firing the gun carried the risk of accidentally hitting Li Si, the latter course of action was undeniably more reasonable. After all, without intervention, Li Si would have surely been killed; with it, there was at least a chance he could survive. Thus, Zhang San’s decision to fire the gun was a necessary act of self-defense taken in response to the immediate threat posed by the bear. Although his actions ultimately failed to save Li Si, they were made under unavoidable circumstances and did not exceed the bounds of what was strictly necessary, thus qualifying as the "emergency relief" described in Article 21 of the Criminal Law. It’s important to note, however, that in this particular case, the protector and the victim happen to be the same person—Li Si himself. Similarly, in situations like wildfires or mining disasters, even if the exact conditions inside the accident site remain unclear, acting promptly to provide assistance is often the only viable option. Delaying rescue efforts would likely worsen the situation, whereas initiating help might turn things around for the better. Based on the principle of "choosing the lesser of two evils"—that is, sacrificing one legitimate interest to safeguard a greater one when two conflicting interests are at stake—an immediate rescue effort becomes the most appropriate course of action. Therefore, even if rescuing operations proceed despite known, significant risks that haven’t yet been fully addressed—and even if these efforts ultimately lead to unintended harm—such actions should still be classified as emergency relief, absolving the individuals involved of criminal liability.

(II) Crime of Dangerous Operations

The biggest highlight of the "11th Amendment to the Criminal Law" in terms of work safety is the addition of the crime of hazardous operations. This new offense essentially elevates certain aggravating circumstances previously outlined in Article 12 of the Interpretation to the level of an independent criminal offense. Compared to existing crimes related to work safety under the current Criminal Law, the crime of hazardous operations is classified as a specific endangerment offense. Under this law, as long as the perpetrator commits any one of the three prescribed acts and thereby creates a "real risk of causing major casualties or other serious consequences," the crime is considered fulfilled. In this sense, the crime of hazardous operations shares a similar nature with the crime of dangerous driving. By establishing this provision, the Criminal Law can intervene much earlier in potential risks, effectively addressing workplace safety issues at their very onset—and ultimately helping to reverse the currently critical situation in work safety management from the root cause. The three types of conduct that serve as crucial elements for establishing this crime include:

First, there is the act of shutting down or sabotaging monitoring, alarm, protective, and life-saving equipment and facilities directly tied to production safety—or tampering with, concealing, or destroying their associated data and information. To ensure safe production, documents such as the "Notice from the State Council on Further Strengthening Enterprise Safety Production" (Guofa [2010] No. 23), the "Notice from the State Administration of Work Safety and the National Coal Mine Safety Administration on Issuing the 'Basic Standards for the Construction and Improvement of Six Major Systems for Underground Coal Mine Safety and Emergency Protection' (Trial)" (Anjian Zong Meizhuang [2011] No. 33), and the "Implementation Measures for Safety Production Licenses for Fireworks and Firecracker Manufacturing Enterprises" (promulgated by Order No. 54 of the State Administration of Work Safety on July 1, 2012) have been introduced. These guidelines mandate that relevant enterprises install critical monitoring, alarm, protection, and life-saving systems and equipment essential for safeguarding production safety. These systems and devices serve as early-warning mechanisms for potential hazards in a company’s production and operational processes, while also functioning as vital tools for documenting evidence of safety incidents. As such, they play a crucial role in preventing accidents and accurately recording the circumstances surrounding any mishaps. However, in practice, some operators, driven by the pursuit of excessive profits or other ulterior motives, deliberately shut down or sabotage safety-related monitoring and alarm systems. They may also manipulate, conceal, or destroy relevant data and information, rendering these critical safeguards virtually ineffective—and ultimately leading to catastrophic outcomes. For instance, in the case of Li Xinjun, Han Erjun, Hou Min, and Deng Shujun, who were charged with endangering public safety through dangerous methods, the four defendants, as managers at Xinhua No. 4 Mine, were fully aware of significant safety risks—such as excessive gas levels—that posed a real threat of disaster. Yet, in their relentless pursuit of profit, they actively circumvented regulatory oversight by instructing gas inspectors not to trigger alarms when gas levels exceeded safe thresholds and even sabotaging gas-monitoring equipment. This deliberate action effectively disabled the early-warning capabilities of the gas sensors, preventing accurate and timely detection of hazardous gas concentrations underground. Ultimately, this negligence resulted in a devastating tragedy: 76 deaths, 2 serious injuries, 4 minor injuries, and 9 cases of slight injury. Similar patterns have emerged in other high-profile incidents, including the "11·29" major water-inrush accident at Yuanjiangshan Coal Mine in Hengyang, Hunan Province; the "11·11" water-inrush incident at Maohua Wantongyuan Coal Industry Co., Ltd. in Pinglu District, Shanxi Province; and the tragic "6·13" explosion involving a liquefied petroleum gas tanker on the Shenhai Expressway in Wenling, Zhejiang Province. These harrowing examples underscore how shutting down or sabotaging safety-critical monitoring systems has become one of the primary factors contributing to industrial accidents. In light of these alarming trends, the "Eleventh Amendment to the Criminal Law" no longer requires actual harm to occur. Instead, it stipulates that criminal liability can be triggered as soon as there is a clear risk of severe consequences—specifically, if an individual engages in acts like shutting down or sabotaging safety-related monitoring systems that could potentially lead to catastrophic disasters. By addressing such risks proactively, the amendment aims to nip safety hazards in the bud before they escalate into full-blown tragedies.

It is important to note that the crime of hazardous operations may overlap with the crimes of illegally controlling computer information systems and sabotaging such systems, as many modern monitoring and alarm systems—and even safety equipment—now rely on automated computer-based control mechanisms. In this regard, this article argues that, although these three offenses share some similarities, they differ in the specific legal interests they protect: while the crime of hazardous operations targets public safety, the other two offenses undermine public order within the broader framework of social management. Thus, these crimes are considered to be in a relationship of imaginary concurrence. When an offender deliberately shuts down or damages critical monitoring, alarm, protective, or life-saving devices and systems directly tied to production safety—or manipulates, conceals, or destroys related data and information—resulting in the failure of essential software or hardware in 10 or more computer information systems, or leading to unauthorized deletion, modification, or addition of data stored, processed, or transmitted across 20 or more systems, thereby creating an imminent risk of serious accidents or other grave consequences, the law prescribes applying the more severe penalty under either the crime of illegally controlling computer information systems or the crime of sabotaging such systems, depending on which offense carries the heavier punishment.

In practice, safety incidents caused by the refusal to implement corrective actions are not uncommon. A prime example is the "11·4" major coal and gas outburst accident at Qiaoziliang Coal Industry Co., Ltd. in Tongchuan, Shaanxi Province, in 2020. After the gas outburst was detected, the construction company refused to comply with regulatory inspection orders—this failure to act became the root cause of the disaster. Specifically, on April 4 of that year, following the temporary suspension of the mine’s safety production license and a spontaneous combustion incident in the 5902 coal mining face, the construction team was ordered to immediately evacuate all personnel and seal off the affected mining area. Then, on April 7, when the mine continued to organize workers to operate in hazardous zones despite being instructed to halt operations and undergo rectification due to its refusal to address underlying safety risks, it was again ordered to suspend production and business for thorough整顿. Yet, the construction company still failed to comply, persisting with unsafe practices—and ultimately, this negligence led to the tragic accident. A similar issue also emerged in the "4·25" fatal construction elevator car fall incident at Feicui Huating residential project in Hengshui, Hebei Province. Investigations later revealed that the construction firm had illegally put the elevator into operation without conducting the required inspections. Even after receiving a supervisory notice demanding they stop using the equipment illegally, the company stubbornly refused to make necessary corrections and continued operating the elevator, directly contributing to the catastrophic outcome.

In practice, safety incidents caused by refusal to implement corrective actions are not uncommon. A prime example is the "11·4" major coal and gas outburst accident at Qiaoziliang Coal Industry Co., Ltd. in Tongchuan, Shaanxi Province, in 2020. After the gas outburst was detected, the construction company refused to comply with regulatory inspection orders—this failure to act became the root cause of the disaster. Specifically, on April 4 of that year, following the temporary suspension of the mine’s safety production license and a spontaneous combustion incident in the 5902 coal mining face, the construction team was ordered to immediately evacuate all personnel and seal off the affected mining area. Then, on April 7, when the mine continued to organize workers to operate in hazardous zones despite being instructed to halt operations and undergo rectification due to its refusal to address underlying safety risks, it was again ordered to suspend production and business for thorough整顿. Yet, the construction company still failed to comply, persisting with unsafe practices—and ultimately, this negligence led to the tragic accident. A similar issue also emerged in the "4·25" fatal construction elevator car fall incident at Feicui Huating residential project in Hengshui, Hebei Province. Investigations later revealed that the construction firm had illegally put the elevator into operation without conducting the required inspections. Even after receiving a supervisory notice demanding they stop using the equipment illegally, the company stubbornly refused to make necessary corrections and continued operating the elevator, directly contributing to the catastrophic outcome.

Third, this refers to the act of engaging in highly hazardous production activities—such as mining, metal smelting, construction work, and the manufacturing, trading, or storage of dangerous goods—without first obtaining the legally required approvals or permits. The primary purpose of implementing the enterprise production safety licensing system is to rigorously control safety access for all types of businesses, particularly those operating in high-risk sectors like mining and hazardous chemical enterprises. By preventing companies lacking basic safety standards from entering production or market operations right from the outset, the system aims to proactively avert and minimize the occurrence of accidents and casualties. In practice, cases where unauthorized production activities, such as mining, are carried out without proper legal approval or licensing—and subsequently lead to disasters—are not uncommon. For instance, in the globally shocking Tianjin Port "8·12" Ruihai Company hazardous materials warehouse fire and explosion incident in 2015, while the direct cause was attributed to the spontaneous combustion of items inside containers near the warehouse due to accumulated heat under extreme weather conditions, the illegal storage of hazardous chemicals without authorization also played a significant role in triggering the catastrophe. Similarly, the "2·29" major roof collapse accident at the Shugen Tian Coal Mine in Luoping County, Qujing, Yunnan Province, underscores this issue. Investigations revealed that the company involved had recklessly resumed production despite ongoing regulatory restrictions, directly contributing to the tragic outcome.

These are the background and main elements behind the establishment of the crime of hazardous operations. When determining this offense, keep the following two points in mind:

First, this crime is classified as a specific endangerment offense. To establish the crime of dangerous operations, the law not only requires the presence of the aforementioned actions but also mandates that there must be an "actual risk of causing major casualties or other serious consequences." This "actual risk" can be understood in two key ways. On one hand, the "actual risk" constitutes part of the objective elements required for the crime to be established. In other words, merely committing one of the three legally defined actions is insufficient—there must also be a real danger of harm that could lead to a safety incident. On the other hand, determining whether a given action poses an "actual risk" of triggering a major accident depends on evaluating the specific circumstances at the time of the act, including factors such as the environment, the nature of the target, and any external changes caused by the behavior. Such assessments must align with common-sense, real-world experience. In practical terms, if, under the conditions prevailing at the time of the act, a reasonable person—based on everyday experience—would conclude that engaging in the risky behavior would likely result in "subsequent major casualties or other severe consequences," then the act can be deemed to carry an "actual risk," thereby satisfying the objective requirements of this crime.

Second, this crime qualifies as an attempted offense under the category of "endangering public safety by dangerous methods." Should it result in actual harm, it could escalate into a full-fledged charge of endangering public safety through such methods— a point that was already demonstrated in the previously mentioned "Li Xinjun, Han Erjun, Hou Min, and Deng Shujun Case of Endangering Public Safety by Dangerous Methods." In this case, the court found that prior to the accident, the coal mine involved was undergoing technical upgrades but lacked a valid safety production license. Moreover, both its business license and coal production permit had expired. Subsequently, the local government had designated the mine as one requiring suspension of operations for rectification. Notably, the defendant not only sabotaged gas monitoring equipment and falsified gas reports—deliberately attempting to evade regulatory oversight—but also refused to comply with mandated safety improvement measures. Furthermore, despite being fully aware of significant safety hazards, the defendant even coerced workers into risky operations against their better judgment. These actions effectively placed the lives and physical well-being of the miners working underground in an extremely perilous situation, posing a level of danger no different from acts like arson or explosions. Given these circumstances, the court ultimately convicted and sentenced the mine manager on charges of endangering public safety by dangerous methods.

(III) The crime of personnel from intermediary organizations entrusted with responsibilities such as safety assessments, environmental impact assessments, and environmental monitoring providing false certification documents

"Article 25 of the Eleventh Amendment to the Criminal Law adds 'personnel from intermediary organizations responsible for safety assessments, environmental impact assessments, environmental monitoring, and other duties' as criminal subjects liable for the crime of providing false certification documents. It also stipulates that if these individuals provide fraudulent safety assessments, environmental impact assessments, or similar documents in major projects or engineering works involving public safety, resulting in exceptionally severe losses to public property, national interests, or the interests of the people, they shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of no less than 5 years but no more than 10 years, along with a fine."

In the 1980s, China introduced a safety assessment system for production and operational processes. The primary goal of this system is to identify, analyze, and predict risks and hazardous factors present in production activities, along with assessing their severity. It also aims to propose practical and effective preventive measures, ultimately helping organizations achieve the lowest possible accident rates, minimize losses, and optimize the efficiency of safety-related investments. According to Article 29 of the revised "Work Safety Law" enacted in 2014, both mining projects and construction projects involving the production or storage of hazardous materials must undergo a comprehensive safety assessment. Only after obtaining a qualified safety assessment report can production and operation entities secure their corresponding licenses. Additionally, the revised "Regulations on Work Safety Permits," issued in 2014, mandate that the state implement a work safety permit system for mining enterprises, construction firms, and manufacturers of hazardous chemicals, fireworks, and civilian blasting equipment. One of the key requirements for obtaining a work safety permit is conducting a legally compliant safety assessment (Article 6). However, in practice, incidents of fraudulent safety assessments have become alarmingly common. On January 11, 2012, the General Office of China’s State Administration of Work Safety issued a notice highlighting that certain safety assessment reports contained significant inaccuracies and even clear evidence of falsification. Reports from as early as 2006 revealed similar issues: the Ningxiang County Supervision Bureau conducted an initial review of 55 safety assessment applications submitted by local companies that year and found that 47 of these reports—over 85%—were problematic. Furthermore, province-wide inspections conducted by Hunan’s work safety authorities uncovered widespread failures, with virtually no assessment report passing rigorous on-site verification. This troubling trend persists to this day. For instance, in the aforementioned Tianjin explosion case, it was discovered that Tianjin Zhongbinhaisheng Technology Development Co., Ltd.—the intermediary responsible for the safety assessment—was, in fact, the same legal entity as Tianjin Zhongbinhaisheng Health & Safety Evaluation Monitoring Co., Ltd. This company blatantly violated regulations by simultaneously undertaking both the pre-assessment and acceptance assessment for Ruihai Company. Moreover, it deliberately fabricated critical information in its pre-assessment and acceptance evaluation reports, intentionally concealing serious safety violations while issuing opinions stating that the facilities "largely complied with relevant national laws, regulations, and standards."

Similar issues also arise in the fields of environmental impact assessment and environmental monitoring. As China’s economic and social development continues to advance, people are placing ever-higher demands on the quality of their living environments, while growing increasingly aware of the need for environmental protection—a trend that has drawn greater attention from the nation. According to relevant legal regulations, any project within China’s borders that could potentially harm the environment must undergo an environmental impact assessment (EIA). The EIA plays a critical role in preventing adverse environmental consequences resulting from planned or implemented projects, thereby promoting the harmonious development of the economy, society, and the environment. Among these factors, the quality of the EIA itself is particularly crucial—it can rightly be described as the "lifeline" of the entire assessment process. An essential component influencing the quality of EIAs is the accuracy and reliability of data collected through environmental monitoring, which forms the foundation of the assessment. The quality of this data directly determines how effectively the EIA identifies potential environmental risks and informs the development of appropriate strategies to prevent or mitigate those impacts. However, in reality, the quality of environmental data in China remains less than ideal. One major reason for this lies in the persistent and widespread issue of falsified environmental monitoring data. Unfortunately, some social environmental monitoring agencies and equipment operation/maintenance firms—motivated either by profit or pressured by unreasonable demands from their clients—have been caught fabricating data or producing misleading reports to maximize earnings. Others engage in substandard practices, cutting corners to reduce costs or gain a competitive edge in the market, ultimately compromising the integrity of their monitoring activities. For instance, during the Ministry of Ecology and Environment’s routine review of EIA documents from the first quarter of 2020, it was discovered that among 101 environmental impact assessment reports reviewed across 24 provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities, eight reports exhibited various quality issues, including omitted evaluation factors, downgraded environmental risk assessments, and narrowly defined scopes of environmental impact analysis.

The falsification of environmental impact assessment data misled relevant authorities, creating a hidden risk that ultimately led to a major safety accident. For instance, one of the critical lessons learned from the "3·21" catastrophic explosion at Jiangsu Xiangshui Tianjiayi Chemical Co., Ltd. was that the environmental evaluation agency involved had submitted false and inaccurate documents. As a result, the significant risks posed by the company’s nitration waste—and the associated safety hazards—were not identified in time, inadvertently disrupting and misguiding the regulatory efforts of the responsible authorities. A similar issue also surfaced in the Tianjin explosion case. According to the investigation report, Tianjin Environmental Engineering Assessment Center, an environmental intermediary, failed to conduct the required on-site inspections during the environmental impact assessment of Ruihai Company’s hazardous materials storage yard renovation project. Consequently, the center overlooked the unauthorized construction activities taking place before approval. Additionally, it neglected to verify the public participation comments included in the EIA report, failing to detect that the public input provided by Ruihai was deliberately fabricated. Moreover, the center did not thoroughly review the EIA document itself, missing the fact that the report had inadequately incorporated valid expert recommendations. These oversights ultimately allowed the authorities to miss crucial safety red flags during the approval process, contributing directly to the disaster.

To curb the occurrence of falsified environmental impact assessments at the source, Article 9 of the "Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Environmental Pollution" (Fa Shi [2016] No. 29) stipulates that if an environmental impact assessment agency or its personnel intentionally provide false environmental impact assessment documents—particularly when the circumstances are serious—or demonstrate gross negligence by issuing documents riddled with significant inaccuracies that lead to severe consequences, they shall be prosecuted and punished under Article 229 and Article 231 of the Criminal Law for the crime of providing false certification documents or the crime of issuing seriously inaccurate certification documents, respectively. Therefore, the inclusion of "personnel from intermediary organizations responsible for duties such as environmental impact assessment and environmental monitoring" in the list of criminal subjects under the crime of providing false certification documents in the "Eleventh Amendment to the Criminal Law" essentially formalizes a practice already widely adopted in judicial interpretations. In essence, "false assessments" conducted by intermediary agencies in areas like mineral resources, safety evaluations, and environmental impact assessments have become one of the key factors contributing to frequent accidents across various sectors, posing a significant risk of major safety incidents in production and business operations. With this legislative update, the scope of individuals subject to prosecution under Article 229 for providing false certification documents is no longer limited to "personnel from intermediary organizations tasked with responsibilities such as asset evaluation, capital verification, validation, accounting, auditing, and legal services." Instead, it now explicitly includes "personnel from intermediary organizations responsible for duties like safety evaluation, environmental impact assessment, and environmental monitoring." This expanded definition empowers authorities to identify potential safety hazards early—in the very initial stages of establishing relevant enterprises—thereby enabling proactive measures to ensure safe production practices and effectively preventing safety-related incidents before they occur.

Ensuring safe production is a critical issue closely tied to the safety of people’s lives and property, serving as a key indicator of balanced and healthy economic and social development. It also reflects the high level of responsibility that the Party and the government have toward the interests of the people. Although China has achieved significant progress in recent years in the field of workplace safety, there remains a gap between current practices and the public’s aspirations for a better quality of life. Therefore, it is timely to adjust and introduce new provisions into the Criminal Law, strengthening its proactive role in preventing safety-related incidents. By addressing early warning signs of potential accidents—acting swiftly to nip them in the bud—we can eliminate major hazards that often lead to workplace disasters. This approach aims to tackle the root causes of safety breaches at their source, making it a crucial step in safeguarding both human life and societal stability. This is precisely the original intention—and the standout feature—of the latest amendment to the Criminal Law regarding workplace safety. Importantly, it fundamentally shifts away from the longstanding principle in China’s criminal legislation, which previously allowed intervention only after an accident had already occurred, such as in cases involving "major casualties or other serious consequences." Instead, the revised law underscores the preventive nature of criminal law: crime prevention, not just punishment, is the ultimate goal. This shift not only reinforces the law’s ability to protect societal interests but also maximizes its effectiveness in averting future risks. That said, how exactly these newly defined offenses will be applied in practice—and what challenges may arise—remains to be seen. In particular, once acts like knowingly organizing risky operations despite significant safety hazards, or engaging in hazardous work activities, are criminalized, the lines between guilt and innocence, as well as between different types of offenses, could become exceedingly subtle and complex. To address these uncertainties, it will be essential in the coming steps to systematically collect and analyze real-world case examples, thoroughly examining and categorizing the various legal disputes that emerge during implementation. Only by doing so can we ensure that these new provisions effectively fulfill their intended purpose, ultimately helping to minimize the occurrence of workplace accidents and further enhancing safety standards across industries.

Author: Hong Li, Professor at Tsinghua Law School

Source: *Chinese Journal of Criminal Law*, Issue 2, 2021