On June 22, 2021, the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security officially released the "Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases such as Telecommunications and Internet Fraud (II)" (hereafter referred to as "Opinion II"). Li Ruiyi, Deputy Chief Judge of the Third Criminal Division of the Supreme People's Court; Liu Taizong, Deputy Director of the Fourth Prosecution Office of the Supreme People's Procuratorate; and Jiang Guoli, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation at the Ministry of Public Security, attended the press conference to provide details on the document and answer questions from reporters. The press conference was chaired by Wang Bin, Deputy Director of the News Bureau of the Supreme People's Court.

 

 

Photo taken at the press conference venue. Photo by Hou Yusheng

 

I. The Background Behind the Development of "Opinion No. 2"

In recent years, telecom and internet fraud crimes have continued to surge, with the criminal landscape becoming increasingly severe and complex. Around these scams, a shadowy "black-and-gray" industrial chain has emerged, spawning numerous upstream and downstream related offenses. This chain acts as both a catalyst and accelerant for the relentless proliferation of telecom and internet fraud, severely threatening people's financial security and other legitimate rights and interests, while also casting a serious shadow over social harmony and stability. The Party Central Committee, with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, has placed high priority on combating and addressing telecom and internet fraud crimes. General Secretary Xi Jinping has issued multiple important instructions and directives, providing clear guidance and fundamental principles for tackling this issue. In response, departments such as the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security have resolutely implemented these directives, adopting a comprehensive strategy that emphasizes both preventive measures and addressing root causes, while firmly upholding the principle of strict punishment in accordance with the law. To this end, the central government has launched a focused campaign to crack down on and tackle new types of telecom and internet-related crimes, achieving remarkable results. In December 2016, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security jointly released the "Opinions on Several Legal Issues Concerning the Handling of Criminal Cases Such as Telecom and Internet Fraud" (hereafter referred to as "Opinion No. 1"), offering clearer and more specific legal guidelines for public security agencies, procuratorates, and courts in handling these cases according to the law. Over the past four years, public security organs, prosecutors' offices, and courts across the country have rigorously applied the Criminal Law, relevant judicial interpretations, and "Opinion No. 1" to investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate a large number of telecom and internet fraud cases—as well as their associated offenses. As a result, more than 95% of defendants have been sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment or higher penalties, playing a crucial role in effectively curbing and combating telecom and internet fraud activities.

 

Currently, telecom and internet fraud crimes remain at alarmingly high levels. In some major and medium-sized cities, these types of cases account for as much as 50% of all criminal incidents. High-profile and large-scale telecom and internet fraud cases are occurring frequently, resulting in substantial financial losses for the public. Last year alone, nationwide telecom and internet fraud cases caused property losses totaling 35.37 billion yuan. Moreover, with the rapid advancement of modern communication and mobile payment technologies—and particularly amid unprecedented domestic crackdowns—many fraud hubs have shifted operations overseas. Meanwhile, illegal trading of SIM cards and credit cards has surged to alarming levels. As a result, judicial practices are now grappling with numerous emerging challenges, placing even greater demands on our efforts to combat these crimes effectively.

 

To adapt to the evolving situation and meet the demands of current real-world challenges, and to further clarify legal standards while ensuring strict punishment and effective crackdowns on telecom and cyber fraud as well as related crimes, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security have jointly formulated and issued "Opinion No. 2." Grounded in practical realities, this new opinion adopts a problem-oriented approach, conducting thorough investigations, extensive research, and careful deliberation—while actively seeking input from various stakeholders. Building upon "Opinion No. 1," "Opinion No. 2" provides even clearer and more specific legal guidelines for addressing telecom and cyber fraud offenses, as well as related crimes involving mobile phone cards and credit cards. We are confident that the issuance of "Opinion No. 2" will play a crucial role in enabling law enforcement agencies—both judicial and political—to combat telecom and cyber fraud and its associated crimes more forcefully, accurately, promptly, and effectively.

 

II. Key Contents and Features of "Opinion No. 2"

"Opinion No. 2" consists of 17 articles. It addresses newly emerging and prominent issues in judicial practice, such as jurisdiction over telecom and internet fraud cases and related offenses; evidence collection in cross-border telecom and internet fraud cases; handling of criminal cases involving "two-card" schemes—specifically mobile phone and credit card-related crimes; and the application of policies when dealing with telecom and internet fraud cases. These provisions primarily reflect three key principles.

 

(1) Continue to uphold the policy of strict punishment while emphasizing the balanced implementation of leniency and severity in criminal justice.

 

First, cross-border telecom and cyber fraud crimes will be treated as a top priority and punished severely, particularly addressing the challenges of gathering evidence and securing convictions in these cases. Under intense crackdowns, many domestic telecom and cyber fraud hubs have already shifted operations overseas, relentlessly targeting citizens back in China. Statistics show that currently, more than 60% of fraudulent activities are being carried out from overseas bases. Meanwhile, due to various objective limitations, it remains extremely difficult for Chinese public security authorities to gather evidence or enforce the law effectively abroad—whether through police cooperation or judicial assistance. To tackle this issue, while "Opinion No. 1" already established a dual approach by setting both monetary and quantitative thresholds for identifying telecom and cyber fraud offenses, "Opinion No. 2" specifically addresses the unique characteristics of cross-border telecom and cyber fraud. It stipulates that if there is clear evidence proving an individual’s involvement with an overseas fraud syndicate or criminal group—and if they’ve committed telecom and cyber fraud against Chinese residents while operating outside the country—even when the exact amount defrauded cannot yet be verified—if the suspect has spent a cumulative total of 30 days or more traveling overseas to join such fraud operations within one year, or has made multiple trips to these overseas hubs, they should be deemed to have exhibited "other serious circumstances" as defined under Article 266 of the Criminal Law. As a result, the individual will face criminal prosecution under the charge of fraud without delay. This new regulation aligns closely with relevant provisions outlined in the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s "Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Fraud Criminal Cases," reflecting the unwavering commitment to imposing strict penalties on cross-border telecom and cyber fraud. At the same time, it resolves the most pressing legal challenges encountered when prosecuting these complex cases. Finally, I would like to send a stern warning to all telecom and cyber fraud criminals: Do not mistakenly believe that overseas territories offer a safe haven or blind spots where you can evade detection. Nor should you assume that committing crimes abroad will allow you to erase evidence or exploit loopholes in the law—these notions are nothing but illusions. If you continue down this path, stubbornly clinging to your misguided beliefs and daring to commit further wrongdoing, no matter how far you flee or hide, you will ultimately not escape justice. Rest assured, you will face severe consequences and be brought to account under the full force of the law.

 

Second, we must adhere to the principle of differentiated treatment—applying both strictness and leniency in a balanced manner—to ensure positive social outcomes. Telecommunications and internet-based fraud crimes typically involve organized criminal groups or gangs, characterized by tight organization, large numbers of participants, and clear hierarchical structures. While the principle of strictly punishing such crimes according to the law remains firm, unwavering, and clearly defined, this "strictness" applies overall. At the same time, however, leniency should also be judiciously employed to complement the stricter measures. For instance, key leaders, masterminds, repeat offenders, and habitual perpetrators within these fraud syndicates will face resolute and severe penalties. On the other hand, first-time offenders, occasional offenders, minors, and current students should have their cases carefully evaluated based on factors such as their role in the crime, level of intent, attitude toward admitting guilt, and efforts to show remorse. Where appropriate, they may receive lighter sentences in accordance with the law. Notably, recent cases have revealed that some fraud groups have been manipulating and enticing college students and recent graduates into participating in fraudulent activities. For these individuals, as long as they recognize the gravity of their actions, sincerely repent, and turn away from wrongdoing, the focus should remain on education, rehabilitation, and rescue—leading to more lenient legal consequences. In particular, for those whose offenses are minor and pose relatively low risks, prosecutors may choose not to press charges altogether or even waive criminal penalties entirely under the law.

 

(II) Continue to uphold the policy of comprehensive punishment, with a particular focus on cracking down on crimes involving "two types of cards."

 

Second, further enhance the efficiency of case handling. Given the cross-regional nature of telecom and cyber fraud crimes, and to address challenges in gathering evidence when cases are investigated in different jurisdictions, the second "Opinion" emphasizes the critical role of public security agencies'信息化 platforms. It stipulates that the investigating police agency can legally use the information system to retrieve relevant evidence materials—such as case registration forms, investigation initiation decisions, and victim statements—prepared by local police departments in other regions. Additionally, the document establishes strict guidelines regarding the personnel involved, the methods of retrieval, and the procedural steps, ensuring both the legality and objectivity of the evidence while significantly improving efficiency and reducing the time traditionally required for cross-jurisdictional evidence collection.

 

Second, the document clarifies the specific legal criteria for applying the crime of "aiding and abetting cybercrime activities" to individuals involved in the illegal trading of "two types of cards"—namely, mobile phone SIM cards and credit cards. As previously noted, these cards have been widely traded illegally and have become essential tools for carrying out telecom and online fraud crimes. The illicit "two-cards" industry has effectively fueled such scams, making it a persistent enabler behind the ongoing surge of telecom frauds. Therefore, cracking down on and rectifying the chaos caused by illegal activities related to "two cards" has become an urgent necessity. Since the launch of the "Operation Cut Cards" last October, significant progress has already been made. Building on the lessons learned from this operation, Opinion No. 2 stipulates that anyone who purchases, sells, or rents out credit cards, bank accounts, mobile phone SIM cards, data plans, or other similar items—knowing full well that they will be used by others to commit cybercrimes—can be classified as having engaged in "aiding" behavior under Article 287-2 of the Criminal Law. Additionally, Opinion No. 2 specifies that if an individual knowingly assists another person in committing a cybercrime by acquiring, selling, or renting payment settlement tools like credit cards, bank accounts, or non-bank payment accounts—amounting to five or more units—or if they provide communication tools such as mobile phone SIM cards or data plans in quantities exceeding 20 units, they may face criminal liability under the crime of aiding and abetting cybercrime activities. This regulation effectively addresses the challenge of determining when illegal trading of "two cards" constitutes "serious circumstances" under the crime of aiding and abetting cybercrime activities. Opinion No. 2 also emphasizes that even if the primary perpetrator of the fraud remains at large, authorities can still take legal action against those already apprehended who are linked to the same criminal network. This approach is designed to streamline investigations, prevent impunity, and ensure that justice is served swiftly and decisively. Finally, I’d like to remind the public: when confronted with offers from criminals to purchase mobile phone SIM cards, credit cards, or other financial instruments, always stay vigilant, think clearly, and resist any temptation. Never let greed for small gains lead you down a dangerous path, risking severe legal consequences and irreparable harm.

 

(III) Continue to uphold the principle of punishing according to law, while placing greater emphasis on strengthening procedural safeguards in case handling.

 

First, further refine the jurisdictional rules governing telecom and cyber fraud crimes as well as their related offenses. Opinion No. 1, based on practical considerations, provides a comprehensive, enumerated list of locations—such as "places where criminal acts occur" and "places where criminal outcomes take place"—to facilitate law enforcement and case handling, initially addressing the longstanding challenges in jurisdiction over these types of cases. However, telecom and cyber fraud crimes continue to evolve into increasingly complex, chain-like, and industrialized operations. A growing number of mobile phone SIM cards and credit cards have become critical tools for criminals, while emerging social platforms like WeChat and Douyin, along with specialized hardware such as "cat pools" and GOIP devices, are increasingly being exploited for illicit activities, posing new and formidable challenges. To keep pace with these evolving trends, Opinion No. 2 expands the scope of jurisdiction to include not only the places associated with the establishment, sale, transfer, or concealment of SIM cards and credit cards used in telecom and cyber fraud—but also the locations where instant messaging data from platforms like WeChat and QQ is sent or received, as well as the transit points of network hardware devices such as "cat pools." This approach firmly upholds the principle of "broad jurisdiction" for telecom and cyber fraud crimes and their upstream and downstream related offenses, ensuring smoother case management and litigation processes while enabling more precise and efficient crackdowns on these crimes. Moreover, to fully uncover the facts of these intricate criminal networks and streamline legal proceedings, Opinion No. 2 stipulates that upstream crimes providing support for telecom and cyber fraud—including those involving the laundering of illegally obtained proceeds—and downstream offenses aimed at concealing or disguising criminal gains, which together form multi-layered crime chains, should all be deemed interconnected. As a result, public security, procuratorial, and judicial authorities are empowered to consolidate and handle these cases jointly, enhancing their ability to deliver robust and coordinated responses against this pervasive threat.

 

Second, further enhance the efficiency of case handling. Given the cross-regional nature of telecom and cyber fraud crimes, and to address challenges in gathering evidence when cases are investigated in different jurisdictions, the second "Opinion" emphasizes the critical role of public security agencies'信息化 platforms. It stipulates that the investigating police agency can use the information system to retrieve relevant evidence materials—such as case registration forms, investigation initiation decisions, and victim statements—legally prepared by local police departments in other regions. Additionally, the document establishes strict guidelines regarding the personnel involved, the methods of retrieval, and the procedural steps, ensuring both the legality and objectivity of the evidence while significantly improving efficiency and reducing the time traditionally required for cross-jurisdictional evidence collection.

 

Additionally, building on "Opinion No. 1," which strengthened penalties for property-related offenses in telecom and cyber fraud crimes, "Opinion No. 2" stipulates that when handling such cases, funds seized from accounts involved in the crime should first be returned to the victims. If these funds are insufficient to cover the full amount owed to victims, they should be returned proportionally instead. This ensures that every effort is made to minimize economic losses for affected individuals, thereby effectively safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the public.

 

Attachment: Relevant Provisions of the Criminal Law, along with Related Judicial Interpretations and Guiding Opinions

 

Attachment 1

 

Relevant provisions of the Criminal Law

 

Article 177-1 [Crime of Impeding Credit Card Management] Anyone who, under any of the following circumstances, obstructs the management of credit cards shall be sentenced to imprisonment of up to three years or criminal detention, along with a fine ranging from RMB 10,000 to RMB 100,000—either imposed concurrently or separately. In cases involving exceptionally large quantities or other serious circumstances, the offender shall face imprisonment of more than three years but less than ten years, accompanied by a fine of no less than RMB 20,000 and no more than RMB 200,000.

 

(1) Knowingly possessing or transporting a forged credit card, or knowingly possessing or transporting a forged blank credit card in significant quantities;

(II) Illegally possessing another person's credit card in significant quantities;

(III) Obtaining credit cards by using false identity documents;

(4) Selling, purchasing, or providing counterfeit credit cards to others, or obtaining credit cards using false identity documents.

 

[Legislative Interpretation] On December 29, 2004, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress issued the "Interpretation on Provisions of the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China Regarding Credit Cards," which defines "credit cards" under the Criminal Law as electronic payment cards issued by commercial banks or other financial institutions, offering all or some of the following functions: consumer payments, credit loans, fund transfers and settlements, as well as cash deposits and withdrawals.

 

Article 253-1 [Crime of Infringing on Citizens' Personal Information] – Anyone who violates state regulations by selling or providing citizens' personal information to others, and if the circumstances are serious, shall be sentenced to imprisonment of up to three years or criminal detention, along with a fine or a single penalty. If the circumstances are particularly severe, the offender shall face imprisonment for more than three years but less than seven years, accompanied by a hefty fine.

 

Anyone who violates relevant national regulations by selling or providing to others personal information of citizens obtained during the performance of duties or the provision of services shall be subject to heavier penalties as stipulated in the preceding paragraph.

 

Anyone who steals or illegally obtains personal information of citizens through other means shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph 1.

 

If a unit commits any of the first three offenses, the unit shall be fined, and the directly responsible person in charge, along with other individuals directly accountable, shall be punished according to the provisions specified for each respective offense.

 

Article 266 [Crime of Fraud] Anyone who defrauds public or private property, with a relatively large amount involved, shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of up to three years, criminal detention, or control, and may also be fined or punished solely by a fine. For cases involving a huge amount or other serious circumstances, the offender shall face fixed-term imprisonment of more than three years but less than ten years, along with a fine. In cases involving an especially huge amount or other particularly grave circumstances, the punishment shall be fixed-term imprisonment of ten years or more, up to life imprisonment, accompanied by a fine or confiscation of property. Where this Law provides otherwise, the specific provisions shall prevail.

 

Article 280, Paragraph 3: [Crime of Forging, Altering, or Trading Identity Documents]

 

Anyone who forges, alters, or trades identity documents such as resident ID cards, passports, social security cards, or driver's licenses—documents legally recognized for verifying identity—will be sentenced to up to three years in prison, detention, compulsory labor under supervision, or deprivation of political rights, along with a fine. In cases involving serious circumstances, the penalty increases to a prison term of more than three but less than seven years, accompanied by a fine.

 

Article 281-1, Paragraph 1: [Crime of Using False or Stolen Identity Documents] In activities where identity verification is required according to national regulations, using forged, altered, or stolen identity documents—such as residents' ID cards, passports, social security cards, or driver's licenses—that can legally prove one's identity constitutes a crime. For cases involving serious circumstances, the offender shall be sentenced to detention or criminal detention, along with either a fine or a single penalty of a fine.

 

Article 287-2 [Crime of Assisting in Cybercrime Activities] – Anyone who knowingly provides technical support, such as internet access, server hosting, network storage, or communication transmission, to others engaging in criminal activities via the information network, or offers assistance like advertising promotion or payment settlement, where the circumstances are serious, shall be sentenced to imprisonment of up to three years or detention, and may also be fined either separately or jointly.

 

If a unit commits the crime mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the unit shall be fined, and the directly responsible person in charge and other individuals directly accountable shall be punished according to the provisions of the first paragraph.

 

If the actions described in the first two clauses also constitute other crimes, they shall be punished according to the provisions prescribing the heavier penalty.

 

Article 312 [Crime of Concealing or Disguising Criminal Proceeds and Profits] Anyone who knowingly harbors, transfers, acquires, sells on behalf of others, or otherwise conceals or disguises criminal proceeds or the profits derived from them shall be sentenced to imprisonment of up to three years, detention, or control, and may also be fined either separately or jointly. In cases involving serious circumstances, the offender shall face a prison term of more than three years but less than seven years, along with a fine.

 

If a unit commits the crime mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the unit shall be fined, and the directly responsible person in charge and other individuals directly accountable shall be punished according to the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

 

Appendix 2

 

Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate

Regarding the Handling of Criminal Fraud Cases

Interpretation of Several Issues Regarding the Specific Application of Laws

(Interpretation No. 7 of 2011)

 

To legally punish fraud-related criminal activities and protect the ownership of public and private property, this document provides explanations on several key issues regarding the specific application of laws in handling criminal fraud cases, based on relevant provisions of the Criminal Law and the Criminal Procedure Law, and tailored to the needs of judicial practice.

 

Article 1: Fraud involving public or private property valued at between 3,000 yuan and 10,000 yuan, between 30,000 yuan and 100,000 yuan, or exceeding 500,000 yuan, shall be respectively classified as "substantial amount," "huge amount," and "especially huge amount" as stipulated in Article 266 of the Criminal Law.

 

The Higher People's Courts and People's Procuratorates of provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the central government may, in conjunction with their region's economic and social development conditions, jointly determine specific enforcement standards within the amount ranges prescribed in the preceding paragraph, and shall file these standards with the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate for record.

 

Article 2: If the amount of fraudulently obtained public or private property reaches the threshold specified in Article 1 of this Interpretation, and any of the following circumstances applies, a more severe punishment may be imposed in accordance with the provisions of Article 266 of the Criminal Law:

 

(1) Committing fraud against an unspecified large number of people by sending text messages, making phone calls, or using the internet, radio and television, newspapers, and magazines to disseminate false information;

(II) Fraudulently obtaining disaster relief, emergency rescue, flood control, preferential treatment, poverty alleviation, resettlement, aid, or medical funds and materials;

(III) Engaging in fraud under the guise of disaster relief fundraising;

(4) Fraudulently obtaining property from persons with disabilities, the elderly, or those who have lost their ability to work;

(5) Causing the victim to commit suicide, suffer mental instability, or experience other serious consequences.

 

If the amount of fraud is close to the thresholds for "large amount" or "especially large amount" as stipulated in Article 1 of this Interpretation, and if any of the circumstances outlined in the preceding paragraph apply, or if the perpetrator is a key leader of a fraud ring, the case should be classified accordingly as "other serious circumstances" or "other particularly serious circumstances" under Article 266 of the Criminal Law.

 

Article 3: Although the fraud involving public or private property has already met the "substantial amount" threshold specified in Article 1 of this Interpretation, if any of the following circumstances applies and the perpetrator acknowledges guilt and expresses remorse, prosecution may be waived or criminal penalties may be exempted in accordance with Article 37 of the Criminal Law and Article 142 of the Criminal Procedure Law:

 

(1) Those with legally prescribed circumstances warranting leniency in sentencing;

(II) Those who fully return the illicit gains and provide compensation before the first-instance verdict is announced;

(III) Those who did not participate in the division of spoils, received a smaller share, and were not the principal offenders;

(IV) Where the victim has expressed forgiveness;

(5) Other cases that are minor in nature and pose little harm.

 

Article 4: If property is fraudulently obtained from close relatives and the relatives subsequently offer their forgiveness, the matter generally will not be treated as a criminal offense.

 

When it comes to defrauding close relatives of their property, if criminal responsibility is indeed necessary, the handling of such cases should also be handled leniently, taking into account the specific circumstances.

 

Article 5: Attempted fraud targeting property of particularly large value, or involving other serious circumstances, shall be subject to criminal prosecution and punishment.

 

Using telecommunication methods such as sending text messages, making phone calls, or leveraging the internet to defraud an unspecified large number of people—where the amount of fraud remains difficult to verify—but where one of the following circumstances applies, it should be classified as "other serious circumstances" under Article 266 of the Criminal Law, leading to conviction and punishment for attempted fraud:

 

(1) Sending more than 5,000 fraudulent messages;

(II) Making fraudulent phone calls to 500 or more individuals;

(III) The fraud methods are malicious and pose severe risks.

 

If the acts specified in the preceding paragraph are carried out in quantities exceeding ten times the standards set forth in items (1) and (2) of the same paragraph, or if the fraudulent methods are particularly egregious and the harm caused is especially severe, such cases shall be classified as "other particularly serious circumstances" under Article 266 of the Criminal Law, and the perpetrator shall be convicted and punished for attempted fraud.

 

Article 6: If a fraud involves both completed and attempted offenses, and these reach different sentencing ranges, the heavier penalty shall apply. If they fall within the same sentencing range, the offense shall be punished as completed fraud.

 

Article 7: Anyone who knowingly provides assistance—such as credit cards, mobile phone SIM cards, communication devices, communication channels, network technical support, or payment processing—to another person committing fraud shall be treated as an accomplice in the crime.

 

Article 8: If someone impersonates a staff member of a state organ to commit fraud, thereby simultaneously constituting both the crime of fraud and the crime of swindling under false pretenses, the punishment shall be determined and imposed according to the provision carrying the heavier penalty.

 

Article 9: After a case is filed, any fraud-related assets and their accrued earnings that have been seized, detained, or frozen—provided their ownership is clearly established—shall be returned to the victims. If ownership remains unclear, the assets may be returned to victims proportionally based on the ratio of the amount defrauded to the total value of all seized, detained, or frozen assets and their accrued earnings; however, any amounts already reimbursed must be deducted.

 

Article 10: If the perpetrator has used the fraudulently obtained property to pay off debts or transferred it to others, and one of the following circumstances applies, the property shall be recovered in accordance with the law:

 

(1) Received knowingly as fraudulent property;

(II) When the other party obtains the fraudulently acquired property without payment;

(III) The other party obtained the fraudulently acquired property at a price significantly below market value.

(4) The other party obtained the fraudulent property as a result of illegal debt or unlawful criminal activities.

 

If someone acquires fraudulently obtained property in good faith, it will not be subject to recovery.

 

Article 11: If any previously issued judicial interpretations are inconsistent with this interpretation, this interpretation shall prevail.

 

Attachment 3

 

Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security

Regarding the Handling of Criminal Cases Such as Telecommunications and Internet Fraud

Opinions on Several Issues Regarding Applicable Law

(Fa Fa [2016] No. 32)

 

To legally punish telecom and internet fraud, as well as other criminal activities, protect the legitimate rights and interests of citizens, legal entities, and other organizations, and maintain social order, these Opinions have been formulated based on the provisions of laws such as the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China and the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, along with relevant judicial interpretations—and in light of practical work considerations.

 

I. General Requirements

 

In recent years, telecom and cyber fraud crimes—carried out using communication tools, the internet, and other technological means—have continued to surge, posing significant threats by violating citizens' personal information, disrupting radio communication management regulations, and enabling the proliferation of upstream and downstream related offenses such as concealing or laundering illegally obtained funds and proceeds. These crimes severely undermine people's financial security and other legitimate rights and interests, disrupt the orderly functioning of telecom networks, erode societal trust, and cast a dark shadow over public safety and social harmony and stability. As a result, their harmful impact is profound, drawing strong public outcry and concern.

 

People's Courts, People's Procuratorates, and public security organs must, in response to the characteristics of crimes such as telecom and online fraud, persist in tackling these offenses across the entire chain and from all angles. They should ensure that punishments are meted out swiftly, strictly, and in accordance with the law, while making every effort—both extensive and intensive—to recover stolen assets and minimize losses. Furthermore, they need to continuously refine working mechanisms, strengthen collaboration and coordination, and resolutely curb telecom and online fraud and other related criminal activities, striving to achieve a harmonious alignment between legal outcomes and societal benefits.

 

II. Severely Punish Telecommunications and Cyber Fraud Crimes in Accordance with the Law

 

(1) According to Article 1 of the "Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Laws in Handling Criminal Cases of Fraud," fraud committed using telecommunications network technologies—where the value of the defrauded public or private property exceeds RMB 3,000, RMB 30,000, or RMB 500,000, respectively—shall be classified as "significant amount," "huge amount," and "especially huge amount," respectively, as stipulated in Article 266 of the Criminal Law.

 

If telecom and internet fraud is committed multiple times within two years without being addressed, and the cumulative amount of the fraud reaches the threshold for criminal liability, the offender shall be prosecuted and punished according to law.

 

(II) For crimes involving telecom network fraud that meet the relevant monetary threshold and fall under any of the following circumstances, consider imposing a heavier penalty:

 

1. Causing severe consequences such as the victim's or their immediate family members' suicide, death, or mental instability;

2. Impersonating staff members of judicial authorities or other state agencies to commit fraud;

3. Those who organize and direct telecom network fraud criminal groups;

4. Committing telecom network fraud from overseas;

5. Those who have previously been subject to criminal penalties for telecom or internet fraud crimes, or who have received administrative penalties for such offenses within the past two years;

6. Fraudulently obtaining property from persons with disabilities, elderly individuals, minors, students, or those who have lost their ability to work; or defrauding patients suffering from serious illnesses and their relatives of their belongings.

7. Fraudulently obtaining disaster relief, emergency rescue, flood control, preferential treatment, poverty alleviation, resettlement, aid, medical assistance, and other funds or materials;

8. Engaging in fraud under the guise of disaster relief, fundraising, or other social welfare and charitable causes;

9. Seriously disrupting the work of public security organs and other departments by using technological means such as telephone paging systems;

10. Engaging in fraud by employing covert techniques such as links to "phishing websites," links to "trojan" programs, and network intrusions.

 

(III) In cases involving telecom network fraud crimes where the amount defrauded is close to the thresholds for "significant amount" or "especially large amount," and where one of the circumstances specified in paragraph (II) above is present, such cases shall be classified accordingly as "other serious circumstances" or "other particularly serious circumstances" as defined under Article 266 of the Criminal Law.

 

The "proximity" stipulated above should generally be maintained at 80 percent or more of the corresponding amount standard.

 

(4) In cases involving telecom network fraud crimes, if the suspect or defendant has successfully obtained property through deception, they shall be convicted and punished for the crime of fraud (completed offense). If the amount defrauded cannot be verified but one of the following circumstances exists, it should be classified as "other serious circumstances" as stipulated in Article 266 of the Criminal Law, leading to conviction and punishment for the crime of fraud (attempted offense):

 

1. Sending more than 5,000 fraudulent messages, or making fraudulent calls to more than 500 individuals;

2. Posting fraudulent information online with a total of 5,000 or more page views.

 

If the circumstances described above involve amounts exceeding the relevant threshold by ten times or more, they should be classified as "other particularly serious circumstances" as stipulated in Article 266 of the Criminal Law, and the offender shall be convicted and punished for attempted fraud.

 

The aforementioned "making fraudulent calls" includes both initiating fraudulent calls and answering callback calls from victims. For instances involving repeated dialing or answering the same phone number, as well as repeatedly sending scam messages to the same victim, the total number of call attempts, answered calls, and message sends will be calculated cumulatively.

 

If, due to reasons such as the suspect or defendant deliberately concealing or destroying evidence, it becomes difficult to gather proof of the number of phone calls made or messages sent, the court may, based on the verified daily call frequency and daily message count, combined with other relevant evidence—such as the timing of the alleged crime and the suspect/defendant’s own statements—make a comprehensive determination.

 

(5) In cases of telecom network fraud involving both completed and attempted offenses, if the thresholds for sentencing differ between the two, the heavier penalty shall apply. If the thresholds fall within the same sentencing range, the offense will be treated as a completed fraud crime.

 

(6) When determining the sentence for defendants convicted of telecom and internet fraud crimes, the sentencing starting point and benchmark sentence should generally be set at the higher end. In finalizing the actual sentence to be imposed, all relevant case facts and circumstances must be carefully considered, ensuring precise application of any applicable aggravating or mitigating factors while maintaining a balance between the severity of the crime and the corresponding punishment.

 

(7) For defendants convicted of telecom and internet fraud crimes, the scope of probation should be strictly controlled, and the conditions for granting probation must be carefully evaluated.

 

(8) For defendants convicted of telecom and internet fraud crimes, greater emphasis should be placed on the lawful application of property-based penalties, increasing the severity of economic sanctions to maximize the deprivation of their ability to re-offend.

 

III. Thoroughly Punish Related Crimes

 

(1) In cases involving telecom network fraud, the illegal use of "fake base stations" and "illegal radio broadcasts" that disrupt the order of radio communications—when such actions meet the criteria outlined in Article 288 of the Criminal Law—shall be prosecuted under the crime of disrupting the order of radio communication management. If these actions also constitute the crime of fraud, sentencing shall follow the provision prescribing the heavier penalty.

 

(II) Violating relevant national regulations by selling or providing citizens' personal information to others, or by stealing or illegally obtaining such information through other means—when these actions meet the criteria outlined in Article 253-1 of the Criminal Law—shall be prosecuted under the crime of infringing upon citizens' personal information.

 

Using illegally obtained personal information of citizens to commit telecommunications and internet fraud, if this constitutes multiple crimes, shall be punished accordingly according to law.

 

(III) When impersonating staff members of state organs to commit telecom and internet fraud, and the act simultaneously constitutes both fraud and swindling, the offender shall be convicted and punished according to the provision carrying the heavier penalty.

 

(4) Illegally possessing another person's credit card, without evidence proving involvement in telecom or online fraud activities, and meeting the criteria outlined in Article 177-1, Paragraph 1, Item (2) of the Criminal Law, shall be prosecuted for the crime of obstructing credit card management.

 

(5) Anyone who knowingly transfers, cashes out, or withdraws funds derived from telecom network fraud crimes—or the proceeds generated from such funds—through any of the following methods shall be held criminally accountable for the crime of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds and gains, as stipulated in Article 312, Paragraph 1, of the Criminal Law. However, this does not apply if there is clear evidence demonstrating that the individual genuinely had no knowledge of the illegal origin of the funds.

 

1. Assisting in converting or transferring funds through illegal means, such as skimming cash using point-of-sale (POS) terminals;

2. Assisting others in dispersing large sums of cash across multiple bank accounts, or frequently transferring funds between different bank accounts;

3. Repeatedly using, or opening multiple credit cards, fund payment and settlement accounts under false identities, or repeatedly employing unusual methods such as covering cameras or disguises to assist others in transferring funds, withdrawing cash, or obtaining cash advances;

4. Providing credit cards or fund payment/settlement accounts opened under someone else's identity to others, and subsequently assisting those individuals in transferring funds, withdrawing cash, or obtaining cash advances;

5. Cashing out through methods like mobile phone top-ups or trading game point cards at prices significantly different from market rates.

 

Those who engage in the aforementioned actions after prior collusion shall be treated as jointly committing a crime.

 

Even if the telecom network fraud suspects involved in the aforementioned actions have not yet been apprehended, or if the case has not yet been legally adjudicated, as long as the existing evidence sufficiently proves that the criminal act actually took place, this does not affect the determination of the crime of concealing or hiding criminal proceeds or gains derived from crime.

 

If the above actions also constitute other crimes, they shall be punished according to the provisions prescribing the heavier penalty, unless otherwise specified by law or judicial interpretations.

 

(6) If an internet service provider fails to fulfill its information network security management obligations as stipulated by laws and administrative regulations, and refuses to take corrective measures after being ordered to do so by the regulatory authorities, resulting in the widespread dissemination of fraudulent information or causing severe consequences due to user data breaches, criminal responsibility shall be pursued under Article 286-1 of the Criminal Law for the crime of "refusal to perform information network security management obligations." If the conduct also constitutes the crime of fraud, sentencing and punishment shall be determined according to the provision imposing the heavier penalty.

 

(7) Conducting activities as stipulated in Articles 287-1 and 287-2 of the Criminal Law—specifically, committing the crime of illegally using information networks or aiding and abetting cybercrime—and simultaneously constituting the crime of fraud—shall be punished according to the provision carrying the heavier penalty.

 

(8) Financial institutions, internet service providers, telecommunications operators, and other entities engaged in business activities—when they violate relevant national regulations and are exploited by telecom and online fraud criminals, resulting in property losses to others—are legally liable for their respective responsibilities. If such actions constitute a crime, criminal responsibility will be pursued according to law.

 

4. Accurately Determining Joint Criminal Conduct and Subjective Intent

 

(1) A criminal organization consisting of three or more individuals that is relatively stable and formed specifically to commit telecom and internet fraud offenses shall be identified as a fraud syndicate in accordance with the law. The principal offenders who organize and lead the criminal syndicate shall be punished according to all the crimes committed by the group. Those who organize, direct, plan, or serve as core members within the syndicate will be severely penalized under the law.

 

For accomplices who play a secondary or supportive role in criminal organizations, especially those who turn themselves in within the prescribed period, actively assist in apprehending the principal offender, and proactively help recover stolen assets, penalties will be mitigated or reduced in accordance with the law.

 

For principal offenders other than the ringleaders of criminal organizations, they should be punished according to all the crimes they participated in or organized and directed. These "all crimes" include not only the specific amounts of fraud that can be verified, but also details such as the number of fraudulent messages sent, the number of times fraudulent phone calls were made, and the number of times fraudulent web pages were viewed.

 

(2) When multiple individuals jointly commit telecom and internet fraud, the suspects and defendants shall be held accountable for all fraudulent activities carried out by the criminal group during the period they were involved. Those who play a primary role in the specific stages of the crime may be identified as principal offenders, while those whose roles are secondary may be classified as accomplices.

 

The "period of involvement" as defined above begins from the moment the suspect or defendant first commences the fraudulent act.

 

(III) Anyone who knowingly assists others in committing telecom or online fraud crimes, and falls under any of the following circumstances, shall be treated as a co-perpetrator—unless otherwise specified by law or judicial interpretations:

 

1. Providing credit cards, fund payment settlement accounts, mobile phone SIM cards, and communication devices;

2. Illegally obtaining, selling, or providing citizens' personal information;

3. Manufacturing, selling, or providing malicious programs such as "trojan" software and "phishing tools";

4. Providing "fake base station" equipment or related services;

5. Providing technical support such as internet access, server hosting, network storage, and communication transmission, or offering assistance with payment processing and settlement;

6. When providing technical services such as number-changing software or call-line solutions, if it is discovered that the caller ID has been altered to match numbers belonging to domestic Party and government agencies, judicial authorities, or public service departments, or if overseas users have had their numbers redirected to domestic numbers—and yet the service is still provided—

7. Providing assistance such as funding, venue, transportation, and living support;

8. Assisting in the transfer of proceeds and gains derived from fraud-related crimes, as well as facilitating cash withdrawals or cashing out.

 

The aforementioned provision regarding "knowingly assisting others in committing telecom and online fraud crimes" should be determined through a comprehensive analysis, taking into account both subjective and objective factors such as the defendant’s cognitive ability, past experiences, frequency and methods of their actions, relationship with the other parties involved, financial gains, whether they have previously been penalized for telecom or online fraud, and whether they deliberately attempted to evade investigation.

 

(4) Those who recruit others to carry out telecom and internet fraud activities, or who create or provide fraud schemes, terminology lists, voice packs, messages, or other related materials, will be prosecuted as co-perpetrators of fraud.

 

(5) Although some suspects remain at large, if this does not affect the determination of criminal facts against those suspects and defendants who have already been apprehended, their criminal responsibilities may be pursued in accordance with the law without delay.

 

5. Determine jurisdiction over the case in accordance with the law

 

(1) Telecommunications network fraud cases are generally investigated by the public security organ in the jurisdiction where the crime occurred. However, if it is more appropriate for the public security organ in the suspect’s place of residence to initiate the investigation, they may do so instead. The "jurisdiction" includes both the location where the criminal act took place and the place where the criminal consequences were realized.

 

"The location of the crime" includes the locations of website servers used in telecom network fraud, the places where the websites were established or managed, the locations of compromised computer information systems or their administrators, the locations of computer systems used by suspects and victims, as well as the originating, transmitting, reaching, and receiving points of fraudulent phone calls, text messages, emails, and other communication methods. It also encompasses the sites where the fraudulent activities were continuously carried out, as well as the locations associated with preparation, initiation, transit, and termination of the criminal acts.

 

“The place where the crime’s consequences occurred” includes the location where the victim was deceived, as well as the actual locations where the fraudulently obtained assets were acquired, concealed, transferred, used, or sold.

 

(II) For cases initially detected by public security authorities in the location where the telecom network fraud first occurred—cases where the amount defrauded did not yet meet the threshold for "significant amount" at the time—investigation may still be initiated and pursued by the public security agency that originally discovered the crime, provided that the total amount eventually reaches or exceeds the "significant amount" criterion.

 

(III) If any of the following circumstances exist, the relevant public security authorities may consolidate investigations within the scope of their responsibilities:

 

1. One person committing multiple crimes;

2. Jointly committed;

3. When suspects involved in a joint crime also commit other crimes;

4. The crimes committed by multiple suspects are directly linked, and consolidating the cases for joint investigation will help clarify the facts of the matter.

 

(Four) For criminal cases involving multi-tiered, cross-regional telecom network fraud—such as those arising from online transactions, technical support, or fund payment and settlement—a common higher-level public security authority may designate relevant public security agencies to initiate investigations, guided by principles that facilitate a clear understanding of the criminal facts and ensure efficient legal proceedings.

 

(5) In cases of telecom and cyber fraud—or other crimes—where multiple public security agencies have jurisdiction to initiate investigations, the case shall be investigated by the public security agency that first received the report or by the agency responsible for the primary crime scene. If there is a dispute, the issue will be resolved through consultation, guided by the principle of facilitating a clear investigation of the criminal facts and ensuring efficient legal proceedings. If no agreement can be reached after consultation, the common higher-level public security authority will designate the relevant agency to take over the investigation.

 

(6) Criminal cases involving telecom and internet fraud committed overseas may be assigned by the Ministry of Public Security to relevant public security agencies for investigation and prosecution, based on principles that facilitate the clarification of criminal facts and the smooth progression of legal proceedings.

 

(7) For cases where public security organs have initiated an investigation, merged cases for joint investigation, or, due to jurisdictional disputes, have been assigned to investigate by their common higher-level public security authority—when such cases require approval for arrest, referral for review and prosecution, or initiation of public prosecution—they shall be handled by the People's Procuratorate and People's Court located in the area where the public security organ that originally took action is situated.

 

For major, difficult, and complex cases, as well as cases involving foreign entities, public security organs should notify the people's procuratorates and people's courts at the same level before officially initiating an investigation.

 

(8) In jointly committed telecom fraud cases where jurisdiction has already been established, once the fugitive suspects are apprehended, jurisdiction typically reverts to the public security organs, people's procuratorates, and people's courts that originally had authority over the case.

 

6. Collection and Examination & Evaluation of Evidence

 

(1) When handling telecom network fraud cases, if it is objectively impossible to collect statements from each victim due to constraints such as the large number of victims, investigators may, instead, comprehensively determine the number of victims and the amount of fraudulently obtained funds by integrating the collected victim statements with verified bank account transaction records, third-party payment settlement account records, call logs, electronic data, and other corroborating evidence.

 

(2) Case evidence collected by public security organs through technical investigation measures, when used as evidence, must be submitted along with the legal documents approving the implementation of such measures, as well as the evidence materials gathered, and a written explanation must be provided regarding their source and other relevant details.

 

(3) Evidence materials obtained from overseas—whether requested from judicial authorities in the location where the evidence is found pursuant to international treaties, criminal justice assistance agreements, mutual legal assistance arrangements, or based on the principle of equality and mutual benefit; or collected through international police cooperation mechanisms or initiated via INTERPOL for collaborative evidence-gathering procedures—may, once verified as authentic, be used as a basis for reaching a final decision. Public security authorities shall provide detailed explanations regarding the evidence’s origin, the individuals who collected it, the specific time of collection, as well as information about the person or entity that provided the evidence, the timing of their contribution, and the process involved in its safekeeping and handover.

 

For other evidence materials originating from outside the country, their source, the provider, the time of provision, as well as the person who collected them and the time of collection, should all be carefully reviewed. Evidence that can substantiate the facts of the case and meets the requirements stipulated by the Criminal Procedure Law may be admitted as valid evidence.

 

7. Handling of Property Involved in the Case

 

(1) When public security organs investigate and handle telecommunications and internet fraud cases, they shall submit the illicit funds and赃物 involved in the case along with a detailed list. Upon filing an indictment, the People's Procuratorate must simultaneously hand over these materials to the people's court that accepted the case, while also providing recommendations on how the illicit funds and赃物 should be handled.

 

(2) Funds held in the bank accounts or third-party payment accounts involved in the case—specifically, legitimate property belonging to clearly identified victims—shall be promptly returned. If, due to objective reasons, it is impossible to verify all victims, but there is evidence demonstrating that the account was used for telecommunications and internet fraud crimes, and the defendant cannot provide a lawful explanation for the source of the funds, such funds shall, pursuant to Article 64 of the Criminal Law, be deemed illegal proceeds and subject to confiscation.

 

(III) If the defendant has used the fraudulently obtained property to pay off debts or transferred it to others, and one of the following circumstances applies, the property shall be recovered according to law:

 

1. Received knowingly as fraudulent property;

2. When the other party obtains the fraudulent property without payment;

3. The other party obtained the fraudulent property at a price significantly lower than the market value;

4. The other party obtained the fraudulent property as a result of illegal debt or unlawful criminal activities.

 

If someone acquires fraudulently obtained property in good faith, it will not be subject to recovery.

 

Fa Fa [2021] No. 22

Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security

On the Application of Laws to Criminal Cases Involving Telecommunications and Internet Fraud

Opinions on Several Issues (II)

 

To further strengthen the legal crackdown on telecom and cyber fraud crimes, and to implement a comprehensive, end-to-end approach targeting both upstream and downstream related offenses, this Opinion has been formulated based on provisions of laws such as the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China and the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China, along with relevant judicial interpretations. It addresses emerging key issues identified in judicial practice and aligns with practical operational needs.

 

I. The jurisdiction over telecom and internet fraud crimes, in addition to the locations where the criminal acts occurred and where the outcomes took place as specified in the "Opinions on Several Legal Issues Concerning the Handling of Criminal Cases such as Telecom and Internet Fraud" issued by the Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security, also includes:

 

(1) Locations where SIM cards, data plans, and IoT cards used in criminal activities are opened, sold, transferred, or concealed;

(II) The locations where credit cards used in criminal activities are opened, sold, transferred, concealed, or utilized, as well as the places where funds are delivered to or withdrawn from counterparties involved in financial transactions;

(III) The locations where bank accounts and non-bank payment accounts used for criminal activities were opened, sold, or utilized, as well as the locations where funds were delivered to or withdrawn by the counterparties involved in the financial transactions;

(IV) The locations from which instant messaging messages used for criminal activities, as well as advertising and promotional information, are sent, received, or delivered;

(5) Locations where hardware devices such as "cat pools" (Modem Pools), GOIP equipment, and multi-SIM card devices used in criminal activities are sold, connected to networks, or concealed;

(6) The places where internet accounts used for criminal activities are sold or accessed.

 

II. Providing tools, technical support, or other assistance for telecommunications and internet fraud crimes, as well as aiding in concealing or disguising the proceeds of such crimes and any gains derived from them—particularly when these activities form a multi-tiered criminal chain—or when the same website, communication group, financial account, or crime hub is used to carry out multiple telecommunications and internet fraud offenses—shall be deemed as evidence that the crimes committed by several suspects or defendants are interconnected. In such cases, people's courts, people's procuratorates, and public security organs may consolidate the cases for handling within their respective jurisdictions.

 

III. If there is evidence confirming that the perpetrator participated in an overseas fraud criminal group or gang and carried out telecom and internet fraud targeting residents within China, and while the exact amount of the fraud remains difficult to verify, the individual has spent a cumulative total of 30 days or more—or made multiple trips—over the course of one year to overseas fraud hubs, such behavior shall be deemed as "other serious circumstances" as stipulated in Article 266 of the Criminal Law, and criminal liability for fraud will be pursued according to law. This does not apply, however, if evidence proves that the individual traveled abroad for legitimate purposes.

 

4. Holding another person's corporate settlement card without a valid reason constitutes "illegally possessing another person's credit card," as defined in Paragraph (2) of Article 177-1 of the Criminal Law.

 

V. Illegally obtaining, selling, or providing internet account credentials—including those enabling information publishing, instant messaging, payment processing, and settlement—and personal biometric data, if meeting the criteria outlined in Article 253-1 of the Criminal Law, shall be prosecuted under the crime of infringing upon citizens' personal information.

 

The number of bulk internet account passwords and personal biometric data will be directly determined based on the quantities seized, unless there is evidence indicating that the information is inaccurate or duplicated.

 

6. When registering online for mobile phone cards, credit cards, bank accounts, or non-bank payment accounts, using someone else's identity document information and replacing the photo on that document to pass online verification constitutes the act of forging identity documents. Such actions, if meeting the criteria outlined in Article 280, Paragraph 3 of the Criminal Law, will result in criminal liability under the charge of "forging identity documents."

 

Using forged or altered identification documents, or illegally using someone else's identity documents to obtain mobile phone cards, credit cards, bank accounts, or non-bank payment accounts—when such actions meet the criteria outlined in Article 280-1, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Law—will result in criminal liability under the charge of "using false or stolen identity documents."

 

If the above two actions simultaneously constitute other crimes, they shall be punished according to the provisions prescribing the heavier penalty, unless otherwise specified by law or judicial interpretations.

 

VII. Conducting any of the following actions with the intent of assisting others in using information networks to commit crimes may be considered "assisting" behavior as defined under Article 287-2 of the Criminal Law:

 

(1) Acquiring, selling, or renting credit cards, bank accounts, non-bank payment accounts, internet account credentials with payment and settlement functions, network payment interfaces, or online banking digital certificates;

 

(II) Acquiring, selling, or leasing other people's mobile phone cards, data plans, or IoT cards.

 

8. When determining whether a person has knowingly allowed another to commit crimes using information networks—as stipulated in Article 287-2 of the Criminal Law—the court shall assess, based on the number, quantity, and type of credit cards, bank accounts, non-bank payment accounts, internet account credentials with payment and settlement functions, online payment interfaces, online banking digital certificates, or even mobile phone SIM cards, data plans, IoT cards, etc., that the individual has acquired, sold, or rented, combined with the person’s cognitive abilities, past experiences, the identities of their transaction partners, their relationship with those who carried out the information network crimes, the timing and manner in which technical support or assistance was provided, the extent of financial gain obtained, and the individual’s own statements—taking into account both subjective and objective factors comprehensively.

 

Acquiring, selling, or renting corporate bank settlement accounts, as well as corporate payment accounts held by non-bank payment institutions, or when industry professionals in sectors such as telecommunications, banking, and online payments illegally establish and sell or rent out others' mobile phone cards, credit cards, bank accounts, or non-bank payment accounts—taking advantage of their job responsibilities or service-related access—may be deemed as "other circumstances sufficient to establish that the perpetrator knowingly acted," as stipulated in Article 11, Item (7) of the "Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Involving Illegal Use of Information Networks and Assistance in Cybercrime Activities." However, this presumption may be rebutted by contrary evidence.

 

9. If one knowingly provides any of the following forms of assistance to another person who is using the information network to commit a crime, it may be deemed as "other serious circumstances" as stipulated in Paragraph 1, Item (7) of Article 12 of the "Interpretation by the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Involving Illegal Use of Information Networks and Assistance in Cybercrime Activities":

 

(1) Acquiring, selling, or renting 5 or more credit cards, bank accounts, non-bank payment accounts, internet account passwords with payment and settlement functions, network payment interfaces, or online banking digital certificates;

 

(II) Acquiring, selling, or leasing 20 or more mobile phone cards, data plans, or IoT cards belonging to others.

 

10. Distributors of e-commerce platform prepaid cards, virtual currencies, mobile phone top-up cards, game point cards, and in-game equipment—when explicitly informed by public security authorities during criminal investigations that their transaction partners are suspected of telecom and online fraud—yet continue engaging in transactions with them—shall be held criminally liable under Article 287-2 of the Criminal Law for allegedly aiding and abetting cybercrime activities. If such conduct also constitutes other crimes, sentencing will follow the provisions prescribing the heavier penalty.

 

11. Anyone who knowingly transfers, cashes out, or withdraws funds derived from telecommunications or internet fraud crimes—using any of the following methods—and whose actions meet the criteria outlined in Article 312, Paragraph 1, of the Criminal Law, shall be held criminally accountable for the crime of concealing or disguising the proceeds of crime and the gains derived therefrom. However, this does not apply if there is clear evidence demonstrating that the individual genuinely had no knowledge of the illegal origin of the funds.

 

(1) Repeatedly using, or employing multiple payment codes and online payment interfaces opened under non-personal identity verification, to assist others in transferring funds, cashing out, or withdrawing cash;

(II) Converting assets into cash or withdrawing funds through e-commerce platform prepaid cards, virtual currencies, mobile phone top-up cards, game point cards, in-game equipment, at prices significantly different from market rates;

(III) Assisting in the conversion or transfer of assets while charging "handling fees" that are significantly higher than market rates.

 

Those who carry out the aforementioned actions after prior collusion shall be treated as jointly committing a crime; if such actions also constitute other criminal offenses, they shall be convicted and punished according to the provisions prescribing the heavier penalty—unless otherwise specified by law or judicial interpretations.

 

Twelve, providing technical support, advertising promotion, payment processing, or other assistance to others who commit telecom and internet fraud crimes; or concealing, transferring, acquiring, acting as a sales agent for, or otherwise disguising or hiding the proceeds and gains derived from such fraud—while the fraudulent acts themselves can be confirmed, if the perpetrators have not yet been apprehended, criminal responsibility may still be pursued in accordance with the law against those suspects or defendants who have already been taken into custody.

 

13. Public security organs in the jurisdiction where the case is being handled may access, through their own information systems, evidence materials such as criminal case filing records, decisions to initiate investigations, and victim statements lawfully prepared or collected by public security agencies in other jurisdictions. When retrieving such materials, at least two investigators must be present, and the time of retrieval, along with the name of the information system used, must be documented. The retrievers must sign the documentation, which will then be stamped with the official seal of the handling agency. Once verified as authentic, these materials can be admitted as valid evidence.

 

14. For overseas evidence materials collected through international police cooperation or transferred by foreign law enforcement agencies, if the foreign police failed to provide documentation regarding the discovery, collection, storage, and handover of such evidence due to objective limitations, public security authorities shall prepare a written explanation detailing the source of the evidence, the transfer process, as well as its type, quantity, and distinctive features. This explanation must be signed by two or more investigators and stamped with the official seal of the public security agency. If, after review, the evidence is deemed sufficient to substantiate the facts of the case, it may be admitted as valid evidence.

 

15. For telecom and cyber fraud suspects who have been apprehended and detained by foreign judicial authorities but are subsequently tried in China, the period of detention abroad may be credited toward their prison sentence.

 

16. When handling criminal cases involving telecom and internet fraud, it is essential to fully implement the criminal policy of combining leniency with strictness. Throughout the investigation, prosecution review, and trial processes, comprehensive evidence collection should be conducted, and suspects and defendants must be accurately identified based on their hierarchical roles and levels of involvement in the joint crime. Additionally, their attitudes toward admitting guilt and their expressions of remorse should be carefully assessed. By differentiating among individuals appropriately—applying both leniency and severity as warranted—and ensuring scientifically balanced sentencing, we can guarantee that punishments are proportionate to the crimes committed.

 

For criminal groups and organizers, planners, commanders, and key members involved in telecom and internet fraud schemes—especially those who exploit minors, students, seniors, or people with disabilities—we will impose strict legal penalties.

 

For accomplices in telecom network fraud criminal groups or gangs—particularly those who have been involved for a relatively short period, committed frauds of relatively low amounts, performed auxiliary roles while receiving minimal compensation, or are first-time offenders, occasional offenders, minors, or students—courts should comprehensively consider their specific roles and contributions within the joint crime, the degree of social harm caused, their level of subjective malice, personal risk to society, and their attitude toward admitting guilt and showing remorse. Based on these factors, lighter or reduced penalties may be imposed in accordance with the law. In cases involving minor offenses, prosecution may be waived entirely or criminal punishment may be exempted altogether. For offenses that are clearly minor and pose negligible harm, no criminal charges should be filed at all.

 

17. Funds seized from the accounts involved in the case should first be returned to the victims; if these funds are insufficient to cover the full amount, they should be returned proportionally.

 

 

Supreme People's Court, Supreme People's Procuratorate, Ministry of Public Security

June 17, 2021

 

 

Source: Supreme People's Court