

Wang Jun, Director of Beijing Starrise Law Firm
In cybercrime cases, electronic data is an indispensable and highly significant type of evidence. This is like the two sides of a coin: on the one hand, the evidence‑gathering efforts of public security organs are of paramount importance, and the parties concerned or the companies involved have an obligation to cooperate; on the other hand, such cooperation by citizens or the companies concerned is not without limits. It raises the question of where the boundary lies between safeguarding one’s own rights and cooperating with law enforcement—namely, how to strike a balance between rights and obligations. Next, I will elaborate on this topic from three perspectives.
The qualification of the entity conducting forensic examination of electronic data is a legal prerequisite for safeguarding cybersecurity.
In the civil and commercial spheres, informed consent is a fundamental principle. As long as the data subject is aware of and consents to the processing, the acquisition or copying of data by others generally does not pose a problem. However, the situation is entirely different in administrative or criminal contexts. While citizens and social organizations have an obligation to cooperate, such cooperation is contingent upon the administrative or public security authorities possessing lawful authorization.
In handling cybercrime cases, we have encountered a number of pressing issues. For example, who should be responsible for obtaining electronic data—public security organs or forensic institutions? This raises the question: what kind of procedural formalities are required—authorization documents, case‑filing documents, or investigative‑evidence‑collection documents? In practice, the ancillary issues that arise are exceedingly diverse.
We have encountered many. The situation of “obtaining evidence first, then completing the formalities later.” This practice varies in sophistication, ranging from sophisticated to crude. In most cases, investigators retroactively date documents; however, lapses sometimes occur—when a party states in the record, “The date of my authorization was backdated.” Such an assertion is not merely a procedural defect but a serious violation of due process. As defense counsel, we typically seize upon these procedural issues and, in conjunction with other substantive matters, mount our defense.
There is another scenario, one that we have also encountered in the course of handling cases: The victimized company independently collected evidence and commissioned an expert appraisal, after which the prosecutor submitted the relevant appraisal opinions and supporting data to the court. From a legal perspective, we of course do not accept such an expert opinion, as the impartiality of evidence collection and the objectivity of expert examination are fundamental principles and widely recognized standards. In this case, not only did the victimized company conduct its own evidence‑gathering and expert assessment, but the entire process was neither sealed nor recorded on video, leaving no way to ensure the authenticity and objectivity of the electronic evidence. Ultimately, we successfully challenged and excluded both the expert opinion closely tied to the electronic data and the corresponding site‑inspection and examination records, and the court declined to admit them.
The third scenario involves the forensic institution collecting evidence. Can an expert appraisal agency obtain evidence? I believe this should be examined on a case-by-case basis. In one online gambling case we handled, the technical director of the company involved issued a written authorization to a third-party forensic institution, permitting it to log into the company’s account and download backend data. So, what is the legal effect of this authorization document? Can it serve as a lawful basis for the investigating authorities to collect evidence?
First, it is necessary to establish a legal basis. The “Regulations on the Occupational Classification of Forensic Appraisals of Audio-Visual Materials” stipulates that appraisal institutions may extract and preserve network data that has been publicly released or authorized by the data owner. Accordingly, we surmise that the investigating authorities will rely on this regulation as the lawful foundation for sourcing data as forensic evidence. However, the investigating authorities have overlooked the hierarchical status and scope of application of this occupational classification regulation.
Furthermore, Article 12 of the General Provisions on Forensic Examination explicitly stipulates: “When entrusting an examination, the commissioning party shall provide the forensic institution with authentic, complete, and sufficient examination materials and shall be responsible for their authenticity and legality.” Article 24 states: “With the consent of the commissioning party, the forensic institution may dispatch personnel to the scene to collect examination materials. Such on-site collection must be conducted by no fewer than two staff members of the forensic institution, at least one of whom must be a forensic examiner qualified for the relevant matter. During on-site collection, a person designated or appointed by the commissioning party must be present to witness the process and sign the collection record.” In summary, it is… In litigation proceedings, forensic institutions must accept commissions from the case-handling authorities, thereby excluding instances of individual commissioning. Moreover, the evidence samples obtained by such institutions shall be provided by the commissioning party, which, in this context, can only be a public security, procuratorial, or judicial authority; no other entity may serve as the commissioning party. In addition, the Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security on the Collection, Extraction, and Examination and Adjudication of Electronic Data in Criminal Cases also stipulate that the collection and extraction of electronic data shall be conducted by two or more investigators.
In light of the aforementioned legal provisions and judicial interpretations, it is clear that, in criminal cases, only the investigative authorities may collect electronic data; forensic institutions may not accept direct authorization from the data subject nor independently extract evidence. The “Regulations on the Occupational Classification of Forensic Examination of Audio-Visual Materials” rank far below judicial interpretations in terms of legal authority and are primarily applicable to civil and commercial matters, where citizens or organizations commission such examinations on their own initiative—thus they do not apply to criminal cases.
Returning to the issue of rights protection for the parties involved in the case, we recommend focusing on: When collecting evidence, the investigating authority must ensure that the company involved in the case is present with either its legal representative or a witness. If, in exceptional circumstances, there are no witnesses, the law mandates video recording. In cases we have handled, we have successfully excluded expert opinions by relying on witness testimony or video evidence that revealed the involvement of individuals outside the investigating authority in the collection of evidence.
Appropriate methods for collecting and preserving electronic data are a necessary prerequisite for safeguarding cybersecurity and ensuring the smooth operation of enterprises.
With regard to methods of electronic data forensics, based on the “Regulations on the Collection, Extraction, and Examination and Adjudication of Electronic Data in Criminal Cases” issued by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security, I have summarized them into five categories.
The first method is to seize the original storage medium. This is one of the most direct and effective methods of evidence collection; when conditions permit, prioritizing this approach can best ensure the integrity and authenticity of electronic data.
The second method involves extracting electronic data through on-site collection or remote examination. In practical application, this scenario is quite common. For example, investigators who obtain the relevant account credentials may directly log into the account to extract the required electronic data; this approach is both flexible and efficient.
The third option is to print, take a photo, or record a video. If the previously mentioned methods of seizing original storage media and extracting data are both impractical, then printing, photographing, or recording can serve as alternative means of evidence collection, enabling the partial fixation and preservation of electronic data.
It should be noted that the three methods outlined above are arranged in a hierarchical order: priority is given to seizing the original storage medium; if seizure is not feasible, electronic data may be extracted; and only if extraction is also impractical should one proceed to printing, photographing, or video recording.
The fourth method is to freeze electronic data, and the fifth method is to retrieve electronic data. There is no hierarchy among these three methods, nor between them and the first method. In practical work, the most commonly encountered approaches to evidence collection are extracting electronic data and requesting access to electronic data. Data freezing may also be employed; however, given certain prerequisites—such as an excessively large volume of data, the risk of tampering during extraction, or the need to rely on online applications for dynamic visualization—the investigating authorities, out of prudence, do not invariably resort to freezing measures.
With the promulgation and implementation of the Law on the Promotion of the Private Economy and related regulations, optimizing the business environment and safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of private enterprises have become increasingly important. Therefore, if investigative authorities exercise caution in applying asset‑freezing measures, or promptly lift such freezes once they are no longer necessary, and return storage media after seizing them for evidence‑gathering purposes, they can ensure the normal operation of businesses while balancing the needs of investigations with the protection of private enterprises’ rights and interests—thus achieving a balanced approach that integrates three key objectives.
The independence of the entities responsible for forensic examination of electronic data constitutes a critical line of defense and a practical challenge in safeguarding cybersecurity.
With regard to the entities responsible for the forensic examination of electronic data, many may assume that such entities are specialized forensic institutions; however, in practice, certain circumstances arise that exceed expectations.
For example, The appraisal institution may have affiliations with the investigating firm and the auditing agency. Before a case is officially filed, the investigation agency may engage in technical investigative measures. By collaborating with database users—such as victims in cybercrime cases—it can, even prior to formal investigation or case initiation, gain insights into the business models and profit‑generating activities of the companies involved, and then submit the relevant data to forensic experts for analysis. From the perspective of the implicated companies, such situations are difficult to prevent; the only recourse is to strengthen routine data monitoring—covering data patterns, transaction volumes, and user behavior—and to issue timely alerts upon detecting any anomalies.
In addition, Auditing firms may also have issues. We once handled a cybercrime case in which the auditing firm exhibited unusual conduct. At the time the public security authorities commissioned the audit, the relevant evidentiary materials had not yet been obtained, as evidenced by the seizure and freezing records. Subsequently, through analysis of documentary evidence and examination of electronic data, we determined that the audit’s source material was actually derived from the forensic institution’s own evidence. Even more striking, the auditing firm completed an audit of over RMB 4 billion in transactional activity within a single day—raising serious suspicions that someone else was secretly carrying out the audit work.
Thus, in practice, third-party institutions that are supposed to be neutral and objective do not always manage to remain truly impartial and objective. In such cases, lawyers can identify these issues through the examination of electronic data—put in today’s popular parlance, this means… “Defeating magic with magic” specifically involves copying and analyzing electronic data, examining user behavior patterns—such as login times, whether recharge patterns have undergone sudden changes, IP address fluctuations, and whether new user registrations occur during unusual time periods—among other methods. Through data analysis, we can identify the issues in the collaboration between law enforcement agencies and third-party institutions and mount a defense by addressing the legality of the data sources at their root.
However, in judicial practice, merely challenging the legality of an expert opinion is often insufficient to overturn it. In many cases, we must integrate the issues of legality with those of authenticity in order to effectively “discredit” expert opinions or audit reports that are otherwise difficult to challenge.
Conclusion
Procedural legitimacy is an inviolable red line in the judicial practice of cybersecurity. In cases of cybercrime, the legal boundaries governing evidence collection by public security authorities not only affect judicial fairness but also directly impinge upon the legitimate rights and interests of the parties involved. Accordingly, it is imperative to proceed from three dimensions—evidence‑collecting entities, methods of evidence collection, and forensic appraisal bodies—scrupulously adhering to statutory provisions to ensure the legality and propriety of the evidentiary process; this constitutes another dimension of safeguarding cybersecurity. At the same time, defense counsel should proactively exercise their professional role, leveraging methodologies for examining electronic data and adopting a strategy that combines legality review with authenticity verification, thereby providing robust legal support and effective defense for the parties concerned.

Attorney Profile
.
Wang Jun
Director of Beijing Starrise Law Firm
Founding Partner
Director of Beijing Starrise Law Firm, Director of the Management Committee, and founding partner; holds undergraduate and master’s degrees from Huazhong University of Science and Technology. Member of the Criminal Procedure Law Specialized Committee and the Women Lawyers’ Working Committee of the 12th Beijing Lawyers Association; contracted author for Peking University Law Information Network; senior researcher at the Southern Finance Legal Research Institute; and public‑interest goodwill ambassador against telecom and online fraud. Has published numerous professional articles in leading journals such as People’s Procuratorate and China Lawyers. Certified by the International Information Science Examination Institute (EXIN) as both a Data Protection Officer (DPO) and a Data Protection Officer under the Personal Information Protection Law of China (DPOPIPL), and is also an SGS‑certified internal auditor for the ISO/IEC 42001:2023 Artificial Intelligence Management System.
He has successfully defended numerous criminal cases resulting in acquittals and possesses extensive practical experience in handling criminal–civil intersection cases and defending against property‑related penalties. He is particularly adept at representing clients in matters involving official misconduct, economic crimes, and cybercrime, with a wealth of hands‑on expertise, especially in the examination and analysis of electronic evidence.
Honors and Awards:
Fiscal Year 2025
Shortlisted for the ALB Legal Awards’ “NARA Annual Managing Partner Award”
LEGALBAND Client Choice: Top 15 Female Lawyers in China
Top 40 Chinese Legal Talents of GCP
GRCD China’s Female Lawyer of the Year
Fiscal Year 2024
Law New Agency’s Annual Power List: “Top 100 Outstanding Partners of the Year 2024”
China Business Law Journal “The A-List Legal Elite” award has once again recognized [the recipient] as a “Visionary Leader.”
The “Annual Managing Partner” award at the Guike Annual Conference.
LexisNexis 2024 “Under 40 Elite” Greater China List
LEGALBAND Client Choice “Top 15 Rising Partners List”
Fiscal Year 2023
China Business Law Journal “The A-List Legal Elite” awards selected him as a “Visionary Leader.”
The 8th Guike Annual Conference “A Breath of Fresh Air – Most Promising Growth Award”
Fiscal Year 2021
Awarded the “Gold Medal Lawyer” in the criminal defense category at the 21st Century Southern Financial and Legal Research Institute’s Gold Medal Lawyer Selection.
Layout: Wang Xin
Reviewed by: Management Committee


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