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(Promulgated on November 28, 2025, by Order No. 46 of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council; effective January 1, 2026)


Chapter I General Provisions


Article 1: In order to uphold the Party’s overall leadership over central enterprises, strengthen oversight by investors, standardize the accountability process for violations in business operations and investment activities of central enterprises, further improve the system for supervising and managing state-owned assets, ensure the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets, prevent the loss of state-owned assets, promote law-based and compliant business practices, and support the strengthening, optimization, and expansion of state-owned enterprises and state capital, these Measures are formulated in accordance with the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on State-Owned Assets in Enterprises, the Provisional Regulations on the Supervision and Administration of State-Owned Assets in Enterprises, the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Managers of State-Owned Enterprises, and the Opinions of the General Office of the State Council on Establishing a System of Accountability for Violations in Business Operations and Investment Activities of State-Owned Enterprises, as well as other relevant laws, regulations, and documents.


Article 2 For the purposes of these Measures, “central enterprises” refer to state‑owned enterprises in which the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (hereinafter referred to as SASAC) exercises the duties of an investor on behalf of the State Council.


Article 3. For the purposes of these Measures, “accountability for violations in business operations and investment” (hereinafter referred to as “accountability”) refers to the process by which, following investigation, verification, and determination of liability, relevant persons responsible for management and operation of central enterprises who have violated applicable regulations, failed to perform or improperly performed their duties, and thereby caused losses of state-owned assets or other adverse consequences in the course of business operations, are subject to disciplinary action.


The “provisions” referred to in the preceding paragraph include national laws and regulations, rules and regulations on the supervision of state-owned assets, relevant provisions issued by industry regulatory authorities, and internal management rules of enterprises, among others. The “failure to perform duties” mentioned in the preceding paragraph refers to the failure to exercise one’s powers or assume responsibilities within the prescribed time limit or within a reasonable and justified period; it generally encompasses inaction, refusal to perform duties, and undue delay in performing duties. The “improper performance of duties” refers to the inadequate or incomplete exercise of powers and assumption of responsibilities in accordance with applicable regulations and the requirements of the position; it typically includes exercising powers contrary to established procedures, exceeding one’s authority, or abusing one’s authority.


Article 4. The work of accountability shall adhere to the following principles:


(1) Uphold and strengthen the Party’s leadership. Guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, we will adhere to the principle of “two consistent principles,” integrate Party leadership throughout the entire process of accountability, reinforce a rigorous tone, stringent measures, and exacting standards, and take intra‑Party supervision as the leading force. We will promote the seamless integration and coordinated operation of investor oversight with various other forms of oversight, thereby establishing an accountability mechanism that is comprehensive in coverage, clearly defined in responsibilities, characterized by transparent procedures, and governed by standardized, orderly practices, so as to ensure the effective implementation of the decisions and arrangements of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council.


(2) Uphold accountability in accordance with laws and regulations. Taking national laws and regulations as the benchmark, and in compliance with the rules and regulations on state‑asset supervision, relevant provisions of industry regulatory authorities, and internal corporate management policies, we will rigorously hold accountable those enterprise management personnel who, by violating applicable provisions or failing to perform, or improperly performing, their duties, have caused losses to state assets or other adverse consequences, and implement lifelong accountability for major decision‑making.


(3) Uphold objectivity and impartiality in determining accountability. In accordance with the important guiding principle of “distinguishing among three categories,” and taking into account the specific circumstances of the enterprise, conduct a thorough investigation to verify the facts, nature, and consequences—both in terms of losses incurred and impacts sustained—of any violations. Consider both quantitative criteria and qualitative distinctions, ensuring that findings are clear, evidence is conclusive, characterization is accurate, and procedures are compliant. Identify the responsibilities of relevant personnel, safeguard the enthusiasm of those involved in corporate management and operations to pursue innovation and take initiative, and handle the accountability of responsible parties appropriately and fairly.


(4) Adhere to a tiered and layered accountability system. In principle, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and central enterprises shall delineate their respective responsibilities for accountability in accordance with the state‑capital investment relationships and the authority over cadre management, organize accountability efforts at different levels, and hold operating and managerial personnel at various levels of the enterprise accountable, thereby establishing an accountability framework that is tiered, effectively coordinated, and seamlessly integrated across all levels.


(5) Uphold the integrated approach of disciplinary accountability, education, and institutional development. While holding those responsible for violations in business operations and investment strictly accountable, we will intensify efforts to summarize and publicize typical cases, strengthen cautionary education, and enhance deterrence, thereby encouraging central enterprises to continuously refine their rules and regulations, close management loopholes, elevate operational and managerial standards, safeguard and enhance the value of state‑owned assets, and promote high‑quality development.


Article 5: In the course of accountability investigations, thorough inquiries shall be conducted into underlying practices such as the misappropriation of state-owned assets, the conversion of public resources to private gain, and the transfer of benefits. Where personnel involved in enterprise management are found to be suspected of disciplinary violations, official misconduct, or criminal offenses, the relevant cases shall be referred, in accordance with applicable regulations, to the discipline inspection and supervision authorities or the judicial organs for handling in compliance with laws and regulations.


Chapter 2: Scope of Accountability


Article 6: Where personnel responsible for the operation and management of central enterprises, in violation of relevant regulations, fail to perform or improperly perform their duties, thereby giving rise to any of the circumstances set forth in Articles 7 through 19 of these Measures and causing losses to state-owned assets or other adverse consequences, they shall be held accountable accordingly.


Article 7: Circumstances for Accountability in Group-Level Governance and Control:


(1) Failure to implement, or inadequate implementation of, the Party and the state’s principles, policies, decisions, and arrangements, as well as relevant national regulations on group‑level business management and control, resulting in asset losses or other adverse consequences;


(2) Making decisions, approving, or organizing the implementation of major business and investment matters in violation of prescribed procedures or beyond authorized powers; or such decisions, approvals, or implementations contravene the Party and the state’s principles, policies, strategic arrangements, and relevant national regulations.


(3) Violation of regulations on the management of core responsibilities and principal business; insufficient focus on developing the core business; and deviations in development positioning, direction, and strategy.


(4) Deficiencies in the Group’s internal control system and its implementation have resulted in oversight of significant risk factors and other issues, or, even when such risks were identified, failure to report or address them in a timely manner.


(5) Establishing multi-tiered structures to conduct business in violation of relevant regulations in order to evade regulatory oversight;


(6) Violating the state’s policies on income distribution, failing to perform duties effectively, and maintaining non‑compliant practices in the remuneration management of heads of subordinate subsidiaries;


(7) A subsidiary under its jurisdiction has committed a serious violation of regulations, discipline, or laws, resulting in substantial asset losses that significantly impact the Group’s production, operations, and financial condition, or giving rise to grave adverse consequences;


(8) Subsidiaries engage in financing‑related trading activities or conduct fictitious trading practices such as “empty turnover,” “order‑chasing,” and circular transactions in violation of applicable regulations;


(9) Refusal to implement, procrastination in implementing, or falsification of corrective measures required by relevant national regulatory authorities with respect to significant issues related to business operations and investment.


Article 8: Circumstances for Accountability in Risk Management:


(1) Failure to fulfill, as required, the duties of establishing compliance management, internal control, and risk management systems, resulting in the absence of such systems and significant deficiencies in internal control processes;


(2) Compliance management, internal control, and risk management systems have not been implemented or have been inadequately enforced, resulting in the failure to promptly analyze, identify, assess, issue early warnings for, address, and report significant operational and investment risks.


(3) Failure to conduct legal reviews, as required, of the enterprise’s rules and regulations, economic contracts, and significant decisions;


(4) Failure to comply with relevant regulations on the supervision of state-owned assets, resulting in off-balance-sheet liabilities, disguised borrowing, or excessive indebtedness that triggers a debt crisis and jeopardizes the enterprise’s going‑concern status;


(5) Maliciously evading or defaulting on financial debts;


(6) Concealing, failing to report, falsely reporting, or delaying the reporting of significant risks and risk‑related loss events; directing the preparation of false financial reports, thereby causing serious distortions in accounting information and substantial discrepancies between a company’s books and its actual assets.


(7) Failing to adequately report significant operational risk events, or responding and handling such events untimely and ineffectively.


Article 9: Circumstances for Accountability in Procurement and Sales Management:


(1) Failing to conclude or perform contracts in accordance with the prescribed procedures, or failing to perform or improperly performing one’s duties, thereby causing the contract price to be manifestly unfair;


(2) Failure to perform the contract in accordance with its terms, or abandonment of contractual rights without just cause;


(3) Illegally exploiting related-party transactions to transfer benefits;


(4) Failure to conduct tendering in accordance with the prescribed procedures or failure to implement the tender results;


(5) Providing credit sales, qualifications, guarantees, or advance payments in violation of applicable regulations; or engaging in disguised financing or investment through business prepayments or commodity transactions, among other means.


(6) Failure to promptly pursue receivables or take effective preservation measures as required;


(7) Employing fraudulent practices, irrelevant diversification, and other methods to fabricate or inflate operating revenue.


Article 10: Circumstances for Accountability in Engineering Contracting and Construction:


(1) Failure to conduct, as required, due diligence and feasibility studies or risk assessments on the subject matter of the contract;


(2) Failing to comply with prescribed decision-making and approval procedures, or engaging in bidding without authorization or beyond the scope of authorized authority;


(3) Violating regulations by securing a contract through a bid priced below cost without a reasonable commercial justification;


(4) Failing to follow the prescribed decision-making and approval procedures, and entering into or amending contracts without authorization;


(5) Failure to conduct a rigorous review of the contract terms in accordance with prescribed procedures, resulting in significant omissions;


(6) Projects, as well as goods and services related to project construction, have not been subject to tendering in accordance with the relevant regulations, or tendering has been circumvented.


(7) Subcontracting, subcontracting in violation of applicable regulations, and other such practices;


(8) Making payments in excess of the agreed contract amounts or beyond the scheduled progress.


Article 11: Circumstances for Accountability in Financial Operations:


(1) Investing in various financial institutions without complying with the prescribed decision-making and review‑filing procedures;


(2) Initiating the establishment of, or making capital contributions to, a private equity investment fund without complying with the prescribed decision-making and review‑filing procedures;


(3) Conducting trust, leasing, factoring, and other financial businesses, as well as fund‑related activities, in violation of applicable regulations; failing to adequately support the core business; and shifting from the real economy to the virtual economy.


(4) Conducting futures, options, and other financial derivative activities in violation of applicable regulations;


(5) Accepting customer funds without recording them in the books, illegally soliciting public deposits or engaging in disguised forms of public deposit‑taking, and participating in, or engaging in disguised participation in, private lending in violation of applicable regulations;


(6) Breaching fiduciary duties by improperly using client funds or other assets held in trust or on behalf of others.


Article 12: Circumstances for Accountability in the Field of Scientific and Technological Innovation:


(1) By manufacturing and selling, or procuring, counterfeit or falsely labeled domestically produced products, they falsely reported having completed the research‑and‑development task.


(2) Falsifying the progress of assigned scientific and technological innovation tasks or making false reports on research outcomes;


(3) Obtaining approval for scientific research activities through deception or other improper means; securing projects under science and technology programs (including special projects, funds, etc.), research funding, awards, honors, positions, or professional titles; falsely reporting, fraudulently claiming, embezzling, misappropriating, or diverting government‑funded science and technology funds.


(4) Obtaining subsidies and support through fraudulent means, such as establishing shell companies or using counterfeit or unauthorized branding.


(5) The statistics on R&D expenditures were inaccurate, with false listings and inflated reporting of R&D spending.


Article 13: Circumstances for Accountability in Fund Management:


(1) Raising and using funds in violation of decision-making and approval procedures or beyond the scope of authorized powers;


(2) Violating regulations by retaining funds in one’s personal name, conducting income and expenditure settlements, opening bank accounts, and other such practices;


(3) Establishing “slush funds”;


(4) Raising funds, issuing stocks or bonds, making donations, providing guarantees, entrusting wealth management, lending or borrowing funds, or opening letters of credit and processing bank drafts in violation of applicable regulations;


(5) Falsely inflating expenditures to misappropriate funds;


(6) Violating regulations by arbitrarily setting remuneration and overpaying or improperly disbursing employee compensation and benefits;


(7) Due to deficiencies in internal financial controls or failure to comply with internal financial control policies, incidents of misappropriation, embezzlement, theft, fraud, and other such misconduct have occurred.


(8) Illegally lending funds;


(9) Failure to manage and utilize the relevant special funds in dedicated accounts as required.


Article 14: Circumstances for Accountability in Property Rights Management:


(1) Failing to follow the prescribed decision-making and approval procedures, or transferring or reallocating state-owned property rights beyond the scope of authorized authority;


(2) Financial audits and asset appraisals violate relevant regulations;


(3) Concealing assets that should be subject to audit and valuation; instructing or directing the provision and disclosure of false information; and soliciting or directing intermediary agencies to issue false financial audit reports, asset valuation certifications, legal opinions, or other such documents.


(4) Failure to implement the recusal system in accordance with relevant regulations;


(5) Violating relevant regulations and the principles of open and fair trading by transferring, at below-market prices, corporate equity, shares of listed companies, and assets, among other things;


(6) Conducting transactions or transfers of state-owned assets in violation of applicable regulations;


(7) Failure to comply with the prescribed procedures for managing state‑owned shareholder identification; unauthorized management of the names of state‑owned enterprises and the trade names within such names; and unauthorized use of enterprise licenses and qualification certificates.


(8) Failing to carry out property rights registration for state‑invested enterprises in accordance with the relevant regulations, or using the certificate (form) of state‑owned asset property rights registration in violation of applicable provisions;


(9) Engaging in unauthorized nominee shareholding, fictitious controlling interests, exercising control without actual authority, sham joint ventures, or operating under a shell‑company arrangement, among other violations.


Article 15: Circumstances for Accountability in Fixed Asset Investment:


(1) Failure to conduct a feasibility study or risk analysis as required;


(2) The project cost estimate was not reviewed in accordance with the prescribed procedures and deviated significantly from actual conditions;


(3) Instructing or directing intermediary agencies or relevant entities to issue false reports;


(4) During the decision-making process, significant risk factors were not adequately considered, and no risk mitigation plan was developed.


(5) Making investments without complying with the prescribed decision-making and approval procedures;


(6) The procurement and construction project was not subject to tendering in accordance with the relevant regulations, and tendering was interfered with, circumvented, or manipulated.


(7) Unauthorized alteration of the engineering design, construction scope, or additional investment;


(8) Project management is chaotic, resulting in severe construction delays or project abandonment, and costs are significantly higher than those of comparable projects.


(9) Significant changes occur in the external environment or in the project itself, yet the investment plan is not promptly adjusted and stop-loss measures are not implemented as required;


(10) Conducting investment projects that are expressly prohibited or not subject to filing under the prescribed investment supervision regime;


(11) Failing to conduct post‑evaluation of investment projects as required, submitting false information in the course of such evaluations, or having violations identified through post‑evaluation.


Article 16: Circumstances for Accountability in Equity Investment:


(1) Failure to conduct due diligence as required, or failure of due diligence to include risk analysis and other necessary steps, resulting in material omissions;


(2) Financial audits, asset appraisals, or valuations that violate relevant regulations;


(3) Instructing or directing intermediary agencies or relevant entities to issue false reports;


(4) Failure to comply with prescribed decision-making and approval procedures; undertaking projects whose risks exceed the entity’s risk‑bearing capacity; or failing to adequately consider significant risk factors and to develop risk‑mitigation contingency plans.


(5) Violating regulations by providing financing to other joint venture or cooperative partners in various forms, or by means such as high‑premium acquisitions to transfer benefits to related parties;


(6) The investment contract, agreement, and the target company’s articles of association, among other legal documents, contain provisions that undermine state-owned interests, resulting in a loss of control over the management of the target company.


(7) Making an early payment of the merger and acquisition consideration in violation of the contractual provisions;


(8) Following an investment or acquisition, integration was not carried out in accordance with the relevant work plan, resulting in a loss of control over the target company’s management.


(9) Failure to exercise corresponding shareholder rights after making equity investments, and failure to promptly implement loss‑mitigation measures when material changes occur;


(10) Deviating from the approved core business and strategic investment plan, thereby creating non‑core assets through substantial debt financing;


(11) Conducting investment projects that are expressly prohibited or not subject to filing under the prescribed investment supervision regime;


(12) Failing to conduct post‑evaluation of investment projects as required, submitting false information in the course of such evaluations, or, following a post‑evaluation, being found to have engaged in violations.


Article 17: Circumstances for Accountability in Restructuring and Reorganization:


(1) Failure to comply with the prescribed decision-making and approval procedures;


(2) Failure to organize and carry out asset inventory, financial audits, and asset appraisals in accordance with the relevant regulations;


(3) Intentionally transferring or concealing state-owned assets, or providing false information to intermediary agencies, and instructing or directing such agencies to issue falsified certification results regarding asset inventory and verification, financial audits, and asset appraisals;


(4) Converting state-owned assets into equity at a conspicuously unfair low price, selling them, or distributing them free of charge to other entities or individuals;


(5) During the restructuring and reform processes, including the development of a mixed‑ownership economy, the implementation of employee stock ownership, bankruptcy reorganization, or liquidation, failure to comply with applicable regulations results in the disguised misappropriation or private division of state‑owned assets.


(6) Failing to collect the proceeds from the transfer of state-owned assets in accordance with the prescribed procedures;


(7) The articles of association and other legal documents of the restructured entity contain provisions that prejudice state-owned interests.


Article 18: Circumstances for Accountability in the Area of Overseas Business and Investment:


(1) Failure to establish, as required, the enterprise’s internal management systems for overseas investment, resulting in inadequate oversight and control of such investments;


(2) Violation of the management system for overseas state-owned property rights;


(3) Failing to conduct risk assessments as required and to implement effective risk mitigation measures when making overseas investments or undertaking overseas projects, or lacking adequate controls over risks associated with overseas operations;


(4) Engaging in improper business practices in violation of applicable regulations, and engaging in cutthroat competition without regard for costs or consequences;


(5) Violating regulations by paying intermediary agencies fees for the procurement of agency‑type or other intermediary services;


(6) Overseas investment projects that, in violation of applicable regulations, are expressly prohibited or not subject to filing under the investment supervision regime;


(7) Any violation of other relevant provisions of this Chapter, or any other overseas investment activities expressly prohibited by the State.


Article 19: Other circumstances in which liability shall be pursued for violations of regulations, failure to perform duties, or improper performance of duties resulting in losses to state-owned assets or other adverse consequences.


Chapter 3: Determination of Asset Losses and Adverse Consequences


Article 20: With respect to asset losses or other adverse consequences resulting from violations of regulations in the business operations and investment activities of central enterprises, the amount of asset loss shall be determined, on the basis of investigation and verification, in accordance with relevant provisions, as shall the impact on the enterprise, society, and the state.


Article 21: Asset losses comprise direct losses and indirect losses. Direct losses refer to the amounts and impacts that have a direct causal relationship with the actions of the relevant personnel; indirect losses are those arising from or resulting from the actions of the relevant personnel, and, in addition to direct losses, represent other quantifiable amounts and impacts.


Article 22: For central enterprises, asset losses arising from violations of business operations and investment shall be classified as follows: losses of RMB 5 million or less are deemed ordinary; losses exceeding RMB 5 million but not exceeding RMB 50 million are deemed substantial; and losses exceeding RMB 50 million are deemed significant. With respect to loss thresholds applicable to cases involving disciplinary or legal violations or criminal offenses, the relevant provisions of Party regulations and national laws and regulations shall prevail.


The term “above” as used in the preceding paragraph includes the specified number, whereas the term “below” does not include the specified number.


Article 23: The amount and impact of asset losses may be determined through a comprehensive assessment based on written documents issued in accordance with the law by judicial or administrative authorities, as well as specialized reports—such as special audit reports, appraisal reports, or certification reports—prepared by qualified accounting firms, asset appraisal agencies, law firms, technical appraisal institutions, and other professional entities, together with internal supporting documentation provided by the enterprise.


Article 24: Where related violations in business operations and investment have not yet resulted in actual asset losses, but there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that such losses are likely to occur in the foreseeable future and their amounts can be reliably measured, they may, upon assessment by an intermediary agency, be recognized as contingent losses and included in asset losses.


Article 25. Other adverse consequences shall primarily include:


(1) Where a central enterprise’s business qualifications are downgraded or revoked, its bank account is frozen, or its financial condition deteriorates, resulting in the loss of its production and operational advantages, a breakdown in its capital chain, and a decline in its ability to continue operating;


(2) Where significant legal disputes arise, the entity is subject to public censure or penalties by industry regulators, or it gives rise to major adverse public opinion, thereby damaging the commercial reputation of central enterprises and their image as entities operating in full compliance with laws and regulations;


(3) Where, due to non-compliant business operations, the entity has been subject to regulatory controls or sanctions by relevant authorities, resulting in a major operational risk event and significant adverse impacts;


(4) Where significant deviations occur in the implementation of state‑owned asset supervision or industry‑specific regulatory plans, where key performance targets are not met as expected, or where critical regulatory indicators remain unfulfilled, thereby adversely affecting the progress and outcomes of relevant work undertaken by central enterprises;


(5) Other adverse impacts on enterprises, society, and the state.


Article 26: The severity of other adverse consequences may be categorized, based on the nature of the violation and its resulting impact, into minor adverse consequences, significant adverse consequences, and serious adverse consequences.


(1) General adverse consequences refer to violations of a relatively minor nature, with impacts primarily confined to the enterprise involved.


(2) Significant adverse consequences refer to cases where the violations are relatively serious and their impact is primarily felt at the level of the relevant industry or across central enterprises as a whole.


(3) Major adverse consequences refer to cases where the violation is of a serious nature and its impact is primarily felt at the national and societal levels.


Article 27: Adverse consequences and their severity may be determined through a comprehensive assessment, taking into account written documents issued by judicial or administrative authorities in accordance with the law, media reports, expert appraisal reports issued by qualified professional institutions, opinions rendered by relevant experts, as well as internal evidence provided by the enterprise. Such determination shall also consider factors such as the context in which the violation occurred, the scope of the adverse effects, and the duration thereof.


Chapter 4: Determination of Liability


Article 28: During their tenure, personnel responsible for the operation and management of central enterprises who, in violation of relevant regulations, fail to perform or improperly perform their duties, thereby causing losses to state-owned assets or other adverse consequences, shall be held accountable accordingly. Liability for non-compliant business operations and investments is categorized, based on job responsibilities, into direct responsibility, supervisory responsibility, and leadership responsibility.


Article 29: Direct liability refers to the responsibility that relevant personnel shall bear when, within the scope of their job duties, they violate applicable regulations, fail to perform their duties, or fail to perform them properly, thereby playing a decisive and direct role in causing asset losses or other adverse consequences.


If the person in charge of an enterprise falls under any of the following circumstances, they shall bear direct responsibility:


(1) The individual, either alone or jointly with others, has violated national laws and regulations, rules and regulations on the supervision of state-owned assets, relevant provisions of industry regulatory authorities, or internal enterprise management rules;


(2) Instructing, directing, compelling, condoning, or shielding subordinates from violating national laws and regulations, rules and regulations on the supervision of state-owned assets, relevant provisions of industry regulatory authorities, and internal enterprise management rules;


(3) Directly deciding, approving, or organizing the implementation of major economic matters without following the prescribed procedures or exceeding authorized powers;


(4) When presiding over relevant meetings or otherwise deliberating, and in the face of dissent from the majority, directly making decisions on, approving, or organizing the implementation of major economic matters;


(5) Authorizing (or entrusting) other leading personnel to make decisions on matters that, in accordance with relevant laws, regulations, and institutional provisions, should be handled by the primary responsible person (the overall person in charge), or on matters covered by signed target‑responsibility agreements, or on other important duties that ought to be fulfilled, where such decisions are improper or erroneous;


(6) Other acts for which direct liability should be borne.


Article 30: Managerial liability refers to the responsibility borne by relevant personnel who, within the scope of their direct supervisory (or area‑of‑responsibility) duties, violate applicable regulations, fail to perform their duties, or fail to perform them properly, thereby causing asset losses or other adverse consequences.


Article 31: Leadership responsibility refers to the liability borne by the principal person in charge of an enterprise for asset losses or other adverse consequences arising from violations of regulations, failure to perform duties, or improper performance of duties within the scope of their job responsibilities.


Article 32: If a subsidiary of a central enterprise engages in unlawful business operations or investment that gives rise to any of the circumstances set forth in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article, the relevant management personnel of the parent enterprise shall bear corresponding accountability.


The circumstances under which relevant personnel of the higher-level enterprise shall bear corresponding responsibility include:


(1) Where significant asset losses or adverse consequences occur and have a material impact on the enterprise’s production, operations, and financial condition;


(2) Where significant or major asset losses have occurred repeatedly, or where significant or major adverse consequences have been caused.


In addition to the relevant personnel of the next higher-level enterprise, circumstances in which personnel of even higher-level enterprises should also bear corresponding responsibility include:


(1) Where violations of rules, discipline, or laws result in substantial asset losses and jeopardize the enterprise’s survival and development;


(2) Where, over a specified period, multiple subsidiaries under the same parent company experience a series of significant asset losses or give rise to serious adverse consequences.


Article 33: If a central enterprise, in violation of relevant regulations, fails to report, underreports, or falsely reports significant asset losses or serious adverse consequences, the principal responsible person and the responsible person in charge shall be held accountable in accordance with the standards applicable to leadership responsibility and supervisory responsibility.


Article 34: If a central enterprise fails to organize and carry out accountability investigations in accordance with the relevant regulations and job responsibilities, the enterprise’s principal officers and other relevant personnel shall be held accountable by analogy to leadership responsibility, supervisory responsibility, and direct responsibility.


Article 35: Where the relevant business decision-making bodies of central enterprises, acting in a collective decision-making capacity, adopt decisions or engage in other acts involving unlawful business operations and investments that result in asset losses or other adverse consequences, they shall bear corresponding collective liability in accordance with their respective duties and powers; the relevant members shall also bear corresponding individual liability.


Article 36: Where, in the course of lawful and compliant business operations, and while fulfilling their duties of loyalty and due diligence, central enterprise management personnel have not sought illegal gains and have not caused significant asset losses or other serious adverse consequences, they may, upon comprehensive assessment and following the prescribed approval procedures, be exempted from liability if any of the following circumstances apply:


(1) In the course of organizing scientific and technological research and development, technological innovation, the commercialization of research outcomes, or the promotion of domestically produced equipment, where the high degree of experimental exploration and significant uncertainty—coupled with adjustments in the selection of technical approaches and changes in market conditions for outcome commercialization—make it difficult to achieve the intended objectives;


(2) In the course of undertaking strategic investments, venture capital initiatives, developing strategic emerging industries, planning and building future-oriented industries, exploiting energy and mineral resources, establishing leading roles in modern industrial chains, or implementing major reform measures, where projects fail to meet expectations due to a lack of experience, pioneering trial-and‑error approaches, or unforeseeable external developments beyond one’s control;


(3) In the course of optimizing the layout and restructuring the state‑owned economy, as well as in efforts to revitalize existing assets and dispose of inefficient or non‑performing assets, where asset losses or other adverse consequences arise due to significant adjustments in relevant policies or major changes in the external environment that could not have been foreseen in advance under objective circumstances;


(4) Those who, in collective decision-making, have clearly voiced dissenting or reserved opinions regarding erroneous decisions;


(5) Where, in the course of implementing a decision, due diligence and fulfillment of duties have been exercised, but asset losses or other adverse consequences have occurred due to force majeure, unforeseeable circumstances, or other objective factors;


(6) Other circumstances in which liability is exempted.


Chapter 5: Accountability and Disciplinary Measures


Article 37: The measures for handling the persons held accountable include criticism or admonishment, organizational measures, reduction of remuneration, entry bans or restrictions, disciplinary sanctions, and referral to the discipline inspection and supervision authorities or judicial organs for further handling. Such measures may be applied individually or in combination.


(1) Criticism or admonishment. This includes educational criticism, requiring a written self‑examination, public censure, or admonishment;


(2) Organizational measures. These include suspension for investigation, reassignment of duties, ordering resignation, removal from office, and demotion. Matters that fall outside the cadre management authority of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council shall be referred to the competent authorities with such authority for appropriate organizational action.


(3) Reduction of remuneration. This includes reducing or clawing back performance-based annual bonuses or tenure‑based incentive income, terminating or recovering other medium- and long-term incentive benefits, and revoking eligibility to participate in such medium- and long-term incentive programs, among other measures.


(4) Prohibition and restriction: For a period of five years up to a lifetime, the individual shall be prohibited from serving as a director (supervisor) or senior management personnel of state-owned enterprises.


(5) Disciplinary sanctions. Where relevant personnel engaged in the operation and management of central enterprises commit unlawful acts as stipulated in the Regulations on Disciplinary Sanctions for Managers of State-Owned Enterprises, they shall be subject to disciplinary measures such as a warning, a recorded demerit, a serious recorded demerit, demotion, removal from post, or dismissal, in accordance with the pertinent provisions.


(6) Referral to the discipline inspection and supervision authorities or the judicial organs for handling. Where there are suspected violations of discipline, official duties, or criminal offenses, such cases shall be referred to the discipline inspection and supervision authorities or the judicial organs in accordance with relevant regulations for disposition in compliance with rules, discipline, and law.


Article 38: When a central enterprise incurs asset losses or other adverse consequences, following verification and determination of liability, it shall, except where the case is referred to disciplinary inspection and supervision authorities or judicial organs for handling in accordance with relevant provisions, be dealt with as follows:


(1) In cases involving ordinary asset losses or ordinary adverse consequences, the directly responsible person and the supervising responsible person shall be subject to disciplinary measures such as criticism and education, an order to submit a written self‑examination, public censure, or admonishment; moreover, their performance‑based annual salary for the year in which responsibility is determined may be reduced or recovered by up to 50%.


The responsible leaders may be subject to disciplinary measures such as criticism and education, or be required to submit a written self‑examination; furthermore, up to 30% of their annual performance‑based salary for the year in which responsibility was determined may be withheld or recovered.


(2) In cases where significant asset losses or adverse consequences occur, the directly responsible person and the supervising responsible person shall be subject to disciplinary measures such as public criticism, admonishment, suspension for investigation, reassignment, or being ordered to resign, while their remuneration shall be reduced in accordance with the following standards: 50%–100% of the performance‑based annual bonus for the year in which responsibility is determined shall be deducted and recovered; 50%–100% of the tenure‑based incentive income for the term in which responsibility is determined or for the most recent complete term shall be deducted and recovered; any unexercised medium- and long-term incentive rights shall be terminated; all medium- and long-term incentive gains attributable to the year in which responsibility is determined and the preceding year shall be returned; and the individual shall be prohibited from participating in any new medium- and long-term incentive programs within the enterprise for a period of five years.


The responsible leaders shall be subject to disciplinary measures such as public criticism, admonishment, suspension for investigation, or reassignment; concurrently, their remuneration shall be reduced in accordance with the following criteria: 30%–70% of the performance‑based annual bonus for the year in which responsibility is determined shall be withheld and recovered, and 30%–70% of the tenure‑based incentive compensation for the term in which responsibility is determined or for the most recent complete term shall be withheld and recovered. In addition, any unexercised medium- or long-term incentive rights shall be terminated, and the individual shall be prohibited from participating in any new medium- or long-term incentive programs offered by the enterprise for a period of three years.


(3) In cases of significant asset losses or serious adverse consequences, the directly responsible persons and the supervising responsible persons shall be subject to disciplinary measures such as reassignment, ordered resignation, removal from office, demotion, and entry bans, while their remuneration shall be reduced in accordance with the following standards: 100% of the performance-based annual bonus for the year in which responsibility is determined shall be deducted and recovered; 100% of the tenure‑based incentive income for the tenure in which the responsibility is determined or for the most recent complete tenure shall be deducted and recovered; any unexercised medium- and long-term incentive rights shall be terminated; all medium- and long-term incentive gains accrued during the three years preceding (and including) the year in which responsibility is determined shall be returned; and the individual shall be prohibited from participating in any new medium- and long-term incentive programs offered by the enterprise.


The responsible leaders shall be subject to disciplinary measures, including reassignment, ordered resignation, removal from office, demotion, and entry bans, while their remuneration shall be reduced in accordance with the following standards: 70%–100% of the performance‑based annual bonus for the year in which responsibility is determined; 70%–100% of the tenure‑based incentive compensation for the term in which responsibility is determined or for the most recent complete term; termination of any unexercised medium- and long-term incentive rights; forfeiture of all medium- and long-term incentive gains accrued during the three years preceding the year in which responsibility is determined (inclusive); and a five-year ban on participation in any new medium- or long-term incentive programs offered by the enterprise.


Article 39: When a subsidiary of a central enterprise incurs asset losses or other adverse consequences, and pursuant to these Measures the relevant personnel of the central enterprise should be held accountable, the responsible individuals shall be subject to disciplinary measures including public criticism, admonishment, suspension for investigation, reassignment, order to resign, removal from office, demotion, and entry bans. At the same time, their remuneration shall be reduced in accordance with the following standards: a reduction and recovery of 30% to 100% of the performance-based annual bonus for the year in which responsibility is determined; a reduction and recovery of 30% to 100% of the tenure‑based incentive income for the term in which responsibility is determined or for the most recent complete term; termination of any unexercised medium- and long-term incentive rights; forfeiture of all medium- and long-term incentive gains accrued during the three years preceding (and including) the year in which responsibility is determined; and a prohibition, for a period of three to five years, from participating in any new medium- and long-term incentive programs offered by the enterprise.


Article 40: With respect to the relevant business decision-making bodies of central enterprises bearing collective responsibility, measures such as criticism and education, ordering a written self‑examination, and public censure shall be imposed; corresponding investor authorizations and delegations of authority shall be adjusted or revoked. Where asset losses are extremely substantial and jeopardize the enterprise’s survival and development, or where other particularly serious adverse consequences have occurred, the relevant entities shall be reorganized in accordance with prescribed procedures.


Article 41. The “year of liability determination” refers to the year in which liability is pursued and addressed. If a relevant person in charge holds no position or has held a position for less than a full year during the year of liability pursuit and handling, the provisions applicable to the most recent complete year of tenure shall apply; if there is no complete year of tenure, the provisions shall be applied by reference to the actual months of service prior to the handling, with such period not exceeding twelve months.


Article 42: With respect to the same incident and the same responsible party, any reduction or recovery of remuneration shall be applied in accordance with the highest applicable standard among disciplinary sanctions, administrative sanctions, other forms of disciplinary action, and accountability measures; such measures shall not be cumulatively applied.


For different incidents, the cumulative total of salary deductions and clawback percentages imposed on the same responsible party in the same year of liability determination shall not exceed 100%.


Article 43: Where a relevant person held accountable is subject to admonishment, they shall not be promoted or further appointed within six months; where they are reassigned to a different post, they shall not be promoted or further appointed within one year; where they are ordered to resign or removed from office, they shall not be assigned to a leadership position within one year, nor shall they hold a leadership position at a level higher than their previous post within two years; where they are demoted, they shall not be promoted or further appointed within two years. If a person is simultaneously subjected to disciplinary action, administrative sanctions, or other forms of punishment, the longer of the applicable periods shall apply.


Article 44: Where any of the following circumstances exists, the persons concerned shall be subject to more severe disciplinary measures:


(1) Where asset losses occur frequently, involve substantial amounts, and result in severe consequences;


(2) Cases that persist despite repeated prohibitions, violate regulations in defiance of orders, and have a severely adverse impact;


(3) Forcing or instigating others to violate regulations, thereby causing asset losses or other adverse consequences;


(4) Failure to take timely measures or inadequacy of such measures resulting in the escalation of asset losses or other adverse consequences;


(5) Concealing, failing to report, or falsely reporting asset losses or other adverse consequences;


(6) Refusing to cooperate with, or interfering with or resisting, accountability investigations;


(7) Other circumstances that warrant more severe disciplinary action.


Article 45: Where personnel responsible for the operation and management of central enterprises, having already been subject to accountability measures, engage in further violations of regulations or improper investment activities during the period of such accountability, thereby causing asset losses or other adverse consequences, the relevant persons shall be subjected to more severe disciplinary action.


Article 46: With respect to mistakes made by personnel involved in the management and operation of central enterprises during the course of enterprise reform and development, if such mistakes do not constitute violations such as failure to implement orders, disregard of prohibitions, improper pursuit of personal gain, deliberate misconduct, or arbitrary decision‑making, they shall be subject to tolerance in accordance with relevant regulations and procedures. Where any of the following circumstances exist, the persons held accountable for non‑compliant business operations and investments may be given lighter or reduced disciplinary measures:


(1) Where the circumstances are minor;


(2) Where the objective is to promote the enterprise’s reform, development, and stability, or to fulfill its economic, political, and social responsibilities, and where the individual has not sought personal gain;


(3) Matters that are not explicitly restricted or prohibited by the Party and the state’s guidelines and policies, the Party Constitution, Party rules and discipline, national laws and regulations, or local statutes and regulations;


(4) In the event of an emergency or unforeseen incident, where decisions are made by an individual or a small group and are promptly reported and subsequently ratified afterward, provided that no intentional misconduct or gross negligence is involved;


(5) Those who promptly take effective measures to mitigate and recover asset losses and eliminate adverse impacts;


(6) Where an individual proactively reports asset losses or other adverse consequences and actively cooperates with accountability investigations, or voluntarily denounces other individuals who have caused asset losses or other adverse consequences, and such reports are verified as true;


(7) Other circumstances that may warrant lighter or reduced disciplinary measures.


Article 47. “Mitigated handling” refers to the imposition of a less severe disciplinary measure within the range of liability and sanctions prescribed in these Measures for the relevant violations.


Severe disciplinary action refers to imposing a more severe penalty within the range of accountability measures prescribed in these Measures for the relevant violations.


Article 48. Mitigated disciplinary action refers to the imposition of a penalty one level lower than the range prescribed in these Measures for the corresponding violation.


Aggravated handling refers to imposing a penalty one level more severe than the range of disciplinary measures prescribed in these Measures for the relevant violations.


Article 49: Persons held accountable for violations in business operations and investment shall be subject to admonishment, written self-criticism, public censure, or cautionary measures; however, if any of the circumstances set forth in Article 46 of these Measures apply, such persons may be exempted from disciplinary action.


Article 50: Any mitigation or exemption of disciplinary measures against persons held accountable for violations in business operations and investment shall be subject to approval by the next higher-level enterprise that made the decision or by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council.


Article 51: Where a relevant person in charge has already retired but, pursuant to these Measures, should be removed from office or demoted, their corresponding benefits shall be adjusted in accordance with the applicable regulations. If losses to state-owned assets are caused by violations of business and investment practices, such persons may be held liable for compensation in accordance with laws and regulations. Any issues or leads involving suspected disciplinary violations, official misconduct, or criminal offenses shall be referred to the discipline inspection and supervision authorities or the judicial organs for handling.


Where the persons held accountable have been reassigned or have resigned, they shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.


Article 52: If a relevant responsible person no longer receives performance-based annual compensation from this enterprise in the year in which liability is determined, the amount to be recovered shall be calculated as the total of the full performance-based annual compensation for the last complete year of employment prior to departure and the total incentive income for the most recent complete term of office, and such compensation shall be clawed back in accordance with the relevant provisions of these Measures.


Article 53: Directors (supervisors) of central enterprises, as well as other relevant personnel, who, in violation of applicable provisions, fail to perform or improperly perform their duties, thereby causing losses to state-owned assets or other adverse consequences, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary measures in accordance with national laws and regulations, relevant rules and regulations, and these Measures.


Chapter VI: Responsibilities and Duties in Accountability Work


Article 54: In principle, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and central enterprises shall organize and carry out accountability investigations in accordance with the state‑owned capital investment relationships and the respective authorities for cadre management.


Article 55: The principal responsibilities of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council in accountability work are as follows:


(1) Research and formulate relevant systems for holding central enterprises accountable;


(2) Organize and carry out investigations into major asset losses, significant adverse consequences, and substantial asset losses that have resulted in considerable adverse consequences occurring at central enterprises, as well as accountability measures involving the persons in charge of such enterprises.


(3) Accountability investigations concerning central enterprises and their subsidiaries that are deemed necessary to be directly organized and conducted;


(4) Conduct special inspections to address common issues identified in central enterprises;


(5) For issues requiring rectification by central enterprises, supervise and urge the enterprises to implement the relevant requirements for corrective actions.


(6) To guide, supervise, and inspect the work related to accountability in central enterprises;


(7) Other matters related to accountability.


Article 56 The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council shall establish a dedicated accountability body to handle issues and leads concerning violations of business operations and investment by central enterprises and their subsidiaries, as referred by relevant authorities in accordance with prescribed procedures. Following preliminary verification, such matters shall be categorized and handled accordingly, and the Commission shall organize related investigations through methods including guidance and oversight, publicized supervision, joint investigations, special investigations, and fact-finding inquiries. It shall determine the responsibilities of the persons concerned, formulate recommendations for disciplinary action, and urge the enterprises to implement corrective measures.


Article 57: The principal responsibilities of central enterprises in accountability work are as follows:


(1) To research and formulate the enterprise’s internal systems for accountability;


(2) Organize and carry out investigations into general or significant asset losses and general or significant adverse consequences incurred by enterprises at this level; major asset losses and major adverse consequences, as well as significant asset losses that give rise to substantial adverse consequences, incurred by second-tier subsidiaries; and pursue accountability for the persons in charge of such second-tier subsidiaries.


(3) Accountability investigations of its subsidiaries that it deems necessary to organize and conduct directly;


4. To guide, supervise, and inspect the work related to accountability at its subordinate subsidiaries;


(5) Organize and carry out relevant accountability investigations in accordance with the requirements of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council.


(6) Other matters related to accountability.


Article 58: Central enterprises shall, under the leadership of their Party committees (Party leading groups), strengthen accountability for violations in business operations and investment, establish and improve a sound accountability system, designate appropriate functional departments or institutions to organize and carry out accountability measures, and ensure effective coordination and cooperation with the enterprise’s discipline inspection and supervision bodies.


Article 59: Central enterprises shall establish a reporting system for accountability investigations. They shall promptly submit written reports to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council regarding significant and major cases and leads involving violations in business operations and investment, and shall, in accordance with relevant requirements, regularly report on the progress of accountability work.


Article 60: If a central enterprise fails to organize and carry out accountability investigations in accordance with the relevant regulations and job responsibilities, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council shall, pursuant to applicable provisions, hold the responsible persons of the relevant central enterprise accountable.


Article 61: The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and central enterprises shall strengthen safeguards regarding accountability mechanisms, personnel, and funding. Where relevant personnel, in handling major violations of regulations, disciplines, or laws—such as unlawful business operations or investments—fail to detect issues that should have been identified, or, having detected them, engage in perfunctory follow-up, concealment, failure to report, or inadequate investigation and handling, they shall be held accountable in accordance with applicable regulations and disciplinary rules.


Chapter VII Procedures for Accountability Work


Article 62: The conduct of accountability investigations involving central enterprises shall, in general, follow the procedures of case acceptance, preliminary verification, categorized disposition, verification or investigation, handling, and rectification.


Article 63: Accept and process issues and leads related to violations of business operations and investment that have been transferred by relevant authorities in accordance with prescribed procedures, and carry out the collection, organization, and analysis of pertinent evidence and materials.


Article 64 The specialized accountability agency of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council shall accept complaints and leads concerning violations of business operations and investment by enterprises in the following circumstances:


(1) Those discovered in the course of state‑owned asset supervision and administration;


(2) Those referred by audit, inspection, disciplinary inspection and supervision authorities, as well as other relevant departments;


(3) Reported by central enterprises;


(4) Other issues and leads related to violations in business operations and investment.


Article 65: With respect to accepted cases of violations in business operations and investment, as well as related leads and supporting evidence and materials, necessary preliminary verification shall be conducted.


Article 66 The principal tasks of the preliminary verification include:


(1) The circumstances surrounding asset losses and other adverse consequences;


(2) Instances of violations of regulations, discipline, or laws;


(3) Whether it falls within the scope of accountability;


(4) Recommendations and requirements from the relevant parties, etc.


Article 67: The preliminary verification shall, as a general rule, be completed within 30 working days; upon necessity, the period may be extended by up to an additional 15 working days.


Article 68: Based on the findings of the preliminary verification, where there are indeed facts of violations of regulations, discipline, or laws, such cases shall be handled in accordance with the prescribed duties, powers, and procedures, and classified accordingly.


Article 69: The main tasks of categorized disposal include:


(1) Where the matter falls within the scope of accountability responsibilities of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, the Commission’s dedicated accountability body shall organize and conduct verification or investigative proceedings. If, in violation of the relevant provisions of these Measures, further verification is required, a case shall be instituted upon approval by the principal head of the Commission; the enterprise subject to verification or investigation shall be notified in writing, and the competent state supervisory authority shall be informed.


(2) Where the matter falls within the scope of accountability responsibilities of central enterprises, it shall be referred to and relevant central enterprises shall be urged to carry out accountability measures.


(3) With respect to violations of regulations in business operations and investment involving centrally managed officials, upon approval by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission, relevant verification or investigation shall be conducted as required.


(4) If the matter falls within the purview of accountability responsibilities of other relevant departments, it shall be referred to those departments.


(5) Where there are allegations of disciplinary violations, official misconduct, or criminal offenses, the matter shall be referred, in accordance with relevant regulations, to the discipline inspection and supervision authorities or the judicial organs for handling in compliance with rules, discipline, and law.


Article 70: The specialized accountability body of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council shall, as required by its work, establish dedicated working groups to promptly initiate verification or investigative procedures concerning violations in business operations and investment activities; ascertain the circumstances warranting accountability; determine the extent of asset losses and adverse consequences; identify the root causes; accurately characterize the nature of the misconduct; and clarify and assign responsibility to the relevant personnel.


Article 71: In light of the progress made by central enterprises in reducing or recovering asset losses and mitigating adverse impacts, accountability measures may be initiated as appropriate.


Article 72: In conducting verification or investigations, the working group may adopt the following measures to collect evidence:


(1) Conduct interviews with persons related to the matters under verification or investigation, prepare interview records and have them signed and confirmed by the relevant parties, or require such parties to provide written explanations. Where in-person interviews are impractical, information may be obtained through correspondence.


(2) Examine and duplicate relevant documents, meeting minutes (records), materials, accounting books, original vouchers, and other related documents of the enterprises under verification or investigation;


(3) When necessary, solicit reports from enterprises on matters under verification or investigation and require them to provide explanations regarding the relevant circumstances.


(4) Conduct on-site verification or investigation of the enterprise’s physical assets, etc.;


(5) Entrusting qualified professional institutions to conduct audits, assessments, or attestations on relevant matters;


(6) Other necessary work measures.


Article 73: During the course of verification or investigation, any unpaid or unvested performance-based annual bonuses, tenure‑based incentive payments, and medium‑ to long‑term incentive awards shall be suspended; in principle, the relevant responsible persons shall not resign. With respect to those whose positions may impede the smooth conduct of the verification or investigation, measures such as suspension for review, reassignment, or removal from office may be taken as appropriate.


Article 74: In the course of verifying or investigating significant violations of business operations and investment, where there is a genuine need for such work, with approval, requests may be made to the discipline inspection and supervision authorities for necessary support. Any issues or leads suspected of disciplinary violations, official misconduct, or criminal offenses shall, after completing the prescribed approval procedures, be referred to the discipline inspection and supervision authorities or the judicial organs for handling.


Article 75: Verification or investigative work shall, in principle, be completed within six months; however, the period may be appropriately extended as necessary.


Article 76: Upon completion of verification or investigation, the relevant enterprise and responsible persons shall, as a general rule, be consulted regarding the findings. Following collective deliberation, a verification (investigation) report—detailing the facts of the violation, asset losses, or other adverse consequences—and a report on the determination of responsibility shall be prepared, and after consolidation, both reports shall undergo a legality review.


When soliciting opinions, the working group shall inform the relevant responsible parties of the facts established through verification or investigation, together with the pertinent supporting evidence, and afford them the opportunity to make statements, present their defenses, and sign their comments.


Article 77: Based on the findings of verification or investigation, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council shall, in accordance with its authority over cadre management and relevant procedures, hold the persons concerned accountable and impose appropriate disciplinary measures, issue a decision or recommendation on such measures, and set forth requirements for rectification and measures for the supervision of state-owned assets applicable to the enterprises concerned. Relevant information shall be promptly reported to the competent authorities.


Where verification or investigation reveals that relevant personnel responsible for the operation and management of central enterprises have engaged in unlawful conduct as defined in the Regulations on Disciplinary Measures for Managers of State-Owned Enterprises, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council shall, in accordance with its authority over cadre management, impose appropriate disciplinary measures in accordance with the law; matters falling outside the scope of the Commission’s cadre-management authority shall be referred to the competent authorities for handling.


Article 78: If the party subject to disciplinary action disagrees with the decision, they may, within one month from the date of service of the decision, file a written appeal and submit relevant supporting documentation. The execution of the original decision shall not be suspended during the appeal period.


The supporting evidence submitted in the respondent’s appeal shall consist of newly discovered evidence arising after the verification or investigation has been conducted, or of evidence demonstrating that the expert opinions or other documents upon which the verification or investigation was based have been revised.


Article 79: Where the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council or a central enterprise has rendered a disciplinary decision, the person subject to the decision may file an appeal with the entity that issued such decision; where a subsidiary of a central enterprise has rendered a disciplinary decision, the appeal shall be filed with the next higher-level enterprise.


Where a disciplinary decision is made in accordance with the Regulations on Disciplinary Measures for Managers of State-Owned Enterprises, appeals shall be filed in accordance with the prescribed procedures.


Article 80: The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and central enterprises shall, within thirty working days from the date of receipt of an appeal, conduct a review and, in accordance with the relevant procedures, issue a decision to uphold, revoke, or amend the original disposition, and notify the appellant and the appellant’s enterprise in an appropriate manner.


Article 81: Central enterprises shall, in accordance with the requirements for rectification, earnestly summarize lessons learned, formulate and implement corrective measures, optimize business processes, improve their internal control systems, plug operational and management loopholes, and strictly adhere to the bottom line of law-based and compliant operations. With respect to systemic, trend‑driven, and emerging issues in corporate operations, they shall establish and refine a long-term risk‑prevention mechanism that seamlessly integrates ex‑ante, in‑process, and ex‑post oversight, thereby promoting both symptomatic and root‑cause solutions.


Article 82: Central enterprises shall, within 60 working days from the date of receipt of the disposition decision or the rectification notice, submit a rectification report and relevant supporting materials to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council shall strengthen oversight and inspection of the implementation of corrective measures, publicize typical cases as warnings, prevent repeated violations, and consolidate the outcomes of rectification.


Article 83: In carrying out accountability for violations in business operations and investment, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and central enterprises shall strengthen coordination and cooperation with audit, inspection, disciplinary inspection and supervision, as well as other relevant departments. With respect to issues and leads related to violations in business operations and investment that are referred to them, they shall promptly provide feedback on the handling status and enhance the application of the outcomes of accountability measures.


Article 84 The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and central enterprises shall, in accordance with the State’s relevant regulations on information disclosure, progressively make public to the general public information on the investigation and accountability for violations in business operations and investment, and accept social oversight.


Article 85: Actively leverage information technology in carrying out accountability work, promote the reporting, aggregation, sharing, and comprehensive utilization of relevant data and information, establish an information reporting system for losses arising from violations of business operations and investment, as well as an information inquiry system for personnel subject to entry bans or restrictions in central enterprises, and intensify the application of information technology in accountability efforts.


Chapter VIII Supplementary Provisions


Article 86: Central enterprises shall, in accordance with these Measures and taking into account their own specific circumstances, refine the scope of accountability, the criteria for classifying the extent of asset losses and adverse consequences, and other relevant provisions; formulate or revise the systems and regulations pertaining to accountability; and submit such measures for record‑keeping with the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council.


Article 87: State‑owned asset supervision and administration authorities at the regional level may, by reference to these Measures and in light of local conditions, formulate or revise relevant systems and regulations on accountability within their respective jurisdictions.


Article 88: With respect to accountability measures for state‑owned equity‑participated enterprises, the relevant procedures may, by analogy to these Measures, be submitted to the shareholders’ meeting of such enterprises for consideration and initiation.


Article 89: Cases involving production safety accidents, environmental pollution incidents, or instability events shall be handled separately in accordance with relevant state regulations.


Article 90: These Measures shall be interpreted by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council.


Article 91: These Measures shall come into force on January 1, 2026. At the same time, the “Measures for the Accountability of Central Enterprises for Irregular Operations and Investment (Trial)” (Order No. 37 of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council) shall be repealed.



※ Source: Supervision and Accountability Bureau


Layout: Wang Xin

Reviewed by: Management Committee


Beijing Headquarters Address: No. 8, Jianguomen North Street, Dongcheng District, Beijing 17th Floor, China Resources Building



Wuhan Branch Address: Room 1001, 10th Floor, Huangpu International Center, Jiang’an District, Wuhan, Hubei Province

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