(Promulgated by Order No. 46 of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council on November 28, 2025, effective January 1, 2026)

Article 1: In order to uphold the Party’s overall leadership over central enterprises, strengthen investor oversight, standardize the accountability system for illegal business and investment activities in central enterprises, further improve the supervision and management system for state-owned assets, fulfill the responsibility of preserving and enhancing the value of state-owned assets, prevent the loss of state-owned assets, promote law-based and compliant operations of enterprises, and support the strengthening, optimization, and expansion of state-owned enterprises and state-owned capital, these Measures are formulated in accordance with relevant laws, regulations, and documents including the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on State-Owned Enterprise Assets, the Interim Regulations on the Supervision and Management of State-Owned Enterprise Assets, the Regulations on Disciplinary Actions against Managers of State-Owned Enterprises, and the Opinions of the General Office of the State Council on Establishing a System for Holding Responsible Parties Accountable for Illegal Business and Investment Activities in State-Owned Enterprises.

Article 2: For the purposes of these Measures, “central enterprises” refer to state-owned enterprises whose investor responsibilities are performed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (hereinafter referred to as SASAC) on behalf of the State Council.

Article 3: The accountability for violations in business and investment activities (hereinafter referred to as “accountability”) referred to in these Measures means the process of investigating, verifying, and determining responsibility for relevant persons in central enterprises who, in the course of business operations, violate regulations, fail to perform their duties or fail to perform their duties properly, thereby causing losses of state-owned assets or other adverse consequences. Following such investigation, verification, and responsibility determination, the persons concerned will be held accountable and dealt with accordingly.

The “provisions” referred to in the preceding paragraph include national laws and regulations, regulatory rules for the supervision of state-owned assets, relevant provisions issued by industry regulators, and internal management regulations of enterprises, among others. The “failure to perform duties” referred to in the preceding paragraph means failing to exercise one’s authority or assume responsibility within the prescribed time limit or within a reasonable and justifiable time frame; such failure generally includes inaction, refusal to perform duties, and delay in performing duties. The “failure to properly perform duties” refers to the failure to exercise one’s authority or assume responsibility appropriately or fully in accordance with applicable regulations and job responsibilities; such failure generally includes failure to follow established procedures, exceeding one’s authority, and abuse of authority.

Article 4: The accountability work shall adhere to the following principles:

(1) Uphold and strengthen the Party’s leadership. Guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, we must adhere to the principle of “two consistent approaches,” integrate the Party’s leadership throughout the entire process of accountability work, reinforce the strict tone, stringent measures, and rigorous requirements, take intra-Party supervision as the leading force, promote seamless coordination between investor oversight and various other forms of oversight, establish a responsibility accountability mechanism that is comprehensive in coverage, clearly defined in responsibilities, transparent in procedures, and standardized and orderly, and ensure that the decisions and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the State Council are effectively implemented.

(2) Adhere to accountability based on laws and regulations. Taking national laws and regulations as the benchmark, and in accordance with the regulatory rules for state-owned asset supervision, relevant provisions of industry regulators, and internal management regulations of enterprises, rigorously hold accountable those enterprise management personnel who, by violating regulations, failing to fulfill their duties, or failing to properly perform their duties, have caused losses of state-owned assets or other adverse consequences. Implement lifelong accountability for major decision-making.

(3) Adhere to objective and impartial accountability. Implement the important requirement of “distinguishing among three aspects,” and, in light of the actual circumstances of the enterprise, thoroughly investigate and verify the facts, nature, and resulting losses and impacts of the violations. Take into account both quantitative standards and qualitative differences. The findings must be clear-cut, supported by solid evidence, accurately characterized, and procedurally compliant. Relevant personnel should have their responsibilities clearly identified, while at the same time safeguarding the enthusiasm of those involved in enterprise management and operations to take initiative and get things done. Handle the responsibilities of those concerned appropriately and fairly.

(4) Adhere to a tiered and layered accountability system. In principle, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and central enterprises shall define their respective responsibilities for accountability based on the equity relationships of state-owned capital and the authority over cadre management. They shall organize accountability efforts at different levels, holding accountable and taking disciplinary actions against management personnel at various levels within enterprises, thereby establishing a responsibility accountability system that is tiered, layered, effectively coordinated, and seamlessly integrated from top to bottom.

(5) Adhere to the combination of punishment, education, and institutional development. While holding those responsible for non-compliant business and investment activities strictly accountable, intensify efforts to summarize and publicize typical cases, strengthen warning and educational campaigns, and leverage their deterrent effect. This will encourage central enterprises to continuously improve their rules and regulations, plug management and operational loopholes, enhance their management capabilities, ensure the preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets, and promote high-quality development.

Article 5: In the course of accountability investigations, a thorough inquiry shall be conducted into the underlying acts of embezzlement of state-owned assets, conversion of public resources into private gain, and transfer of benefits that lie behind violations. If any personnel involved in enterprise management and operations are found to be suspected of disciplinary violations, official misconduct, or criminal offenses, they shall be referred, in accordance with relevant regulations, to the discipline inspection and supervision authorities or judicial organs for handling according to rules, discipline, and law.

Article 6: If personnel involved in the operation and management of central enterprises violate regulations, fail to perform their duties or fail to perform their duties properly, thereby causing any of the circumstances listed in Articles 7 through 19 of these Measures and resulting in losses of state-owned assets or other adverse consequences, they shall be held accountable accordingly.

Article 7: Circumstances for Accountability in Group Control and Management:

(1) Failure to implement or inadequate implementation of the Party and the state’s guidelines, policies, decision-making arrangements, and relevant national regulations on group operations and management, resulting in asset losses or other adverse consequences;

(2) Making decisions, approving, or organizing the implementation of major business and investment matters in violation of prescribed procedures or exceeding authorized powers; or making decisions, approving, or organizing the implementation of major business and investment matters that violate the Party and the state’s guidelines, policies, decision-making arrangements, and relevant national regulations.

(3) Violating regulations governing the management of core responsibilities and primary business activities, failing to adequately focus on developing the core business, and exhibiting deviations in development positioning, direction, and strategy.

(4) There are defects in the Group’s internal control system construction and implementation, leading to failure to detect major risk factors and potential hazards, or even if detected, these issues were not reported or addressed in a timely manner.

(5) Establishing multi-tiered structures in violation of relevant regulations to conduct business and evade regulatory oversight;

(6) Violating the state’s policies on income distribution, failing to effectively fulfill duties, and improperly managing the compensation of heads of subordinate subsidiaries;

(7) A major violation of rules, discipline, or law occurs at a subsidiary enterprise, resulting in significant asset losses and having a substantial impact on the Group’s production, operations, and financial condition, or causing serious adverse consequences.

(8) Subsidiaries under its jurisdiction engage in financing trade activities or fictitious trade practices such as “empty turnover,” “single-document transactions,” and circular trading in violation of regulations;

(9) Refusing to implement, delaying implementation of, or making false corrections in response to requirements from relevant national regulatory authorities regarding the rectification of significant issues related to business operations and investment.

Article 8: Circumstances for Accountability in Risk Management:

(1) Failure to fulfill, as required, the responsibilities for establishing compliance management, internal control, and risk management systems has resulted in the absence of such systems and significant defects in internal control processes.

(2) Compliance management, internal control, and risk management systems have not been implemented or have been inadequately implemented, resulting in failure to promptly analyze, identify, assess, warn of, respond to, and report significant risks associated with business operations and investments.

(3) Failing to conduct legal reviews of enterprise rules and regulations, economic contracts, and important decisions as required;

(4) Failure to comply with relevant regulations on the supervision of state-owned assets has led to off-balance-sheet liabilities, disguised borrowing, or excessive debt, triggering a debt crisis that jeopardizes the company’s continued operations.

(5) Maliciously evading or defaulting on financial debts;

(6) Concealing, underreporting, falsely reporting, or delaying the reporting of significant risks and risk loss events; instructing the preparation of false financial reports, thereby causing serious distortions in accounting information and severe discrepancies between a company’s books and actual assets.

(7) Failing to take the reporting of major operational risk events seriously, responding perfunctorily, or failing to address and handle such incidents in a timely manner and with insufficient measures.

Article 9: Circumstances for Accountability in Procurement and Sales Management:

(1) Failing to enter into or perform contracts as required, or failing to fulfill or improperly fulfilling duties, resulting in a contract price that is significantly unfair;

(2) Failing to properly perform the contract, or abandoning rightful contractual rights without justifiable reasons;

(3) Violating regulations by using related-party transactions to transfer benefits;

(4) Failure to conduct bidding as required or failure to implement the bidding results;

(5) Providing credit sales, qualifications, guarantees, or advance payments in violation of regulations; using business prepayments or commodity transactions as a disguised form of financing or investment.

(6) Failure to promptly pursue receivables or take effective preservation measures as required;

(7) Employing deceptive practices, irrelevant diversification, and other such methods to fabricate and inflate operating revenue.

Article 10: Circumstances for Accountability in Engineering Contracting and Construction:

(1) Failure to conduct due investigation and verification or risk analysis on the subject matter of the contract as required;

(2) Failure to follow the prescribed decision-making and approval procedures, or bidding without authorization or beyond the scope of authorized authority;

(3) Bidding and winning a contract at a price below cost without a reasonable commercial justification, in violation of the regulations;

(4) Failing to follow the prescribed decision-making and approval procedures and unilaterally signing or modifying contracts;

(5) Failure to conduct a rigorous review of contractual agreements in accordance with prescribed procedures, resulting in significant omissions.

(6) Projects and goods and services related to project construction were not tendered in accordance with regulations or tendering was circumvented.

(7) Subcontracting, subcontracting in violation of regulations, etc.;

(8) Making payments exceeding the agreed contract terms in terms of pricing or schedule.

Article 11: Circumstances for Accountability in Financial Affairs:

(1) Investing in various financial institutions without fulfilling the prescribed decision-making and approval/filing procedures;

(2) Failing to follow the prescribed procedures for decision-making and review/filing when initiating or contributing to private equity investment funds;

(3) Conducting financial businesses such as trust, leasing, factoring, and fund management in violation of regulations, providing inadequate support for the core business, and shifting from the real economy to the virtual economy.

(4) Conducting financial derivatives businesses such as futures and options in violation of regulations;

(5) Accepting customer funds without recording them in the books, illegally absorbing public deposits or engaging in disguised absorption of public deposits, and violating regulations by participating in or indirectly participating in private lending.

(6) Violating the fiduciary duty and unauthorizedly using clients’ funds or other assets entrusted or held in trust.

Article 12: Circumstances for Accountability in Scientific and Technological Innovation:

(1) Falsely completing key research and development tasks by manufacturing, selling, and procuring pseudo-innovative and pseudo-domestically produced products;

(2) Falsifying the progress of undertaken science and technology innovation tasks and falsely reporting achievements;

(3) Obtaining approval for scientific research activities through fraudulent or improper means, acquiring projects under science and technology programs (special initiatives, funds, etc.), research funding, awards, honors, job titles, and positions; falsely reporting, misappropriating, embezzling, diverting, or withholding government-funded science and technology funds.

(4) Obtaining subsidies and support through means such as establishing shell companies or using counterfeit or unauthorized brand labels;

(5) The statistics on R&D investment in science and technology are inaccurate, with R&D investment being falsely listed and overstated.

Article 13: Circumstances for Accountability in Fund Management:

(1) Raising and using funds in violation of decision-making and approval procedures or exceeding authorized powers;

(2) Violating regulations by retaining funds, handling financial transactions, or opening bank accounts in one’s personal name;

(3) Establishing “small treasuries”;

(4) Raising funds, issuing stocks or bonds, making donations, providing guarantees, entrusting wealth management, lending or borrowing funds, issuing letters of credit, or processing bank bills in violation of regulations;

(5) Falsely listing expenditures to siphon off funds;

(6) Violating regulations by arbitrarily setting salaries and excessively or improperly issuing employee compensation and benefits;

(7) Due to deficiencies in internal financial controls or failure to comply with internal financial control systems, incidents such as misappropriation, embezzlement, theft, and fraud of funds may occur.

(8) Illegally lending funds;

(9) Failure to manage and use the special funds designated for specific purposes in accordance with regulations.

Article 14: Circumstances for Accountability in Property Rights Management:

(1) Failing to follow the prescribed decision-making and approval procedures, or transferring or reallocating state-owned property beyond the scope of authorized authority;

(2) Financial audits and asset appraisals violate relevant regulations;

(3) Concealing assets that should be included in the scope of audit and assessment; organizing the provision and disclosure of false information; instructing or directing intermediary agencies to issue false financial audit reports, asset valuation certificates, and legal opinions, among other documents.

(4) Failure to implement the recusal system in accordance with relevant regulations;

(5) Violating relevant regulations and the principles of open and fair trading by transferring enterprise property rights, shares of listed companies, and assets at prices significantly below market value;

(6) Conducting transactions and transfers of state-owned assets in violation of regulations;

(7) Failure to comply with the prescribed procedures for managing the identification of state-owned shareholders, improper management of the names of state-owned enterprises and the characters used in their corporate names, and unauthorized use of enterprise licenses and qualification certificates.

(8) Failing to register the property rights of state-funded enterprises as required and using certificates (forms) for the registration of state-owned assets in violation of regulations;

(9) Violating regulations by holding equity on behalf of others, engaging in fictitious controlling interests, exercising control without actual control, forming false joint ventures, or operating under a nominal affiliation.

Article 15: Circumstances for Accountability in Fixed-Asset Investment:

(1) Failure to conduct a feasibility study or risk analysis as required;

(2) The project budget was not reviewed in accordance with regulations and significantly deviated from the actual situation;

(3) Directing or instructing intermediary agencies or relevant entities to issue false reports;

(4) Major risk factors were not adequately considered during the decision-making process, and no risk prevention plans were developed.

(5) Investing without following the prescribed decision-making and approval procedures;

(6) The procurement and construction project was carried out without following the prescribed bidding procedures, or involved interference with, circumvention of, or manipulation of the bidding process.

(7) Unauthorized alteration of engineering designs, construction content, or additional investments;

(8) Chaotic project management has led to severe construction delays, unfinished projects, and significantly higher costs compared to similar projects.

(9) Significant changes occur in the external environment or in the project itself, yet the investment plan is not adjusted promptly as required, and no stop-loss measures are taken;

(10) Investing in projects that are expressly prohibited or not subject to filing under the investment supervision system in violation of applicable regulations;

(11) Failing to conduct post-project evaluations of investment projects as required, providing false materials during the post-evaluation process, or discovering violations in a project following the post-evaluation.

Article 16: Circumstances for Accountability in Equity Investment:

(1) Failure to conduct due diligence as required, or failure to perform risk analysis during due diligence, resulting in significant omissions;

(2) Financial audits, asset appraisals, or valuations that violate relevant regulations;

(3) Directing or instructing intermediary agencies or relevant entities to issue false reports;

(4) Failure to follow the prescribed decision-making and approval procedures, undertaking projects that exceed risk tolerance, or failing to adequately consider significant risk factors and develop risk mitigation plans.

(5) Violating regulations by providing funding support to other joint venture or cooperative partners in various forms, or transferring benefits to related parties through means such as mergers and acquisitions at significantly inflated premiums;

(6) Legal documents such as investment contracts, agreements, and the articles of association of the target enterprise contain clauses that undermine state-owned interests, leading to a loss of control over the management of the target enterprise.

(7) Paying the merger and acquisition consideration ahead of schedule in violation of the contractual agreement;

(8) After the investment and merger, integration was not carried out in accordance with the relevant work plan, resulting in loss of control over the management of the target company.

(9) After acquiring a stake through investment, failing to exercise the corresponding shareholder rights and failing to take timely loss-stopping measures when significant changes occur;

(10) Deviating from the approved core business and strategic investment plan to acquire assets unrelated to the core business through substantial debt financing;

(11) Investing in projects that are expressly prohibited or not subject to filing under the investment regulatory system in violation of applicable regulations;

(12) Failing to conduct post-investment evaluations as required, providing false materials during the post-evaluation process, or discovering violations in the project through the post-evaluation.

Article 17: Circumstances for Accountability in Restructuring and Reform:

(1) Failure to follow the prescribed decision-making and approval procedures;

(2) Failure to organize and carry out asset clearing, financial audits, and asset appraisals as required;

(3) Intentionally transferring or concealing state-owned assets, or providing false information to intermediary agencies, and instructing or directing these agencies to issue false verification results regarding asset clearing, financial audits, and asset appraisals;

(4) Converting state-owned assets into shares, selling them, or distributing them free of charge to other entities or individuals at prices that are significantly below fair value;

(5) During the process of developing a mixed-ownership economy, implementing employee stock ownership, or undergoing bankruptcy reorganization or liquidation—when regulations are violated, resulting in disguised misappropriation or private division of state-owned assets;

(6) Failing to collect the proceeds from the transfer of state-owned assets as required;

(7) The articles of association and other legal documents of the restructured entity contain provisions that harm state-owned interests.

Article 18: Circumstances for Accountability in Overseas Business and Investment:

(1) Failure to establish, as required, systems related to the management of overseas investments by enterprises, resulting in a lack of effective oversight and control over overseas investments;

(2) Violating the management system for state-owned property rights overseas;

(3) Failing to conduct risk assessments as required and implement effective risk mitigation measures when making overseas investments or undertaking overseas projects, or lacking adequate controls over risks associated with overseas operations.

(4) Engaging in improper business practices in violation of regulations, as well as engaging in vicious competition regardless of costs and consequences;

(5) Violating regulations by paying intermediary agencies fees for purchasing agency or other intermediary services;

(6) Overseas investment projects that violate regulations by engaging in activities explicitly prohibited or not subject to filing under the investment supervision system;

(7) Violating other relevant provisions of this chapter or engaging in other overseas business investment activities explicitly prohibited by the state.

Article 19: Other circumstances in which accountability shall be pursued for violations of regulations, failure to perform or improper performance of duties resulting in losses of state-owned assets or other adverse consequences.

Article 20: For asset losses or other adverse consequences caused by illegal business and investment activities of central enterprises, the amount of asset loss shall be determined based on investigation and verification, in accordance with relevant regulations, as well as the impact such losses have on the enterprise, society, and the state.

Article 21: Asset losses include direct losses and indirect losses. Direct losses refer to the amounts and impacts of losses that have a direct causal relationship with the actions of relevant personnel; indirect losses refer to other amounts and impacts—beyond direct losses—that can be identified and measured and are either triggered or caused by the actions of relevant personnel.

Article 22: For central enterprises, asset losses resulting from improper business operations and investments are categorized as follows: losses below 5 million yuan are considered general asset losses; losses between 5 million yuan and 50 million yuan are considered major asset losses; and losses exceeding 50 million yuan are considered serious asset losses. For losses involving violations of discipline, illegal activities, or criminal acts, the applicable loss standards shall be in accordance with the provisions of relevant Party regulations and national laws and regulations.

The term “above” as used in the preceding paragraph includes the specified number itself, whereas the term “below” does not include the specified number itself.

Article 23: The amount and impact of asset losses may be comprehensively assessed and determined based on written documents issued in accordance with the law by judicial and administrative authorities, as well as specialized audit, appraisal, or verification reports prepared by qualified accounting firms, asset valuation agencies, law firms, professional technical appraisal institutions, and other specialized organizations, together with internal supporting documentation provided by the enterprise itself.

Article 24: Even if the relevant illegal business investments have not yet resulted in actual asset losses, but there is clear evidence indicating that asset losses are likely to occur in the foreseeable future and the amount of such losses can be reliably measured, they may, upon assessment by an intermediary agency, be recognized as contingent losses and included in asset losses.

Article 25: Other adverse consequences mainly include:

(1) When a central enterprise’s business qualifications are downgraded or revoked, its bank funding accounts are frozen, its financial condition deteriorates, and as a result, it loses its competitive edge in production and operations, its capital chain breaks down, and its ability to continue operating sustainably declines;

(2) Cases involving major legal disputes, being notified and penalized by industry regulators, or triggering significant negative public opinion—any of which result in damage to the commercial reputation of central enterprises and their image as operating in compliance with laws and regulations;

(3) Having been subject to control or sanctions by relevant authorities due to non-compliant operations, experiencing a major operational risk event, and thereby causing significant negative impacts;

(4) When there are significant deviations in the implementation of plans related to state-owned asset supervision or industry management, important work objectives fail to be achieved as expected, or key regulatory indicators are not met—thus negatively impacting the progress and effectiveness of relevant work by central enterprises—;

(5) Other negative impacts on enterprises, society, and the nation.

Article 26: The severity of other adverse consequences may be categorized into general adverse consequences, significant adverse consequences, and serious adverse consequences, based on factors such as the nature of the violation and the impact of its outcomes.

(1) General adverse consequences refer to violations that are relatively minor in nature, with impacts primarily confined to the enterprise involved.

(2) Significant adverse consequences refer to violations that are relatively serious in nature and whose impact is primarily felt at the level of the relevant industry or the central enterprise as a whole.

(3) Major adverse consequences refer to cases of serious violations whose impact is primarily felt at the national and societal levels.

Article 27: The nature and extent of adverse consequences shall be determined through a comprehensive assessment, taking into account factors such as written documents issued by judicial and administrative authorities in accordance with the law, reports from news media, verification reports issued by qualified professional institutions, expert opinions from relevant specialists, and internal supporting documentation provided by the enterprise. Such assessment shall also consider the context in which the violation occurred, the scope of the negative impact, and the duration of the adverse effects.

Article 28: During their tenure, personnel involved in the operation and management of central enterprises who violate regulations, fail to perform their duties, or fail to perform their duties properly, thereby causing losses of state-owned assets or other adverse consequences, shall be held accountable accordingly. Responsibility for illegal business and investment activities shall be categorized, based on job responsibilities, into direct responsibility, supervisory responsibility, and leadership responsibility.

Article 29: Direct responsibility refers to the liability that relevant personnel shall bear when, within the scope of their job duties, they violate regulations, fail to perform their duties, or fail to perform their duties properly, thereby playing a decisive and direct role in causing asset losses or other adverse consequences.

If the head of an enterprise falls under any of the following circumstances, they shall bear direct responsibility:

(1) I myself or, together with others, have violated national laws and regulations, rules and regulations for the supervision of state-owned assets, relevant provisions of industry regulatory authorities, and internal management regulations of the enterprise;

(2) Soliciting, instructing, compelling, condoning, or shielding subordinates from violating national laws and regulations, rules and regulations for the supervision of state-owned assets, relevant provisions of industry regulatory authorities, and internal management regulations of the enterprise;

(3) Directly deciding, approving, or organizing the implementation of major economic matters without following prescribed procedures or exceeding authorized powers;

(4) When presiding over relevant meetings for discussion or otherwise conducting research, directly deciding, approving, and organizing the implementation of major economic matters in situations where the majority disagrees;

(5) Authorizing (or delegating) other leading personnel to make decisions on matters that, according to relevant laws, regulations, and institutional provisions, should be handled by the primary responsible person (overall responsible party), as well as on matters involving signed target responsibility agreements or other important duties that should be fulfilled, and subsequently allowing such decisions to be made improperly or resulting in decision-making errors;

(6) Other acts that should be directly held accountable.

Article 30: Supervisory responsibility refers to the liability that relevant personnel shall bear for asset losses or other adverse consequences caused by their failure to fulfill or improper fulfillment of their duties within the scope of their direct supervisory (or assigned) responsibilities, in violation of applicable regulations.

Article 31: Leadership responsibility refers to the accountability that the principal person in charge of an enterprise bears for asset losses or other adverse consequences caused by violating regulations, failing to perform their duties, or failing to properly perform their duties within the scope of their job responsibilities.

Article 32: If a subsidiary of a central enterprise engages in illegal business operations or investments that lead to the circumstances described in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article, the relevant management personnel of the parent enterprise shall bear corresponding responsibilities.

The circumstances under which relevant personnel of the higher-level enterprise shall bear corresponding responsibilities include:

(1) A significant asset loss or serious adverse consequences occur, significantly impacting the company’s production and operations as well as its financial condition;

(2) Repeated occurrences of significant or major asset losses, or those resulting in significant or major adverse consequences.

In addition to the personnel from the next higher-level enterprise, personnel from even higher-level enterprises should also bear corresponding responsibilities in the following circumstances:

(1) Cases involving violations of rules, discipline, or laws that result in substantial asset losses and pose a serious threat to the enterprise’s survival and development;

(2) In a given period, multiple subsidiaries under the same entity experience consecutive and concentrated instances of significant asset losses, or suffer major adverse consequences.

Article 33: If a central enterprise violates regulations by concealing, failing to report, or falsely reporting significant asset losses or major adverse consequences, the primary and directly responsible officials of the enterprise shall be held accountable in accordance with their leadership and supervisory responsibilities.

Article 34: If a central enterprise fails to carry out accountability investigations as required by regulations and relevant job responsibilities, the persons in charge of the enterprise and other relevant personnel shall be held accountable by analogy according to their leadership responsibility, supervisory responsibility, and direct responsibility.

Article 35: If the relevant business decision-making bodies of central enterprises make decisions on illegal business investments or engage in other illegal business investment activities through collective decision-making, and such actions result in asset losses or other adverse consequences, the bodies shall bear corresponding collective responsibility according to their respective duties and authorities. The members involved shall also bear their respective responsibilities.

Article 36: If central enterprise management personnel, while conducting business in compliance with laws and regulations, fulfilling their duties of loyalty and due diligence, and without seeking illegal gains or causing significant asset losses or serious adverse consequences, fall into any of the following circumstances, they may be exempted from liability after comprehensive assessment and completion of the approval procedures as prescribed:

(1) In the course of organizing scientific and technological research and development, technological innovation, technology transfer, or promoting the localization and application of equipment, it may be difficult to achieve the predetermined objectives due to the highly experimental and uncertain nature of the work, as well as factors such as adjustments in technology route selection and changes in the market for technology transfer.

(2) In the course of undertaking strategic investments, venture capital investments, developing strategic emerging industries, planning and building future industries, developing energy and mineral resources, establishing leaders in modern industrial chains, and implementing major reform measures—where projects fail to meet expectations due to lack of experience, pioneering trials, and objectively unforeseeable major external changes;

(3) In the work of optimizing and restructuring the layout of the state-owned economy, revitalizing existing assets, and disposing of inefficient and ineffective assets, if asset losses or other adverse consequences arise due to major policy adjustments or significant changes in the external environment that could not have been foreseen in advance for objective reasons;

(4) Those who raise clear objections or reservations about erroneous decisions in collective decision-making;

(5) Where, in the implementation of a decision, due diligence has been exercised and responsibilities fulfilled, but asset losses or other adverse consequences have occurred due to objective factors such as force majeure or unforeseeable circumstances;

(6) Other circumstances in which liability is exempted.

Article 37: The measures for handling relevant persons accountable include criticism or admonishment, organizational disciplinary actions, salary deductions, entry restrictions, disciplinary sanctions, referral to the discipline inspection and supervision authorities or judicial organs for prosecution, and other such measures. These measures may be applied individually or in combination.

(1) Criticism or admonishment. This includes critical education, requiring a written self-check, issuing a public criticism, or offering admonishment.

(2) Organizational measures. These include suspension for investigation, adjustment of position, ordering resignation, removal from office, and demotion. For matters that fall outside the scope of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission’s (SASAC) authority over cadre management, they shall be referred to the competent authorities with cadre management powers for appropriate organizational measures.

(3) Deduction of remuneration. This includes deducting and recovering annual performance bonuses or tenure-based incentive income, terminating or reclaiming other medium- and long-term incentive benefits, and revoking eligibility to participate in medium- and long-term incentive programs, among other measures.

(4) Prohibition and Restrictions: For a period of five years up to lifetime, individuals shall be prohibited from serving as directors (supervisors), senior management personnel, or other similar positions in state-owned enterprises.

(5) Disciplinary Actions. If personnel involved in the operation and management of central enterprises engage in unlawful acts as stipulated in the “Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Managers of State-Owned Enterprises,” they shall be subject to disciplinary actions—including warnings, records of demerits, serious records of demerits, downgrading, removal from office, and dismissal—in accordance with relevant regulations.

(6) Refer the case to the disciplinary inspection and supervision authorities or judicial organs for handling. If the case involves suspected violations of discipline, official misconduct, or criminal offenses, it shall be referred to the disciplinary inspection and supervision authorities or judicial organs in accordance with relevant regulations for handling in compliance with rules, discipline, and law.

Article 38: If a central enterprise incurs asset losses or other adverse consequences, and after verification, investigation, and determination of responsibility, in addition to referring the case to the discipline inspection and supervision authorities or judicial organs for handling in accordance with relevant regulations, it shall also be handled as follows:

(1) In cases involving general asset losses or minor adverse consequences, the directly responsible person and the person in charge shall receive criticism and education, be required to submit a written self-criticism, be publicly criticized through notification, and receive admonishment. Additionally, their annual performance-based salary for the year in which responsibility is determined may be reduced or recovered by up to 50%.

Leaders who bear responsibility will receive criticism and education, be required to submit a written self-criticism, and may have their annual performance-based salary reduced or recovered by up to 30% for the year in which responsibility was determined.

(2) In cases involving significant asset losses or serious adverse consequences, the directly responsible person and the person in charge shall receive disciplinary actions including public criticism, admonishment, suspension for investigation, job adjustment, or being ordered to resign. At the same time, their remuneration shall be reduced according to the following standards: 50% to 100% of the annual performance-based salary for the year in which responsibility is determined; 50% to 100% of the tenure incentive income earned during the tenure in which responsibility is determined or during the most recent complete tenure; termination of any unexercised medium- and long-term incentive rights; forfeiture of all medium- and long-term incentive gains earned in the year of responsibility determination and the preceding year; and prohibition from participating in any new medium- and long-term incentive plans offered by the enterprise for a period of five years.

Leaders who bear responsibility will be subject to disciplinary measures including public criticism, admonishment, suspension for investigation, and adjustment of their positions. At the same time, their remuneration will be reduced according to the following standards: 30% to 70% of their annual performance-based salary for the year in which responsibility is determined; 30% to 70% of their tenure incentive income for the tenure in which responsibility is determined or for their most recent complete tenure; termination of any unexercised medium- and long-term incentive rights; and a prohibition against participating in any new medium- and long-term incentive plans offered by the company for a period of three years.

(3) In the event of significant asset losses or serious adverse consequences, the directly responsible person and the person in charge shall be subject to measures including job adjustment, ordered resignation, removal from office, demotion, and restrictions on future employment. At the same time, their remuneration shall be reduced according to the following standards: 100% of the annual performance-based salary for the year in which responsibility is determined shall be deducted and recovered; 100% of the tenure incentive income earned during the tenure in which responsibility is determined or during the most recent complete tenure shall be deducted and recovered; any unexercised medium- and long-term incentive rights shall be terminated; all medium- and long-term incentive gains earned in the three years preceding the year in which responsibility is determined (inclusive) shall be turned over; and the individual shall be barred from participating in any new medium- and long-term incentive plans offered by the enterprise.

Leaders who bear responsibility shall be subject to measures including job adjustment, ordered resignation, removal from office, demotion, and restrictions on future employment. At the same time, their remuneration shall be reduced according to the following standards: 70% to 100% of the annual performance-based salary for the year in which responsibility is determined; 70% to 100% of the tenure incentive income earned during the term in which responsibility is determined or the immediately preceding complete term; termination of any unexercised medium- and long-term incentive rights; forfeiture of all medium- and long-term incentive gains accumulated over the three years preceding the year in which responsibility is determined (inclusive); and a five-year ban on participation in any new medium- and long-term incentive plans offered by the company.

Article 39: If a subsidiary of a central enterprise incurs asset losses or other adverse consequences and, according to these Measures, the relevant personnel of the central enterprise should be held accountable, the responsible individuals shall be subject to disciplinary actions including public criticism, admonishment, suspension for investigation, adjustment of position, ordered resignation, removal from office, demotion, and restrictions on future employment. At the same time, their remuneration shall be reduced in accordance with the following standards: 30% to 100% of the performance-based annual salary for the year in which responsibility is determined; 30% to 100% of the tenure incentive income earned during the tenure in which responsibility is determined or during the most recent complete tenure; termination of any unexercised medium- and long-term incentive rights; forfeiture of all medium- and long-term incentive gains accrued in the three years preceding the year in which responsibility is determined (inclusive); and prohibition from participating in any new medium- and long-term incentive plans offered by the enterprise for a period of three to five years.

Article 40: For the business decision-making bodies of central enterprises bearing collective responsibility, measures such as criticism and education, ordering a written self-examination, and issuing public criticism shall be imposed; relevant investor authorizations and delegation of powers shall be adjusted or revoked. In cases where asset losses are substantial and threaten the survival and development of the enterprise, or where other particularly serious adverse consequences have occurred, the affected entities shall be reorganized in accordance with prescribed procedures.

Article 41: The “year of accountability determination” refers to the year in which accountability measures are taken and handled. If a relevant person in charge did not hold any position or held a position for less than a full year during the year of accountability determination, the most recent complete year of service shall be used as the basis; if there is no complete year of service, the actual number of months served prior to the handling (not exceeding 12 months) shall be used as the reference.

Article 42: For the deduction and recovery of remuneration related to the same incident and the same responsible person, the highest standard applicable among disciplinary sanctions, administrative disciplinary actions, or other penalties and accountability measures shall be adopted; these measures shall not be applied in combination.

For different incidents, the cumulative deduction and recovery ratio of compensation for the same responsible person in the same year of responsibility determination shall not exceed 100%.

Article 43: Individuals held accountable who have received a warning or admonishment shall not be promoted or further employed within six months; those who have been reassigned to a different post shall not be promoted or further employed within one year; those who have been ordered to resign or removed from office shall not be assigned to leadership positions within one year, nor shall they hold leadership positions at a level higher than their previous position within two years; those who have been demoted shall not be promoted or further employed within two years. If an individual is subject to both disciplinary sanctions, administrative penalties, and other forms of punishment simultaneously, the longer of the applicable periods of ineligibility shall prevail.

Article 44: In any of the following circumstances, the relevant persons responsible shall be subject to stricter disciplinary measures:

(1) Asset losses occur frequently, involve substantial amounts, and have severe consequences;

(2) Repeatedly prohibited yet persisting in violations, defying regulations, and causing severe negative impacts;

(3) Forcing or instigating others to violate regulations, resulting in asset losses or other adverse consequences;

(4) Failure to take timely measures or ineffective measures that lead to the expansion of asset losses or other adverse consequences;

(5) Concealing, failing to report, or falsely reporting asset losses or other adverse consequences;

(6) Refusing to cooperate with or interfering with or resisting accountability efforts;

(7) Other cases that should be dealt with more severely.

Article 45: If personnel involved in the operation and management of central enterprises are held accountable and, during the period of impact, engage again in illegal or non-compliant business investments that result in asset losses or other adverse consequences, the relevant persons responsible shall be subject to stricter disciplinary measures.

Article 46: For mistakes made by personnel involved in the management and operation of central enterprises during enterprise reform and development—provided that such mistakes do not involve failure to implement orders, disregard of prohibitions, improper pursuit of personal gain, intentional misconduct, or arbitrary and unilateral decision-making—these individuals shall be granted tolerance in accordance with relevant regulations and procedures. Where any of the following circumstances exist, those responsible for non-compliant business investments may receive lighter or reduced disciplinary measures:

(1) Those with minor circumstances;

(2) Aimed at promoting enterprise reform, development, and stability, or fulfilling the enterprise’s economic, political, and social responsibilities, and without any personal gain-seeking intentions;

(3) Those that are not explicitly restricted or prohibited by the Party and the state’s guidelines and policies, the Party Constitution, Party rules and discipline, national laws and regulations, local statutes, and regulations, etc.;

(4) In the event of handling emergencies or urgent situations, if an individual or a small group makes a decision on the spot and promptly completes the reporting procedures afterward and obtains subsequent ratification, provided that no intentional misconduct or gross negligence is involved;

(5) Timely taking effective measures to reduce and recover asset losses and eliminate adverse effects;

(6) Actively reporting instances of asset losses or other adverse consequences and cooperating fully with efforts to hold those responsible accountable, or proactively reporting other individuals who have caused asset losses or other adverse consequences, provided such reports are verified as true;

(7) Other cases that may be treated leniently or with reduced penalties.

Article 47: Lighter handling refers to imposing a less severe penalty within the range of accountability and disciplinary measures prescribed in these Measures for violations.

Harsher punishment refers to imposing a more severe penalty within the range of accountability and disciplinary measures prescribed in these regulations for violations.

Article 48: Mitigated handling refers to imposing a penalty one level lower than the range of accountability and disciplinary measures prescribed in these Regulations for violations stipulated herein.

Aggravated handling refers to imposing a penalty one level higher than the range of accountability and disciplinary measures prescribed in these regulations for violations.

Article 49: For those responsible for violations in business operations and investment, disciplinary measures such as criticism and education, ordering a written self-examination, public criticism, or admonishment shall be imposed. However, if any of the circumstances specified in Article 46 of these Measures apply, such persons may be exempted from disciplinary action.

Article 50: Any reduction or exemption of penalties imposed on persons held accountable for violations in business operations and investment must be approved by the enterprise at the next higher level that made the penalty decision, or by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council.

Article 51: If a person with relevant responsibilities has already retired but, according to these Measures, should have been removed from office or demoted, their corresponding benefits shall be adjusted accordingly as prescribed. If losses of state-owned assets are caused by illegal business or investment activities, the individual may be held liable for compensation in accordance with laws and regulations. Any issues or clues involving suspected disciplinary violations, job-related misconduct, or criminal offenses shall be referred to the discipline inspection and supervision authorities or judicial organs for handling.

If the person(s) concerned have been transferred or have left their posts, they shall be handled in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph.

Article 52: If the relevant responsible person no longer receives a performance-based annual salary from this enterprise in the year when responsibility is determined, the amount to be recovered and deducted from their compensation shall be calculated based on the total of their full performance-based annual salary for the immediately preceding complete year of employment and their incentive income for the most recent complete term of office, in accordance with the relevant provisions of these Measures.

Article 53: Directors (supervisors) and other relevant personnel of central enterprises who violate regulations, fail to perform their duties, or fail to properly perform their duties, thereby causing losses of state-owned assets or other adverse consequences, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary measures in accordance with national laws and regulations, relevant rules and regulations, and these Measures.

Article 54: In principle, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and central enterprises shall organize and carry out accountability investigations in accordance with the relationships of state-owned capital investment and the authorities for cadre management.

Article 55: The primary responsibilities of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council in accountability investigations are:

(1) Study and formulate systems related to accountability for central enterprises;

(2) Organize and carry out investigations into major asset losses, serious adverse consequences, and significant asset losses that have resulted in substantial adverse consequences occurring at central enterprises, as well as the accountability procedures involving responsible persons from central enterprises.

(3) Responsibility accountability work for central enterprises and their subsidiaries that the authorities deem it necessary to organize directly;

(4) Conduct a special verification of common issues existing in central enterprises;

(5) For issues requiring rectification by central enterprises, urge the enterprises to implement the relevant rectification requirements.

(6) Provide guidance, supervision, and inspection of work related to accountability for central enterprises;

(7) Other matters related to accountability investigations.

Article 56: The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council shall establish a dedicated accountability body within its structure to receive from relevant parties, in accordance with prescribed procedures, reports and leads concerning violations of regulations and improper investment activities by central enterprises and their subsidiaries. After preliminary verification, these cases will be categorized and handled accordingly. The body will organize relevant investigation efforts through methods such as guidance and supervision, public listing for supervision, joint investigations, special investigations, and inquiries, to determine the responsibilities of the individuals involved, formulate recommendations for appropriate handling measures, and supervise enterprises to ensure that corrective actions are effectively implemented.

Article 57: The primary responsibilities of central enterprises in accountability efforts are:

(1) Study and formulate systems related to accountability within this enterprise;

(2) Organize and carry out investigations into general or significant asset losses, as well as general or significant adverse consequences, incurred by enterprises at this level; major asset losses, serious adverse consequences, and major asset losses resulting in significant adverse consequences incurred by second-level subsidiaries; and pursue accountability for those responsible among the leaders of second-level subsidiaries.

(3) Responsibility accountability work for its subsidiaries that the entity deems necessary to organize and carry out directly;

(4) Provide guidance, supervision, and inspection of the accountability-related work of its subordinate subsidiaries;

(5) Organize and carry out relevant accountability efforts as required by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council;

(6) Other matters related to accountability efforts.

Article 58: Central enterprises shall, under the leadership of their Party committees (Party groups), strengthen efforts to hold accountable those responsible for improper business and investment activities, establish and improve a sound accountability system, clearly designate the relevant functional departments or institutions to organize and carry out accountability work, and ensure effective coordination and cooperation with the enterprise’s disciplinary inspection and supervision bodies.

Article 59: Central enterprises shall establish a reporting system for accountability investigations. They shall promptly submit written reports to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) regarding issues and leads related to significant and major violations in business operations and investments, and shall regularly report on the progress of accountability investigations in accordance with relevant work requirements.

Article 60: If a central enterprise fails to carry out accountability investigations as required by relevant regulations and job responsibilities, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council will, in accordance with applicable provisions, hold the responsible persons of the relevant central enterprise accountable.

Article 61: The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and central enterprises shall strengthen guarantees in terms of accountability mechanisms, personnel, and funding. Any personnel who fail to detect major violations of regulations, discipline, or laws—such as illegal business practices and investments—when they should have done so, or who, after detecting such violations, merely go through the motions without pursuing them seriously, conceal them from reporting, or handle them inadequately, shall be held accountable according to regulations, discipline, and law.

Article 62: The process for conducting accountability investigations into central enterprises generally should follow these procedures: acceptance of complaints, preliminary verification, categorized handling, verification or investigation, disposition, and rectification.

Article 63: Accept and handle issues and leads related to improper business investments that have been transferred by relevant parties in accordance with prescribed procedures, and carry out the collection, organization, and analysis of relevant evidence and materials.

Article 64: The specialized accountability body of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council shall accept complaints and leads concerning violations of regulations in business operations and investment by the following enterprises:

(1) Discovered in the course of state-owned asset supervision and management work;

(2) Referrals from audits, inspection tours, disciplinary inspection and supervision authorities, and other relevant departments;

(3) Reported by central enterprises;

(4) Other issues and leads related to illegal business and investment activities.

Article 65: Conduct necessary preliminary verification of the reported issues and clues regarding non-compliant business investments, as well as the relevant evidence and materials.

Article 66: The primary tasks of the preliminary verification include:

(1) Situations involving asset losses and other adverse consequences;

(2) Cases of violations of rules, discipline, and laws;

(3) Whether it falls within the scope of accountability;

(4) Recommendations and requirements for relevant parties.

Article 67: The initial verification work should generally be completed within 30 working days; depending on the needs of the work, the deadline may be extended by up to 15 additional working days.

Article 68: Based on the preliminary verification findings, for cases where violations of discipline, rules, or laws are indeed established, classified handling shall be carried out in accordance with the prescribed duties, powers, and procedures.

Article 69: The main tasks of categorized disposal include:

(1) For matters falling within the scope of accountability responsibilities of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, the specialized accountability body of the SASAC shall organize and carry out verification or investigation. If violations of the provisions of these Measures require further verification, a case shall be initiated upon approval by the principal person in charge of the SASAC, and the enterprise being verified or investigated shall be notified in writing. The SASAC shall also notify the state supervisory authorities with jurisdiction over the matter.

(2) For matters falling within the scope of accountability responsibilities of central enterprises, transfer them to and urge the relevant central enterprises to carry out accountability measures.

(3) Regarding issues and leads involving irregular business and investment activities by cadres under central management, after obtaining approval from the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission, relevant verification or investigation work shall be carried out as required.

(4) If the matter falls within the scope of accountability responsibilities of other relevant departments, it shall be referred to those departments.

(5) In cases involving suspected disciplinary violations, official misconduct, or criminal offenses, the matter shall be referred to the discipline inspection and supervision authorities or judicial organs for handling in accordance with relevant regulations, rules, and laws.

Article 70: The specialized accountability investigation agency under the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council shall, based on work needs, establish dedicated working groups to promptly carry out verification or investigation into cases of improper business operations and investments, confirm the circumstances warranting accountability, determine the extent of asset losses and adverse consequences, identify the root causes, accurately classify the nature of the violations, and clarify and ascertain the responsibilities of the relevant personnel.

Article 71: In conjunction with the progress made by central enterprises in reducing or recovering asset losses and eliminating adverse effects, accountability measures may be initiated as appropriate.

Article 72: In conducting verification or investigation, the working group may adopt the following working measures to collect evidence:

(1) Conduct interviews with personnel involved in the matters under verification or investigation, prepare interview records and have the relevant personnel sign and confirm them, or request the relevant personnel to provide written explanations. For cases where face-to-face interviews are inconvenient, information may be obtained through correspondence.

(2) To examine and copy relevant documents, meeting minutes (records), materials, account books, original vouchers, and other related materials of the enterprises being verified or investigated;

(3) When necessary, solicit reports from the enterprise on matters under verification or investigation and request it to provide explanations regarding the relevant circumstances.

(4) Conduct on-site verification or investigation of the enterprise’s physical assets, etc.;

(5) Entrust a professional institution with the appropriate qualifications to conduct audits, assessments, or verifications on the relevant issues;

(6) Other necessary work measures.

Article 73: During the verification or investigation period, the payment or disbursement of performance-based annual salaries, tenure incentive income, and medium- to long-term incentive benefits that have not yet been paid or realized to the persons concerned shall be suspended. In principle, these persons concerned shall not resign from their positions. For those persons concerned whose presence might impede the smooth conduct of the verification or investigation, measures such as suspension for inspection, job adjustment, or removal from office may be taken as appropriate.

Article 74: In the verification or investigation of major violations in business and investment activities, where there is a genuine need for work, with approval, one may request the disciplinary inspection and supervision authorities to provide necessary support. Any issues and clues discovered that are suspected of violating discipline, engaging in official misconduct, or constituting a crime shall, after undergoing the prescribed approval procedures, be transferred to the disciplinary inspection and supervision authorities or judicial organs for handling.

Article 75: Verification or investigation tasks should generally be completed within 6 months, and may be appropriately extended as necessary.

Article 76: Upon completion of the verification or investigation, the enterprise and the relevant persons responsible shall generally be consulted to provide their views on the results of the verification or investigation. After collective deliberation, a verification (investigation) report detailing the facts of violations, asset losses, or other adverse consequences, as well as a report identifying responsibilities, shall be prepared. Following comprehensive review, the reports shall undergo a legality review.

When hearing opinions, the working group shall inform the relevant persons in charge of the facts confirmed through verification or investigation, as well as the supporting evidence, allowing them to make statements, present their defenses, and sign their comments.

Article 77: Based on the results of verification or investigation, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council shall, in accordance with its authority over cadre management and relevant procedures, hold the persons responsible accountable and issue a decision or recommendation for handling. It shall also put forward requirements for rectification to the relevant enterprises and adopt supervisory measures for state-owned assets. Relevant information shall be promptly reported to the competent authorities.

If the verification or investigation reveals that personnel involved in the operation and management of central enterprises have committed violations as stipulated in the "Regulations on Disciplinary Actions for Managers of State-Owned Enterprises," the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council shall, in accordance with its authority over cadre management, impose appropriate disciplinary measures in accordance with the law. If the matter does not fall within the scope of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission’s cadre management authority, it shall be referred to the competent authority with such authority for handling.

Article 78: If the person subject to disciplinary action disagrees with the disciplinary decision, they may file a written appeal within one month from the date of delivery of the decision, and provide relevant supporting documentation. The execution of the original disciplinary decision shall not be suspended during the appeal period.

The supporting documentation submitted in the appeal by the party being processed shall consist of evidence newly discovered after the verification or investigation and handling, or evidence demonstrating that documents such as expert opinions upon which the verification or investigation and handling were based have been altered.

Article 79: If the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council or a central enterprise makes a disciplinary decision, the person subject to the discipline shall file an appeal with the entity that made the disciplinary decision. If a subsidiary of a central enterprise makes a disciplinary decision, the person subject to the discipline shall file an appeal with the next higher-level enterprise.

If a disciplinary decision is made pursuant to the “Regulations on Disciplinary Actions against Managers of State-Owned Enterprises,” appeals shall be filed in accordance with the prescribed procedures.

Article 80: The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and central enterprises shall, within 30 working days from the date of receipt of the appeal, review the appeal and make a decision—either upholding, revoking, or modifying the original handling decision—in accordance with the relevant procedures, and shall notify the appellant and his/her enterprise in an appropriate manner.

Article 81: Central enterprises shall, in accordance with the requirements for rectification, earnestly summarize and draw lessons from past experiences, formulate and implement corrective measures, optimize business processes, improve internal control systems, plug loopholes in operations and management, and strictly adhere to the bottom line of lawful and compliant management. For widespread, trending, and emerging issues in enterprise operating practices, a long-term mechanism for risk prevention—integrating pre-event, in-process, and post-event supervision—should be established and perfected to address both symptoms and root causes.

Article 82: Within 60 working days from the date of receipt of the handling decision and the rectification notice, central enterprises shall submit to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council a rectification report and relevant supporting materials. The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council will strengthen supervision and inspection of the implementation of corrective measures, publicly announce and warn about typical cases, prevent repeated violations, and consolidate the achievements of rectification.

Article 83: In carrying out accountability investigations into improper business and investment activities, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and central enterprises shall strengthen coordination and cooperation with audit authorities, inspection teams, disciplinary inspection and supervision agencies, and other relevant departments. They shall promptly provide feedback on the status of handling transferred cases and leads related to improper business and investment activities, and enhance the application of the outcomes of accountability efforts.

Article 84: The State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council and central enterprises shall, in accordance with the state’s relevant regulations on information disclosure, gradually make public to the society information on the accountability for improper business and investment activities, thereby accepting social oversight.

Article 85: Actively leverage information technology to carry out accountability efforts, promote the submission, collection, sharing, and comprehensive utilization of relevant data and information, establish an information reporting system for losses from non-compliant business investments and accountability work, as well as a query system for individuals barred from holding positions in central enterprises, and intensify the use of information technology in accountability work.

Article 86: Central enterprises shall, in accordance with these Measures and taking into account their own specific circumstances, refine the scope of accountability, the criteria for categorizing the extent of asset losses and adverse consequences, and other relevant aspects. They shall also develop or revise relevant systems and regulations on accountability and submit them to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council for filing.

Article 87: The state-owned asset supervision and administration agencies in various regions may, by reference to these Measures and in light of their actual conditions, formulate or revise local regulations and provisions concerning accountability.

Article 88: The accountability work for state-owned enterprises with equity participation may, by reference to these Measures, be submitted to the shareholders’ meeting of the state-owned enterprise with equity participation for initiating accountability proceedings.

Article 89: For incidents involving production safety, environmental pollution, or instability that result in liability, separate handling shall be carried out in accordance with relevant national regulations.

Article 90: This Regulation shall be interpreted by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council.

Article 91: These Measures shall take effect as of January 1, 2026. The “Implementation Measures for Accountability for Irregular Business and Investment Activities of Central Enterprises (Trial)” (Order No. 37 of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council) shall be repealed concurrently.

※ Source: Supervision and Accountability Bureau

Layout: Wang Xin

Reviewed by: Management Committee