
Editor’s Note:
Recently, Attorney Wang Jun, director of Beijing Starrise Law Firm, was invited to participate in the “Special Symposium on Defending Cases Involving Concealment, Assistance in Criminal Activities, and Money Laundering—Strategy Criminal Defense Forum (Session 9),” hosted by Beijing Lüce Law Firm. She delivered a presentation titled “Examining the Determination of the Crime of Assisting in Criminal Activities Through the Lens of Rules Governing the Extraction of Foreign‑Origin Data.” Drawing on a case involving the concealment and disguise of proceeds from crime stemming from an overseas online gambling platform, Attorney Wang, from the perspective of electronic data evidence, conducted an in-depth analysis of the boundaries between the crimes of assisting in criminal activities and concealing or disguising criminal proceeds, as well as the practical challenges and institutional expectations surrounding the extraction of foreign‑origin data in cross‑border cybercrime cases.

Wang Jun
Director of Beijing Starrise Law Firm
The case I am sharing today is a criminal matter stemming from an overseas online gambling platform. Initially, the defendant was charged with the crime of concealing or disguising proceeds of crime (the “concealment” offense), but following defense efforts, the court ultimately convicted the defendant of the crime of assisting in cybercrime activities (the “assistance” offense). What makes this case particularly noteworthy is not the debate over the legal characterization—though that remains a hot topic in practice—but rather the issues it has brought to light. The Regulatory Gaps and Practical Challenges in Cross-Border Electronic Data Forensics.
Case Summary:
A typical yet “evidence‑lacking” cross‑border money‑laundering chain
This case involves a typical cross-border money‑laundering scheme: an overseas gambling platform → an offshore third‑party payment provider → a domestic money‑laundering ring → a domestic cultural‑media company → a domestic live‑streaming platform. The flow of funds operates as follows: the live‑streaming platform provides its payment‑collection API to the cultural‑media company, which then channels the proceeds through the money‑laundering ring and the third‑party payment provider, ultimately integrating them into the Alipay top‑up interface of the overseas gambling platform. Gamblers’ bets, paid via QR‑code scanning, are deposited directly into the live‑streaming platform’s account, after which the perpetrators use fictitious tipping, host settlements, and profit‑sharing arrangements on the platform to launder the illicit proceeds.
From this analytical framework, we can clearly discern the core distinctions between the crimes of concealment and harboring proceeds of crime and the crime of assisting in cybercrime. In terms of the stage at which the offense occurs, the former targets post‑completion disposal of illicit funds arising from an upstream crime, whereas the latter takes place during the commission of the upstream offense itself, constituting instrumental participation. Objectively, the crime of concealment and harboring requires substantive actions such as cashing out, splitting, or transferring criminal proceeds, while the crime of assisting in cybercrime typically amounts to providing accounts, technical support, or other basic forms of assistance. Subjectively, the crime of concealment and harboring demands specific and explicit knowledge that the funds are “proceeds of crime,” whereas the crime of assisting in cybercrime only requires “generalized awareness”—that is, awareness that the funds may be used for cybercriminal activities. It is precisely on the basis of these distinctions that the defense counsel successfully persuaded the court to classify this case as the crime of assisting in cybercrime rather than the crime of concealment and harboring.
But today, what I wish to focus on is not the charge itself, but rather… A fundamental deficiency in the evidentiary record of this case.
Evidence Gap:
Without the correlation of overseas data, the funds’ closed-loop cannot be completed.
Among the facts found by the court, there is a key statement: “The gambling platform embedded the live‑streaming company’s API password into its system to generate top‑up links.” However, this statement appears in the entire case file only as the testimony of a few defendants, and there is no… Other objective evidence or electronic evidence corroborates it.
In typical domestic cases, establishing the call logic of API interfaces and the data‑exchange process typically requires objective evidence such as remote examination records, electronic data extraction records, and forensic expert opinions. However, in this case, although forensic expert opinions and electronic data extraction records were produced, they pertained exclusively to servers of domestic live‑streaming platforms, the defendant’s chat logs, and transaction records, and did not involve any server data from overseas gambling platforms.
This omission means: Although the domestic fund‑flow chain is clear, the linkages with offshore gambling platforms fail to form a closed loop. The court’s finding that the act of “API‑based password implantation” constitutes aiding and abetting lacks objective evidentiary support. In particular, given that this case involves downstream offenses—whether concealment or assistance—the law further requires that the upstream criminal conduct itself be supported by evidence.
Normative Review:
Extraction of overseas data is legally grounded, yet in practice it is virtually absent.
The central issue raised by this case is: How should electronic data stored on overseas servers be collected as evidence?
In fact, the existing legal framework does provide a clear pathway. The “Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Handling of Cross-Border Gambling Criminal Cases” explicitly stipulates that, with respect to the collection, examination, and evaluation of electronic data in cross-border gambling cases: first, such procedures must comply with domestic laws, primarily the 2016 Regulations of the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security on Several Issues Concerning the Collection, Extraction, and Examination and Adjudication of Electronic Data in Criminal Cases, as well as the 2019 Rules of the Ministry of Public Security on the Collection of Electronic Evidence in Criminal Cases; second, the use of technical investigative measures must be subject to strict approval procedures; and third, where appropriate, criminal judicial assistance under international treaties should be pursued.
In addition, the 2016 Regulations explicitly stipulate the electronic‑evidence‑collection methods of “online extraction” and “remote online examination,” whereby, when the original storage medium is located abroad and cannot be seized, data stored on overseas servers may be extracted online through these procedures.
The path exists, but why is it almost never seen in practice? I have reviewed a large number of cases involving overseas gambling, and not a single one has successfully obtained evidence from abroad. The same holds true for the foreign-related official‑crime cases I have handled: all evidence pertaining to money‑laundering charges consists solely of domestic testimonial evidence, which cannot be legally linked to any objective conduct occurring overseas. The reason is readily apparent: Criminal judicial assistance procedures are cumbersome, time-consuming, and fraught with uncertainty. Meanwhile, remote online data extraction faces practical obstacles such as difficulties in obtaining account credentials and conflicts over data sovereignty. Consequently, in practice, the choice often leans toward “case‑handling efficiency” at the expense of “evidence integrity.”
Institutional Expectations:
Directions for the Revision and Improvement of Evidence-Collection Rules
Encouragingly, this issue is now receiving attention. In May of this year, the Ministry of Public Security issued the “Rules on Electronic Data Collection by Public Security Organs (Draft for Comments),” which systematically revises the 2019 “Rules on Electronic Data Collection in Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs.”
Article 30 of the draft for public comment explicitly states: “With respect to the extraction of overseas data, online extraction may be conducted by means of providing account credentials through the data holder or the server provider.” This represents an improvement over the current regulations; however, I believe there is still room for further refinement.
Based on our firsthand experience in handling cases, our Xinglai Electronic Evidence Defense Team has put forward the following points in our proposed amendments:
First, the principle of priority in judicial assistance. Criminal judicial assistance should be explicitly designated as the preferred avenue for cross-border evidence collection. Even if, in practice, it proves inefficient, establishing it as a principle will help progressively refine the relevant mechanisms and compel investigative authorities to give due attention to the legality of foreign‑related evidence.
Second, the concretization of the actor’s cooperation with the proceedings. In cases where the perpetrator cooperates by providing account credentials, their rights and obligations must be clearly communicated, and audio‑visual recordings must be made concurrently. Where the perpetrator refuses to cooperate, it is recommended that obtaining account credentials through technical means be reserved as a fallback measure, with its application strictly limited to specified conditions.
Third, the level of approval should be raised. Cross-border evidence collection involves the data sovereignty of other countries and may give rise to diplomatic risks. At present, the draft for public comment limits approval authority to the head of the county-level public security organ; we believe that, at a minimum, such authority should be elevated to the head of the municipal-level public security organ, and that a risk‑assessment and filing mechanism should be established.
Fourth, emphasize the simultaneous audio and video recording and the preservation of evidence of legality. Whether conducting remote inspections or performing online data extraction, the comprehensive documentation of the evidence‑collection process is critical to establishing the admissibility and authenticity of the evidence—particularly in cross‑border contexts.
Conclusion
The evidentiary issues in cross-border cybercrime are, at their core, The contradiction between “technology knows no borders” and “justice is bound by national boundaries.” Against the backdrop of the adoption of the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime, striking a balance between respecting data sovereignty and effectively combating crime has become a shared challenge for legislators, judicial authorities, and legal practitioners.
Returning to this case, although the court’s ultimate conviction for the crime of assisting information network criminal activities demonstrates a steadfast adherence to the proper application of the law, I am even more hopeful that, in future cases involving cross-border elements, we will see more foreign‑origin electronic evidence admitted into court in accordance with established legal standards—ensuring that every fact found can withstand scrutiny under the rules of evidence, rather than relying solely on isolated testimonial evidence to close the logical loop.
Attorney Profile
.
Wang Jun
Director of Beijing Starrise Law Firm
Founding Partner
Director of Beijing Starrise Law Firm and Head of its Management Committee; Executive Director of the Civil–Criminal–Administrative Integration Research Base jointly established by the School of Criminal Law and Justice at China University of Political Science and Law and Xinglai Law Firm; and Director of Xinglai’s Center for Professional Practice in Official‑Related Crimes. Holds undergraduate and master’s degrees from Huazhong University of Science and Technology. Member of the Criminal Procedure Law Specialized Committee and the Women Lawyers’ Working Committee of the 12th Beijing Lawyers Association, and Senior Research Fellow at the Southern Finance Legal Research Institute. Recognized with numerous accolades, including ALB’s “NARA Annual Managing Partner Award,” a place among the Top 15 Managing Partners on LEGALBAND’s Rising Stars List, inclusion on the “White Collar and Business Crime” ranking of China’s Top Lawyers, selection as one of China’s Top 15 Female Lawyers, and recognition as a Visionary Leader in The Visionaries section of China Business Law, as well as placement on LexisNexis’s Elite Leaders List.
He has published numerous professional articles in leading journals such as People’s Procuratorate and China Lawyers, and was featured on the cover of the book “Walking with the Law” published by the Chinese Culture Publishing House. He is a dual‑certified Data Protection Officer (DPO) and Data Protection Officer for Privacy (DPOPIPL) through the International Information Science Examinations Institute (EXIN). He has successfully defended multiple criminal cases resulting in acquittals, possesses extensive practical experience in criminal–civil intersection cases and property‑related sentencing defenses, and excels in representing clients in official‑duty and cybercrime matters, particularly having amassed substantial hands‑on expertise in electronic data examination.
Editor and Layout: Wang Xin
Reviewed by: Shen Xinyu


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