
Abstract: The 2026 Amendment to the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate Decision (Fa Shi [2026] No. 13), which revises the 2012 Judicial Interpretation on Insider Trading, focuses on adjusting the threshold for criminal liability and the grounds for excluding criminal liability, while fully preserving the three‑category framework set forth in Article 2 regarding “persons who illegally obtain inside information.” In practice, two key issues have emerged: whether individuals who passively acquire inside information should be held liable beyond the scope of the judicial interpretation, and where the boundary of criminal liability lies for downstream participants in a chain of information transmission. Two landmark cases provide corroborating examples: first, the case of Lu, disclosed in a special report by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate in 2025, involves insider information that, after being passed through two intermediaries—“Xia” and “Wang”—reached end‑users such as He and Huang, many of whom were not prosecuted; second, the insider‑trading case involving Fan, Wang, and Zhang, tried by the Second Intermediate People’s Court of Shanghai, shows that Wang and Zhang lent their accounts and acted under instructions, with both funds and profits flowing to the upstream actor, Fan, and despite each having engaged in personal trading, no criminal liability was imposed for those individual transactions, with criminal responsibility confined strictly to their complicity in “facilitating trading.” Together, these cases demonstrate that, following secondary transmission, passive recipients whose personal or nominee‑account trading is not subject to criminal prosecution exhibit a pattern in which criminal accountability for downstream actors is typified, behavior‑specific, and subordinate to broader culpability, without broadly classifying end‑users as “individual traders” and imposing blanket liability. Drawing on Fa Shi [2012] No. 6 and its accompanying “Understanding and Application,” Fa Shi [2026] No. 13, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s special report, relevant case‑law references, and the views of scholars and practitioners, this paper argues that the new judicial interpretation maintains a prudent stance toward passive acquirers and downstream participants in multi‑tiered transmission chains, remaining consistent with the 2012 interpretation; moreover, the restrained application observed in certain cases serves precisely to confirm that the fundamental intent of the 2012 judicial interpretation has not been undermined.
Keywords: Insider trading offense; passive acquirer; multi-tiered transmission; principle of legality in criminal law
Introduction: Raising the Issue
The punishment for the crimes of insider trading and leaking inside information has long been governed by a policy of “zero tolerance.” On July 24, 2026, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate jointly issued the “Decision on Amending the Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Insider Trading and Leaking Inside Information” (Fa Shi [2026] No. 13), which took effect on July 27, 2026.
This amendment primarily addresses new developments in the legal revisions governing the securities and futures markets and in case-handling practice: first, it reaffirms stricter liability for key actors by adding to Article 5 that “the time when a controlling shareholder, actual controller, or relevant decision-maker discloses to closely related persons the preliminary intention to form inside information” shall be deemed the initial moment of the initiation of the act; second, it refines the grounds for excluding criminal liability for insider trading (Article 4); and third, it aligns the threshold for criminal liability with the 2022 standards for initiating prosecution (Articles 6 and 7). Notably, the amendment makes no changes to the three‑category framework set forth in Article 2 of the Interpretation regarding “persons who illegally obtain inside information on securities or futures trading,” thereby maintaining the established position of the 2012 judicial interpretation.
This gives rise to two pressing questions that require clarification: First, should individuals who passively obtain inside information be held liable beyond the categories of subjects expressly defined in the judicial interpretation? Second, when inside information has been transmitted through multiple layers, how should the criminal liability of downstream participants be determined so as not to unduly broaden the scope of enforcement?
To address the aforementioned questions, this paper conducts a comparative analysis of two corroborating cases. The first case is the insider‑information‑leakage and insider‑trading matter involving Mr. Lu and others, as detailed in a special report issued by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on May 7, 2025, entitled “Leaking Insider Information Without Gaining Profit: Should Criminal Liability Be Pursued?” According to the report, the insider information originated with Mr. Lu, Chairman of Gree Real Estate (a legally designated insider), and was transmitted through an intermediary chain—“Mr. Xia → Mr. Wang”—before reaching end‑users such as Mr. He, Mr. Huang, Mr. Li, and Mr. Lu, who acquired it passively. Notably, several of these passive recipients were not held criminally liable.
Sample Two is the insider‑trading case involving the merger and acquisition of “Shanghai Ganglian,” adjudicated by the Second Intermediate People’s Court of Shanghai. Guo Jiang, CEO of HCNet and a legally designated insider, disclosed material nonpublic information to his close associate, Fan; in turn, Fan instructed Wang and Zhang to execute trades. Wang and Zhang lent their securities accounts to others and carried out trading under Fan’s direction, yet all funds in those accounts and any resulting profits were appropriated by Fan. As accomplices in insider trading, they were held criminally liable, but were not prosecuted for their own independent personal trading activities. Both cases share a common feature: the passive recipients who obtained information through intermediaries were not subject to full criminal liability as independent individual traders, whether for their own personal transactions or for trades conducted under nominee accounts. This paper takes these two cases as “dual samples” and, drawing on Judicial Interpretation No. 6 of 2012 and its accompanying “Understanding and Application,” Judicial Interpretation No. 13 of 2026, special documents issued by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, reference cases from the People’s Courts Case Database—including the Gu case—and the Liu Baochun case—along with related instances such as Chen Qiaoling in the Liu Baochun case, who was exempted from criminal punishment; Zhao Limei and others whose cases were handled separately in the Du Lanku case; and Z, Xiong Jiwen, and Ming Moshishi, who were granted discretionary non‑prosecution by Shenzhen procuratorial authorities—examines similar situations where individuals who passively acquired inside information were either not prosecuted or received only administrative penalties. These cases are incorporated into the analysis, which further draws upon the perspectives of Wang Xin, Xing Huiqiang, Zhang Zixue, Liu Xianquan, Fang Yu, Li Changqing, and others.
I. The Criminal Law Regulatory Boundaries for Persons Who Acquire Insider Information Passively
(1) Normative Framework: Three Categories of Illegally Obtained Persons and the Normative Positioning of “Passive Acquisition”
Article 180 of the Criminal Law limits the subjects of this offense to two categories: “persons who possess inside information on securities or futures trading, or persons who have illegally obtained such inside information.” Article 2 of Judicial Interpretation No. 6 of 2012 categorizes “illegal acquisition” into three types: (1) those who obtain inside information by unlawful means, including theft, fraud, misappropriation, eavesdropping, inducement, espionage, or private trading; (2) close relatives of persons who possess inside information, or other persons with a close relationship to such insiders, who engage in or disclose related transactions during the sensitive period, where the transactions are manifestly abnormal and lack a legitimate rationale or an appropriate source of information; and (3) those who, during the sensitive period, communicate or come into contact with insiders and engage in or disclose related transactions that are manifestly abnormal and lack a legitimate rationale or an appropriate source of information.
Among these, the normative intent of Category II (identity‑specific) is as follows: close relatives or persons with a close relationship enjoy an inherent advantage in accessing inside information and, accordingly, should bear a duty of confidentiality that exceeds that imposed on the general public. Therefore, whether such access is obtained voluntarily or involuntarily, it constitutes unlawful acquisition of inside information.
Reference Case No. 109 of the Shanghai Higher People’s Court (Gu’s insider trading case) explicitly holds that Gu, who has known the insider Guo for many years and has maintained a close working relationship in lending matters, qualifies as a person with a close relationship. Accordingly, whether obtained voluntarily or involuntarily, such information is deemed to have been illegally obtained by a person holding a specific status.
The third category (the proactive liaison type) emphasizes the initiative of “liaison and contact,” and, like the identity‑specific type, is subject to the dual constraints of “clearly abnormal transactional behavior” and “lack of a legitimate reason or legitimate source of information,” thereby serving as a reverse safeguard against presumptions regarding the relevant party. The 2026 amendment did not address Article 2, indicating that the aforementioned typological and limited framework for determination has been fully preserved.
(II) The “Neutral Zone” Obtained Passively: Determination of Non-Specific Identities and Non-Contact Persons
The only category that genuinely leaves room for interpretation is the “neutral zone” situated outside the aforementioned types—individuals who are neither close relatives nor closely connected to the informed party, nor have they proactively contacted or engaged with the informed party, but rather came into possession of inside information incidentally and passively (such as those who overhear telephone conversations or happen to read documents). In this regard, the drafters of the Interpretation, in their “Understanding and Application,” explicitly set forth two prerequisites:
Premise one: The passive recipient must be someone other than a close relative or a person with a close relationship; if the recipient is a close relative or a person with a close relationship, they are classified as such regardless of whether the acquisition was active or passive. Premise two: The passive recipient must subjectively “know” — that is, they must be aware both that the information constitutes inside information and that its source stems from a disclosure by an insider or from unlawful acquisition by another party. Under these premises, whether such conduct should constitute a crime remains a matter of two opposing views: one argues that, in accordance with the principle of legality, the passive recipient has no duty of confidentiality and employs no unlawful means, and therefore should not be deemed an illegal acquirer; the other advocates, drawing on the legislative approaches of the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe, Japan, and Hong Kong, China, to classify such conduct as a crime under certain conditions.
In sorting out the relevant issues, Judge Li Changqing of the No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court of Shanghai further pointed out that the notion of “unlawful acquisition” should not be dismissed solely on the basis of the means or status of acquisition. Instead, after satisfying the objective criteria of “clearly abnormal transactional behavior” and “lack of legitimate justification or a legitimate source of information,” a cautious determination should be made in accordance with the “objective unlawfulness theory,” thereby establishing a binary distinction between those who unlawfully obtain information and those who are knowingly aware of it. However, as for occasional, passive recipients who happen to learn of such information in a neutral context, they must still be assessed strictly in line with the principle of unity between subjective and objective elements; they should not be automatically deemed guilty.
Accordingly, it follows that judicial interpretations do not criminalize all passive acquirers across the board. As for those who passively acquire information incidentally in a neutral context—where no duty of confidentiality exists, the transaction exhibits no obvious irregularities, and subjective knowledge is difficult to establish—they are, by their very nature, outside the scope of Article 2’s regulatory framework, let alone subject to accountability through “circumventing” the judicial interpretation.
(III) The Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s Position and Boundaries Regarding “Passive Acquirers”—Taking the Lu Case as a Starting Point
In 2025, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate published a special article titled “If Insider Information Is Leaked but No Profit Is Gained, Should Criminal Liability Be Pursued?” Using the case of Lu, a pseudonym used in the report, as an illustrative example, the article directly addresses the question of whether criminal liability should be imposed when insider information is disclosed without any financial gain. At the time, Lu served as chairman of Gree Real Estate and was a legally designated insider and part of the “key minority” involved in the company’s major asset‑restructuring plan to acquire 100% equity in Zhuhai Duty Free Group. The sensitive period for the insider information spanned from March 14 to May 12, 2020. Lu leaked this confidential information to Xia, the general manager of a bank’s client department; Xia subsequently passed it on to Wang, a vice president of a large corporation; and Wang, in turn, disclosed it to multiple individuals and orchestrated related trading activities. In total, the illegal gains from this scheme exceeded RMB 10 million.
After surrendering, Lu argued that his “disclosure” was motivated by public-spiritedness and aimed at facilitating the restructuring, and that he had derived no personal gain, thus warranting no criminal liability. However, the procuratorial authorities contended that, as a member of the listed company’s “key minority” and a legally designated insider, Lu should be subject to strict legal enforcement—even in the absence of personal profit—because his failure to uphold his duty of confidentiality triggered a cascading dissemination of information through secondary and subsequent channels, thereby inducing others to engage in trading. Luo Xi, deputy director of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s Inspection Office stationed at the China Securities Regulatory Commission, further pointed out that when disclosing the information, Lu cautioned Xia not to purchase shares, demonstrating that he foresaw the possibility that Xia might exploit the information for trading yet deliberately allowed it to occur, thus exhibiting the subjective intent required for leaking inside information. Ultimately, the Shangrao Intermediate People’s Court, in its first-instance ruling in January 2024, found Lu guilty of the crime of leaking inside information, sentencing him to one year and six months’ imprisonment and imposing a fine of RMB 1.5 million. In January 2025, the Jiangxi Provincial Higher People’s Court, in its second-instance review, dismissed the appeal and upheld the original verdict.
The prosecution logic elucidated in this article exhibits a dual dimension: at the “source” level—where statutory insiders disclose material nonpublic information—even if no profit is derived, strict accountability is imposed, underscoring both the duty of confidentiality and source‑level governance; by contrast, at the “end‑point” level—where passive recipients acquire the information after it has been passed on—state remains restrained, with individuals such as He and Huang, despite engaging in actual trading, remaining unprosecuted. This pattern of “strict accountability at the source, lenient treatment at the end” stands in stark contrast to the fact that downstream passive acquirers, the focus of this study, are not held liable, thereby demonstrating that judicial interpretations and their practical application consistently anchor liability within a typological framework of “information source–transmission chain–transaction endpoint,” rather than pursuing blanket, tier‑independent accountability across the board.
II. Empirical Cases of Passive Acquirers in the Second Pass Who Have Not Been Subject to Criminal Liability
(1) Typologization of the transmission chain and the prosecutorial logic of “strict at the source, broad at the end”
The leakage and exploitation of inside information often take the form of a chain—“first‑hand, second‑hand, third‑hand”—with distinct identities and responsibilities at each level, warranting a typological analysis. At the first tier are statutory insiders, who owe a duty of confidentiality; their disclosure may constitute the crime of leaking inside information, as exemplified by the Lu case, which illustrates strict accountability at the source. At the second tier are those who obtain information by virtue of a specific status or through direct contact (such as Fan and Wang); having illegally obtained the information and then disclosing or using it, they commit insider trading or the crime of leaking inside information and are typically treated as principal offenders. As for the third tier and beyond, circumstances must be distinguished: if the individual is a close relative or a person with a close relationship to an insider, or has previously been in contact with such an insider, and the transaction is manifestly abnormal and lacks a legitimate basis, they may still be deemed an illegal acquirer. By contrast, if the person merely acquired the information passively after receiving it from a second‑hand source, or acted on instructions from an upstream party to facilitate trading, their liability should be assessed in light of their subjective awareness and the abnormality of the transaction, without allowing for unlimited retroactive attribution.
With respect to the “broad‑end” principle, the core of the rule is as follows: the punitive focus is directed at the information source and those who actively re‑disclose or exploit the information, while individuals at the downstream end who passively receive or participate are not treated as criminally liable—unless they meet a narrow threshold, namely that there exists an intentional nexus between the passive acquirer and the information disseminator—thus preventing the broad‑scale criminalization of their individual transactions. This approach has been consistently affirmed in both the Lu case and the Shanghai Ganglian case.
(II) The Gree Real Estate Case: Transaction Details and Hierarchical Allocation of Liability Among He, Huang, Li, and Lu
Following a two‑step transmission through “Xia” and “Wang,” the Lu case reached the final stage of trading, at which point the transactions and associated liabilities of He, Huang, Li, and Lu can be examined in detail. According to an official report issued by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the findings of both first‑ and second‑instance judgments: after learning of favorable information from Xia, Wang disclosed it to his close friends He and Huang, who subsequently purchased shares of Gree Real Estate, realizing profits of over RMB 330,000 and RMB 430,000, respectively. In addition, during a dinner with his former subordinate and friends Cai, Wu, and Li, Wang shared the inside information; Li—general manager of an electrical machinery company jointly held by Wang, Cai, Wu, and Wu’s son—then instructed the finance department to transfer RMB 2.6 million for share purchases, yielding a profit of over RMB 3.79 million, which was divided among Wang, Cai, and Wu. Furthermore, Wang directed Lu to purchase 600,000 shares on his behalf, generating a profit exceeding RMB 3.86 million, of which Lu received RMB 770,000 and Wang RMB 3.09 million. Meanwhile, Cai also passed the information to Zhang, who bought more than 4.24 million shares, reaped profits exceeding RMB 28 million, and paid Cai RMB 7.73 million.
Most critically, when filing the public prosecution, the procuratorial organ explicitly stated: “Although He and Huang were not held criminally liable because the amount of their illicit gains did not meet the threshold for initiating a case and pursuing criminal prosecution, that amount must nonetheless be included in the total amount involved in Wang’s alleged crime of insider‑information disclosure.” In other words, although He and Huang did engage in personal trading, they were not subject to criminal prosecution because their transactions amounted to passive receipt following secondary transmission and their profits fell short of the threshold for case initiation and prosecution—under the 2022 revised standards, such a threshold is set at RMB 500,000 or more in illicit gains or avoided losses. Nevertheless, the value of their trades was counted as part of the overall criminal proceeds attributable to the upstream insider‑discloser, Wang. This does not represent a “breakthrough” in judicial interpretation regarding accountability; rather, it reflects strict adherence to the precise thresholds established by the relevant legal provisions.
Similarly, Li, a former subordinate of Wang, merely followed instructions to notify the company’s finance department to transfer funds; he neither appropriated any proceeds nor was held accountable as an independent actor. Likewise, Lu, though instructed to make purchases on behalf of others and receiving RMB 770,000, was not included in the final list of six defendants—Wang, Xia, Cai, Wu, Zhang, and Lu—because there was no shared criminal intent. Together, He, Huang, Li, and Lu exemplify the liability profile of passive downstream participants: they passively received or participated, and their individual transactions or nominal dealings were not comprehensively prosecuted as independent criminal acts. This stands in stark contrast to the principle of “strict accountability at the source”—while Lu, as the source of the leak who derived no profit, was still sentenced to actual imprisonment, the passive downstream recipients were excluded from criminal prosecution.
(3) The Shanghai Steel Union Case: The Restrained Stance of Wang and Zhang—“Holding Them Accountable Solely for Assisting in Trading”
The insider‑trading case involving Shanghai Steel Union provides another comprehensive example of multi‑tiered information transmission: At the end of 2015, Guo Jiang—CEO of HCNet and a legally designated insider—disclosed the inside information to Fan, the legal representative of Huimei Company, a supplier of HCNet with close ties to Guo. Between January and February 2016, Fan passed the information on to Wang and Zhang, instructing them to lend their brokerage accounts and assist in purchasing shares of Shanghai Steel Union. The Second Intermediate People’s Court of Shanghai held that, after illegally obtaining insider information, Fan exploited it by trading through others’ accounts—conduct of particularly serious nature—and further disclosed the information, thereby inducing others to trade. Consequently, Fan was convicted of insider trading and leaking insider information, sentenced to four years and six months’ imprisonment, and fined RMB 13 million (as the principal offender), with illegal gains confiscated and any shortfall ordered to be reimbursed.
Wang and Zhang were convicted of insider trading as accomplices and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment, suspended for five years, and three years’ imprisonment, suspended for three years, respectively, along with fines. However, the most methodologically significant aspect of this case lies precisely in the “boundaries” of their criminal liability: According to Criminal Judgment No. (2018) Hu 02 Xing Chu 99, Guo Jiang disclosed inside information to Fan, who independently purchased 65,000 shares, realizing illicit profits exceeding RMB 580,000; together with Wang and Zhang, Fan acquired an additional 588,200 shares, generating illicit gains of RMB 2.9888 million; furthermore, Fan also leaked the inside information to Wang and Zhang, who collectively bought 3,196,900 shares, earning illicit profits of RMB 9.1842 million.
In other words, Wang and Zhang were not held criminally liable for their own independent “personal transactions”; their criminal liability was strictly confined to the act of “facilitating transactions”—namely, lending their accounts and carrying out instructions as accomplices.
The key significance of this judgment lies in the court’s determination that Wang and Zhang were, in fact, “passive recipients,” and that, in cases involving transactions lacking a shared criminal intent, no criminal liability was imposed.
(4) The Boundaries of Downstream Accountability and the “Prohibition of Secondary Presumption”
The greatest risk of multi‑tiered transmission is the infinite diffusion of liability along the chain. Both the prosecution and the academic community agree on a dual requirement: “direct receipt” and “subjective intent.” Shao Zhicai of the First Branch of the Shanghai People’s Procuratorate has argued that, in principle, those who disclose or transmit inside information bear responsibility only for the actions of the immediate recipient; they are liable for all subsequent transmissions and transactions only when they knowingly anticipate that the information will be further passed on or disseminated.
Judge Fang Yu of the Third Intermediate People’s Court of Beijing further distinguished between two scenarios: in cases involving secondary transmission, third-party transactions following information passed by a specific‑status actor—such as close relatives or persons with a close personal relationship to the informant—may be subject to liability; by contrast, secondary transmission by actors who merely establish contact is difficult to attribute to subjective intent and thus should not give rise to liability. Professor Shang Haowen of Beijing Normal University likewise emphasized that the subjective intent of secondary transmitters must be rigorously established to prevent an overbroad expansion of criminal liability; meanwhile, passive, fortuitous recipients who have not undertaken any further verification, lacking a duty of confidentiality and failing to meet the principle of unity between subjective and objective elements, should not be held liable.
Professor Liu Xianquan holds that individuals in the “second‑line” position are likewise classified as “persons who illegally obtain inside information,” since their conduct amounts to obtaining such information without authorization; however, this characterization requires the element of “knowing awareness.” At the same time, a “mice trader” is not automatically an accomplice of the position‑builder; for complicity to be established, there must be a concerted intent with the person who disclosed the information. This view aligns with scholarly doctrines that emphasize “information as the connecting link” and set “subjective knowing awareness” as the threshold, together delineating the boundaries of downstream liability.
Overall, the attribution of liability to downstream actors in multi-tiered transmission should adhere to a typological approach, with information serving as the connecting link, and be conditioned on the triad of “subjective knowledge,” “manifestly abnormal transactions,” and “lack of legitimate source.” The party who discloses or transmits the information bears responsibility toward the direct recipient (except where the dissemination is knowingly permitted), and it is strictly prohibited to rely on presumptive conclusions as the basis for further presumptions (a prohibition on secondary presumptions) in order to prevent procedural inefficiency and undue expansion of the scope of enforcement.
(5) Consistency Among Similar Cases: The Predominant Judicial Tendency to Not Substantively Prosecute Personal Transactions of Passive Acquirers
The aforementioned pattern of “strict oversight at the source and lenient enforcement at the end” is by no means an isolated phenomenon limited to the Lu case and the Shanghai Ganglian case. Expanding the scope of analysis to include a broader sample of finalized convictions and non-prosecution decisions reveals that “the individual transactions of passive acquirers (or passive participants) who obtained information after the intermediary stage are not subject to full criminal liability as independent traders” constitutes a widely prevalent judicial trend, which can be corroborated from both criminal and administrative perspectives.
The criminal dimension—“exemption from punishment, non-prosecution, and separate case handling”—is illustrated by the following example. In the Supreme People’s Court Gazette case of Liu Baochun and Chen Qiaoling for insider trading, the defendant Chen Qiaoling, who was the wife of the informed party Liu Baochun (a contact designated by the Nanjing Municipal Government), acted under instruction to purchase shares through a family‑controlled account and realized illicit profits exceeding RMB 7.499 million. The court found her to be an accomplice in the crime of insider trading but explicitly stated: “Taking into account that Chen is a non‑identity‑based offender, that she carried out the insider‑trading act passively at the direction of Liu, and that she has demonstrated remorse, she is hereby exempted from punishment in accordance with the law.” Although Chen Qiaoling falls within the category of a specific‑status subject, she was granted exemption from punishment due to her passive role, being acting under instructions, and her status as a non‑identity‑based offender, thereby demonstrating the judiciary’s restraint toward passive participants.
Second, in the insider‑trading and insider‑information‑leakage case involving Du Lanku and Liu Naihua (a typical case cited by the Supreme People’s Court), after learning the relevant information from his spouse, Du Lanku, Liu Naihua further disclosed it to Zhao Limei and others (all of whom are being prosecuted in separate cases). As a result, Zhao Limei and her associates purchased over 780,000 shares of Gaochun Ceramics stock, realizing illicit profits exceeding RMB 12.01 million. Although the couple, Zhao Limei and her husband, were subsequently held accountable in another case, the legal rationale was that Zhao Limei’s spouse was a close associate of Liu Naihua; therefore, the provisions applicable to passive recipients did not apply.
Administrative (Procedural) Dimension—A “Passive Acquisition” Case of “Non-Criminal, Only Administrative Penalties.” In the administrative penalty case involving Xiong Jiwen for insider trading, Xiong Jiwen inadvertently and passively obtained inside information when a knowledgeable source voluntarily disclosed it during a casual conversation with friends in a tea house, and subsequently purchased RMB 795,000 worth of shares in “Yunnai Power.” The Shenzhen People’s Procuratorate, applying the criteria for initiating criminal prosecution, determined that Xiong Jiwen did not meet the threshold for criminal liability and thus decided not to prosecute. In its penalty decision, the China Securities Regulatory Commission explicitly noted Xiong Jiwen’s defense, which argued that “individuals who passively obtain inside information are markedly distinct from those who employ illegal means such as theft, deception, misappropriation, eavesdropping, inducement, espionage, or private trading; their subjective malice is relatively minor, and the nature of their conduct is comparatively light.” Although the regulatory document did not reduce the penalty on this basis, it nonetheless acknowledged in practice the distinction between “passive acquisition” and “acquisition through illegal means,” and, since the conduct did not satisfy the criminal standard, the matter was resolved at the administrative level through fines and confiscations.
China’s CSRC’s first batch of administrative enforcement guiding cases, Case No. 3 (the insider‑trading case involving Ming and Shi), is even more illustrative: Xue, an intermediary and informed party, disclosed inside information to Chen, who obtained it unlawfully; Ming and Shi, who were colleagues of Chen and maintained close daily communication, learned of the information incidentally and subsequently purchased shares, realizing profits of RMB 2.0843 million and RMB 2.142 million, respectively. In response, the judicial authorities chose not to pursue or exempted them from criminal liability for their insider‑trading conduct. Accordingly, the Anhui Securities Regulatory Bureau reversed course, treating the matter as an administrative violation and imposing only an administrative penalty of RMB 8.453 million in fines and confiscations. This case likewise refrained from pursuing criminal liability against those who passively acquired the information through secondary transmission.
In sum, whether it be exemption from punishment, non-prosecution, or case separation at the criminal level, or administrative measures such as non-criminal penalties, all point to the same conclusion: passive acquisition and passive participation—individual transactions—are not subject to full accountability as independent actors under the current legal framework. The very existence of such “passive acquisition” cases underscores that judicial interpretations and their application consistently anchor themselves in the unity of subjective and objective elements, exercising restraint toward end‑stage passive recipients, rather than constituting isolated instances of “overstepping” the original intent of those interpretations.
III. Conclusion: The Two Cases Converge—The passive acquirer’s individual transaction following the second transfer was not prosecuted, thereby corroborating the cautious intent underlying the judicial interpretation.
Interpretation No. 13 of 2026, which amends the 2012 Judicial Interpretation on Insider Trading, focuses primarily on modernizing the thresholds for criminal liability and the grounds for excluding criminal liability, while leaving unchanged the three‑category framework set out in Article 2 regarding “persons who have illegally obtained inside information.” This demonstrates that both the legislative and judicial authorities adopt a cautious, typological and narrowly circumscribed approach to the determination of “illegal acquisition,” consistent with the 2012 Interpretation.
Accordingly, with respect to the two issues raised in this paper, the following conclusions may be drawn:
First, regarding whether passive recipients should be held liable beyond the scope of judicial interpretation: Passive acquisition does not automatically constitute a crime. Only in cases involving specific identity‑based offenses—whether active or passive—and contact‑based offenses may liability be imposed when the requisite identity requirements are met, the transaction is manifestly abnormal, and there is no legitimate source of information. As for those who happen to become passively aware in a neutral context, in accordance with the principle of legality and the allocation of the burden of proof, they fall outside the regulatory ambit of Article 2 and should not be subjected to liability through “overreach” of that provision.
Second, with regard to the attribution of liability among relevant parties following multi‑tiered transmission, a typological assessment along the chain should be adopted: in principle, downstream participants shall not bear criminal liability for their individual transactions; the party who discloses or transmits the information shall, in principle, be liable to the direct recipient (except where they knowingly facilitate further dissemination), while strictly adhering to the “prohibition of secondary presumption” to prevent undue expansion of criminal sanctions and procedural inefficiencies.
Third, and most fundamentally, by juxtaposing the landmark cases of Lu and Shanghai Ganglian, and further factoring in cases such as Chen Qiaoling—whose criminal liability was waived in the Liu Baochun case—and Zhao Limei, who was handled separately in the Du Lanku case, along with others like Xiong Jiwen and Ming and Shi, who were either not prosecuted or received only administrative penalties after “passively acquiring” information, one can discern a consistent underlying pattern: whether it is He and Huang, who passively received funds after being relayed in the Lu case (or Li and Lu, who participated passively), or Wang and Zhang, who lent their accounts and executed instructions in the Shanghai Ganglian case, or even Chen Qiaoling, who was exempted from punishment for acting under instruction and in a passive capacity in the published case—none of these individuals have been held fully criminally liable as independent traders. Collectively, these cases demonstrate that criminal law’s approach to downstream participants consistently exhibits typification, behavior‑specificity, and subordination of responsibility: it neither broadly classifies end‑stage passive recipients as “individual traders” and imposes blanket liability nor oversteps the subject‑matter and element boundaries delineated in the 2012 Interpretation. Any prosecutions in individual cases represent specific applications within the framework of judicial interpretation, addressing exceptional circumstances; such restraint and precision precisely confirm, rather than contradict, the cautious intent underlying the interpretation. Accordingly, one should neither infer nor conclude that the normative purpose of the judicial interpretation has been undermined.
While adopting a “zero-tolerance” approach to cracking down on securities‑related violations, it remains essential to uphold the principles of legality and proportionality between crime and punishment, exercising restraint in the expansive application of the offense of insider trading, so that stringent deterrence at the source and lenient treatment at the end are appropriately balanced within a typological framework.
References
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[11] Liu Xianquan, “On the Latest Judicial Interpretation and Legal Application of Insider Trading Crimes,” Jurist, No. 5, 2012; Liu Xianquan, Theory and Practice of Securities and Futures Crimes, Commercial Press, 2005.
[12] Fang Yu, Shang Haowen, et al., “Cracking Down on Criminal Activities in the Securities and Futures Markets in Accordance with the Law: An Important Measure to Safeguard the Healthy Development of the Capital Market” (Special Symposium Presentation), China Court Network, January 2026.
[13] Li Changqing (Shanghai No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court): “Legal Literacy: Common Legal Issues in Insider Trading and the Disclosure of Inside Information,” Shanghai Courts Website, 2024.
[14] Shao Zhicai, “Difficult Issues in the Identification of Insider Trading and the Disclosure of Inside Information” (in discussion with Liu Xianquan et al.), published in People’s Procuratorate, No. 8, 2017.
[15] Supreme People’s Procuratorate: “If No Profit Was Made from Leaking Inside Information, Should Criminal Liability Still Be Pursued?,” Supreme People’s Procuratorate Official Website, May 7, 2025 (Front-Page News of the Procuratorial Daily).
[16] Reference Case No. 109 of the Shanghai Higher People’s Court: Gu’s insider trading case.
[17] Intermediate People’s Court of Nantong City, Jiangsu Province (2009) Tongzhong Xing Er Chu Zi No. 0007: The insider trading case involving Liu Baochun and Chen Qiaoling (a case published in the Bulletin of the Supreme People’s Court).
[18] First-instance judgment by the Shangrao Intermediate People’s Court and second-instance judgment by the Jiangxi Provincial Higher People’s Court (final judgment rendered in January 2025): Criminal Judgment and Criminal Ruling in the case involving Lu Mou (Lu Mou) for disclosing inside information, and Wang Mou and others for insider trading and disclosure of inside information.
[19] Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court, Case No. (2018) Hu 02 Xing Chu 22: The case of Wang and Zhang involving insider trading and the disclosure of inside information (first-instance criminal judgment).
[20] Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court, Case No. (2018) Hu 02 Xing Chu 99: The case of Fan Mou involving insider trading and the disclosure of inside information (first-instance criminal judgment).
[21] China Securities Regulatory Commission, Inspection Bureau: “Final Investigation Report on the Case of Wang et al. Suspected of Insider Trading in ‘Shanghai Ganglian’” and “Referral Letter Regarding the Suspected Crime of Insider Trading by Wang et al.”
[22] Administrative Penalty Decision of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (Xiong Jiwen) [2022]: Case involving passive acquisition of inside information and non-prosecution due to failure to meet the threshold for criminal prosecution.
[23] China Securities Regulatory Commission’s First Batch of Administrative Enforcement Guiding Cases, No. 3: The Insider Trading Case Involving Ming and Shi (Criminal Proceeds Returned to Administrative Proceedings, Evidence Conversion).
[24] The Supreme People’s Court released typical cases involving the crimes of insider trading and disclosure of inside information (the case of Du Lanku and Liu Naihua for insider trading and disclosure of inside information), which was tried in the first instance by the Intermediate People’s Court of Wuxi City, Jiangsu Province.
Index: Cases and Regulations
[Regulations and Judicial Interpretations]
Article 180 of the Criminal Law (Crime of Insider Trading and Disclosure of Inside Information)
Articles 51 and 52 of the Securities Law (revised in 2019)
Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court No. 6 of 2012 on Insider Trading and its “Understanding and Application”
Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court No. 13 of 2026: Decision on Amending the Judicial Interpretation on Insider Trading
The Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security’s “Provisions on the Standards for Filing and Prosecuting Criminal Cases under the Jurisdiction of Public Security Organs (II)” (Revised in 2022)
Minutes of the Symposium on Several Issues Concerning Evidence in the Adjudication of Securities Administrative Penalty Cases, issued by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (2011)
[Case]
Sample of a special document from the Supreme People’s Procuratorate: Case of Lu Mou (Lu Mou) for disclosing inside information, and of Wang Mou et al. for insider trading and disclosure of inside information (first instance at the Shangrao Intermediate People’s Court; second instance at the Jiangxi Higher People’s Court; final judgment rendered in January 2025).
Reference Case No. 109 of the Shanghai Higher People’s Court: Gu’s Insider Trading Case (Guo Jiang → Gu)
Supreme People’s Court Gazette Case: Liu Baochun and Chen Qiaoling Insider Trading Case (2009) Tongzhong Xing Er Chu Zi No. 0007
(2018) Shanghai No. 02 Criminal Initial Case No. 22: The case of Wang and Zhang involving insider trading and the disclosure of inside information.
(2018) Shanghai No. 02 Criminal Case No. 99: The case of Fan’s insider trading and disclosure of inside information
Guo Jiang Insider Trading Case (Shanghai No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court, August 2018)
Supreme People’s Court Typical Case: The insider trading and disclosure of inside information case involving Du Lanqu and Liu Naihua (with Zhao Limei and two other defendants subject to separate criminal accountability).
Administrative Penalty Decision of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (Xiong Jiwen) Case (obtained passively, did not meet the threshold for criminal prosecution, no decision to prosecute)
CSRC’s First Batch of Guiding Cases, No. 3: The Insider Trading Case Involving Ming and Shi (Criminal Proceeds Returned to Administrative Proceedings; No Criminal Liability Imposed)
[Keywords]
Passive acquisition; passive recipient following the second transmission; multi-tiered transmission; persons who illegally obtain inside information; legality of crimes and punishments
Attorney Profile
.
Wangying
Beijing Starrise Law Firm
Director of the Securities Business Center
Partner
EMBA, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University. Member of the Securities Law Committee of the 12th Beijing Lawyers Association. Holds qualifications as an independent director of listed companies, as well as multiple professional certifications, including senior management and compliance officer credentials in the securities industry.
Attorney Wang Ying boasts extensive experience in financial‑capital legal services and securities dispute resolution. He has conducted in-depth research on securities‑related rights‑protection matters, including insider trading, violations of information‑disclosure requirements, market manipulation, and false statements, and is dedicated to safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of listed companies, controlling shareholders, directors, supervisors, senior executives, and intermediary institutions. In handling cases, he excels in a four‑pronged, integrated strategy that coordinates criminal, administrative, civil, and disciplinary proceedings, adept at fortifying clients’ legal defenses amid the intricate interplay of regulatory investigations, criminal accountability, civil claims, and exchange‑level scrutiny. His representation has repeatedly secured outcomes such as acquittals in criminal proceedings, reductions or exemptions from penalties, and dismissals of civil liability claims, with his landmark cases establishing a benchmark in the fields of securities compliance and crisis management.
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