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In the field of criminal justice, evidence serves as the cornerstone for establishing legal facts; when the legality of the evidence itself is called into question, the entire edifice of fact‑finding risks collapse. The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence constitutes a critical line of defense against this risk. It not only embodies the essence of procedural justice but also functions as an indispensable safeguard, protecting the fundamental human rights of suspects and defendants and preventing miscarriages of justice.

The Criminal Procedure Law and its related provisions have established a relatively comprehensive regime for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. Drawing on statutory requirements and cases handled, this paper examines, from both formal and substantive perspectives, the mechanisms for reviewing such evidence in practice and the complex challenges it poses.


 


 


 

I. Procedural Illegality: Exclusion of Evidence in the Context of Procedural Irregularities


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

In the current criminal justice context, illegally obtained evidence is distinguished between a broad and a narrow sense, which directly determines the scope of application of the exclusionary rule and its review logic.

Among these, the methods used to obtain narrowly defined illegal evidence either directly infringe upon the fundamental human rights of the person subjected to such collection or proceed in a manner that clearly violates statutory provisions; the core of their review lies in assessing the severity of the illegality of the evidentiary act. With respect to narrowly defined illegal evidence, the law explicitly stipulates that it “shall be excluded.” By contrast, broadly defined illegal evidence encompasses all evidence collected in violation of statutory procedures, including both narrowly defined illegal evidence and evidence whose admissibility may be compromised by flawed collection methods or procedural defects—thus requiring a dual assessment of procedural illegality and the risk of undermining judicial fairness. As for evidence other than narrowly defined illegal evidence that raises questions about its legality, the law does not prescribe an outright exclusion rule but rather provides that such evidence “may not be used as the basis for a verdict.”

“Formal” illegal evidence primarily refers to cases where the methods or procedures used to collect the evidence violate statutory provisions; under the current legal framework, such evidence falls within the broader category of illegally obtained evidence.


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

(1) Illegality of Evidence-Gathering Methods: An Infringement on Fundamental Human Rights


 


 

 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

Although we are no longer in a purely confession‑centric system, owing to the enduring influence of cultural traditions and practical experience, verbal evidence—particularly the statements made by suspects and defendants—continues to occupy a pivotal position in criminal proceedings and often constitutes the central point of contention in the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. Depending on the subject of evidence collection and the formal distinctions among unlawful methods, the law has established corresponding review standards.


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

1. Illegally obtained evidence from criminal suspects and defendants


 


 


 

The Criminal Procedure Law stipulates that any statements obtained from criminal suspects or defendants through “torture, coercion, or other illegal methods” must be excluded. According to the Interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Law, the Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Strict Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal Cases (hereinafter referred to as the “Strict Exclusion Provisions”), and the Procedures for Excluding Illegally Obtained Evidence in Criminal Cases (hereinafter referred to as the “Exclusion Procedures”), such illegal methods specifically include “violent means such as beating or the unlawful use of restraints, or other cruel and degrading practices amounting to quasi‑physical torture”; “methods involving threats of violence or of serious harm to the legitimate rights and interests of the person concerned or their close relatives”; and “illegal measures such as unlawful detention or other unlawful restrictions on personal liberty.” Moreover, the Opinions on Establishing and Improving a Mechanism for Preventing Wrongful Criminal Convictions provide that “methods such as freezing, starvation, exposure to the sun, scorching, and fatigue‑inducing interrogation” are likewise classified as illegal methods on par with torture and coercive interrogation.


 


 


 


 


 


 

In light of the specific circumstances enumerated in the aforementioned provisions, where relevant statements are obtained through violent methods such as beatings or the unlawful use of restraints, as well as through disguised forms of physical torture—including freezing, starvation, exposure to the elements, heat‑induced torment, and exhaustion‑induced interrogation—and by means of threats involving violence or serious harm to the lawful rights and interests of the person concerned or their close relatives, the coercive measures must further reach a level that “inflicts unbearable suffering on the individual, thereby compelling a statement against their will” in order to fall within the category of evidence “that shall be excluded.” By contrast, no such threshold of severity is required for statements obtained through unlawful methods such as illegal detention or other unlawful restrictions on personal liberty. The former not only demands the “formal” element of unlawful interrogation but also a requisite degree of harshness, whereas the latter is subject to no such requirements.


 


 


 


 


 


 

In a “organized crime” case in which the author served as defense counsel in Liaoning, several defendants were subjected to various forms of coercive interrogation—such as beatings, electric shocks, and threats—while under residential surveillance at a designated location. They were subsequently taken to police stations and other investigative facilities for questioning and the preparation of official records. Following pretrial conferences and courtroom proceedings, numerous statements obtained from several defendants were ruled inadmissible as illegally obtained evidence and excluded. Notably, one defendant represented by the author had been beaten prior to interrogation, leaving visible injuries, and was also subjected to prolonged, exhausting interrogations, including hunger‑induced questioning, as well as the unlawful use of restraints—particularly handcuffing behind the back—for extended periods during the course of questioning.


 


 


 


 


 


 

According to the Regulations on the Procedures for Handling Criminal Cases by Public Security Organs (hereinafter referred to as the “Criminal Case Procedure Regulations”) and the Strict Exclusion Rules, “threats, inducements, and deception” directed at criminal suspects and defendants are also classified as unlawful methods alongside torture and coerced confessions. However, in light of other relevant provisions—particularly other clauses within the Strict Exclusion Rules—practice generally holds that only evidence obtained through severe “threats” may qualify as illegally obtained evidence that is “required to be excluded” in the narrow sense.

For example, confessions obtained by investigators through threats—such as threatening to hold the suspect’s or defendant’s close relatives criminally liable, or imposing coercive measures like criminal detention on those relatives—should also be excluded as illegally obtained evidence, because they infringe upon the suspect’s or defendant’s fundamental familial sentiments and free will.


 


 


 


 


 


 

In the case of Zheng, involving embezzlement, bribery, and abuse of power (Criminal Trial Reference No. 1140) The court of first instance found that the details of the bribe‑giving as disclosed by the briber were inconsistent with the defendant, Zheng Moumou’s, statements, and that Zheng Moumou denied accepting a bribe in court. Zheng further alleged that investigators had obtained his guilty plea by offering bail and threatening to arrest his children. The prosecution failed to produce evidence demonstrating that the guilty plea was lawfully obtained; accordingly, such testimony should have been excluded under the law. Following the procuratorial organ’s appeal, the court of second instance nonetheless dismissed the appeal and upheld the original judgment.

The reasoning of the court in this case also makes clear that whether a threat has reached a serious level must be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case. Generally speaking, verbal threats alone impose only a limited restriction on or deprivation of the suspect’s or defendant’s freedom of will; if, after weighing the relevant interests, the suspect or defendant concludes that confessing is more advantageous than resisting and thus discloses the facts of the crime, the likelihood that such a confession is false is lower than that of a confession obtained through torture or coercive interrogation. However, if the method of threat exceeds a certain threshold—such as seriously harming the legitimate rights and interests of the person concerned or their close relatives, or employing methods prohibited by law or practices intolerable under social morality—the threat should be deemed to have reached a serious level and fall within the category of “other methods that cause mental suffering to the defendant” as defined in the Interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Law. Accordingly, any confession obtained by such means must be excluded.


 


 


 


 


 


 

However, in practice, confessions obtained solely through threats that harm the lawful rights and interests of the suspect and their close relatives remain relatively difficult to exclude outright. In a “organized‑crime” case that the author helped handle in Chongqing, investigators threatened the defendant: if he did not make a statement in accordance with their instructions, his family would be arrested; but if he complied with those instructions, he would be released on bail pending trial. Under such circumstances, the defendant ultimately made a guilty plea as directed by the investigators. Although the defendant and his defense counsel sought to exclude that record and any corresponding repetitive statements, the court of first instance nevertheless declined to initiate the relevant procedure, citing that “there were no grounds warranting the commencement of an investigation into the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.”


 


 


 


 


 


 

Under the existing legal framework, whether a suspect’s or defendant’s statement should be excluded hinges on whether it was obtained through unlawful means that subjected the individual to severe physical or mental pain or suffering, thereby inducing profound psychological fear and compelling the statement against their will.

In this regard, confessions obtained through “inducement or deception,” if made by a suspect or defendant based on a mistaken belief but without causing severe physical or psychological suffering—thus lacking “psychological coercion” and not infringing upon their fundamental human rights—do not qualify as illegally obtained evidence that must be excluded under the narrow definition. Such evidence is generally difficult to exclude outright during the proceedings; instead, its admissibility as a basis for conviction must be assessed in conjunction with an examination of its legality. More commonly, its veracity is evaluated in light of other evidence, and a comprehensive determination is then made as to whether it may serve as the foundation for a verdict.

However, if, by fabricating claims that the suspect or a close relative suffers from a terminal illness and thereby exploiting the suspect’s or defendant’s desire to secure release on bail as soon as possible in order to seek treatment or care for a loved one, the suspect or defendant is induced to make a guilty plea in accordance with prescribed demands, such conduct no longer amounts merely to deception; rather, it constitutes a threat that exploits fundamental human rights and deeply held familial sentiments, and may still constitute psychological coercion. Accordingly, any statements obtained under such circumstances should be excluded as illegally obtained evidence.


 


 


 


 


 


 

In the case of Zheng, involving embezzlement, bribery, and abuse of power, the court’s reasoning likewise held that Zheng’s admission of the bribery was influenced not only by the threat that his daughter and son-in-law had been taken into custody by the procuratorial authorities, but also by investigators’ promise to release him on bail pending trial upon his confession. In other words, the investigators simultaneously used bail as a means of inducement. Zheng’s defense was corroborated by interrogation records and other evidence. This method of combining inducement with threats, to a certain extent, intensified the coercive effect, inflicting severe psychological distress on the defendant.


 


 


 


 


 


 

In sum, evidence obtained through violent methods, disguised forms of physical torture, or threats to the personal safety or the legitimate rights and interests of the suspect or defendant and their close relatives—methods that subject the individual to severe physical suffering or inflict acute psychological distress—clearly constitute a direct violation of fundamental human rights and contravene basic moral principles. Where the unlawful nature of such coercive measures is sufficient to compel a confession against the person’s will, the resulting statement must be excluded, regardless of its factual accuracy, owing to the brutality and inhumanity of the evidence‑gathering techniques employed.

Moreover, if the suspect or defendant has been subjected to unlawful detention, the circumstances and conditions of such detention are themselves sufficient to evoke a profound sense of fear. In such cases, regardless of whether torture or other unlawful practices have been employed, and irrespective of the severity of any other illicit methods used, the statements obtained must be excluded outright, as the very foundation of their admissibility—namely, the legality of the evidence‑gathering process—has been gravely violated, constituting a serious infringement of human rights.


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

2. Illegally obtaining evidence from witnesses and victims


 


 




 

The Criminal Procedure Law stipulates that witness testimonies and victim statements obtained through “illegal methods such as violence or threats” must be excluded; moreover, the Strict Exclusion Provisions and the Exclusion Procedures explicitly state that “unlawful restriction of personal liberty” is also classified as an illegal method on par with “violence and threats.”


 


 


 


 


 


 

Compared with the exclusionary rule governing the statements of criminal suspects and defendants, the relevant provisions apply a significantly lower standard to the exclusion of witness testimony and victim statements: it suffices that unlawful means were employed in a formal sense, without requiring that such means have been sufficient to compel the relevant persons to make their statements against their will.

However, in practice, during the collection of evidence from witnesses and victims—particularly in major cases such as official‑duty crimes and organized‑crime cases—investigative personnel sometimes resort to threats or even violence against witnesses and so‑called “victims” in order to establish that the relevant individuals have committed the offenses at issue. Moreover, even when witnesses and victims allege that they were subjected to intimidation and dispute the veracity of the evidence, such evidence is often difficult to exclude outright.


 


 


 


 


 


 

In the aforementioned “organized crime” case in Liaoning Province, several witnesses testified in court that the contents of their statements were untrue. Moreover, during questioning, investigators subjected them to varying degrees of intimidation; some witnesses were even interrogated while being handcuffed behind their backs, a practice identical to that used with defendants—clearly violating fundamental procedural safeguards for obtaining evidence from witnesses. Nevertheless, the relevant evidence was not directly excluded on the grounds of “violence or threats”; instead, its admissibility must be determined through judicial proceedings.

Adding to the complexity, the law does not explicitly require investigators to simultaneously audio‑record and video‑record the process of taking statements from witnesses and victims, thereby making it impossible to verify, through such recordings, the legality of the questioning, as well as the consistency and authenticity of the written record with the actual content of the interrogation.

If the court neither requires nor summons witnesses and victims to appear in court for on‑the‑spot verification, then, under a “documentary‑only” trial procedure, it becomes impossible either to disqualify witness testimony and victim statements on the ground of formal illegality or to reject their evidentiary content on the basis of substantive untruthfulness; indeed, this approach may prove even more prejudicial than the unlawful collection of evidence from suspects or defendants.


 


 


 


 


 


 


 

Author Biography

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Yang Qichen

Beijing Starrise Law Firm

Partner

Bachelor of Laws and Bachelor of Management from China University of Political Science and Law. A practice mentor at the School of Criminal Justice of China University of Political Science and Law, holding qualifications to practice in the securities and futures industries. With many years of experience working in the procuratorial organs of Beijing Municipality and the organizational departments of district Party committees, he has participated in the handling of hundreds of cases, covering offenses such as property crimes, crimes against personal rights, crimes endangering public safety, economic crimes, official‑duty crimes, sexual offenses, gambling offenses, drug‑related crimes, crimes harming environmental and resource protection, crimes involving organized crime and evil forces, and cases subject to compulsory medical treatment procedures, thereby accumulating extensive practical expertise in criminal justice.


 

Since commencing practice, the attorney has handled a wide range of major and complex cases, including economic crimes, official‑duty crimes, crimes perpetrated by organized criminal groups and triad‑like forces, offenses endangering public safety, and mining‑related crimes. In numerous instances, the defense achieved favorable outcomes such as non‑prosecution, dismissal or modification of charges, and mitigation or reduction of penalties.


 

Business Areas:

Criminal defense, appeals and complaints, and corporate criminal risk prevention.




 

Editor and Layout: Wang Xin

Reviewed by: Management Committee


 

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