
Continuing from the previous article… Opinion | Yang Qichen: “Form” and “Substance” in the Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence (Part I)
In the field of criminal justice, evidence serves as the cornerstone for establishing legal facts; when the legality of the evidence itself is called into question, the entire edifice of fact‑finding risks collapse. The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence constitutes a critical line of defense against this risk. It not only embodies the essence of procedural justice but also stands as an indispensable safeguard for the fundamental human rights of suspects and defendants, while helping to prevent miscarriages of justice.
The Criminal Procedure Law and its related provisions have established a relatively comprehensive regime for the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence. Drawing on statutory requirements and cases handled, this paper examines, from both formal and substantive perspectives, the mechanisms for reviewing such evidence in practice and the complex challenges it poses.
(2) Illegality of the Evidence-Collection Procedure: A Violation of Standard Operating Procedures
With respect to the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, the focus is primarily on the inhumanity of the methods used in the case of testimonial evidence, whereas for non‑testimonial evidence, it lies chiefly in procedural irregularities.
1. Exclusionary rule for physical and documentary evidence: the “discretionary exclusion” model
The Criminal Procedure Law stipulates that if physical evidence or documentary evidence collected does not comply with statutory procedures and may seriously undermine judicial fairness, it shall be rectified or reasonably explained; otherwise, it must be excluded. The Rules on the Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence further clarify that methods violating statutory procedures include unlawful searches, seizures, and other such practices.
Under the aforementioned provisions, the exclusion of physical and documentary evidence is predicated on the fact that the procedures for their collection fail to meet statutory requirements, thereby giving rise to procedural defects; moreover, such defects must be of a nature that “may seriously undermine judicial fairness.” This standard constitutes the critical threshold and the scope of discretion within which it is determined whether the relevant physical or documentary evidence should be excluded.
In general, the severity of such a defect must be assessed comprehensively, taking into account the gravity of the procedural violation, the specific nature of the infringed rights, the significance of the relevant evidence, and the overall character of the case. For example, one must consider whether the evidence‑gathering process seriously violated constitutional rights—such as conducting an unlicensed search of a residence—whether it infringed upon fundamental rights like personal liberty, property, privacy, or the inviolability of one’s home; whether the evidence obtained constitutes crucial, core evidence; whether the procedural irregularity was due to intentional misconduct, gross negligence, or other objective factors; whether the case involves a serious crime or poses a grave threat to the public interest; and whether the procedural defect can be effectively remedied.
Unlike the statements of criminal suspects and defendants, even if the illegality of the collection of physical and documentary evidence reaches a “serious” level, such illegality does not necessarily entail its exclusion; the law still affords an opportunity to rectify the deficiency or provide a reasonable explanation. Only when rectification or explanation is impossible must the evidence be excluded.
Among these, rectification focuses on formal perfection—such as supplementing signatures, affixing seals, or providing clarifications—while reasonable explanation emphasizes offering a persuasive account of the reasons for the violation—for example, due to urgent circumstances or objective impediments. Moreover, both rectification and explanation must achieve the effect of “eliminating unlawfulness” or “rendering the evidence admissible”; they may not be mere perfunctory measures.
Compared with testimonial evidence, physical and documentary evidence is often unique and irreplaceable, making it difficult to obtain again. When such evidence is pivotal to establishing guilt or determining the sentence, its exclusion may directly render the entire evidentiary chain incomplete. Accordingly, the law grants these types of evidence specific avenues for redress, thereby safeguarding substantive justice in the case.
At the same time, the standard of “likely to seriously undermine judicial impartiality” is highly abstract, affording a considerable degree of discretionary leeway; as a result, it readily becomes a focal point of contention and directly affects the factual findings underlying conviction and sentencing.
2. Other evidence: The exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence does not apply directly.
The Criminal Procedure Law provides that, with respect to expert opinions for which the expert is required to appear in court to testify, if the expert refuses to do so upon notification by the court, such opinions “shall not be used as the basis for a verdict.” The Interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Law, meanwhile, specifies, in the context of the examination and admissibility of various types of evidence, the circumstances under which expert opinions, records of site inspections, examinations, identifications, investigative experiments, audiovisual materials, and electronic data “shall not be used as the basis for a verdict.” However, none of these provisions expressly stipulates that the aforementioned three categories of evidence may be directly excluded; accordingly, they do not fall within the category of evidence that, due to “serious illegality,” may be deemed inadmissible and thus precluded from being presented during courtroom proceedings through a pretrial conference or trial.
The Criminal Procedure Law stipulates that evidence that has not been verified as true through in-court procedures such as presentation, identification, and cross-examination shall not be used as the basis for a verdict; the Exclusionary Rules further clarify that illegally obtained evidence that has been excluded in accordance with the law “shall not be presented or subjected to cross-examination, nor may it serve as the basis for a verdict.”
Accordingly, in contrast to narrowly defined physical evidence, documentary evidence, and testimonial evidence, which may be directly excluded and thus barred from admission into the court’s evidentiary proceedings, other types of evidence—such as expert opinions—must undergo judicial examination before they can be deemed admissible as the basis for a verdict. The exclusion of narrowly defined illegal evidence serves as a “double safeguard,” whereas evidence such as expert opinions, which are not subject to the exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence, constitutes only a “single safeguard.”
II. Substantive Illegality: Spiritual Coercion That Transcends Formalities
Unlike “formal illegality,” which arises from violations of legal requirements in the methods or procedures of evidence collection, “substantive illegality” goes beyond superficial procedural defects. It requires assessing the extent to which the evidentiary methods suppress the willful autonomy of the person whose evidence is sought and the substantial adverse impact such methods have on judicial fairness—thus embodying the core value of the exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence.
The essence of substantive illegality lies in the imposition of severe, sustained psychological coercion upon a suspect or defendant—namely, that the methods of evidence collection render the individual mentally unable to make free decisions or so resistant to such pressure as to be compelled to make statements or admissions contrary to their true intentions.
1. Exclusion of Repeated Statements: A Limited Recognition of the “Fruit of the Poisonous Tree” Doctrine
The Interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Law, the Regulations on Strict Exclusion of Illegally Obtained Evidence, and the Procedures for Excluding Illegally Obtained Evidence all explicitly provide that any repetitive statements identical to a confession obtained through torture or coercive interrogation—made by the defendant under the influence of such unlawful methods—shall likewise be excluded.
This rule draws in part on the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine, emphasizing that evidence obtained directly through unlawful means (the “poisonous tree”) and any derivative evidence (the “secondary poisonous fruit”) should, in principle, be excluded, thereby eliminating the ongoing deterrent effect of unlawful evidence‑gathering on the subjects of such investigations.
At the same time, in conjunction with the proviso stipulated above, the law effectively adopts a “general exclusion plus conditional admissibility” approach to repetitive statements. This ensures, on the one hand, enhanced protection of the defendant’s human rights through the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, while, on the other hand, allowing for the conditional admissibility of repetitive statements, thereby upholding substantive justice and improving litigation efficiency.
In the case of Zheng, involving embezzlement, bribery, and abuse of power, , and his first guilty plea was made under duress, Under intense psychological fear, there is a risk that the suspect may refrain from altering an earlier confession during questioning by the same investigating authority, and the statements made at different stages exhibit a high degree of consistency. Accordingly, it is impermissible to dismiss the credibility of such statements solely on the ground that subsequent interrogations in the investigative phase did not involve overt threats, thereby presuming that the prior coercive measures had no influence. Ultimately, the court ruled to exclude those statements. Moreover, the opinion in that case also indicates that, “in specific cases,” The voluntariness and reliability of a repeated statement should be assessed comprehensively, taking into account the nature and severity of the prior unlawful evidence‑gathering, the progress of the proceedings, any changes in the entity conducting the evidence‑gathering, and other relevant circumstances. Furthermore, sufficient evidence must be examined to dispel any reasonable suspicion that the defendant’s statement was obtained under duress, so as to determine whether the repeated statement should be excluded. ”。
2. Exclusion of Non-Repetitive Statements: The Prolonged Effects of Psychological Coercion
In practice, in addition to the inherent repetitiveness of the statements themselves, there may also be situations where, during the imposition of coercive measures or the course of evidence‑gathering, sustained and intense psychological pressure is exerted on a suspect or defendant— even if, at certain stages, no torture or coercive interrogation was employed, or if such methods did not reach the threshold of torture or coerced confession— thereby severely curtailing the individual’s freedom of will and compelling them to make statements contrary to their true intentions. In such cases, the relevant statements should likewise be deemed “substantively unlawful” and excluded.
In the aforementioned “organized‑crime” case in Liaoning Province, most of the statements recorded during the defendant’s period of residential surveillance at a designated location—those prepared by the defense counsel—were excluded; however, one statement was not excluded. Although no unlawful practices such as physical abuse, the illegal use of restraints, or coercive interrogation were present in the preparation of this particular statement, it was nonetheless produced during the same time period as other statements that had already been excluded. The interrogators were identical to those who had prepared the excluded statements, and they repeatedly took minutes almost daily over a very short span, with extremely brief intervals between interrogations. Both the statements preceding and following this one had been excluded, and the synchronized audio‑video recordings of the interrogation further revealed that the interrogators subjected the defendant to verbal threats during the drafting of the record.
In the author’s view, although the defendant did not suffer direct torture or coercive interrogation during the preparation of this statement, the severe fear that had already taken root—stemming from prior interrogations conducted by the same officers—persisted and compelled the defendant to make a confession against his own will. Even though the defendant did not merely “reiterate an earlier statement” but instead “made a new one,” both instances were the result of psychological coercion that had been established and continued; accordingly, such statements should be excluded as substantive illegally obtained evidence.
The prohibition against unlawful evidence‑gathering from relevant persons, particularly the strict ban on torture and coerced confessions, is rooted in the need to safeguard the fundamental human rights of suspects, defendants, and other subjects of evidence‑collection, as well as their right to remain silent. Coercion to self‑incriminate is forbidden, thereby ensuring that verbal evidence is both voluntary and authentic. Moreover, in the process of excluding illegally obtained evidence, “voluntariness” takes precedence over “authenticity.” Relevant provisions also stipulate that whether a defendant has been subjected to “unbearable suffering resulting in a confession made against his or her will,” rather than merely an “unwilling but truthful confession,” serves as the central criterion for determining whether such a statement should be excluded.
In other words, if a suspect or defendant, due to torture or coercive interrogation, has had their “freedom of will deprived” or their “capacity for rational decision‑making severely impaired,” such that the relevant statement lacks voluntariness, then, so long as the individual remains in the same ongoing environment of psychological coercion, that statement should likewise be excluded on the ground that its voluntariness cannot be ascertained.
III. The Significance and Challenges of Excluding Illegally Obtained Evidence
Excluding illegally obtained evidence constitutes a necessary safeguard for fundamental rights—such as personal liberty, human dignity, privacy, and property—as well as for interpersonal relationships and emotional bonds, thereby protecting citizens from unlawful infringements by state authority. By invalidating the “improper outcomes” of unlawful conduct—namely, illegally obtained evidence—it raises the costs of illegality, thereby ensuring that evidence‑gathering in criminal proceedings complies with legal procedures.
The core of the exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence lies in determining whether such evidence is admissible, rather than in ascertaining its specific content. Consequently, the exclusion of illegal evidence may, at times, impede the discovery of the truth in individual cases; however, its fundamental objective is to enhance the overall reliability of evidence and the legitimacy of the fact-finding process by regulating evidentiary collection, thereby facilitating more accurate determinations of the facts of a case from a macroscopic perspective and over the course of historical development.
In China’s judicial tradition, the pursuit of substantive justice is deeply entrenched, and the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence often faces pressure to achieve the goal of “neither miscarrying justice nor letting criminals go unpunished.” Consequently, how to more effectively instill among judicial officers the principle that “substantive justice must be realized through due process” remains a critical challenge.
In particular, the criteria in confessions—“subjecting a suspect or defendant to unbearable suffering against their will”—and in physical and documentary evidence—“potentially seriously undermining judicial fairness”—grant judicial officers substantial discretionary authority, resulting in inconsistent application in practice and necessitating more refined guidance and the use of landmark cases to provide direction. Moreover, difficulties faced by the defense in presenting evidence, the formalistic nature of the prosecution’s burden of proof, inadequate implementation of audio‑video recording requirements, and low rates of witness‑testimony appearances by investigators all constrain the effective practical application of the exclusionary rule for illegally obtained evidence.
The exclusion of illegally obtained evidence still looks good in theory, but is very difficult to implement in practice.
E
Author Biography
.
Yang Qichen
Beijing Starrise Law Firm
Partner
Bachelor of Laws and Bachelor of Management from China University of Political Science and Law. A practicum mentor at the School of Criminal Justice of China University of Political Science and Law, holding qualifications to practice in the securities and futures industries. With many years of experience working in the procuratorial organs of Beijing Municipality and the organizational departments of district Party committees, he has participated in the handling of hundreds of cases, including offenses against property, crimes infringing on personal rights, crimes endangering public safety, economic crimes, official‑duty crimes, sexual offenses, gambling‑related crimes, drug‑related offenses, crimes harming environmental and resource protection, “black‑and‑evil” organized crime, and cases involving compulsory medical treatment procedures, thereby accumulating extensive practical expertise in criminal justice.
Since commencing practice, the attorney has handled a wide range of major and complex cases, including economic crimes, official‑duty crimes, crimes perpetrated by organized criminal groups and triad‑like forces, offenses endangering public safety, and mining‑related crimes. In numerous instances, the defense achieved favorable outcomes such as non‑prosecution, dismissal or modification of charges, and mitigation or reduction of penalties.
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