
On April 21, 2026, the 33rd session of the Dacheng Criminal Law Forum was held at the firm’s Beijing headquarters, focusing on the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate’s “Interpretation (II) on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Embezzlement and Bribery,” as well as practical issues in bribery cases. Wang Jun, director of Beijing Starrise Law Firm, was invited to attend the conference and delivered a presentation on the “Rules for Determining Bribery Involving Lending and Interest Collection.” Director Wang Jun, drawing on the 61st batch of guiding cases issued by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (Case No. 248: Huang’s bribery case), conducted an in-depth analysis—from the perspectives of conduct characterization and amount determination—of the judicial rationale and key defense strategies in bribery cases involving lending money and collecting interest.
In mid-April this year, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate issued the “Interpretation (II) on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Involving Embezzlement and Bribery,” while the Supreme People’s Procuratorate also released its 61st batch of guiding cases. These guiding cases summarize and provide guidance on several emerging and concealed forms of official misconduct, categorizing them into five types of bribery: those involving artificially inflated transaction stages, lending with interest‑taking, real estate transactions, investment returns, and anticipated returns from pre‑IPO shares. Among these, the “lending with interest‑taking” type of bribery is the focus of today’s discussion.
The 2003 “Minutes of the National Symposium on the Adjudication of Economic Crime Cases” explicitly stipulates that, when a state functionary borrows money from a person seeking favor, it is necessary to examine such factors as whether there is a legitimate purpose for the loan, the true destination of the borrowed funds, the basic nature of the parties’ ordinary financial transactions, whether repayment has been made, and whether the reason for non‑repayment stems from objective impediments or subjective malice. However, the type of bribery involving lending and collecting interest disclosed this time is precisely the opposite: the state functionary does not act as the borrower but rather as the lender, extending funds to the person seeking favor and collecting interest; any amount exceeding a certain threshold is deemed the bribe.
Next, let us examine the core reasoning underlying the determination of bribery in Case No. 248, involving Huang某某 for accepting bribes and illegally granting loans.
The defendant, Huang, male, born in 1962, was the former branch manager of a certain bank’s Longyan branch.
From 2008 to 2014, while serving as the president of the Longyan Branch of a certain bank, Huang took advantage of his official position to assist relevant entities and individuals in matters such as guarantee and credit approval, and illegally accepted property from others totaling over RMB 13.32 million.
Among these, from 2010 to 2012, Huang, taking advantage of his official position, provided assistance to a certain financing guarantee company and a Fujian real estate company—both effectively controlled by Lin—in matters such as guarantee‑credit approval and the sale of commercial premises. In gratitude for Huang’s support and in order to continue securing it, Lin offered to borrow from Huang at a monthly interest rate of 3% for corporate operations, while stating that the maximum monthly interest rate he charged others was 2%. Between August 2011 and October 2012, Huang lent Lin a total of RMB 8 million in three installments. Lin used these funds for activities including providing credit enhancement through the financing guarantee company and engaging in short‑term lending, and paid Huang interest totaling RMB 1.7249 million at the agreed monthly rate of 3%, which exceeded the highest monthly interest rate Lin charged other borrowers during the same period by 1 percentage point. The excess interest amounted to RMB 575,000.
(1) The Ease of Corroborating Subjective Evidence
The determination of bribery must always return to its core and essential principle: whether the benefits obtained by a state functionary are commensurate with the official acts performed in their capacity. All of these guiding cases underscore this fundamental characteristic.
How is this kind of correspondence assessed in cases of official misconduct? It relies heavily on testimonial evidence. As long as the official states, “I accepted this money because I did something for him,” and the person seeking favor asserts, “I gave him the money because the official did something for me,” such testimonial evidence is sufficient to establish the facts. Although in practice there are certain issues regarding the methods of obtaining testimonial evidence, its reliability, and its susceptibility to change, it nonetheless constitutes a distinct category of evidence. When the testimonies of both parties corroborate one another, even a fabricated story can come to be treated as an established legal fact.
(II) Defense Based on the Examination of Objective Evidence
From the perspective of objective evidence, it is particularly important to determine whether the person seeking favor has a genuine need for a loan. If there is no genuine borrowing need, the conduct undoubtedly constitutes bribery; if, on the other hand, there is a genuine borrowing need, further examination may be warranted:
First, did the official conduct any inquiries or verify the petitioner’s genuine funding needs prior to extending the loan? Even if only a verbal inquiry was made—rather than retaining a written promissory note—such an effort can lay the groundwork for a defense down the line. Moreover, if the petitioner borrows merely one or two hundred thousand yuan from others but seeks several million yuan from the official, this conspicuous deviation from ordinary practice is likely to arouse reasonable suspicion on the part of the investigating authorities. This too can be framed as a question of the loan’s necessity.
Second, it is necessary to examine whether there is any overlap between the period during which the loan was made and the time when the official provided assistance or when the petitioner sought to gain an advantage. If such overlap exists, this factor alone is unlikely to serve as a valid defense; but even if no overlap is found, does that necessarily preclude criminal liability? In fact, it does not. The 2003 “Minutes of the Symposium on Economic Crimes” provides a clear definition of “seeking benefits for a petitioner,” encompassing various stages, including promises, actions taken, and actual realization. Nevertheless, this remains a point worthy of attention, and when considered alongside other relevant factors, it can help facilitate a more comprehensive assessment of the case.
Third, compare the interest rates on loans during the same period. If the bribe‑giver’s borrowing rates from other parties are all very low, yet the rate charged to the official is significantly higher, this creates a risk of bribery; however, if the official’s rate is equal to or lower than that of other lenders, it can effectively eliminate such a risk. It should be noted that loan interest rates must be benchmarked against those prevailing at the same time, as market funding costs vary across different periods.
The first two points are those that must be carefully considered and applied in combination in such cases, whereas only the third point can independently preclude bribery charges.
(3) Extended Reflections
Based on the foregoing cases, I have also drawn several reflections that may help with risk prevention in practice.
First, it is necessary to examine whether the public official possesses genuine capacity to lend. If the official’s annual income is only RMB 200,000 or RMB 500,000, yet the borrowed funds clearly exceed that capacity, there may be no legitimate or proportionate justification for such lending. Furthermore, the lawful origin of the official’s own funds used for lending must be verified; failure to clarify the source could expose the official to another criminal liability—namely, the crime of having unexplained sources of massive wealth.
Second, attention should be paid to the genuineness of transactions or investments. Does the public official engage in unearned gains or pursue low‑risk, high‑return opportunities? All equity investments and market transactions entail risks. If a public official accepts non‑equity shares or contributes only a minimal amount yet consistently receives a disproportionately high share of the profits, such arrangements readily fall within the scope of what is considered a quid pro quo between power and money.
Let us examine the criteria for assessing authenticity in other guiding cases:
Fictitious Incremental‑Transaction Bribery (Prosecutorial Case No. 247) — A state functionary and a petitioner agreed that, through a company effectively controlled by the functionary’s wife, fictitious transaction stages would be created, enabling the company to appropriate over RMB 33 million in profit margins from reselling transactions. The company engaged in these resales did not conduct any substantive business activities and bore no market risk. Under these circumstances, the court held that what was nominally a transaction was, in fact, bribery.
Real‑estate transaction‑based bribery (Prosecutorial Case No. 249)—The developer stipulated a down payment of RMB 500,000 for the purchase; however, the public official lacked sufficient financial means and paid only RMB 200,000 as a deposit. Moreover, under standard real‑estate sales procedures, the parties are required to sign a letter of intent on the day the deposit is paid and to remit the full purchase price and execute the sales contract within seven days; otherwise, the deposit is forfeited. Yet, this official exceeded the prescribed timeframe: even after one year, he had still not paid the remaining balance, had not entered into any contract, and had not paid the full 50% deposit—clearly contravening normal market practices. Ultimately, the court determined that he lacked genuine purchasing capacity and that the purported deposit was merely a façade to conceal a fictitious transaction.
Bribery in the Form of Investment Returns (Prosecutorial Case No. 250)—Although the investing company’s eligibility to acquire equity was limited to its internal employees, in order to express gratitude to a state functionary, the briber nevertheless arranged for that individual to make an investment despite lacking such eligibility, while in fact refraining from participating in the management or operations of the enterprise. This arrangement differs fundamentally from the market risks borne by other shareholders. Moreover, it is inconsistent with both sound logic and established market practices; consequently, it was deemed, upon穿透 analysis, to constitute a quid pro quo involving power and money, rather than a legitimate market‑based investment.
All of the aforementioned practices boil down to one key point: the authenticity of transactions or investments must be given paramount attention. Only when they are genuine can they serve as a safeguard against risks or as grounds for defense; otherwise, they may easily expose parties to criminal liability.
Third, be vigilant about indirect relationships that exist apart from official business ties. When an official and a petitioner have a business relationship, all financial transactions—regardless of their legitimacy—should be avoided to the greatest extent possible. But does the absence of such a business relationship mean that vigilance can be relaxed? The new provisions in Interpretation (II) make clear that it does not. Article 14 of Interpretation (II) provides an expanded interpretation of “taking advantage of one’s position”: if a state functionary secures benefits for another person through other state functionaries who are subject to hierarchical or supervisory relationships with the former, such conduct shall be deemed “taking advantage of one’s position.” This principle was already set forth in the 2003 Minutes of the Symposium on Economic Crimes; the present expansion clarifies that such subordinate‑or‑supervisory relationships are not limited to superior–subordinate or hierarchical ties, but must be assessed in light of the nature and functions of the official’s employing institution, the specific duties held, as well as relevant legal provisions, institutional arrangements, policy influences, and established practices.
This is somewhat akin to the “grand accusation” mindset—the antithesis of Attorney Zhao Yunheng’s “grand defense”: regardless of whether a supervisory relationship exists or whether there is a superior–subordinate dynamic, as long as there is even the slightest connection, it may be swept into the scope.
Fourth, attention should be paid to the “promise” of seeking improper benefits. Article 13 of Interpretation (II) has broadened the scope of what constitutes mediation‑based bribery. Previously, the provision that “where a person knowingly accepts property in exchange for securing a specific favor for the requester, such conduct is deemed a promise to procure an advantage for the requester” applied only to ordinary bribery; it has now been extended to mediation‑based bribery, with the threshold for “seeking improper benefits” expanded to the stage of “making a promise.” Accordingly, when handling cases involving lending money and collecting interest as a form of bribery, one must not confine oneself to ordinary bribery but also assess whether mediation‑based bribery entails similar risks.
(1) The principle for determination shall be the actual profit obtained at the time of the incident.
When lending‑and‑interest‑receiving bribery occurs, how should the amount of the bribe be calculated? Article 11 of Interpretation (II) provides clear guidance on determining the bribe amount, stipulating that the principle is to base it on the actual profit obtained—this constitutes a fundamental principle. Applying this to the present case, how is the actual profit calculated? The intermediary borrowed funds from others at a maximum interest rate of 2%, while paying state functionaries an interest rate of 3% per month; accordingly, the bribe amount is computed based on the interest rate differential of 1%.
(2) Not taking bank interest rates as the benchmark,
Using the highest borrowing rate prevailing at the time of the request as the benchmark.
When calculating the interest differential, bank interest rates are not used as a benchmark. Currently, the one-year LPR stands at 3%, which translates to a monthly rate of 0.25%—a very low threshold. The guiding case does not take bank interest rates as the reference standard, which reflects a more favorable and lenient approach to determining the amount of the offense. However, it should be noted that even if the highest prevailing interest rate at which the petitioner borrowed from others is lower than 0.25%—say, 0.2%—the interest differential is still calculated using 0.2% as the reference rate. In short, bank interest rates should be disregarded; they bear no relevance to the determination of the monetary amount involved.
(3) Extended Reflections
Reverse reasoning: Could the interest rate at which a lender—namely, a state functionary or official—extends a loan to another party serve as a benchmark? If so, further examination should be given to the maximum interest rate applicable to other loans extended by such state functionaries, including whether it is comparable to the prevailing market rate and whether the funds in question are their own.
Comparative Reflection: Should the cost of funds be deducted? This issue is not emphasized in the guiding case at hand, but it appears in two other cases from the same batch (Prosecutorial Case No. 249 and Prosecutorial Case No. 251). In illegal‑business‑operation cases, reasonable operating costs may be deducted when determining the amount of unlawful gains; what about bribery cases? Prosecutorial Case No. 249 and Prosecutorial Case No. 251 already provide for the deduction of funding costs— even where the so‑called deposit is fictitious, it is nonetheless subtracted when calculating the bribe amount; likewise, if the purchase of pre‑IPO shares was undertaken with the intent to accept a bribe, the funds used for that purchase are likewise excluded from the bribe calculation.
This principle can be extended as follows: In cases of bribery involving the lending of funds for interest, if an official’s loan consists primarily of personal funds with only a small portion borrowed, a question of funding costs arises. In light of the principles set forth in the aforementioned guiding case, I believe it is worth exploring the possibility of deducting such funding costs.
Author Biography
.
Wang Jun
Director of Beijing Starrise Law Firm
Founding Partner
Director of Beijing Starrise Law Firm and Head of its Management Committee; Executive Director of the Civil–Criminal–Administrative Integration Research Base jointly established by the Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Institute of China University of Political Science and Law and Xinglai Law Firm; and Director of Xinglai’s Professional Practice Center for Official‑Related Crimes. Holds undergraduate and master’s degrees from Huazhong University of Science and Technology. Serves as a member of the Criminal Procedure Law Specialized Committee and the Women Lawyers’ Working Committee of the 12th Beijing Lawyers Association, and is a Senior Research Fellow at the Southern Finance Legal Research Institute. Has been recognized on LEGALBAND’s 2026 China Top Lawyers Ranking in the “White‑Collar and Business Crime” category, received the ALB Legal Awards’ NARA Annual Managing Partner Award, and been named among LEGALBAND’s Top 15 Female Lawyers and Top 15 Rising Partners in China. Additionally, she has been honored with accolades such as “The Visionaries” by Commercial Law, and included on LexisNexis’s Elite List, among other distinctions.
He has published numerous professional articles in leading journals such as People’s Procuratorate and China Lawyers, and was featured on the cover of the book “Walking with the Law” published by the Chinese Culture Publishing House. He is a dual‑certified Data Protection Officer (DPO) and Data Protection Officer for Privacy (DPOPIPL) through the International Information Science Examination Institute (EXIN). He has successfully defended multiple criminal cases resulting in acquittals, possesses extensive practical experience in criminal–civil intersection cases and property‑related sentencing defenses, and excels in representing clients in official‑duty and cybercrime matters, particularly having amassed substantial hands‑on expertise in electronic data examination.
Layout: Wang Xin
Reviewed by: Shen Xinyu


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