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The new Company Law innovatively establishes a shareholder disqualification regime, the legislative intent of which is to uphold the principle of capital adequacy, compel shareholders to strictly fulfill their capital contribution obligations, and safeguard the legitimate interests of compliant shareholders and the company’s creditors. However, in China, most limited liability companies are inherently characterized by strong personal ties, with each shareholder bearing distinct responsibilities for the company’s development. In many cases, whether or not a shareholder has paid up their subscribed capital is not used as a criterion for assessing mutual trust and good faith; indeed, shareholder disqualification may even run counter to the practical interests of highly person‑centric companies.


 

Whether it is the “shareholder expulsion regime” stipulated in Article 17 of the Supreme People’s Court’s Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China (III), or the more refined “shareholder disqualification regime” introduced under the new Company Law, since their inception, these mechanisms have increasingly been applied in disputes over corporate control among shareholders. This trend has become particularly pronounced following the new Company Law’s strict limitation of shareholders’ subscribed capital contribution deadlines to within five years of the company’s incorporation, thereby significantly curtailing the “benefits of the subscription period.” The era when shareholders could agree to extended subscription terms has thus come to an end. As these subscription deadlines approach, a large number of companies will find themselves in a situation where shareholders have failed to fulfill their obligations to pay up their subscribed capital upon maturity. Consequently, conflicts over corporate control among limited‑liability company shareholders are likely to erupt on a substantial scale during shareholder disqualification proceedings. Yet, with respect to the practical application of such procedures, while numerous theoretical articles can be found through public searches, empirical studies remain scarce. Moreover, applying the shareholder disqualification regime to contests over corporate control demands precisely the kind of practical, experience‑based expertise that is often lacking. Drawing on my extensive hands‑on experience, this paper takes limited‑liability companies as its primary subject of analysis and offers a detailed examination of the key practical issues arising when the shareholder disqualification regime is invoked in the context of struggles for corporate control.


 

Under Articles 51 and 52 of the Company Law, if a shareholder fails to fulfill its capital contribution obligation, the company’s board of directors shall issue a written notice urging payment. Upon expiration of the grace period, if the shareholder still has not complied, the board may resolve to issue a written notice of loss of shareholding rights, thereby depriving the shareholder of the equity corresponding to the unpaid capital. Such forfeited equity must, in accordance with the law, be transferred, reduced through capital reduction, or subscribed by other shareholders on a pro rata basis. The statutory provisions are straightforward, and the procedures for triggering such loss of rights are likewise clearly set out. However, contests over corporate control often involve highly complex practical issues, and the aforementioned legal framework clearly falls short of addressing these real‑world needs. Drawing on insights gleaned from numerous case studies, we will conduct a detailed analysis, centering on the statutory procedures governing the loss of shareholder rights.


 


 


 


 


 

I. Board Meeting Convening Procedure for Collecting Shareholders’ Capital Contributions


 

1


 

Entity convening the board of directors


 

If one seeks to contest corporate control through a shareholder forfeiture regime, the first step is to successfully convene a board of directors meeting.


 

Where a limited liability company has two or more shareholders, in most cases each shareholder will appoint one or two directors to serve on the board of directors, and the chairman is typically appointed by the largest shareholder in terms of subscribed capital.


 

According to Article 72 of the Company Law: “The board of directors’ meeting shall be convened and presided over by the chairman. If the chairman is unable or unwilling to perform his duties, the vice-chairman shall convene and preside over the meeting; if the vice-chairman is unable or unwilling to perform his duties, a director shall be jointly nominated by a majority of the directors to convene and preside over the meeting.”


 

Company law stipulates that the chairman of the board is the primary person responsible for convening and presiding over board meetings, and the chairman is typically appointed by the controlling shareholder. This arrangement enables the chairman to decide whether or not to convene a board meeting based on the interests of the shareholders he represents, thereby seeking to seize control of the company in pursuit of his own interests, while suppressing or infringing upon the rights of other shareholders or restricting their ability to take appropriate actions. For example, if all shareholders have failed to fulfill, or have only partially fulfilled, their capital contribution obligations, the chairman may, in accordance with his own interests, determine which…

When convening the board of directors, how to initiate a shareholder‑dissociation procedure against other shareholders, or how to restrict other directors from triggering such a procedure by refusing to call a board meeting—these scenarios are far from uncommon in practice. Consequently, in disputes over corporate control, the election of the chairman assumes paramount importance.


 

From the perspective of other directors, there is indeed a way out of the deadlock. Under Article 72 of the Company Law, if the chairman “fails to perform his duties,” the vice-chairman shall convene and preside over the board of directors; if the vice-chairman likewise fails to act, “a director shall be nominated by a majority of the directors to convene and preside.” The initiation of procedures for shareholder rights‑related matters is inherently part of the chairman’s statutory obligations. Once shareholders, directors, or supervisors formally request a board meeting on the issue of shareholder rights, the chairman is obligated to convene it within a reasonable timeframe. Should he fail to do so, pursuant to Article 72, the authority to call the board will pass down the hierarchy in accordance with the prescribed legal sequence. Notably, the provision that “a director shall be nominated by a majority of the directors to convene and preside” imposes a strict numerical requirement. For example, in a three‑member board, aside from the chairman, a majority of the remaining directors—i.e., at least two—must agree to convene the meeting; in a five‑member board, three out of the four non‑chairman directors must concur, and so on. If the requisite quorum cannot be met, the party concerned may find itself particularly disadvantaged in a struggle for control of the company. Consequently, in situations where one cannot yet secure the chairman’s cooperation, securing the support of a sufficient number of directors becomes all the more critical.


 

Accordingly, the chairman of the board serves as the convener; however, where the statutory requirements are met, other directors may also convene a board meeting independently, bypassing the chairman.


 

2


 

Determination of the Agenda for the Board Meeting


 

In general, the agenda for a board meeting should be drafted and communicated by the person who convened the board. However, in contests over corporate control, it is often the case that no shareholder has fulfilled their capital‑contribution obligations, and one shareholder seeks to oust the other through a procedure for disqualifying defaulting shareholders. In such circumstances, the convener’s proposed agenda typically focuses on demanding payment of contributions from those shareholders who have failed to meet their obligations, and they will naturally resist adding a motion to demand payment from themselves. Meanwhile, directors representing the shareholders whose contributions are being sought will invariably raise an ad hoc motion calling for the collection of contributions from all shareholders, rather than limiting it to their own. This raises the question of who has the authority to determine the board agenda and whether the board must deliberate and vote on any newly introduced items.


 

At present, there are no written provisions governing whether a matter concerning the initiation of collection proceedings against all shareholders who have yet to fulfill their capital contribution obligations should be discussed and put to a vote without the unanimous consent of all directors.


 

From the perspective of the party convening the board of directors, with respect to ad hoc agenda items, such items should not be brought before the board for discussion or voting unless all directors unanimously agree; otherwise, this could raise concerns about non‑compliance with the board‑convening procedures. From the standpoint of the directors being convened, if an additional item pertains to the matter of calling on all shareholders to pay up their subscribed capital, it involves significant corporate interests and should therefore be submitted to the board for deliberation and表决. Although each position has its own rationale, in practice, the party that calls and presides over the board typically retains ultimate authority over agenda setting. Article 73, Paragraph 1 of the Company Law explicitly provides that a company’s articles of association may independently regulate the board’s meeting procedures and voting rules, including how agenda items are determined. However, the more detailed such provisions are in the articles of association, the more standardized corporate governance becomes—yet at the same time, this can make it easier for disputes over control to reach an impasse. Accordingly, the appropriate drafting of the articles of association in different contexts requires case‑by‑case analysis based on the specific circumstances.


 

In summary, from a practical standpoint, in contests for corporate control, the agenda of board meetings is determined by the chairman or directors who convene and preside over the board; however, other directors also have room to leverage their directorial authority to create obstacles or even alter the situation.


 

3


 

Should directors with a conflict of interest abstain from voting?


 

Here, we confine our discussion to the scenario in which all shareholders of a limited liability company appoint directors to form the board of directors. In practice, situations where a majority of the board members are appointed and controlled by a single shareholder—given that such arrangements do not give rise to the risk of a deadlock—are excluded from this analysis.


 

In the context of a corporate control contest, the convening of a board of directors serves to demand payment of capital contributions from a particular shareholder and to initiate proceedings for the deprivation of that shareholder’s voting rights. A director appointed by the shareholder whose rights are being revoked has a conflict of interest with respect to the matters under consideration at the board meeting and must therefore be disqualified from exercising his or her voting rights. Although corporate law does not yet provide explicit statutory guidance on this issue, prevailing judicial practice—guided by directors’ fiduciary duties, the recusal rules applicable to related directors, and the underlying legislative objectives—has increasingly converged toward a uniform standard: directors with a conflict of interest must recuse themselves from voting.


 

4


 

Are board resolutions and notices without the official seal valid?


 

Article 51 of the Company Law provides that, upon resolution of the board of directors, the company shall issue a notice demanding payment of unpaid capital contributions to the shareholders concerned. In practice, the most direct and authoritative manifestation of the company’s will is the corporate seal. However, in disputes over corporate control, it may happen that the corporate seal is effectively controlled by the shareholder against whom the capital‑call is directed. Under such circumstances, it is clearly unrealistic to expect that shareholder to affix the corporate seal to documents adverse to their interests, such as a capital‑call notice or a document effecting loss of voting rights.


 

We hold that, in such circumstances, a lawful and valid resolution adopted by the board of directors constitutes the company’s will. The failure to affix the official seal is attributable to the malicious conduct of shareholders subject to capital call or shareholders whose rights have been forfeited, and does not constitute a procedural defect. Accordingly, if the directors who voted in favor of the resolution jointly sign the notice of capital call or the notice of forfeiture, such signatures shall be deemed to represent the company’s interests.


 

However, the company seal, as a direct representation of the corporation, confers a significant advantage in disputes over corporate control when one holds it. Shareholders who have been urged to contribute their capital or whose voting rights have been revoked may likewise leverage the company seal to mount appropriate set‑off defenses or countermeasures against any documents or facts that are adverse to their interests; yet, this paper will not delve into such matters in detail.


 

5


 

The “unlimited powers” of a company with only one director


 

In practice, many companies, for the sake of operational convenience, choose not to establish a board of directors and instead appoint “a single director” (formerly known as an “executive director” under the old law). When the company is operating normally and there are no conflicts among shareholders, this one‑director structure can indeed be efficient and streamlined, enabling the company to respond swiftly and make sound judgments in response to complex business environments. However, once a struggle for control arises, the powers of that single director are magnified to an extreme degree: by exercising the board’s statutory powers under company law, the director can unilaterally issue notices to shareholders demanding payment of their capital contributions and declarations of shareholder default. In other words, the shareholder represented by that single director can, through unilateral decision‑making, legally seize control of the company and marginalize other shareholders. As for whether the shareholder represented by that director has fulfilled its capital‑contribution obligations, such considerations appear to be irrelevant in the context of a corporate‑control battle waged by invoking shareholder default.


 

From our perspective, if a company is small, has few shareholders, and operates as a community of shared interests, appointing a single director can facilitate rapid growth. However, as the company expands and its shareholders are bound together by common interests, establishing a board of directors becomes necessary, with each shareholder actively participating in management to prevent any one director from wielding unchecked power. That said, based on our practical experience, even when a company has only one director, the other shareholders are not entirely at an impasse. In such circumstances, contesting that director’s position can still leave considerable room for maneuver within the broader, often complex struggle for corporate control—though this is a technical issue that we will not delve into further here.


 


 


 


 


 

II. Service of Process in the Shareholder’s Loss-of-Right Procedure


 

Most people overlook the importance of service of process in the shareholder forfeiture procedure.


 

Article 52 of the Company Law stipulates that, within sixty days from the date the company issues a notice to call for payment, shareholders whose contributions have been called must fully pay up their subscribed capital—provided that such shareholders have indeed received the notice. Otherwise, the company is entitled to declare them to have forfeited their shareholder rights. Following such a declaration, the affected shareholder may, within thirty days of receiving the notice of forfeiture, bring an action challenging the forfeiture; failure to do so will result in the loss of any right to litigate. It is commonly understood that this provision governs either the calculation of the final deadline for shareholders to make their capital contributions or the time limit for seeking redress after forfeiture. However, based on extensive practical experience, we have demonstrated that, in contests over corporate control, the more critical function of service of process lies in how each party effectively leverages the relevant procedural rules to substantively exclude or strip the opposing party of all rights in the shareholder‑forfeiture proceedings. If successfully executed, this approach can yield far greater practical impact than any other form of contestation or strategic maneuvering within the shareholder‑forfeiture framework.


 

For example, under the law, a company is required to serve a notice demanding payment of unpaid capital contributions on the relevant shareholder in writing, and must grant that shareholder a 60‑day grace period. From the perspective of legal fairness, this safeguards the lawful rights of the shareholder subject to such a demand; however, from the standpoint of a battle for corporate control, once that shareholder receives the notice, the ensuing 60‑day grace period often becomes the most intense and complex phase of the struggle—characterized by fierce contests over the official seal, disputes over the convening of board meetings, conflicts surrounding shareholder meetings, civil litigation, criminal complaints, and reports of unlawful conduct—all of which are likely to erupt simultaneously during this period. Consequently, the contest for control of the company enters a truly uncertain phase.


 

From the perspective of the party issuing the demand‑for‑payment or loss‑of‑rights notice, ensuring both lawful service and procedural compliance while also demonstrating that the notified party fails to take any responsive action within the statutory time limit is a challenge that hinges not on an understanding or application of the law, but rather on a host of practical, empirically derived technical issues. Likewise, from the standpoint of the party subject to such a notice, securing timely receipt of the relevant demand or loss‑of‑rights communication—and, at the very least, being able to become aware of it within the statutory period and mount an appropriate response—requires highly specialized guidance throughout the entire process of control‑rights contestation. We underscore the critical importance of proper service in corporate control‑rights disputes, urging all parties to accord it due attention; however, we refrain from elaborating on the specific technical details herein.


 


 


 


 


 

III. Partial Loss of Control in the Battle for Corporate Control


 

The “shareholder disqualification system” under the new Company Law differs from the “shareholder expulsion system” under the old law in that, under the new law, disqualification applies only to the portion of shares corresponding to the unpaid capital contribution. In other words, a company may disqualify only the shares attributable to the shareholder’s failure to fulfill their capital‑contribution obligations; it may not disqualify all of the shareholder’s shares merely because the shareholder has failed to meet part of their capital‑contribution duty.


 

As previously noted, given that most limited liability companies in China are highly person‑oriented, it is sometimes not in the company’s best interests—or aligned with the expectations of other shareholders—to fully disqualify a shareholder who has failed to fulfill their capital contribution obligations and permanently remove them from the company. When a shareholder has entirely failed to meet their capital contribution duties, must the company, in order to initiate the disqualification procedure, disqualify all of the shares held by that shareholder? At present, there are no statutory provisions addressing this issue, nor have any relevant real‑world cases been identified through publicly available sources.


 

We contend that corporate law falls under private law, and in the absence of an explicit statutory prohibition, there is no impediment to imposing partial loss of shareholder rights on shareholders who have failed to fulfill their capital contribution obligations, making such a measure both feasible and viable. For example, if a shareholder holds 51% of the shares and, upon the expiration of the capital contribution deadline, has not paid any portion of the registered capital, applying a loss-of-rights sanction could either result in the complete forfeiture of the 51% equity interest or, alternatively, the deprivation of only 3% of the shares, thereby achieving the objective of stripping the shareholder of control over the company. In this way, even amid exceptionally fierce contests for corporate control, it becomes possible to restructure the company’s ownership structure. Proceed smoothly It leaves ample room, preventing the company’s core interests from being undermined by overly fierce battles over control.


 


 


 


 


 

IV. Treatment of Shares Subject to Loss of Voting Rights


 

Article 52 of the Company Law sets forth three statutory methods for handling shares that have been deprived of voting rights: first, such shares shall be transferred in accordance with the law; second, they shall be cancelled and the company’s capital reduced accordingly; third, if they remain untransferred or uncleared within six months, the other shareholders shall subscribe to the corresponding capital contributions in proportion to their respective shareholdings. We will now examine and analyze each of these options in turn.


 

With respect to the first approach, the equity that has been cancelled may be transferred both internally and externally; however, neither the decision to effect such a transfer nor the identity of the transferee or the transfer price is at the discretion of the shareholder whose rights have been forfeited. Instead, these matters are determined by the shareholders’ meeting, and the forfeited shareholder is not entitled to any proceeds from the transfer. In this scenario, the transferor is the company, not the forfeited shareholder. The transfer price may not fall below the par value of the equity being transferred, and the consideration paid by the transferee is remitted directly to the company to replenish the capital contribution, thereby ensuring that the company’s capital is fully subscribed.


 

With respect to the second approach, the cancelled shares may be cancelled, and the company shall carry out the corresponding capital‑reduction procedures. Since the cancellation of shares results in a reduction of the company’s registered capital, it is necessary to comply with the statutory capital‑reduction procedures prescribed in Article 224 of the new Company Law, including notifying creditors and publishing a public announcement. In implementing these procedures, a resolution must be adopted by the shareholders’ meeting; given that the shareholder whose voting rights have been forfeited is a party to the capital reduction and thus has a vested interest, such shareholder shall not exercise voting rights when the resolution is passed.


 

With respect to the third approach—where the other shareholders of the company fully pay the corresponding capital contributions in proportion to their respective shareholdings—this amounts to transferring the forfeited shares to other shareholders within the company. The prerequisite for adopting this method is that, within six months from the effective date of the notice of forfeiture, the forfeited shares have neither been transferred nor cancelled. In fact, this approach is indistinguishable from the first method, “share transfer.” It constitutes a mandatory fallback provision under corporate law: if, after the company has made a forfeiture decision with respect to a shareholder, it fails to transfer or cancel the forfeited shares within six months, this compulsory rule is imposed on internal shareholders to prevent such an abnormal situation from persisting and undermining the stability of the company’s equity structure. However, in my view, there is no legitimate basis for maintaining this mandatory mechanism. Once it becomes clear that, within the six-month period following the forfeiture decision, no shareholder has expressed an intention to acquire those shares, it follows that the other shareholders lack any willingness to pay the corresponding consideration. Under such circumstances, a compulsory transfer would not only be ineffective but could also be construed as coercing shareholders into increasing their holdings—a practice that is plainly unlawful.


 

Based on my extensive experience with numerous practical cases, I have observed that, when a shareholder’s equity is deemed forfeited, the most preferred approaches among the other shareholders are either cancellation of the share or capital reduction. These methods do not alter the post‑restructuring equity proportions and avoid imposing any additional capital contribution obligations on the remaining shareholders. The reason why, in many instances, such cancellations or reductions are not completed within six months of the forfeiture decision is that the capital‑reduction procedure is highly stringent: it requires notifying the company’s external creditors and obtaining their consent. However, unless their claims have been fully satisfied, these creditors are unlikely to approve a capital reduction. To address this predicament, I recommend that future judicial interpretations of the new Company Law include supplementary provisions to ensure the effective coordination between the procedures for shareholder forfeiture and capital reduction, thereby resolving the inconsistencies and gaps currently encountered in practice.


 

Furthermore, in cases handled by our team, we have encountered another practical dilemma: when the shares held by a disenfranchised shareholder are subject to judicial freezing or pledged to third parties, the market supervision authorities are unable to proceed with capital reduction or registration amendments. What, then, should be done? At present, the law remains silent on this issue. Yet, in disputes over corporate control, such a predicament appears to provide the disenfranchised shareholder with one last means of resistance. The struggle for control among shareholders may sometimes carry greater internal significance, while at other times it is more externally oriented. When a disenfranchised shareholder places particular emphasis on maintaining their registered status as a shareholder in official business records, they may seek to preserve that status in public company filings by having their shares placed under judicial freeze. In similar cases we have handled, we have attempted to engage with the court issuing the freeze, but the results have been limited. On this matter, we hope that the legislative authorities will give due attention and address it through subsequent judicial interpretations; meanwhile, we will continue to explore two‑way solutions through further practical experience.


 

In fact, the practical challenges and complexities of corporate control disputes are far greater and more profound than those discussed in this paper. Moreover, since the implementation of the new Company Law, disputes over corporate control that rely on the deprivation of shareholders’ rights have been on the rise; yet a lack of sufficient practical experience appears to be the most significant hurdle for both shareholders and companies in such situations. Corporate control battles can never be successfully waged solely through theoretical treatises or statutory provisions; they require extensive, hard‑won practical insights, coupled with the ability to draw broader lessons from specific cases amid intricate and evolving conflicts. This paper confines itself to examining and analyzing the common focal points and dilemmas identified by the Xinglai legal team through their analysis of numerous cases, with the hope of providing useful guidance to those who may find it relevant.


 

Author Biography

.

Xu Rui

Beijing Starrise Law Firm Partner
Director of the Enterprise Appeals Business Center

Partner at Beijing Starrise Law Firm and Director of its Corporate Petition Practice Center. Holds an LL.M. from Wuhan University and serves as a director of the Heilongjiang Chamber of Commerce in Beijing. In 2025–2026, was recognized by Commercial Law as “The A-List: Rising Legal Stars,” and was named GRCD China’s Young Lawyer of the Year in 2025. He has also been honored with the “Crown” Emerging Lawyer Award and the Classic Case Award at the 10th Guike Annual Conference. His principal practice areas include complex commercial disputes, corporate control battles, and criminal–civil intersectional matters. He excels at identifying optimal solutions for clients in major civil and commercial disputes, striving to achieve the most favorable outcomes in defense or litigation. With extensive experience in high‑profile civil and commercial disputes, corporate control conflicts, third‑level review proceedings, corporate compliance, criminal defense, and significant asset preservation and enforcement, he has successfully handled numerous landmark cases—leveraging retrial procedures and third‑level review processes—to recover substantial losses for his clients.


 

Business Areas:

Major commercial disputes, corporate matters, criminal defense, and third‑level review. He excels at providing clients with expert civil and commercial legal services, corporate legal services, and criminal legal services in complex, high‑stakes cases, and has amassed extensive practical experience in commercial disputes, corporate litigation, criminal defense, and retrial appeals.


 

Layout: Wang Xin

Reviewed by: Shen Xinyu


 

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Wuhan Branch Address: Room 1001, 10th Floor, Huangpu International Center, Jiang’an District, Wuhan, Hubei Province

 

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