
In the crime of assisting information network criminal activities, the determination of “knowing” directly delineates the boundary between criminal liability and non‑criminality. At present, judicial practice is characterized by significant difficulties in proving “knowing,” a generalized use of presumptions, perfunctory reasoning, inconsistent standards for assessing the degree of knowledge, and an unclear demarcation from complicity. This situation stems both from normative shortcomings at the legislative level—namely, overly broad formulations of “knowing” and limited circumstances for applying presumptions—and from pragmatic factors at the judicial‑policy level, such as the lowering of evidentiary thresholds and the expansion of the application of this offense in pursuit of combating crime. To address these issues, the logic underlying the determination of this crime should be reconstructed by examining two dimensions: the actor’s conduct and awareness, as well as the scope of “knowing.”
Keywords: Crime of assisting information network criminal activities; knowing; pocket crime
In recent years, online activities have increasingly come to dominate everyday life, and the trend of criminals exploiting the internet to commit unlawful acts has grown stronger, characterized by diversification of methods, heightened frequency of offenses, and a broadening pool of suspects. The Ninth Amendment to the Criminal Law introduced the crime of “aiding information network criminal activities” (hereinafter referred to as the “aiding‑crime”) under Article 287‑2, stipulating that any natural person or entity who, knowing that another is using the information network to commit a crime, nevertheless provides technical support such as internet access, server hosting, network storage, or communication transmission, or offers assistance such as advertising and promotion or payment settlement—where the circumstances are serious—shall be deemed to have committed a crime. However, in judicial practice, the aiding‑crime has increasingly taken on the character of a “catch-all” offense, primarily because local judicial authorities exhibit excessive discretion and inconsistent standards in determining “knowledge.”
(1) The difficulty of proving “knowledge” is particularly pronounced.
“Knowing” is an essential subjective element of the crime of assisting in cybercrime, characterized by its “intrinsic and implicit” nature. 1 Given that the crime of assisting in cybercrime is a downstream offense, its modus operandi may take on a pyramidal or multi‑chain structure. Perpetrators often participate only in a single link or occupy a specific tier within the criminal organization, remaining unaware of the overall criminal scheme and underlying facts. Consequently, compared with traditional crimes, proving the “knowledge” element in this offense presents significantly greater challenges. Moreover, since the assistance provided by the perpetrator constitutes a factual act that lacks inherent illegality, the difficulty of establishing subjective knowledge through objective evidence is further compounded in this context. 2
(2) Generalized presumption of applicability and vague standards of proof
In judicial practice, the presumption set forth in Article 11 of the Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases Involving the Illegal Use of Information Networks and Assistance in Cybercrime Activities (hereinafter referred to as the “Interpretation on Assistance in Cybercrime”) is widely relied upon; however, the following issues remain:
1. The basis for the presumption is too weak.
The perpetrator’s “knowledge” not only directly determines whether an act constitutes a crime, but also bears on the distinction between the crime of assisting in cybercrime activities and the offense of aiding and abetting cybercrime. However, in current judicial practice, the judiciary has overly relied on the defendant’s own statements as the basis for presuming such knowledge, failing to comprehensively consider the impact of the defendant’s level of awareness on his or her conduct, as well as other objective evidence.
2. A tendency toward “pocketization” has emerged.
Judicial authorities provide insufficient reasoning in their determinations of guilt, effectively treating this offense as a catch-all “pocket” crime. In their judgments, they rarely offer detailed, reasoned explanations for how they establish the element of “knowledge”; instead, they often rely on standard formulations such as “the perpetrator is an adult with normal cognitive capacity,” “the perpetrator knowingly allowed the harmful outcome to occur despite harboring doubts about the nature of the conduct,” or “the conduct is generally associated with criminal liability.” 3 This formalized mode of reasoning has diminished the significance of the “principle of consistency between subjective and objective elements” in judicial practice, thereby giving rise to a tendency toward the overbroad application of this offense as a catch-all provision.
3. The threshold for “knowing” varies.
It is generally held that “knowing” encompasses both “explicit knowledge” and “constructive knowledge.” 4 However, with respect to this offense, a variety of interpretations exist, including such notions as “knowing that it may occur,” “having a certain degree of awareness,” and “ought to have foreseen it.” Significant disagreements over the precise threshold of “knowledge” and inconsistent standards grant judicial authorities considerable discretion, leading in practice to situations where courts convict of this offense even when the evidence falls short of the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.
(3) The boundary with accomplices is unclear.
In current judicial practice, it is common for accomplices in crimes such as fraud to be prosecuted under the charge of aiding and abetting cybercrime. For example, one court judgment stated: “The defendant, Zhai, provided call‑center support to the ‘upstream’ operator. Although he had a general awareness of the subsequent fraudulent activities, he lacked specific knowledge regarding whether and how the ‘upstream’ operator would carry out the fraud, nor did he collude with them beforehand or during the commission of the crime. Moreover, the period during which he provided assistance was relatively brief. Accordingly, he should not be treated as an aider and abettor to the crime of fraud.” 5 The court’s ruling narrowed the scope of liability for accomplices and adopted a more lenient standard for the “knowledge” required under the crime of assisting in cybercrime.
(1) At the legislative and normative levels: The term “knowing” is highly general, and the circumstances subject to presumption are limited.
Current national laws provide overly general provisions regarding “knowledge” in the crime of assisting information network criminal activities. Although the law employs an enumerative approach at the level of specific circumstances to clarify this concept, such enumeration cannot exhaust all possible scenarios of “knowledge,” resulting in situations where certain special cases in practice cannot be precisely aligned with the statutory interpretation. Specifically, under Article 11, Paragraph 7 of the Interpretation on the Crime of Assisting Information Network Criminal Activities—“other circumstances sufficient to establish the actor’s knowledge”—there is a tendency in practice for judicial authorities to adopt inconsistent standards in interpreting what constitutes “sufficient to establish.”
(II) At the level of judicial philosophy: emphasis on combating crime and lowering the standard of proof.
At present, the prevailing approach in judicial practice is to narrow the scope of accomplice liability for other offenses while expanding the application of the crime of assisting information network criminal activities. 6 One perspective is to “implement a criminal policy that balances leniency with severity.” Given that many suspects of the crime of assisting information network criminal activities are currently university students or individuals from remote areas, treating such cases under this offense can result in relatively lighter statutory penalties. Another reason lies in lowering the threshold for establishing “knowledge” in judicial practice—for example, by simplifying the evidentiary standard for “knowledge” and substituting objective conduct for subjective awareness, or by broadening the scope of “knowledge” to include negligent forms of fault, such as carelessness, thereby bringing these circumstances within the purview of the offense.
(1) A comprehensive determination of the perpetrator’s “knowledge” of the elements of the crime of assisting in cybercrime activities.
First, the actor must possess a substantive understanding of “crime.” Such substantive understanding requires that the actor be aware that the conduct the other person is about to undertake is prohibited by criminal law, or that such conduct entails “serious social harm.” 7 However, this does not mean that the actor is required to make a normative assessment of the nature of another’s conduct. 8
Secondly, the perpetrator must be aware that his or her assistance is unlawful. This requirement serves as a crucial criterion for distinguishing between criminal and non‑criminal conduct: on the one hand, it narrows the scope of exoneration for those who hold an erroneous belief about the unlawfulness of their actions; on the other hand, it limits the application of this offense as a “catch-all” charge.
Finally, determining whether the perpetrator acted with “knowledge” must also take into account factors such as the perpetrator’s cognitive capacity, educational background, and whether the conduct was atypical. According to Article 1 of the “Minutes of the Meeting on Legal Issues in the ‘Cutting Off Cards’ Campaign,” “In assessing whether a perpetrator ‘knew’ that another person was using the information network to commit a crime, the principle of consistency between subjective intent and objective circumstances must be upheld; that is, such determination should be made comprehensively by considering the perpetrator’s cognitive abilities, prior experience, transaction counterparties, relationships with those engaged in information‑network‑related criminal activities, and other relevant factors.” Accordingly, when handling this offense, judicial authorities should neither habitually assume that the general public is entirely rational, highly legally aware, and of exceptionally high moral character, nor, conversely, fail to consider the perpetrator’s personal circumstances and the nature of the conduct itself in making a holistic judgment as to whether the perpetrator “knew” that their actions constituted unlawful assistance to others in committing a crime. For example, in the case of Yang Mouming’s assistance in information‑network‑related criminal activities, the court held that, despite lacking any relevant technical expertise, Yang accepted “high‑yield” assignments, received payment in virtual currency, and repeatedly changed his modus operandi—actions that defied common sense—sufficient to establish that he “knew.” 9
(II) Reasonably Narrowing the Scope of “Knowingly” in the Crime of Assisting Information Network Criminal Activities
In this offense, setting the threshold for “knowing” too low would contravene the principle of penal restraint; conversely, setting it too high would undermine efforts to punish crime. Given that judicial practice has excessively lowered the evidentiary standard for “knowing” and broadened the scope of its meaning, it is imperative to appropriately narrow the ambit of “knowing” within the crime of aiding and abetting, thereby clarifying its normative boundaries.
At present, most theories interpret “knowing” as encompassing both “clearly knowing” and “ought to have known”; however, the meaning of “ought to have known” remains controversial. For instance, “ought to have known” should cover situations where the actor could have known or had a duty to know, but should not extend to the “ought to have known” element in negligence; otherwise, it would blur the distinction between intentional and negligent mental states. 10 However, with respect to other interpretations of “knowing,” the author contends that notions such as “may have known” or “should have foreseen” ought to be excluded from the theoretical framework used to establish “knowing.” “May have known” implies that the actor might know or might not know; given the possibility of ignorance, in accordance with the principle of interpreting doubts in favor of the defendant, such a scenario should not be characterized as “knowing.” By contrast, “should have foreseen” is more closely tied to an assessment of the actor’s subjective cognitive obligations and capacities, and is typically invoked in reasoning pertaining to negligent offenses.
The establishment of the crime of assisting in cybercrime was intended to fill the gap in penalizing aiding and abetting acts in cyberspace, rather than to supplant the identification of accomplices in offenses such as fraud. However, under a law‑enforcement orientation that prioritizes cracking down on crime and achieving punitive outcomes, judicial authorities have generally lowered the evidentiary threshold for “knowing” intent, leading to an overbroad application of this offense. This paper argues that the key to addressing this issue lies in drawing clear boundaries for presumptions. On the one hand, a comprehensive assessment approach should be maintained, taking into account individualized factors such as the actor’s level of awareness, living environment, and transaction counterparties, so as to avoid substituting abstract standards based on the “reasonable person” for concrete judgments. On the other hand, the scope of “knowing” intent should be narrowly construed, excluding vague notions like “may have known” or “should have foreseen,” and striving to achieve uniform interpretation and application of “knowing” intent. At the same time, for vulnerable groups—such as students and elderly individuals in remote areas—and in cases involving close personal relationships or reasonable reliance, “knowing” intent should be determined with even greater caution. Only in this way can an appropriate balance be struck between combating cybercrime and safeguarding human rights, thereby restoring the crime of assisting in cybercrime to its original supplementary role.
Author Biography
.
Chen Yujie
Beijing Starrise Law Firm
Lawyer
Doctor of Jurisprudence (J.D.) from the University of Sydney. Holds both Chinese and New South Wales, Australia, legal practice qualifications. Named among the Top 30 Rising Stars on the 2025 Dawkins List. Secured second place in the Second Division of the inaugural Beijing Young Lawyers Criminal Mock Trial Competition and earned third place as a team in the Beijing finals, while also receiving the title of Best Defense Attorney. Has participated in the defense of numerous criminal cases involving corporations and entrepreneurs, as well as cases of official misconduct; has provided comprehensive and specialized compliance services to several large state-owned enterprises.
Business Areas:
Criminal defense, criminal–civil intersection, corporate compliance, and corporate investigations.
Layout: Wang Xin
Reviewed by: Shen Xinyu


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