
The difficulties in construction‑related disputes often stem not from the absence of relevant legal provisions, but from the inherent complexity of construction projects themselves. Issues such as shell‑company arrangements, subcontracting without authorization, and illegal sub‑contracting frequently overlap within a single project, leading to persistent discrepancies in judicial standards across different regions and courts. Against this backdrop, the promulgation of the Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation (II) on Several Legal Issues Concerning the Adjudication of Disputes over Construction Contract Cases—hereinafter referred to as “Interpretation (II)” —carries significant practical implications, notably in standardizing adjudicatory criteria and addressing the evolving needs of social development.
In summary, the value of Interpretation No. 2 is primarily reflected in two key aspects. First, it addresses longstanding, widely debated issues in construction practice—issues that have long drawn significant attention from the legal community—including, but not limited to, how to handle contractual provisions making payment conditional upon audit or fiscal review; how to calculate the construction price following termination of a fixed‑price contract; how to determine the scope and commencement date of the priority right to payment for construction costs; and whether the employer bears a duty to notify prior to undertaking repairs itself to remedy quality defects. Such questions have previously been addressed in local high court guidelines and individual case rulings, yet the applicable rules remained inconsistent. By codifying these matters through judicial interpretation, Interpretation No. 2 helps standardize adjudicatory standards. Second, it also aligns with recent social and structural developments in the construction sector. For example, earlier judicial interpretations strengthened protection for “actual constructors” largely in response to difficulties in ensuring timely wage payments to migrant workers; however, in recent years there have also been instances of malicious debt collection disguised as claims for migrant workers’ wages. Interpretation No. 2, on the one hand, narrows the scope for actual constructors to directly assert construction payments against the project owner, while, on the other hand, it provides migrant workers with a direct avenue to claim their wages under certain circumstances. This reflects a shift in societal concerns: moving from the broader category of “actual constructors” toward a more focused emphasis on safeguarding the wages of migrant workers themselves.

(1) The party lending its qualifications shall not claim any fees for the use of qualifications or management fees.
Article 3 of Interpretation (II) expressly provides that the party lending its qualifications may not claim from the party borrowing such qualifications any fees, including qualification‑lending fees, management fees, or usage fees. This rule is consistent with the overarching goal of regulating order in the construction‑project market: the practice of borrowing qualifications is not legally encouraged, and it would be inappropriate for the judiciary to permit the lender to profit from such unlawful lending. Correspondingly, Article 7 of the Supreme People’s Court’s Interpretation on Several Legal Issues Concerning the Trial of Disputes over Construction Contract Agreements (I) (hereinafter “Interpretation (I)”) further stipulates that, under certain circumstances, the party whose name is being used shall bear joint and several liability to the project owner for defects in the quality of the work. In other words, the party whose name is being used cannot lawfully derive benefits from the lending of its qualifications, yet it may nonetheless incur liability for quality issues arising from its nominal participation in the project. Such a regulatory framework itself serves to standardize and uphold order in the construction‑market.
However, the practical issues are far more complex. The entity under whose name the arrangement is made is typically a qualified, formally registered enterprise—often a state-owned or large‑scale construction firm—which generally will not readily enter into an overt “affiliation agreement” with the party seeking to piggyback on its qualifications, nor will it explicitly stipulate in writing any fees for the use of qualifications, affiliation charges, or management fees. A more common practice is for the two parties to structure payments under the guise of equipment‑rental contracts, material‑supply agreements, or labor‑service contracts, enabling the affiliated party to draw funds from the host entity through these ostensibly separate arrangements. As for the so‑called fee schedule—commonly referred to in practice as the “percentage”—it is usually determined by informal verbal negotiations and rarely formalized in a clear written agreement.
At the same time, in light of the employer’s financial and project‑management requirements, the party relying on another’s qualifications typically finds it difficult to directly claim payment from the employer. More often, the employer first remits the project funds to the account of the entity whose name is being used, after which the relying party withdraws these funds under headings such as equipment fees, material costs, or labor charges. Meanwhile, the reliance fee, tax differentials, management fees, and other related expenses are deducted directly by the entity whose name is being used during the disbursement process. For this very reason, although Article 3, Paragraph 2 of the Interpretation (II) provides that, where the工程质量 is qualified, the party borrowing the qualification may assert its right to payment based on the agreement between itself and the party lending the qualification regarding the payment of the project price, disputes may still arise in numerous cases where there is no written subcontracting agreement and no explicit payment terms.
At this juncture, the question that truly merits inquiry is: if the parties have not entered into a specific agreement regarding payment for the construction work, may the matter be resolved in accordance with the customary practices governing their previous similar projects? Moreover, if the court can ascertain the settlement rules between the parties by reference to the project documentation, how should the so‑called management fees, tax differentials, and qualification‑borrowing fees already deducted by the entity under whose name the contract was registered be characterized? In particular, given that Interpretation No. 2 expressly prohibits the entity under whose name the contract was registered from proactively asserting claims for qualification‑borrowing fees, is it still permissible for that entity to seek to achieve the same economic benefit through “deductions” rather than by filing an independent lawsuit to assert such claims? This issue arguably constitutes the core point of potential controversy in practical application of this provision.
(2) When the subcontractor directly asserts claims for construction payments against the project owner, the decisive factor lies in their state of knowledge at the time the contract was concluded.
With respect to how the party borrowing the qualification may assert its claim for construction payments, Articles 4, 5, and 7 of Interpretation (II) effectively set forth several avenues: First, where the project owner knew or should have known at the time of contract formation that the qualification was being borrowed, the relying party may directly assert its right to payment against the project owner; second, where the conditions for exercising the subrogation rights under the Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China (hereinafter referred to as the “Civil Code”) are met, the relying party may invoke such subrogation to assert its rights directly against the project owner; third, provided that the construction project has passed acceptance inspection and meets the required quality standards, the relying party may seek from the entity whose qualification is being used a monetary compensation corresponding to the value of the work performed.
Notably, Interpretation No. 2 strictly limits the point at which the employer knows or ought to know of the fact of qualification borrowing to the time the contract is concluded; this provision reflects practical considerations. Construction projects typically have long performance cycles, during which the employer frequently interacts with the personnel actually organizing and carrying out on-site construction, and thus inevitably becomes aware—albeit to varying degrees—of the subcontracting arrangement. Without such a temporal limitation, the possibility of the subcontractor directly asserting claims for project payments against the employer could be unduly expanded. Conversely, if the employer was already aware of the subcontracting arrangement at the time of contract formation, it indicates that the employer had at least some knowledge of the true contractor, and one might even infer an implied consent to enter into a direct contractual relationship with the subcontractor. Under these circumstances, permitting the subcontractor to assert rights against the employer based on the de facto construction‑contractual relationship better accords with the substantive nature of commercial transactions.
(3) When procuring goods or services in the name of the entity under whose name the arrangement is registered, it is not sufficient to simply require that entity to assume full liability.
In engineering projects, the party relying on another entity may obtain project revenue by borrowing qualifications, and may also control project costs through subcontracting, sub‑contracting, or by procuring materials and equipment independently. When purchasing materials and equipment from external suppliers, such a relying party sometimes enters into contracts directly in its own name, while at other times it does so in the name of the entity it is relying on. For reasons related to the employer’s on‑site management, document submission and approval procedures, and project financial requirements, the latter scenario is quite common in practice.
The significance of Article 5 of Interpretation (II) lies in the fact that it does not adopt the “one-size-fits-all” approach—common in some local judicial practices—that imposes joint and several liability on both the shell company and the actual contractor. Instead, it returns to the rules governing apparent agency, stipulating that the seller may directly assert the purchase price against the shell company only when the elements of apparent agency are satisfied. Previously, certain higher people’s courts had taken a more stringent approach to similar issues, imposing unified liability on both the shell company and the actual contractor—for example, the Jiangsu High People’s Court’s earlier “Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Adjudication of Disputes over Construction Project Contracting.” By contrast, the rule set forth in Interpretation (II) clearly places greater emphasis on whether, in each individual case, there exists an appearance of rights sufficient to give rise to reasonable reliance on the part of the counterparty.
This point serves as a reminder to both the supplier and the party under whose name the contract is registered. A supplier may not automatically assume that the party under whose name the contract is registered bears joint and several liability for payment merely on the basis of verbal assurances from on-site personnel or customary practices in the project. Similarly, the party under whose name the contract is registered may not indefinitely tolerate the use of the project’s official seal, power of attorney, or procurement procedures; otherwise, they may still be held liable due to the appearance of apparent authority.

Article 6 of the Interpretation (II) provides that the subcontractor or the party engaging in illegal subcontracting generally may not directly seek from the project owner payment of a price reduction compensation or damages. In conjunction with Articles 4 and 7, it is clear that, as a general rule, subcontractors, parties engaged in illegal subcontracting, and entities relying on another’s name may no longer automatically transcend the principle of contractual privity to assert claims for construction payments directly against the project owner. The No. 1 Civil Division of the Supreme People’s Court has previously noted that “actual constructors” typically include sub‑contractors, contractors involved in illegal subcontracting, entities operating under another’s name, and contractors lacking the requisite construction qualifications. From this perspective, Interpretation (II) has, in effect, substantially narrowed the scope of application of the long‑standing regime under which “actual constructors” could directly sue the project owner to recover construction payments.
In the past, the primary function of the “actual constructor” regime was to provide the downstream construction entity with a direct avenue to seek payment from the project owner when funds were repeatedly withheld at each tier of the subcontracting chain. Its underlying objective remained to ensure that construction payments flowed to the final stage and ultimately to resolve the issue of wage arrears for migrant workers. However, as this system has been increasingly abused—leading even to cases where disputes over construction payments are disguised under the pretext of unpaid wages for migrant workers—allowing the concept of “actual constructor” to continue expanding in scope risks undermining the principle of contractual relativity and disrupting the normal order of commercial transactions.
To ensure that this shift leaves sufficient room for maneuver, Interpretation No. 2 effectively introduces two “workarounds.” The first is Article 7 of Interpretation No. 2, which allows the party relying on another’s name, the subcontractor, or the illegally sub‑contracted party—when they meet the conditions set forth in the Civil Code’s subrogation rules—to assert their rights against the project owner by exercising subrogation. However, such subrogation is subject to certain limitations, including the maturity of both the principal and secondary claims and the debtor’s failure to exercise their own rights. Consequently, under the previous legal framework, it has become considerably more difficult for the actual contractor to seek payment directly from the project owner. The second workaround is provided in Article 8, which permits migrant workers, under specified circumstances, to directly request that the construction entity or a subcontractor advance and settle their wages. This provision seeks to compensate for certain social functions originally entrusted to the system of actual contractors, ensuring that project payments are ultimately passed on to those who perform the work and thereby expediting the resolution of wage arrears faced by migrant workers.
Allowing migrant workers to directly assert their wage claims, rather than having the actual contractors pursue payment for the project, is undoubtedly well‑intentioned. This approach not only enables the system of relying on actual contractors to step back to some extent but also helps curb the practice of maliciously pursuing debts under the guise of migrant workers’ wages. However, whether this shift will shift the litigation burden onto individual migrant workers, and whether it will lead to greater fragmentation and a further increase in the number of such cases accepted by the courts, remains to be seen and will depend on subsequent judicial practice.

In government-invested projects and projects contracted by state-owned enterprises, the vast majority of contracts stipulate that payment of the project price at the completion stage is contingent upon an audit or a fiscal review. This often presents contractors with a practical dilemma: if the employer fails to initiate the audit or fiscal review, or if the relevant procedures remain unresolved for an extended period, can the contractor still lawfully assert its claim for payment?
Previously, the Supreme People’s Court’s telephone reply on the legal application when the project final account price confirmed by both parties in construction contract cases differs from the audit‑determined final account price clearly stipulated that the audit conclusion may serve as the basis for judgment only if the contract expressly provides that the audit result shall govern settlement, or if the contractual provisions are ambiguous or invalid. Article 11 of the Regulations on Ensuring Payment to Small and Medium‑Sized Enterprises likewise provides that government agencies, public institutions, and large enterprises may not compel the use of audit findings by auditing authorities as the basis for settlement, unless otherwise agreed in the contract or otherwise provided by law or administrative regulations. In other words, at the national level, prevailing norms generally continue to respect contractual agreements, and clauses requiring audit or review as a precondition for payment are typically not automatically void.
The real issue that needs to be addressed is the employer’s use of audits and reviews to maliciously delay payment. In response, some local courts have already issued preliminary guidelines; for example, the higher people’s courts in Sichuan, Chongqing, and other regions, in their interpretations of construction contract disputes, require courts to examine the reasons why audit opinions are迟迟未能出具 (long delayed in being issued) and to handle each case accordingly. Article 13 of the Interpretation (II) effectively establishes a uniform national standard: if an audit or fiscal review fails to be completed within a reasonable period, the people’s court may initiate procedures such as judicial appraisal to determine the project price; this reasonable period is generally capped at one year. This provision both respects the parties’ agreements regarding audits and reviews and prevents such clauses from being misused as a pretext for the employer to indefinitely withhold payment for the works.

In past cases involving construction projects that have not yet been fully settled, when the contractor seeks payment from the employer, courts often order a judicial appraisal and determine the amount owed by the employer based on the appraised value of the work completed. While this approach is straightforward, it raises a significant issue: it may entirely disregard the parties’ contractual agreement on a fixed total price and instead recalculate the project payment according to government‑mandated unit‑price norms and prevailing market rates. As a result, the project profits that the contractor might otherwise have realized, or the loss risks that it should have borne, could be reallocated by the outcome of the judicial appraisal.
Article 10 of Interpretation (II) provides that, for fixed‑price construction contracts that have been terminated, the contractor’s entitled payment may be determined by multiplying the proportion of the completed works to the total contract price by the agreed‑upon total contract amount. The rationale behind this calculation is that it incorporates both the contractor’s expected profit and, where applicable, any losses into the contractual pricing framework. Profit margins vary across different sectors of the construction industry; overall industry margins are relatively low—typically around 5% to 6%—and certain sub‑sectors, such as interior decoration and underground utility tunnels, may exhibit even greater disparities. Recalculating the payment entirely on the basis of expert appraisal might not accurately reflect the parties’ commercial arrangements; by contrast, the proportional‑allocation approach set forth in Interpretation (II) better captures the risk‑allocation logic inherent in fixed‑price contracts.

(1) Judicial documents should, to the greatest extent possible, clearly specify the scope of the works to which the priority right pertains.
In the past, when courts recognized a construction enterprise’s priority right to payment for construction project costs, some judicial documents did not explicitly specify the scope of the project to which that priority right applied, instead merely stating in general terms that the enterprise “enjoys a priority right to payment for construction project costs.” However, in practice, not only the general contractor but also specialized subcontractors—such as those handling foundation work, excavation, earthworks, or interior finishing—may assert such a priority right. If the scope of the works covered by this priority right is not clearly defined, confusion may arise during the enforcement phase regarding the extent of each party’s entitlement, thereby affecting both the order of payment and the amount recoverable.
Of course, if the court were to determine priority payment rights solely on the basis of the scope of work stipulated in the construction contract, this approach would give rise to new issues. For example, could the subcontractors for excavation and earthworks assert a priority claim against the proceeds from the valuation or auction of the entire construction project? In Case No. (2021) Sup. Ct. Min. Re-trial No. 188, published in the Supreme People’s Court Gazette, the scope of work at issue was limited to excavation support, dewatering, and earth‑moving operations; nevertheless, the Supreme People’s Court held that these works were closely linked to the general contracting project, carried out in tight coordination with and in an overlapping manner alongside the main construction works, and thus constituted an indispensable part of the overall construction endeavor. Accordingly, the excavation and earthworks subcontractors were entitled to a priority claim against the proceeds from the valuation or auction of the entire project. This demonstrates that the determination of the scope of priority payment rights should not be overly mechanical but must take into account the substantive contribution of each component of the construction work to the project as a whole.
(2) An extension of the payment deadline will affect the starting point for calculating interest, but the construction company should nevertheless exercise its rights as soon as possible.
With respect to the time limit for exercising the priority right of payment, Article 41 of Interpretation (I) provides that the period for exercising such a right may not exceed eighteen months, commencing from the date on which the employer is obligated to pay the construction project price. In conjunction with Article 27 of Interpretation (I), where the payment deadline is not expressly agreed upon, the relevant date may be determined based on factors such as the date of delivery, the date of submission of the final settlement documents, or the date of filing a lawsuit. Furthermore, Article 21 of Interpretation (II) stipulates that if the parties have reached an agreement to extend the payment deadline, the commencement date of the priority right of payment shall be determined in accordance with that agreement.
The reason for repeatedly discussing the starting point for calculating the priority of payment is that situations in which construction contractors seek payment for project costs are highly complex. Beyond the common scenario where settlement is delayed long after project delivery, the author has also encountered cases in which the contracting relationship remains unresolved over an extended period, leaving the very basis for the contractor’s claim unclear. In such circumstances, should the limitation period be calculated strictly from the date of delivery, the submission of a settlement request, or the filing of a lawsuit, or should the starting point be determined only after the legal relationship has been clarified? Furthermore, if a construction contract is terminated but the project has nonetheless passed final acceptance, should the payment deadline still be fixed as of the date of termination? At present, there remains no fully uniform regulatory framework addressing these issues. For this very reason, during the project‑settlement phase, construction companies should strive to specify both the payment deadline and the exact amount of the debt, and assert their priority right to payment as early as possible, thereby mitigating the risk of losing their rights due to disputes over the starting point or the passage of the statutory limitation period.

In construction‑project quality‑claim cases, disputes over the repair process are among the most common between the parties. In many projects, quality issues are discovered just prior to commissioning; at that stage, the repair work is time‑critical and demanding, often necessitating rushed, emergency repairs. If the contractor fails to fulfill its repair obligations, the employer typically has to undertake the repairs on its behalf. A practical challenge lies in the fact that, although standard construction contracts generally require the contractor to complete repairs within a reasonable timeframe, they do not always expressly stipulate the employer’s obligation to provide prior notice.
Article 16 of Interpretation (II) expressly imposes on the employer a prior‑notice obligation, which in effect reallocates the risks associated with quality remediation. Where the employer seeks to hold the contractor liable for repair costs, it must, as a general rule, first notify the contractor to perform the repair within a reasonable time frame. Only in cases where the contractor refuses or neglects to carry out the repairs, or where an emergency situation arises, may the employer proceed to arrange for the repairs itself and claim the corresponding reasonable expenses—such circumstances are more likely to be upheld.
However, in practice, remedial matters can be highly complex—particularly in residential real estate projects—where the employer often must arrange for the general contractor or the fit-out contractor to address each issue individually based on feedback from homebuyers, potentially involving tens of thousands of items. In such cases, does the employer’s duty to notify require providing advance notice for each individual remedial item, or may it be satisfied through project‑wide centralized notices, repair checklists, meeting minutes, or similar mechanisms? The Interpretation (II) does not elaborate further on this point, leaving room for subsequent judicial practice to develop more specific rules of adjudication on a case‑by‑case basis.
When viewed within the broader context of the construction engineering sector, Interpretation No. 2 does not simply favor either the employer or the contractor, nor does it merely strengthen or weaken the litigation rights of any particular party. As emphasized in the Supreme People’s Court’s First Civil Division during its Q&A session with reporters, the underlying approach remains to address the most salient issues arising in judicial practice, to standardize adjudicatory criteria, and—through judicial rules—to guide the construction market back toward a more orderly and规范ized trading environment. Construction‑related disputes have far‑reaching implications: on one hand, they affect the order of project construction and investment; on the other, they bear on the survival of construction firms, the timely receipt of payments by suppliers, and the payment of wages to migrant workers. The task of judicial interpretation is precisely to strike a balance among these competing interests.
Accordingly, the real significance of Interpretation No. 2 lies not merely in which specific provision may make it easier for one party to prevail, but in its broader message to market participants: construction projects cannot indefinitely rely on vague contractual arrangements. For instance, shell‑company arrangements entail legal consequences for the unlawful lending of qualifications; the actual contractor may not arbitrarily circumvent the principle of privity of contract; the project owner may not use audit reviews as a means to delay payment; and even when asserting a priority right to payment, the contractor must clearly delineate both the scope and the time limit. The narrower the room for chance or opportunism in project management, the more limited the scope for judicial discretion in litigation.
Attorney Profile
.
Zhang Bingxu
Beijing Starrise Law Firm
Partner
Zhang Bingxu holds a Bachelor of Laws from Tsinghua University and a Master of Laws from Washington University in St. Louis. He practiced for many years at top-tier law firms, providing legal services to leading companies across multiple industries, including China Life Investment, Vanke, Yintai Investment, Wangfujing, and Huabin Investment. Attorney Zhang specializes in civil and commercial dispute resolution, investment and M&A, and corporate legal advisory, with a deep focus on the real estate, insurance‑fund investment, and biopharmaceutical sectors. In the area of dispute resolution, he has handled numerous complex civil and commercial litigation and arbitration matters, with aggregate claim values totaling several billion yuan, successfully helping clients recover substantial losses. In the investment and M&A space, he has participated in landmark projects spanning real estate, insurance‑fund investments, and the biopharmaceutical industry, with cumulative transaction values exceeding ten billion yuan. As a long‑term corporate legal counsel, he provides routine compliance support, designs risk‑management frameworks, and conducts legal assessments of business models for numerous real estate groups, insurance asset‑management institutions, and biotechnology companies, actively engaging in their strategic decision‑making.
Business Areas:
Civil and commercial dispute resolution, legal services for real estate and insurance‑fund investments, and ongoing corporate legal advisory services.
Editor and Layout: Wang Xin
Reviewed by: Shen Xinyu


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