

Utilizing online platforms ⅰ
Online platforms are by no means lawless spaces, and the public is already well familiar with this concept. Using information networks to threaten others or to coerce them into transactions constitutes the crime of forced trading; threatening or blackmailing others to extort public or private property in a substantial amount, or doing so repeatedly, constitutes the crime of extortion; verbally abusing or intimidating others under aggravating circumstances constitutes the crime of provoking trouble; and, of course, fabricating false information, or knowingly disseminating such information online, or organizing or directing others to do so and thereby inciting disturbances that severely disrupt public order, likewise amounts to the crime of provoking trouble…
However, although the criminal risks associated with the aforementioned conduct are now widely recognized by the public, instances in which organizers or participants are classified as members of organized crime or evil forces remain relatively rare in judicial practice—far less common than the traditional criteria for identifying such groups. Judicial officers and lawyers must continue to interpret and apply the four defining characteristics in close alignment with relevant provisions, including the “Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Handling of Criminal Cases Involving Evil Forces.”
For example:
1. In terms of organizational characteristics, this type of crime may involve members who are not well acquainted with one another, as online activities often rely on information‑network communication methods such as instant messaging tools, chat groups, email, and cloud storage services. Consequently, compared with the traditional approach to identifying organized criminal groups—which typically hinges on evidence derived from interviews and interrogation records—greater attention now needs to be paid to the collection, examination, and admissibility of electronic data.
2. In economic characteristics, the acquisition, distribution, and utilization of benefits likewise take on more complex forms; however, Jinxi’s evidence has essentially resolved this evidentiary challenge.
3. Among the behavioral characteristics, a combined online–offline approach is invariably the foundational criterion for determination. By contrast, purely online conduct presents significant challenges in establishing that it constitutes non‑malicious behavior or harm to the public, particularly when used as a basis for identifying organized crime involving evil forces.
4. In terms of the characteristic of illegal control, whereas traditional assessments of organized crime and evil forces typically rely on evidence such as interrogation records, petition submissions, and police reports, the degree of significant influence in cyberspace is more readily quantifiable; in practice, this may require even clearer standards or a more precise operational framework.

Soft violence II
In traditional cases involving organized crime and evil forces, the use of the “soft violence” concept to characterize relevant conduct has already become quite common. Nevertheless, in practice, a considerable number of perpetrators continue to harbor misconceptions about the illegality of their actions, mistakenly believing that as long as the conduct does not escalate into serious violence, it may not constitute a crime. In cyberspace, where soft violence is defined as a criminal modus operandi and applied to establish offenses such as provoking trouble, extortion, and forced transactions, its use is bound to become even more prevalent.
In practice, any conduct carried out via information networks or communication tools that exhibits the characteristics of unlawful and criminal methods—such as harassing, pestering, making a disturbance, or rallying crowds to create a public spectacle in a manner sufficient to instill fear or panic in others, thereby imposing psychological coercion, or sufficient to impair or restrict personal freedom and endanger personal safety and property—may be subject to substantive determination.

Industries and fields that the keyword may pertain to
(1) The lending (online lending, cash‑loan) industry. The sources of funds may involve crimes such as obtaining loans by deception, usury‑driven relending, and illegal business operations (professional loan sharks). However, when large‑scale “soft‑violence” debt collection is employed in tandem, it may give rise to offenses such as fraud, extortion, and the crime of infringing upon citizens’ personal information, thereby potentially being classified as organized crime or gang‑related criminal activity.
(2) The debt-collection industry (financial outsourcing service enterprises). Aside from cases where online‑lending and cash‑loan fraud rings engage in self‑initiated lending and collection, or provide debt‑collection services to banks, consumer finance companies, and the like, or acquire and dispose of non‑performing asset portfolios on their own, if such entities resort to soft‑violence tactics—such as mass‑calling, SMS harassment, posting doctored obscene images, verbal abuse and threats, or disclosing contact lists—they may likewise be found guilty of provoking trouble or extortion, and consequently classified as organized crime.
(3) In sectors such as self-media, online media, and public relations firms, perpetrators exploit self-media accounts—such as WeChat official accounts, forums, and short-video platforms—to publish or repost negative information about enterprises. They then threaten to “continue stoking controversy unless payment is made” or to “delete posts upon payment,” while demanding “collaboration fees” or “public‑relations fees.” Such conduct may constitute offenses including extortion, coercion in transactions, and provoking trouble, potentially leading to the classification of these activities as organized crime.
(4) Industries such as online “water armies” and public-opinion‑manipulation firms organize or hire “online water armies” to fabricate false statements, hype negative news, generate trending topics, and inflate metrics while controlling online reviews. By exerting public‑opinion pressure to compel businesses or individuals to pay, they may be found to have committed offenses such as extortion, forced transactions, or provoking trouble, thereby being classified as organized crime.
(5) Industries such as “professional anti-counterfeiting” and malicious claim‑seeking organizations systematically exploit e‑commerce platform rules or the Food Safety Law, among others, using complaints, reports, negative reviews, and public exposure as tools to extort “compensation payments” or “hush money” from merchants, or to coerce them into purchasing the organization’s goods or services. Such conduct may constitute offenses such as extortion or forced trading, and may accordingly be classified as organized crime.
(6) Industries such as software development and technical services provide technological support for organized crime, including developing loan‑related apps capable of stealing citizens’ personal information, creating mass‑attack software, and setting up illegal online platforms. If one knowingly provides technical assistance to others engaged in criminal activities, this may constitute complicity or the crime of assisting in cybercrime. Importantly, if one is aware of the specific crimes being committed by others and participates in the distribution of illicit proceeds, such conduct may likewise be classified as organized crime.
(7) Other industries or internet service platforms that may be involved in forced consumption, labor‑related extortion, or sexual blackmail may likewise give rise to violations of the aforementioned offenses, thereby potentially being classified as organized crime.

Matters Requiring Attention in Case Handling III
The meeting emphasized the need to strictly adhere to the law, uphold the principle of seeking truth from facts, ensure that no criminal gang or evil force is overlooked, and refrain from arbitrarily labeling non-criminal entities as such.
Accordingly, in handling such cases, judicial officers and lawyers should pay particular attention to the following issues:
(1) Jurisdictional Issues
1. The public security organ at the place of the crime shall initiate an investigation; where necessary, the public security organ at the residence of the suspect may also initiate an investigation.
2. The places of jurisdiction in cybercrime cases include the location of the servers used to carry out the criminal acts, the location of the network service providers, the locations of the affected information network systems and their administrators, the locations of the information network systems used by the suspect, the victim, or other persons involved in the case during the commission of the crime, the victim’s location at the time of the harm, and the location where the victim suffered property losses, among others.
3. Although judicial interpretations still incorporate the rules governing the place of initial acceptance or the principal locus of the crime, and uphold principles conducive to ascertaining the facts of the offense and facilitating litigation, it cannot be denied that, under these provisions, organized‑crime offenses committed via the internet may involve a broader array of competent authorities than traditional organized‑crime offenses. This flexibility in jurisdiction should not be abused or subject to expansive interpretation; rather, the place of acceptance should, as far as possible, be determined by the location of the criminal organization’s offline structure, its core members, and its offline activities. When higher‑level authorities designate jurisdiction, they too should bear this consideration in mind.
(II) Issues of Evidence
Excluding illegally obtained evidence is a frequently contentious issue in the defense of organized‑crime and gang‑related cases. In cases involving the use of online platforms, compared with traditional organized‑crime offenses, the weight of testimonial evidence tends to be relatively reduced. This includes: (1) financial matters such as the accumulation of illicit proceeds, the flow of funds, and the distribution of profits; (2) the collection and extraction of electronic data; and (3) objective evidence corresponding to the four defining characteristics. Mastering and applying these types of evidence pose new challenges and impose higher standards on both judicial officers and defense counsel.
(3) Issues Concerning Coercive Measures
The issues of coercive measures and jurisdiction in organized‑crime cases involving black‑and‑evil offenses are interconnected. For instance, if jurisdiction were to increasingly rely on the principle of multi‑point connectivity for online conduct, it could readily lead to a broader application of residential surveillance at a designated location. Consequently, should the handling of such crimes therefore be subject to stricter scrutiny when applying this measure? This may well be a question that warrants greater attention in practice.

Issues That Relevant Enterprises Need to Be Aware Of
The issues that require attention are, in essence, the legal provisions and interpretations mentioned earlier, as well as the laws and regulations that industry participants should already be familiar with. Criminal policy is not a new law; its application must remain within the bounds of the law, and reliance on luck or misconceptions about illegality ultimately fail to address the underlying problems. Only by conducting business in strict compliance with the law and relevant regulations can one ensure long-term sustainability.
(1) Properly understand the boundaries of the law and apply them in business operations.
(2) Conduct business in accordance with the law and abandon the profit‑driven logic of “illicit appropriation.”
(3) Immediately rectify any violations of regulations or laws and, to the extent possible, mitigate the adverse effects of such conduct.
(4) Clarify the cognitive obligations and responsibilities under the principle of technological neutrality.
(5) Be a kind person and run a business with integrity.
Attorney Profile
.
Wang Weining
Beijing Starrise Law Firm
Founding Partner and Deputy Director
Founding partner, deputy director, and director of the Xinglai Commercial & Criminal Practice Center at Beijing Starrise Law Firm; holds a Ph.D. in Law from Peking University. Member of the Criminal Law Committee of the All-China Lawyers Association (10th term), deputy director of the Criminal Law Committee of the Beijing Lawyers Association (12th term), independent director of Beida Pharmaceutical (000788), and visiting scholar at Cornell University and the University of Chicago. Recognized in LEGALBAND’s China Top Lawyers Rankings in the White-Collar & Business Crime and Compliance categories, and listed as a legal expert in the “Business Crime and Fraud” category for China in the Who’s Who Adviser Handbook. Has repeatedly received numerous accolades from leading legal media and rating agencies, including LexisNexis, China Business Law Journal, LegalOne, Legal 500, GRCD, The Litigation, and Lvxin She. Specializes in providing clients with comprehensive criminal, administrative, and hybrid criminal–civil–administrative legal services in complex and high‑stakes cases, and has amassed extensive practical experience in corporate crisis management, environmental protection, finance and securities, computer networks, and intellectual property. Key practice areas include major risk emergency response, criminal defense, and representation in hybrid criminal–civil–administrative matters.
Layout: Wang Xin
Reviewed by: Shen Xinyu


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