


Citation source
Peng Yali: “Determining Ancillary Liability in Criminal Cases with Incidental Public Interest Civil Litigation,” Modern Law Science, No. 3, 2026, pp. 102–122.
Peng Yali (1995–), female, native of Yiyang, Hunan Province, is an associate professor at the Law School of Renmin University of China, a master’s supervisor, a research fellow at the Center for Criminal Law Science of Renmin University of China, and holds a doctorate in law.
Abstract: As the system of criminal proceedings accompanied by civil public-interest litigation has rapidly evolved, it has revealed a fundamental problem: an unclear determination of the nature of ancillary liability. The traditional view that equates ancillary liability with ordinary civil liability not only leads to imbalances in sanctions and difficulties in enforcement but may also give rise to the issue of “double punishment for the same act” and even risk undermining the principle of legality in criminal law. Through a systematic examination of judicial practice in China, combined with an analysis of the legal nature of liability for ecological and environmental damage and the theory of its systemic structure, ancillary liability should be redefined as a restorative‑justice measure that serves as an alternative to penal sanctions. On the basis of this theoretical reconstruction, a rule‑based framework can be developed—setting the scope of compensation at the level of actual losses, employing market‑value appraisal and substitution‑for‑damage methods for loss calculation, requiring a standard of proof grounded in reasonableness and reliability, and taking compensatory capacity into account when determining liability—in order to address the existing imbalances in liability and the predicament of “empty judgments,” thereby achieving an overall optimization of the effectiveness of criminal sanctions.
Keywords: Criminal public interest litigation with civil claims; ancillary liability; restorative justice; actual losses; ecological and environmental damage
I. Raising the Issue: Practical Dilemmas and Theoretical Reflections
II. Theoretical Reconstruction: Vicarious Liability Should Be a Restorative Justice Measure Replacing Criminal Punishment
III. The Construction of Specific Rules for Vicarious Liability as a Restorative Justice Measure
IV. Conclusion
Since 2018, the number of criminal‑related public interest litigation cases initiated by the procuratorial organs—hereinafter referred to as “criminal‑related public interest litigation”—has grown rapidly, now significantly surpassing the number of ordinary civil public interest litigation cases. This development marks criminal‑related public interest litigation as a “new area of practice” for the procuratorial system. This institutional innovation has played a positive role in safeguarding public interests and remedying ecological and environmental damage, demonstrating the vitality and spirit of innovation inherent in China’s judicial system as it evolves with the times. However, alongside this rapid institutional growth, certain deep‑seated contradictions in judicial practice have also come to the fore. In particular, the lack of clarity regarding the nature of ancillary liability in such cases has given rise to a series of issues that urgently require theoretical clarification.
(1) Imbalance of Responsibility and the Phenomenon of “Empty Judgments” in Judicial Practice
In the field of ecological and environmental crimes, the lack of clarity regarding the nature of ancillary liability is particularly pronounced. The gap between substantial ecological damage compensation awards and the defendants’ limited ability to pay may render judicial rulings effectively “empty.” Taking the crime of illegal fishing of aquatic products as an example, pursuant to Articles 16 and 17 of the Measures for the Identification (Appraisal) of Items Involved in Illegal Fishing Cases and the Assessment and Restoration of Damage to Aquatic Biological Resources (Trial), promulgated by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs in 2021, the total compensation payable for acts such as electric fishing may amount to as much as 44 times the value of the catch.
In practice, the following situations are observed: Defendant A repeatedly used electric fishing to harvest aquatic products, selling them for several thousand yuan; an assessment determined that his conduct resulted in losses to aquatic biological resources amounting to hundreds of thousands of yuan, including indirect damages. Investigation revealed that Defendant A owns no real estate, only a motorcycle and less than 1,000 yuan in bank deposits. Meanwhile, Defendant B’s group engaged in multiple illegal electrofishing operations within a protected area, generating sales proceeds exceeding 500,000 yuan; an assessment concluded that their actions caused losses to aquatic biological resources totaling tens of millions of yuan, including indirect damages. The public prosecutor has sought a judgment ordering Defendants C and others to jointly and severally compensate the full amount claimed. However, Defendant C has bank deposits of just over 100,000 yuan, while the other defendants each hold less than 10,000 yuan in savings, and the total value of the group members’ real estate and vehicles falls short of 10 million yuan. Given that the average annual wage of workers in the local agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery sectors is still below 100,000 yuan, even if the defendants were to exhaust all their lawful income, they would still be unable to satisfy the substantial compensation claims.
Faced with such a predicament, judges may indeed set aside considerations of the defendant’s actual capacity to perform and treat ancillary liability as a purely civil matter of damages, rendering a judgment directly based on the appraisal findings. For example, in the six typical cases of illegal fishing offenses prosecuted in accordance with the law, released by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on June 10, 2023, in the case involving Chen Mouhua and 29 others from Qingyuan City, Guangdong Province, who engaged in illegal fishing and concealed or hid proceeds of crime, the defendant group illegally harvested river fish such as grass carp, silver carp, and crucian carp, selling them for over RMB 1.95 million. An expert appraisal determined that the resulting loss to aquatic biological resources exceeded RMB 32.6 million. In the first-instance judgment, the people’s court ordered Chen Mouhua and 22 other defendants to compensate for the losses to aquatic biological resources, together with appraisal and assessment costs, totaling over RMB 33.22 million. However, if such judgments cannot be enforced, not only will they fail to effectively restore the harmed legal interests, but they may also undermine the credibility and authority of judicial rulings.
From the defendant’s perspective, criminal liability and ancillary civil liability together constitute the full consequences of punishment, and they must therefore be assessed in an integrated manner. A comparative analysis reveals the following: Li was convicted of causing minor injury by stabbing another person during a delivery‑related dispute and sentenced to four years and six months’ imprisonment, with compensation totaling over RMB 39,000; Du and others were convicted of group violence resulting in death and received either a suspended death sentence or eight years’ imprisonment, along with joint compensation—including death compensation—exceeding RMB 527,000. By contrast, illegal fishing that yields illicit profits of several thousand yuan may attract claims amounting to hundreds of thousands of yuan, while ecological damage cases generating illicit gains exceeding RMB 500,000 can face claims running into tens of millions of yuan. The potential imbalance in the allocation of responsibility and the misalignment of value hierarchies in such cases warrant careful consideration. Furthermore, pursuant to Article 192 of the Interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, promulgated and implemented in 2021 (hereinafter referred to as the “Interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Law”), death compensation and disability compensation—collectively referred to as the “two compensations”—are not included within the scope of compensation in ordinary criminal‑civil joint proceedings. Some people’s courts, adhering to this interpretative stance, have declined to uphold claims for these two forms of compensation, suggesting that the imbalance in sanctions could be further exacerbated.
This imbalance stems from the logical differences between the two litigation models in determining damages. In ordinary criminal‑civil joint proceedings, the scope of compensation is strictly limited, typically recognizing only “material losses”; by contrast, in public interest litigation, the assessed amount of ecological damage can grow exponentially. For example, Pan某 used electric fishing gear in a no‑fishing zone to illegally harvest over 20 kilograms of aquatic products, yielding illicit proceeds exceeding RMB 2,400. Pan was convicted of illegal fishing, had his unlawful gains confiscated, and was ordered to pay RMB 123,200 in restoration costs for damage to national aquatic biological resources—comprising RMB 11,200 for direct damages and RMB 112,000 for indirect damages. Such claims, driven by the “explosive” escalation of “indirect losses” under the assessment rules, not only risk resulting in “empty judgments” when the total exceeds the defendant’s capacity to pay but also undermine public confidence in the judiciary.
(II) The Intrinsic Deficiencies of the Existing Theoretical Framework
The various difficulties encountered in judicial practice stem from a cognitive bias that equates ancillary liability with civil liability. Although academia has conducted extensive research on issues such as the mechanisms and practical implementation of criminal‑related public interest litigation and the determination of compensation for ecological and environmental damage, the nature of ancillary liability—the “core” of this institutional framework—has yet to be subjected to sufficiently thorough and systematic theoretical analysis. To date, the only direct legal basis for criminal‑related public interest litigation is Article 20 of the Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Public Interest Litigation Cases, issued jointly by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate. However, this provision addresses only the scope of cases and jurisdictional matters, without touching upon the fundamental question of the nature of liability itself.
The mainstream view on the nature of ancillary liability in criminal‑civil public interest litigation generally aligns with the understanding of ancillary civil liability in criminal‑civil proceedings, with some even treating such litigation as a subcategory of criminal‑civil suits. Accordingly, certain scholars argue that civil public interest litigation and civil actions brought by the People’s Procuratorate exhibit institutional overlap, rendering it unnecessary to reconstruct the system of criminal‑civil public interest litigation. However, as many scholars have long pointed out, the practice of treating ancillary civil liability in criminal‑civil proceedings as fully independent civil liability is logically inconsistent, giving rise to numerous practical difficulties. If this theoretical framework were forcibly transplanted into the realm of public interest litigation, it would not only perpetuate the inherent shortcomings of that model but also generate new problems arising from the shift in context.
First, with respect to the determination of the scope of compensation, treating ancillary liability as civil liability makes it difficult to maintain consistency in judicial practice. As previously noted, in ordinary tort cases resulting in death, victims often receive substantial compensation; by contrast, in more serious criminal cases, the compensation awarded to victims may be comparatively lower. According to the Interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Law, the Supreme People’s Court has advanced this position primarily on the grounds that the “two types of damages” constitute non‑pecuniary losses already compensated through the criminal judgment, and recognizing them would risk double punishment; that such an approach can easily give rise to “empty judgments,” protracted litigation, and low actual compensation rates; and that excessively high compensation standards are detrimental to ensuring victims’ effective redress, particularly given that most defendants lack sufficient financial capacity. However, these justifications are not entirely persuasive. Some scholars have observed that the Supreme People’s Court’s rationale for excluding the “two types of damages” from the compensable scope is, in fact, to align with an incentive mechanism aimed at using criminal sanctions to encourage civil compensation. Yet when the context shifts to criminal‑related public interest litigation, the people’s courts no longer appear to face concerns about “empty judgments,” excessively high compensation standards, or the practical need to leverage criminal proceedings to promote civil redress—especially in cases involving substantial ecological damage far exceeding the defendant’s ability to pay. This inconsistency in judicial stance risks sowing confusion among the public regarding the relative prioritization of legal interests related to life and health.
Secondly, with regard to the interface between criminal penalties and ancillary liability, neither theory nor practice has yet reached a consensus, and cognitive biases and divergences in application persist. If ancillary liability is conceived as a pure, independent form of civil liability, then criminal liability—arising from the exercise of state public authority (such as fines)—and civil liability—resulting from private‑law remedies (such as punitive damages)—should, in principle, coexist without contradiction and be applied separately. Nevertheless, this clear-cut logical framework encounters resistance and skepticism. For instance, even when statutory provisions permit concurrent imposition, some prosecutors nonetheless advocate that, at the enforcement stage, the amount of punitive damages should be deducted from the fine, effectively negating the straightforward aggregation of the two liabilities in terms of overall liability. Moreover, some scholars have observed that, although there are no theoretical impediments to imposing ecological‑environmental restoration liability alongside criminal liability, such a practice effectively increases the total burden borne by the wrongdoer, which, given the already stringent nature of ecological‑environmental restoration obligations, can hardly be regarded as fair. This stance reflects a natural expression of basic moral sentiments and an intuitive sense of justice.
Finally, the procedural disputes over the order of proceedings also reflect inconsistent understandings of the nature of ancillary liability. In practice, people’s courts hold differing views and adopt varying approaches. Some follow a “criminal‑first, civil‑later” model: they first convict and sentence the defendant, then determine the scope of ancillary liability—this approach embodies a “cutting‑off” logic that treats the two as separate procedures. Others adopt a “parallel criminal‑and‑civil” approach: they first adjudicate the question of guilt, then establish ancillary liability, and finally impose a sentence based on the defendant’s compliance with that liability—undoubtedly reflecting a more integrated perspective. The crux of the matter is that the choice between “criminal‑first, civil‑later” and “parallel criminal‑and‑civil” proceedings is not merely a matter of efficiency or procedural preference; it bears on whether the fulfillment of ancillary liability can, in turn, inform the determination of the criminal sentence. Indeed, the very emergence of the “parallel criminal‑and‑civil” model constitutes a powerful empirical refutation of the notion that ancillary liability is purely a civil matter. This suggests that, in the eyes of adjudicators, the performance of ancillary obligations serves not only to compensate for harm but also to signal the defendant’s attitude of remorse and the degree of personal dangerousness, forming an integral part of the overall assessment of criminal responsibility. Consequently, this procedural debate is, at its core, a direct reflection in judicial practice of the ongoing contest over the nature of ancillary liability.
Clearly, the traditional theoretical framework can no longer adequately address the challenges posed by the new institutional regime, necessitating a fundamental reexamination and redefinition of the nature of ancillary liability in criminal‑related public interest litigation.
In the face of the aforementioned practical dilemmas and theoretical inconsistencies, this paper argues that the fundamental solution lies in transcending the conventional framework of civil liability. The “incidental liability” in criminal‑related public interest litigation should no longer be viewed merely as an extension of traditional ancillary civil proceedings; rather, it ought to be redefined as a restorative justice measure that serves as an alternative to punishment, thereby forming, together with penal sanctions, a holistic and coordinated system of accountability. This characterization is grounded both in the intrinsic characteristics of this liability model already evident in China’s judicial practice and in alignment with the theoretical trajectory of systematically developing a liability regime for ecological and environmental damage in our country.
(1) The “quasi‑penal” nature of ancillary liability in China’s public interest litigation practice
By examining the practical implementation of criminal‑related public interest litigation in China, it becomes evident that, both in its procedural framework and in the substantive nature of liability, this form of litigation has markedly departed from the traditional civil liability paradigm, exhibiting a pronounced public‑law character and a punitive orientation.
First, in terms of procedural structure, criminal‑civil public interest litigation is heavily imbued with the character of public authority. In traditional criminal‑civil proceedings, the prosecutor plays no role in the civil phase; the litigation essentially revolves around the relationship between the defendant and the private victim, resembling a private dispute between two equal parties. By contrast, in criminal‑civil public interest litigation, both the criminal prosecutor and the public interest prosecutor jointly participate in the proceedings. Under this framework, the procuratorial organ, as the state’s legal supervisory body, brings suit on behalf of the state and the public interest, and the entire procedure assumes the public‑law character of state‑initiated prosecution and punishment—distinct from the equal‑footed disputes between ordinary civil parties.
Second, in terms of the substantive nature of liability, the ancillary liability in criminal‑related public interest litigation clearly exhibits the characteristics of a “penalty.” In this regard, we may draw on the standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court when determining whether the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) order to recover ill-gotten gains constitutes a “penalty.” The Supreme Court has held that a “penalty” is a sanction imposed and enforced by the state in response to a crime or unlawful conduct, with two key elements: first, the wrongdoing targeted is directed at the public rather than at private individuals. For example, the SEC’s recovery order qualifies as a penalty because it seeks to remedy harm done to the public, not to any specific victim. Consequently, even when victims do not support or participate in the proceedings, the SEC may nonetheless proceed on its own authority. Second, the purpose of the sanction is punishment and deterrence, rather than merely compensating the victim for losses. The Supreme Court emphasizes that if a civil sanction is not solely aimed at redressing harm but also serves the institutional purposes of punishment and deterrence, it should be regarded as a penalty. For instance, the Court generally views the SEC’s recovery actions as deterring violations of securities laws by stripping wrongdoers of their ill‑gotten gains; since deterrence is not a compensatory objective, such measures are deemed penalties.
If this standard is adopted, the ancillary liability in China’s criminal‑related public interest litigation clearly amounts to a form of “punishment.” First, such cases typically involve defendants who, having caused harm to the public, are required to pay sums to the state or assume other forms of responsibility; moreover, these cases generally do not involve specific victims seeking compensation. Second, ancillary liability is not purely compensatory; it also serves punitive and deterrent functions. In its “Reply to Proposal No. 8053 submitted at the Fifth Session of the 13th National People’s Congress,” the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs explicitly stated: “We will improve the institutional mechanisms for ecological compensation in public interest litigation… increase the legal costs of illegal electrofishing, and intensify public awareness‑raising and educational campaigns.” The notion of “increasing costs” underscores a deterrent rather than a compensatory purpose. In fact, the Ministry can scarcely justify the reasonableness of setting ecological restoration expenses at 44 times the market value of the catch obtained through electrofishing. Given the fluid nature of water, whether losses incurred from electrofishing in ordinary waters could indeed reach 44 times the value of the catch remains subject to further scientific verification. Consequently, this type of liability—imposed by the state for deterrence and punishment—no longer constitutes civil liability in essence; within the context of criminal proceedings, it should be understood instead as a measure akin to a “penalty.”
(II) Institutional Insights from a Comparative Law Perspective
Incorporating property-based liability with compensatory functions into the criminal sanctions framework is not an isolated phenomenon worldwide. The experience of the U.S. criminal restitution order system demonstrates that such institutional arrangements are both feasible and effective.
The evolution of the U.S. criminal restitution system illustrates its trajectory from a mechanism for civil liability to one that has once again been integrated into the framework of criminal sanctions. Its origins can be traced back to the 7th-century Anglo-Saxon “Penal Code of King Aethelbert,” which stipulated that each part of the body possessed a compensable value, with the amount of compensation tied to the extent of impairment to the victim’s capacity to work or to engage in combat. Offenders were required to make two types of reparative payments: “wer,” payable to the victim or the victim’s heirs, and “wite,” paid to the king as reparation for breaching the peace. As the state progressively consolidated its monopoly over the power to impose punishment, the restorative function was temporarily stripped away, and the obligation to compensate for harm shifted from the realm of criminal sanctions into that of civil liability.
However, beginning in the 1970s, the victims’ rights movement significantly transformed the role of victims within the U.S. criminal justice system. At the height of the movement, a presidential task force commissioned by President Ronald Reagan conducted a nationwide study of victims’ plight, and one of its key recommendations was to grant victims the right to obtain compensation from offenders. Consequently, the United States has continuously enacted legislation to strengthen federal courts’ authority to issue restitution orders. In 1982, the Victims and Witnesses Protection Act (hereinafter referred to as the “Victims Protection Act”) was passed, integrating restitution into the federal sentencing framework. Prior to this, restitution orders were used only as conditions for probation—and even then, they were rarely imposed. The Act authorized and encouraged courts to impose restitution orders independent of probation, substantially expanding the discretion of federal courts in issuing such orders. The Federal Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (hereinafter referred to as the “Compulsory Restitution Act”) further mandated mandatory restitution in cases where victims suffered personal injury or identifiable economic losses. These landmark pieces of legislation elevated restitution orders to an independent form of punishment—indeed, in certain cases, a compulsory one—and deeply embedded them within the federal sentencing structure.
It is worth noting that, in theory, U.S. courts have explicitly characterized the nature of restitution orders as criminal penalties. In the Brown case, the U.S. federal courts addressed whether a restitution order, by virtue of its compensatory character, its res judicata effect, and its enforceability akin to a civil judgment, should be treated as a civil judgment rather than a criminal sanction. The federal courts held that these attributes do not transform a penal judgment into a civil adjudication requiring a jury to find the underlying facts. This is because: first, restitution orders undoubtedly serve traditional punitive purposes, as the expectation of compensation can enhance the deterrent impact of imprisonment and fines; second, restitution orders are imposed only following a conviction, which distinguishes them fundamentally from civil judgments; third, although restitution aims to compensate victims, its mode of compensation differs from that of ordinary civil judgments; and fourth, unlike in typical civil proceedings, the victim is not a party to the action and can exert only limited influence over the outcome. Accordingly, even if a restitution order exhibits certain features of civil liability, its essential character remains that of a criminal penalty.
In line with the reasoning of U.S. federal courts, in China too, a conviction is often a prerequisite for imposing ancillary liability, and the victim’s rights to participate in the litigation are likewise more restricted than in ordinary civil cases. This article further argues that the determination of ancillary liability must take into account the defendant’s ability to pay.
Following this criminal‑law approach, the scope of harm that a compensation order issued by U.S. federal courts may remedy is consistent with the principle of causation in criminal proceedings: the offense must be the actual and proximate cause of the victim’s injury. The proximate‑cause requirement mandates that there be a sufficiently close connection between the harm alleged by the victim and the criminal conduct; in other words, the harm must have been foreseeable. This standard excludes damages whose causal link to the conduct is too remote. The Federal Sentencing Commission has explicitly clarified that the scope of compensation differs from the concept of loss: a compensation order covers only actual losses, not anticipated losses. Accordingly, the provisions of the Mandatory Restitution Act regarding the scope of restitution bear a close resemblance to the relevant provisions in China’s Interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Law. Under U.S. law, in cases involving offenses that result in physical injury to the victim, if the victim dies as a consequence, the compensation order must require the defendant to pay funeral expenses; however, there is no explicit provision for death‑related compensation.
In stark contrast, Germany’s criminal‑civil ancillary proceedings have been described as “a dead letter.” Even after the legislature amended this procedure in 1986 through the Victims’ Protection Act—eliminating the cap on the amount in dispute, permitting both default judgments and partial judgments, and providing legal aid for court costs—the original situation remained unchanged. As Heinz Müller‑Dietz has observed, criminal‑civil ancillary proceedings have, in practice, never been widely applied within the German criminal justice system. In 2003, such proceedings accounted for only 1.5 percent of all criminal cases at the district court level. For this reason, German scholars have also sought to integrate compensation into substantive criminal law as a distinctive form of response. Indeed, the Netherlands, too, has considered incorporating compensation as a special sanction into its Criminal Code as part of its criminal law reform.
From a comparative law perspective, integrating property‑based liability with a compensatory function into the framework of criminal sanctions is both feasible and effective. The success of the U.S. model lies precisely in its explicit recognition of the dual punitive and compensatory dimensions of reparative liability within criminal proceedings, and in its construction of a comprehensive set of rules centered on the nature of “punishment.” This logical framework and regulatory system offers a well‑tested, mature solution to the twin dilemmas of “imbalanced liability” and “empty judgments” that plague China’s criminal‑related public interest litigation.
(III) The Theoretical Positioning of “Restorative Justice”
Although, from a comparative law perspective, this system of logic and rules can illuminate the concurrent application of ancillary liability and criminal punishment, it may not be appropriate to treat it directly as “punishment” in the sense of China’s criminal law. The primary reason is that China maintains a strict statutory classification of penalties, and ancillary liability does not fall within that category. Accordingly, it is a more prudent approach to regard such liabilities—formally not punishments but substantively bearing the character of “penal sanction”—as restorative justice measures that serve as alternatives to traditional penal sanctions, and to integrate them into a unified framework for comprehensive sanctions alongside conventional penalties.
The concept of “restorative justice” already enjoys a solid theoretical foundation and extensive practical exploration within the field of environmental criminal law in China. Theoretically, some scholars have pointed out that China’s environmental penal system suffers from an overreliance on punitive sanctions, insufficient preventive measures, and a conspicuous absence of restorative sanctions, arguing for the establishment of a three‑pronged penal framework that integrates punishment, prevention, and restoration. Furthermore, ecological restorative justice should be enshrined as a statutory non‑penal sanction within the governance of environmental criminal law, with a judicial mechanism designed around the guiding principles of proactive conceptualization and restoration‑oriented adjudication. In practice, scholars have conducted systematic analyses of the forms and modalities of ecological restoration in criminal judgments, noting that, in criminal cases accompanied by civil proceedings, ecological restoration functions as a form of restorative justice or a distinctive non‑penal sanction. Rooted in the public interest, it places particular emphasis on the restoration of ecological functions.
“Restorative justice” can also accurately characterize the positioning and functions of ancillary liability. First, restorative‑justice measures can serve as an alternative to criminal punishment and offer considerable flexibility. Minnesota, a pioneer in developing and implementing sentencing guidelines, has explicitly embraced restorative‑justice approaches. In the Pearson case, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the broad discretionary authority of restorative‑justice programs. The court held that, although state law does not expressly define the relationship between restorative justice and judicial sentencing, restorative justice affords substantial leeway and adaptability. The concurring opinion in that case further noted that alternative restorative‑justice programs may employ sanctions beyond the traditional spectrum available to district courts. Similarly, China’s judicial practice has established flexible mechanisms for assuming liability, such as off‑site remediation, labor‑based compensation, offsetting through technological upgrades, and stock enhancement and release.
Second, many of China’s criminal justice practices have long been aligned with the principles of “restorative justice.” The prevailing approach in civil public interest litigation attached to criminal cases—namely, adjusting sentencing by taking into account the defendant’s fulfillment of obligations to compensate for damages and restore the ecological environment—is, at its core, also a form of substituting compensation and ecological restoration for traditional penal sanctions. Accordingly, the argument advanced in this paper does not seek to introduce a novel perspective; rather, it aims to illuminate the underlying logic of current practice: namely, that ancillary liability and criminal punishment are mutually concurrent, and on this basis to systematically derive and construct concrete rules.
Understanding the ancillary liability in criminal‑civil public interest litigation as a restorative justice measure that serves as an alternative to punishment, and thereby integrating it with penal sanctions, offers numerous theoretical and practical advantages.
First, this framing helps streamline the determination of the scope of compensation and enhances the efficiency of criminal adjudication. If the nature of ancillary liability were to be equated entirely with civil liability, then, in theory, the people’s courts would have to adhere to the civil law principle of “restoring the victim to the pre‑loss position,” thereby undertaking complex proceedings and assessments of intangible indirect losses and lost expected profits. By contrast, if ancillary liability is treated as a restorative judicial measure, its compensable scope can be naturally confined to the direct consequences that criminal law can readily comprehend and evaluate, significantly reducing the complexity of quantifying damages and facilitating the expeditious conduct of criminal trials. As some scholars have noted, the judicial determination of ecological and environmental damage compensation suffers from such issues as a disconnect between judicial interpretations and administrative regulations, inconsistent calculation standards, and overreliance on expert appraisals; treating ancillary liability as a restorative measure would help address these challenges.
Secondly, judges may, taking into account the specific circumstances of each case—particularly the defendant’s financial means—craft a comprehensive sanctions plan that integrates both penal and restorative measures. This approach frees judicial decision‑making from the constraints of administrative evaluation criteria, thereby affording judges greater discretion.
Finally, this theoretical reconstruction can clarify procedural relationships and preserve room for subsequent remedies. The current debate over whether to adopt a “criminal‑first, civil‑later” or a “parallel criminal‑civil” adjudicatory sequence stems from the ambiguity surrounding the relationship between ancillary liability and criminal punishment. Once the “restorative justice” nature of ancillary liability as a substitute for criminal sanctions is explicitly recognized, the criminal‑civil procedural framework can be clearly delineated and kept distinct, with no interference between the two; consequently, the order of proceedings will no longer constitute a decisive factor affecting the substantive judgment. If a prior civil judgment has already become final, the restorative‑justice measures imposed in the criminal judgment may be correspondingly offset; conversely, if the criminal judgment precedes, the restorative‑justice measures it imposes should likewise be credited against any subsequent civil action. This approach facilitates the enforcement of judgments in public‑interest litigation. Criminal‑related public‑interest actions primarily address the liability borne by the defendant for harm inflicted upon national and societal public interests through criminal conduct. As for victims whose identities may not be definitively established until long after the conclusion of the criminal proceedings, they remain free to bring separate, independent civil claims for damages, without losing their right to redress on the grounds of the principle of *res judicata*.
(IV) The Institutional Foundations of Comprehensive Sanction Regimes
Treating subsidiary liability as a restorative justice measure that serves as an alternative to criminal punishment, and considering it in tandem with penal sanctions, is not only a pragmatic solution to the dilemmas of practical application but also rests on a solid institutional foundation.
First, the legitimacy of punishment is grounded in the irreparable harm that criminal conduct inflicts on society. What renders a particular act criminal is its inability to be fully remedied—namely, the injured legal interest cannot be restored to its original state. For example, human life is priceless; no amount of compensation can make up for the losses suffered by society or the victim’s family. Consequently, intentional homicide is universally regarded as a crime, and the portion of social harm that remains uncompensated is addressed through penal sanctions. Moreover, even when certain legal interests can be adequately restored—for instance, if a stolen vehicle is later returned—the act nonetheless undermines others’ right to the lawful use of property. Beyond safeguarding legal interests, the law also protects individual rights, since the fundamental prerequisite for maximizing social welfare is the freedom of economic exchange. Illegal acts such as theft, at best, merely allocate resources at market prices, falling short of achieving optimal resource allocation. Simply compensating the victim cannot repair the social damage caused by criminal conduct, which disrupts the basic order of the market. Therefore, punishment is required to compel the offender to pay an appropriate measure of reparation to the state—the representative of the harmed community. Accordingly, the essence of punishment may be understood as the obligation imposed on the perpetrator, when a specific victim cannot or should not receive redress, to compensate the state—as the collective representative of society—for the harm caused by their conduct. This is precisely why U.S. courts clearly distinguish between liability owed to a particular victim and liability to the government, which typically carries a punitive character.
Secondly, the actor’s assessment of sanction costs is holistic rather than fragmented. The purpose of legal deterrence is to align private costs with the social costs generated by a given conduct by setting appropriate private costs, thereby guiding rational actors to refrain from behavior that harms society. In practice, even though the law distinguishes among criminal, administrative, and civil statutes—and accordingly prescribes corresponding criminal, administrative, and civil liabilities—when viewed from the perspectives of resource allocation and behavioral incentives, all forms of liability can be reduced to the private costs borne by the actor; in other words, these costs are aggregated into a single, unified calculation. For example, in occupational safety‑related offenses, a mine owner might choose to conceal an accident and privately negotiate a substantial compensation agreement with the victim’s family in order to evade criminal liability. Clearly, for the mine owner, the cost of avoiding criminal liability is quantifiable. When deciding whether to settle out of court or to underreport, the actor weighs the overall cost, not merely the cost imposed by a single branch of law. Consequently, if legislators and adjudicators fail to adopt such a holistic perspective when defining legal liability, sanctions are likely to be disproportionate. Similarly, in ecological‑crime cases, imposing excessively high ecological‑restoration fees in addition to a criminal sentence can result in an unduly high total cost, undermining fairness.
Finally, based on the foregoing theory, if we continue to treat ancillary liability as an independent civil liability, we will inevitably encounter institutional dilemmas: “double punishment for a single act” and “exceeding the statutory penalties.” Since criminal punishment itself serves as “compensation” for harm inflicted upon public interests, if ancillary liability—characterized by its punitive nature—is mistakenly regarded as purely civil liability and imposed in addition to criminal sanctions, it would mean that the defendant bears a double burden for the same conduct. This, in essence, amounts to “double punishment for a single act,” thereby contravening fundamental principles of the rule of law.
The academic community has already sounded the alarm on this issue. Some scholars argue that punitive damages for ecological and environmental torts have given rise to a dual system distinguishing between public‑interest and private‑interest torts, while the practice in judicial proceedings of conflating private‑interest harm with public‑interest litigation may lead to an overreach in imposing substantive liability. Punitive damages for ecological and environmental harm should adhere to a principle of strict prudence; their legal nature is akin to quasi‑criminal fines, and any other legal sanctions imposed on the defendant must be taken into account to avoid double punishment and excessive deterrence. Moreover, punitive damages should apply only to conduct that causes serious harm to private rights; where the ecological environment suffers solely severe damage, the competent statutory authorities lack standing to bring a public‑interest action under Article 1232 of the Civil Code of the People’s Republic of China. It is also worth noting that, if one believes that the statutory penalties for certain offenses are currently too low and call for harsher punishment, the proper legal avenue is to amend the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China through the legislative body, rather than having the administrative authorities issue regulations.
Accordingly, whether viewed from the nature of punishment, the decision-making logic of the offender, or the fundamental principles of the rule of law, integrating ancillary liability with criminal punishment represents a superior approach that can achieve both theoretical coherence and practical fairness.
Once it is recognized that the “incidental liability” in criminal‑related public interest litigation should not be regarded as genuine civil liability, but rather as a restorative‑justice measure intended to substitute for sentencing, it becomes clear that the Guidelines for Handling Civil Public Interest Litigation Cases by the Procuratorial Organs (Trial Implementation) — which takes civil liability as its logical starting point (hereinafter referred to as the “Procuratorial Public Interest Litigation Guidelines”) — cannot be directly applied to such criminal‑related public interest litigation. This shift in theoretical characterization entails not only a redefinition at the conceptual level, but also a fundamental restructuring of the entire institutional framework around the intrinsic attributes of restorative‑justice measures. On the one hand, it must embody the core principle of restorative justice—achieving justice through the repair of harm; on the other hand, it must remain consistent with the basic principles of criminal law, particularly the principles of proportionality between crime and punishment and of restraint.
(1) Scope of Compensation: Based on the Standard of Actual Losses
With respect to the scope of compensation, the Guidelines on Public Interest Litigation by the Procuratorate recognize that damages to the ecological environment encompass emergency response costs, environmental restoration expenses, losses of ecosystem services, inspection fees, appraisal fees, and other reasonable expenditures. The Guidelines further acknowledge that “in practice, owing to the complexity of polluted environments and the diversity of their functions, losses of ecosystem services are often difficult to quantify precisely. However, given that such losses objectively exist, they should be taken into account, at the court’s discretion, when determining the amount of compensation that the tortfeasor is required to pay.” This approach clearly reflects a commitment to compensating for all losses under civil liability, embodying the fundamental principle of traditional civil law that seeks to “make whole” the injured party.
However, once ancillary liability is imbued with a punitive character, determining its scope requires striking a new balance between compensatory and punitive dimensions. The complexity of this balance lies in the fact that ancillary liability cannot be equated entirely with civil compensation, nor can it be reduced to a mere criminal sanction; rather, it constitutes a sui generis institutional arrangement situated somewhere between the two. As a form of “penalty” that incorporates elements of civil enforcement, it retains a compensatory component—unlike a purely punitive fine—and thus the amount of compensation must be grounded in the actual harm caused by the conduct, lacking the substantial flexibility characteristic of fines. At the same time, its punitive dimension implies that ancillary liability may be adjusted to meet the objectives of the sanction, without necessarily corresponding to the full extent of the damage incurred.
The establishment of such a balancing mechanism requires us to reassess the hierarchical structure and complexity of losses. Traditional criminal law typically confines liability to direct losses. For instance, in China, the “substantial amount” threshold for the crime of fraud refers to the magnitude of direct losses. In the United States, compensation orders in criminal proceedings are treated as penalties; accordingly, case law generally does not recognize compensation for indirect harm caused by the defendant’s conduct. However, the very notion of “direct loss” is inherently ambiguous. Particularly in the realm of environmental crimes, the layered and interconnected nature of harm renders the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” even more challenging. As some scholars have noted, ecological value is both limited and legally constructed; therefore, quantification of damage must adhere to clear boundaries and should not broadly seek to recover the full extent of all values.
Taking the crime of illegal fishing as an example, the resulting losses can be categorized into three interrelated yet relatively distinct tiers. The first tier is the value of the fishery resources actually harvested. This constitutes the most straightforward and readily quantifiable loss, typically measurable in terms of market prices. The second tier comprises collateral damage caused by the fishing activity itself. For instance, compared with conventional fishing, electrofishing—at higher voltages—can lead to the mass mortality of aquatic organisms within a given area, only a small fraction of which may ultimately be brought ashore; the portion that dies without being harvested falls under this category. Although such losses occur concurrently with the criminal act, they extend beyond the immediate target of the offense in both spatial scope and magnitude of impact. The third tier encompasses long-term damages arising from the fishing activity. Examples include electrofishing’s detrimental effects on fish gonads, water quality degradation caused by unharvested dead fish, and ecosystem disruption resulting from the widespread mortality of aquatic life throughout an entire body of water. These losses are temporally persistent and systemically pervasive, often implicating the overall balance of the ecological system. According to regulations issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs, the first two tiers appear to be classified as direct losses, while the third is deemed an indirect loss; however, this categorization still gives rise to interpretive challenges. Such a division, based on temporal sequence and causal distance, may fail to adequately address the unique characteristics and complexity of environmental‑related crimes.
In this regard, it may be advisable to shift from the formulation of “direct loss” to a more operational standard—namely, “actual loss.” The legitimacy of ancillary liability rests on whether the defendant’s criminal conduct has caused a concrete, property‑related loss to the government as the representative of the public interest. Such property‑related loss must be objectively provable and quantifiable, rather than an abstract or conceptual harm. Comparative legal experience provides support for this standard. In the U.S. “Lobster Case,” the defendants conspired to illegally overfish South African lobsters and export them to the United States; the court held that the South African government was a proper victim because it possessed a property interest in those lobsters—it could have lawfully seized and sold the illegally harvested lobsters. In that case, the government’s loss was not an abstract “impairment of regulatory authority,” but a specific loss of property interests: lobsters that rightfully belonged to the government were unlawfully taken and disposed of by others.
By contrast, the “poker case” presents a starkly different scenario. In that case, the defendant operated a video‑poker business online, circumventing state regulatory oversight. The court held that, although the state thereby forfeited administrative licensing fees it would otherwise have collected, the government’s interest in the operating license is purely regulatory—not proprietary—so the state does not qualify as an eligible victim entitled to compensation. The underlying rationale of this ruling is that the government’s regulatory authority itself does not constitute a quantifiable property right; any harm to such authority should be addressed through public‑law remedies, such as administrative penalties or criminal sanctions, rather than through monetary compensation.
The foregoing case law demonstrates that the obligation to compensate arises when the government, like any ordinary victim, suffers actual economic loss, rather than from abstract challenges it faces in performing its regulatory functions as a public administrator—challenges that can be addressed through public‑power measures such as criminal penalties or administrative sanctions. Following this line of reasoning, “loss of ecosystem services,” which is difficult to quantify and to convert into concrete economic harm, should logically be excluded from the scope of compensation under ancillary liability. As one scholar has noted in examining punitive damages, ecological harm can be categorized into “pure ecological damage” (such as restoration costs) and “subjective, collective harm” (such as loss of ecosystem services); in current judicial practice, most cases prioritize awarding compensation for “pure ecological damage” while rarely recognizing claims for loss of ecosystem services. This cautious approach in judicial practice is consistent with the “actual loss” standard advanced herein. It should be clarified, however, that this paper maintains only that ancillary liability should not encompass non‑actual losses such as loss of ecosystem services—since, in principle, such losses have already been assessed through criminal sanctions—but this does not preclude the possibility of seeking compensation for these types of losses in other proceedings.
(2) Method for Calculating Losses: Market Value Method or Replacement Cost Method
So, how should “actual loss” be calculated? On this issue, Chinese scholars have conducted systematic research and proposed that the judicial determination of ecological and environmental damage should adopt three modes: judicial review, judicial ascertainment, and judicial discretion. Quantitative methods fall into two categories: the replacement‑equivalent analysis method and the environmental‑value assessment method. The “General Guidelines and Key Steps for the Identification and Assessment of Ecological and Environmental Damage—Part 3: Restoration‑Effectiveness Assessment” (GB/T 39791.3‑2024), issued by the Ministry of Ecology and Environment and other authorities, explicitly stipulates that, among valuation methods, the replacement‑equivalent analysis approach—such as resource‑equivalent analysis and service‑equivalent analysis—should be given priority; secondarily, environmental‑value assessment methods may be employed, including the direct market value method, the revealed preference method, and the stated preference method. Both academic theoretical research and the aforementioned assessment guidelines provide clear methodological guidance for calculating “actual loss.”
From the perspective of practices outside China, two main approaches are used to calculate “actual losses”: the first is the compensatory‑cost method, which estimates the cost of restoring fisheries to their previous levels; the second is the market‑value method, which sets the compensation amount equal to the market value of the overexploited aquatic resources. The differences between these two methods extend beyond the numerical outcomes; they reflect fundamentally different conceptions of loss. The market‑value method confines itself to the first tier of loss—the value of the fishery products directly harvested—making it straightforward and easy to apply. However, it may fail to fully capture the complexity and systemic impacts of ecological‑environmental crimes. By contrast, the compensatory‑cost method can encompass all three tiers of loss, as it translates future ecological damage into present‑day, quantifiable restoration costs, thereby rendering what might appear to be indirect ecological consequences more tangible. This conversion rests on a simple rationale: absent the criminal act, the government would not incur such restoration expenses; it is precisely because of the crime that the government must bear these costs to rehabilitate the damaged ecosystem. Notably, the total loss calculated under the multi‑tiered framework of the compensatory‑cost method does not necessarily exceed that derived from the market‑value method; in the “lobster case,” for instance, the U.S. federal court opted to award the lower figure, based on the compensatory‑cost approach.
In ecological and environmental crime cases, the compensatory approach—also known as the restoration‑cost method—has particularly broad applicability, as it enables the relatively precise translation of ecological harm that is difficult to value in market terms into specific financial expenditures incurred by the government to restore the environment, thereby quantifying “actual loss.” This line of reasoning also offers a fresh perspective for interpreting the Guidelines on Public Interest Litigation by the Procuratorate: the “emergency response costs” and “ecological and environmental restoration costs” stipulated therein should not be viewed as two separate items that can be simply added together, but rather as guidance on how to calculate “actual loss.” Emergency response measures and long-term environmental restoration are often carried out in tandem, jointly constituting the compensable cleanup and restoration costs that the government must incur to address the consequences of the offense.
Empirical evidence from comparative law provides practical validation for this approach. In the U.S. “Asbestos Case,” the defendant company knowingly violated asbestos‑handling standards, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency intervened to clean up the site, incurring costs exceeding $16 million. The court ultimately awarded $10.38 million in damages, after deducting indirect administrative expenses such as attorneys’ fees and management costs. This documented expenditure in the tens of millions of dollars constitutes the “actual loss” subsequently recognized by the court as having been suffered by the government as a result of the defendant’s conduct. The handling of the Asbestos Case highlights several key features of “actual loss” determination: first, the loss must consist of specific, quantifiable economic expenditures, rather than abstract damage assessments; second, such expenditures must bear a direct causal link to the criminal conduct; and third, the government is entitled to compensation for necessary expenses incurred in addressing the consequences of the crime, but not for ordinary administrative or general‑purpose overhead costs.
Defining the scope of compensation as “actual losses” offers at least three advantages.
First, it is necessary to curb the arbitrariness of government compensation claims. This requirement can effectively constrain the government’s tendency to arbitrarily expand both the scope and the amount of compensable losses. For example, in cases of illegal fishing, the value of the fish caught by electrofishing is clearly eligible for compensation; however, any consequential or future damages that have not been quantified through professional appraisal or an actual audit—and thus converted into compensatory expenditures—should not be included in the compensation calculation. By requiring the government to furnish concrete evidence of economic losses, we can effectively prevent arbitrary determination of compensation amounts and ensure the system’s predictability and fairness.
Second, it ensures full redress for the government’s legitimate rights and interests. This requirement also guarantees that any actual losses suffered by the government can be compensated. In other words, if the government incurs economic losses due to criminal conduct, it may bring a claim for damages, thereby encouraging the government to investigate more complex and specialized cases. “Actual losses” may include expenses incurred by the government for remediation, cleanup, and necessary investigative measures undertaken in response to the crime. In comparative law, U.S. courts have upheld government claims for reimbursement of on-site investigation costs associated with “determining the scope of damages and formulating a cleanup plan,” clearly distinguishing such costs from routine criminal investigative expenses that are not compensable. This establishes a reasonable boundary for the category of “inspection, appraisal, and other reasonable expenses” as set forth in the Guidelines on Public Interest Litigation by the Procuratorate: only those special expenses directly attributable to addressing the consequences of the crime may be included within the scope of compensation.
Third, the system for calculating the value of endangered species should be refined. Once the scope of compensation is defined as actual losses, the value of endangered species can be assessed more accurately. The “Guidelines on Public Interest Litigation by the Procuratorate” merely states in principle that, when determining the specific amount of compensation for ecological and environmental damage, consideration should be given to “whether protected species are present and the level of their protection”; this criterion is inadequate, as the intrinsic value of protected species at the same conservation status may vary significantly across different regions and ecosystems. Some scholars have pointed out that, in cases of wildlife-related crimes, the monetary value assigned does not reflect an inherent legal interest but rather a quasi‑property right serving an instrumental purpose. Consequently, the assessed value does not represent the stable or true worth of the wildlife; the multiplicative factors employed are, to a large extent, artificial constructs. This research highlights the shortcomings of the current framework for evaluating species values.
The “actual loss” rule provides a more comprehensive and precise framework for assessment. In comparative law, in the U.S. case of the Whooping Crane, the court did not confine itself to the species’ abstract ecological value or to a mere determination of its conservation status when confronted with a wild whooping crane that had been illegally transported. The Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries submitted a letter to the court detailing its collaboration with a private foundation, which had invested substantial resources in efforts to restore the wild whooping crane population; it estimated that raising, rearing, and releasing a single whooping crane would cost $85,000. The International Whooping Crane Foundation and the Louisiana Wildlife Federation likewise provided estimates of $93,701.67 and $94,000, respectively. Relying on the principle of minimization, the court ultimately upheld the claim for $85,000 in damages. The rationale behind this approach lies in its ability to translate the abstract value of species conservation into concrete costs associated with conservation efforts, thereby grounding the award in objective factual grounds.
(3) Standard of Proof: Reasonable and Reliable Requirements
Relying on expert appraisals or actual expenditures to determine the amount of compensation inevitably raises the issue of evidentiary precision: specifically, what level of statistical detail must the government provide in order to justify its claim for compensation? In this regard, the “Guidelines on Public Interest Litigation by the Procuratorate” stipulate that “when determining the specific amount of emergency response costs… such costs shall be established primarily on the basis of invoices, receipts, vouchers issued by appraisal institutions, and bank transfer records.” Nevertheless, these provisions still fail to address the requisite level of scrutiny. For example, does merely presenting invoices or receipts suffice to meet the standard of proof? Must the government also provide a detailed explanation of the necessity and reasonableness of each individual expenditure?
Chinese academia has examined issues such as judges’ reliance on expert testimony, judicial fact-finding, and discretionary determinations; however, research on the standard of proof remains relatively underdeveloped. Comparative legal experience offers comparatively mature solutions to this problem. In the United States, the standard of proof applicable to compensatory awards is the preponderance of evidence, consistent with civil procedure. Under this standard, the government must present evidence sufficient to persuade the court that the facts it asserts are more likely than not to be true. While the court is not required to make specific factual findings when calculating damages, the information upon which the award is based must be sufficiently reliable to support its approximate accuracy. This standard reflects a pragmatic balance: it demands adequate evidentiary support while avoiding an impossibly high threshold of proof.
The approaches taken in the U.S. “Lobster Case” and the “Asbestos Case” offer instructive lessons. In the Lobster Case, the trial judge initially declined to issue a damages award, citing the complexity of calculating the compensation amount as likely to delay the proceedings. However, the appellate court rejected this stance, holding that the market‑value method could provide a reasonable estimate. Although not absolutely precise, this approach—grounded in the defendant company’s admissions and informant‑derived estimates—constitutes a sound means of “inferring average losses from known data.” When the defendant again appealed, challenging the calculation’s specifics, the appellate court reiterated that it would not overturn the district court’s damages order unless there was manifest error. In the Asbestos Case, the defendants argued on appeal that the government‑submitted accounting tables alone were insufficient to support the damages judgment. Yet the appellate court found that the district court had not abused its discretion, emphasizing that the government had not only provided detailed accounting reports but also presented a comprehensive array of corroborating evidence, including expert testimony from site supervisors, official inspection records, pre‑ and post‑cleanup aerial‑photography comparisons, work‑site reports from frontline workers, and extensive eyewitness accounts. While these pieces of evidence did not perfectly align with every individual expense, they collectively established the authenticity and necessity of the cleanup efforts, thereby lending strong support to the credibility of the accounting data. These precedents resonate with the research of Chinese scholars. Some have suggested that, when specific damages cannot be ascertained, one may draw on Japan’s “equivalent damage‑amount” system, whereby judges exercise discretionary judgment and clearly articulate their rationale; this approach likewise underscores the need for flexibility and pragmatism in setting the standard of proof.
In sum, with respect to the standard of proof, evidence must be reliable but need not be flawless; calculations must be reasonable but do not have to be exact. This standard both safeguards the government’s legitimate rights and interests and prevents institutional rigidity that could result from overly stringent evidentiary requirements.
(4) Considerations Regarding Solvency
Because the “Guidelines on Public Interest Litigation by the Procuratorate” take civil liability as its logical starting point, the defendant’s ability to pay is not taken into account. This approach is indeed justified within the framework of civil legal relations; in civil cases involving damage compensation, priority should be given to satisfying the victim’s need to restore their rights and interests. For example, in the “Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Personal Injury Compensation Cases,” promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court (Fa Shi [2003] No. 20), the calculation methods are either based on the victim’s actual circumstances—such as lost wages—or on objective standards—such as funeral expenses—without reference to the defendant’s financial capacity.
However, in the field of criminal law, whether the defendant’s financial capacity should influence the imposition of a fine has been definitively settled by the “Guiding Opinions on Sentencing for Common Crimes (Trial)” (Fa Fa [2021] No. 21), jointly issued by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate: “When imposing a fine, the court shall base its decision on the circumstances of the offense and, taking into account the defendant’s ability to pay, determine the amount of the fine in accordance with the law.” This provision not only establishes the principle of considering the defendant’s financial capacity in the application of fines but also serves as an important reference for the imposition of other property‑based sanctions.
Once accessory liability is regarded as a restorative‑justice measure that substitutes for traditional penal sanctions, it becomes necessary to take into account the defendant’s capacity to pay, thereby avoiding the awkward situation of imposing “empty judgments and empty penalties.” Such consideration is not only essential for the system’s practical enforceability but also aligns with the fundamental principles of criminal law. The purposes of punishment are to prevent and deter crime and to rehabilitate offenders; if property‑based sanctions exceed the defendant’s actual ability to bear them, they will not only fail to achieve the intended deterrent effect but may even impede the defendant’s reintegration into society—thus running counter to the core objectives of criminal law. However, at present, China has yet to establish a clear framework for how a defendant’s capacity to pay should influence sentencing, and both theoretical research and empirical exploration in this area remain in their nascent stages.
The United States’ extensive experience in this area provides us with valuable comparative‑law resources. As noted above, the legal foundations for restitution orders in the United States comprise the Victims Protection Act and the Mandatory Restitution Act, which embody two distinct approaches to assessing the ability to pay, each reflecting different value orientations and institutional logics.
Under the framework of the Victims’ Protection Act, when determining the amount of compensation, courts must first take into account the defendant’s financial circumstances; this institutional design reflects a thorough consideration of the defendant’s economic capacity. It is important to note that, although the Victims’ Protection Act requires courts to consider the defendant’s ability to pay, it does not prohibit judges from issuing compensation orders against indigent defendants. While trial judges are obligated to assess both the defendant’s “financial resources” and “financial needs,” they may also project the defendant’s future earning potential—recognizing that poverty may be temporary, Congress has provided that compensation need only be paid within five years after the completion of the custodial sentence. However, in forecasting future payment capacity, courts must make realistic projections rather than relying solely on “opportunity”; this ensures that the obligation is genuinely enforceable. To this end, courts must not only be familiar with the defendant’s typical income level but also be apprised of any other potential sources of income. For example, in the Davis case, the court considered not only the defendant’s regular earnings but also her prospective inheritance of over $800,000 as an estate beneficiary, as well as her potential income from writing, thereby crafting a compensation award that balanced the victim’s rights with the defendant’s financial resources.
However, under the framework of the Compulsory Compensation Act, the underlying logic of the system has undergone a fundamental shift. Even when the defendant lacks any capacity to pay, the court is nonetheless required to issue a compensation order against the convicted individual. This provision raises a critical question: how can compensation be enforced fairly, balancing the protection of victims’ rights with due consideration of the defendant’s actual circumstances? The “Forest Case” vividly illustrates this dilemma. In the first-instance judgment, the district court judge expressed deep concern, arguing that ordering the defendant to pay nearly US$15 million would amount to condemning her to a lifetime of inescapable debt. This judge’s apprehension extended beyond the specific case at hand; it reflected a profound reflection on the overall rationality of the system. The judge further observed that, within criminal law, despite the existence of various formulas and sentencing guidelines, there remains room for moral judgment—precisely why sentencing decisions must continue to be made by judges rather than by computers. In this case, I am particularly troubled by the question of whether, in exercising such moral judgment, we should condemn this woman to lifelong poverty, for that is precisely the consequence of the imposed compensation order.
Faced with this predicament, the judge sought a solution within the framework of the law. Under the Compulsory Compensation Act, if determining compensation requires resolving complex factual issues to establish the cause or extent of the victim’s losses—thereby complicating or prolonging the sentencing process to the point where the burden of providing compensation outweighs the benefits of the sentencing procedure—the judge is not required to issue a compensation order. Accordingly, the judge attempted to invoke this provision to decline imposing such an order. However, the appellate court rejected the judge’s reasoning, holding that the Compulsory Compensation Act explicitly stipulates that the amount of compensation is determined by the court, irrespective of the defendant’s financial circumstances, and that the government had presented ample evidence of actual expenditures incurred in carrying out emergency vegetation restoration in the fire‑affected area. Nevertheless, the Act does not entirely disregard practical considerations regarding enforcement; it demonstrates a degree of flexibility: while the determination of the compensation amount is independent of the defendant’s ability to pay, the formulation and implementation of the compensation plan must take the defendant’s specific circumstances into account. The Hoskin case provides a concrete illustration of this flexible approach. In that case, the court approved a pragmatic compensation arrangement: the defendant made a lump‑sum payment of US$100,000 from his retirement account, thereby partially satisfying the total compensation award of US$627,895.52, after which he was required only to make periodic, nominal payments.
In other words, the compensation system under the Compulsory Compensation Law strikes a delicate balance: on the one hand, the statutory amount of compensation is determined without regard to the defendant’s financial capacity, ensuring that the losses caused by the offense are fully assessed; on the other hand, the formulation of the actual compensation plan must take the defendant’s ability to pay into account, so as to prevent the obligation to compensate from becoming an insurmountable barrier to the defendant’s reintegration into society. The underlying rationale of this institutional arrangement lies in separating the two stages of “determination of liability” and “enforcement of liability,” thereby safeguarding both the comprehensive protection of victims’ rights and the practical feasibility of enforcement.
When designing China’s mechanism for assessing the capacity to pay compensation, valuable lessons can be drawn from the discretionary model of the U.S. Victims’ Protection Act and the mandatory‑compensation model of the Compulsory Compensation Act. However, whichever model is adopted, a core principle must be upheld: while fully safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of victims, we must also take into account the defendant’s fundamental need to reintegrate into society. This balance not only embodies the central tenets of restorative justice but also aligns with the fundamental objectives of China’s criminal law—reform through education and crime prevention.
Based on China’s specific national conditions, we recommend adopting a hybrid system that combines the strengths of both approaches: For corporate defendants, a mandatory compensation model could be employed, under which the amount of liability is determined by rigorously assessing the actual extent of ecological and environmental damage, without reducing the liability on the basis of the company’s current financial condition, debt levels, or ability to pay. This approach seeks to uphold the seriousness and deterrent effect of ecological protection, ensuring that enterprises bear full responsibility commensurate with the consequences of their actions and conveying a clear societal orientation toward environmental conservation. During the enforcement phase, a practical, phased‑payment plan should be formulated, taking into account the enterprise’s cash flow, asset structure, and business prospects; this includes evaluating its immediate payment capacity as well as its long-term repayment potential, designing a stepwise implementation schedule, and establishing a monitoring mechanism to prevent the enterprise from evading liability through improper means. For individual defendants, a discretionary model similar to that provided under the Victims’ Protection Law should be applied. At the stage of determining the amount of liability, the defendant’s economic capacity should be given full consideration and treated as a key factor in setting the compensation amount. Such an arrangement reflects a realistic assessment of individuals’ economic vulnerability and embodies humanitarian concern in institutional design, thereby ensuring the enforceability and effectiveness of the judgment. In practice, this should involve a comprehensive evaluation of the defendant’s existing assets and income, family obligations and basic subsistence needs, as well as the nature and severity of the harmful conduct and the degree of subjective fault.
To ensure the effective operation of the system, a complementary dynamic adjustment mechanism should also be established. This mechanism would allow for timely modifications to enforcement arrangements in response to significant changes in the defendant’s financial circumstances: when the defendant’s financial situation improves markedly, the pace of performance may be appropriately accelerated or the original compensation amount restored; conversely, if the defendant encounters severe economic hardship, the enforcement plan can be adjusted accordingly to prevent excessive enforcement. A regular evaluation system should further be put in place to guarantee the effective functioning of this adjustment mechanism. Moreover, when multiple sanctions are imposed concurrently, it is essential to take into account the defendant’s overall capacity to bear the burden, ensuring that the various measures are coordinated and mutually compatible. As some scholars have noted, judicial decisions should strike a balance between penal sanctions and ecological restoration measures, and it is advisable not to impose several economic penalties at the same time. The U.S. case of Jackson v. Randolph exemplifies this principle: the appellate court upheld the award of damages but vacated the fine, because although the district court found that the defendant could afford $13.5 million in damages, it failed to assess whether he remained capable of paying an additional $10 million in fines. Such a holistic approach helps avoid disproportionate punishment and ensures the coordinated implementation and overall reasonableness of all sanctioning measures.
Clarifying the nature of ancillary liability is a pressing preliminary issue in the development of China’s criminal‑civil public interest litigation, directly affecting the sound construction of the subsequent institutional framework and specific rules. In such proceedings, if ancillary liability is mechanically equated with purely civil liability, on the one hand, it fails to accurately reflect the substantive inequality between the procuratorial organ and the defendant; on the other hand, given that administrative authorities often imbue loss‑assessment procedures with a punitive character, this approach risks triggering “double punishment for the same act” and may even contravene the principle of legality in criminal law. Accordingly, it is particularly necessary to reexamine the legal attributes of ancillary liability and its substantive regulatory regime. This paper argues that ancillary liability should not be narrowly construed as civil liability but rather regarded as a restorative justice measure capable of substituting for penal sanctions. The core tenet of restorative justice is to require the defendant, through compensation and reparative actions, to assume responsibility toward society and the victim; beyond redressing the victim’s losses, such measures also serve deterrent and rehabilitative functions. On this basis, ancillary liability is, in essence, a form of “penalty” embedded within civil enforcement mechanisms, possessing both compensatory and punitive dimensions. At the level of overarching design, criminal penalties and ancillary liability should be integrated into a unified evaluative framework, thereby establishing a comprehensive sanctioning regime targeting defendants—consistent with the institutional logic of effectively regulating social conduct by comprehensively accounting for the costs of crime. Under this premise, should victims who can be specifically identified emerge in the future, they would retain the right to bring separate civil tort actions, unbound by the principle of *non bis in idem*.
Once ancillary liability is established as a restorative‑justice measure, the logic underlying the relevant specific rules becomes strikingly clear. First, the scope of compensation should be strictly limited to actual losses, with the amount determined either through market‑based valuation or by means of a substitute‑remedy approach. For instance, in environmental‑pollution cases, the actual cost of pollution remediation may serve as the primary basis for calculating the compensation sum. Second, regarding the standard of proof, the demand for “perfect evidence” should be abandoned; instead, reasonable estimates based on the totality of available information should be permitted. Finally, the defendant’s actual capacity to pay must be factored into judicial deliberations—either by adjusting the nominal award or by refining the implementation plan for actual payment—to ensure both the enforceability and practical feasibility of the compensation order. In fact, many provisions in China’s Guidelines on Public Interest Litigation issued by the procuratorial organs align closely with the arguments advanced here. For example, the method of calculating ecological‑environmental restoration costs via the virtual‑treatment‑cost approach is consistent with the principles underlying the substitute‑remedy approach. Nevertheless, if ancillary liability is construed exclusively as a civil‑law liability, this framing risks generating excessive deterrence at the institutional level, which not only skews the balance of responsibility but also risks resulting in “empty penalties and hollow judgments,” thereby undermining the fairness and authority of the judiciary. Resolving this issue ultimately requires returning to first principles: clarifying that ancillary liability is a form of restorative‑justice liability rather than a purely civil one. In summary, only by taking “restorative justice” as the logical starting point and redesigning the specific rules in close alignment with the distinctive characteristics of public interest litigation can this institutional framework be steered toward maturity and refinement.


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