
Abstract: Using a specific administrative penalty case involving insider trading as a case study, we can observe a form of “substantive integration” between the judiciary and regulatory authorities. The administrative penalty decision did not establish the presumptive element of “a high degree of congruence between trading activity and inside information”; in order to uphold the penalty, the people’s court reclassified the party from being a “contact or associate” under paragraph (v) of Part V of the Minutes to a “person with a close relationship” under paragraph (ii), thereby lowering the standard of proof from “high degree of congruence” to “basic congruence.” Furthermore, it substituted “a high degree of temporal alignment between call times and account transaction times” for “congruence between trading and the formation or change of inside information,” ultimately rendering this element entirely ineffective in the factual findings. This practice of “supplementing elements” oversteps the boundaries of legality review, conflicts with principles such as the defendant’s burden of proof and the requirement to gather evidence before making a decision, and transforms judicial review into a mere extension of administrative fact-finding. Judicial–regulatory coordination should rest on the independent examination of legal elements, rather than at the expense of mutually filling in those elements.
Keywords: insider trading; high degree of congruence; presumption; judicial review; substantive integration
I. Introduction: A Mismatch of Elements Between Two Documents
In June 2021, the securities regulator imposed an administrative penalty on Mr. Qiu, finding that he had controlled two securities accounts to purchase shares of a media company during the sensitive period for material asset restructuring information, thereby constituting insider trading. The regulator ordered the confiscation of his illegal gains and imposed a fine. Dissatisfied with the decision, Mr. Qiu filed an administrative lawsuit after the reconsideration upheld the original ruling. In March 2022, the Beijing Financial Court ruled to dismiss his claim.
This paper focuses not on the conclusions but on the misalignment of elements between the two documents. In the findings section of the penalty decision, after listing abnormal characteristics such as initial purchases, sales of other stocks followed by purchases, concentrated large-scale buying, and purchases at critical junctures, the text merely states that “the timing of calls with insiders is highly consistent with the account’s trading times,” without ever determining that Qiu’s trading activities were “highly consistent” with the formation or changes in the inside information. Qiu’s fifth defense specifically addresses this point: “Qiu’s securities transactions are not highly consistent with the formation or changes in the inside information.” Furthermore, after citing the “Minutes,” the judgment restates the presumptive element as requiring both “a close relationship with an insider” and “securities trading activity that is broadly consistent with that inside information.” It then proceeds to enumerate four factual findings—abnormal purchases, communications, and trades, and the inability to provide a reasonable explanation—yet makes no independent finding regarding the requirement of “broad consistency.”
The requirements are absent in administrative penalties and remain absent in judicial rulings, yet the penalties are nonetheless upheld. This phenomenon suggests that the force sustaining such upholds does not derive from proof of the requirements, but rather from their reallocation. This paper terms this reallocation process the “substantive integration” of securities adjudication and regulation, and seeks to delineate its technical pathways, generative mechanisms, and normative consequences.
II. Standardized Traceability: An Independent Status of “High Conformity”
Section V of the Minutes lists five scenarios in which insider trading can be established: (1) trading by the insider who possesses material nonpublic information; (2) trading by the insider’s spouse, parents, children, or other persons with a close relationship; (3) trading by a person who obtained the information in the course of performing their job duties; (4) trading by a person who illegally obtained material nonpublic information; and (5), the most indirect category, involves “communication or contact” with an insider or a person who knows the inside information prior to its public disclosure, coupled with “securities trading activity that is highly consistent with the inside information.” Among these five scenarios, item (2) requires “substantial consistency,” while item (5) requires “high consistency”; this difference in wording is not merely rhetorical.
The legitimacy of the distinction lies in the degree of the inferential leap. In subparagraphs (1), (3), and (4), the actor’s knowledge of the information can be directly inferred from status or the act of acquisition, with “correspondence” serving merely to corroborate; in subparagraph (2), the relationship of status itself establishes a high probability of information transmission; whereas in subparagraph (5), reliance rests solely on “communication” or “contact,” yet the content of such communication is unverifiable and the fact of transmission cannot be proven, leaving a substantial gap between “communication by telephone” and “transmission of information.” Requiring “high correspondence” precisely sets a threshold for this leap: only when the transaction and the formation or alteration of the information are highly aligned in time, direction, and rhythm can “communication” be elevated to “transmission.”
The Su case provides the clearest illustration of this reasoning. The Beijing Higher People’s Court held that the “high degree of congruence” referred to in paragraph (5) of the Minutes represents the standard of proof that securities regulators must meet with respect to the underlying facts relied upon for presumptions. It further stated that “a principle of prudence should be applied in determining the criteria for applying presumptions, and the evidentiary standard for the underlying facts supporting such presumptions should be correspondingly higher.” Consequently, the court set aside a penalty exceeding RMB 100 million because the administrative penalty decision required a “high degree of congruence,” while the reconsideration decision applied a standard of “relatively close congruence,” resulting in inconsistent standards between the two decisions.
The academic community also shares a consensus of caution on this point. Peng Bing has long argued that evidence showing only a temporal coincidence between a trade and inside information cannot serve as independent presumptive evidence; Miao Yinzhi further criticizes the “contact‑equals‑presumption” approach for layering three presumptions, calling it “overly speculative,” and contends that when acquisition cannot be proven, one should “err on the side of leniency rather than error.” Thus, “high degree of concordance” is not merely an adjective modifying “abnormal trading”; it is an independent element that must be established separately.
III. Element Migration and Fact Substitution: Three Techniques of Judgment
(1) Subject Migration: From item (5) to item (2), changing from a contact person to a close associate.
The judgment’s restatement of the “Minutes” warrants a word-for-word comparison. The subject of item (5) of the “Minutes” is “persons who have communicated with or contacted insiders,” whereas the judgment states that “the plaintiff has a close relationship with an insider.” “Close relationship” is the term used in item (2), referring to “spouses, parents, children, and other persons with a close relationship.” The judgment then elaborates on this relationship by citing “classmates,” “frequent business dealings,” and “frequent calls during the sensitive period,” thereby objectively completing the reasoning that reclassifies Mr. Qiu from a “communicator or contact” to a “person with a close relationship.”
The consequence of this shift is a watering down of the standard: Subparagraph (2) now requires only “substantial conformity.” The term “high degree of conformity” no longer appears anywhere in the judgment; it has been replaced by “substantial conformity,” which is not a typographical error but an inevitable result of reclassifying the relevant subjects. However, the prerequisite for applying subparagraph (2) is that the relationship itself sufficiently supports the likelihood of information transmission—spouses, parents, and children share a common life, making access to information virtually self‑evident; classmates and business associates, by contrast, lack such a shared‑life dynamic, so their information accessibility must still be separately established. Expanding “close relationship” to encompass social and commercial interactions effectively empties subparagraph (5) of its raison d’être: anyone who has communicated by phone can claim to be “close,” and anyone deemed “close” need only demonstrate “substantial conformity,” thereby rendering the “high degree” threshold meaningless.
(2) Factual substitution: from “informational consistency” to “temporal alignment,” and from moderate alignment to high consistency.
More critically, there is a substitution at the factual level. In reasoning that “the trading activity exhibits clear anomalies,” the judgment states: “The timing of their phone calls closely corresponds to the timing of account transactions.” This sentence is placed under the heading of “anomalies” rather than “correspondence.” Replacing a match between call times and order‑placement times with a correspondence between trading rhythms and the processes of information formation and change amounts to a sleight of hand with indicators: the former establishes temporal contiguity between communication and trading, whereas the latter requires structural isomorphism between transaction content and informational content over time.
The probative value of the two is vastly different. During the six-month information‑sensitive period, any purchase made the day after a phone call could be characterized as having “a high degree of match”; by contrast, “high congruence” requires that trading reactions be in the same direction, of similar magnitude, and at the same pace across the vast majority of key inflection points in the information flow. In this case, from May 6 to 22, 2013—before the inside information was made public—the party concerned sold off roughly seventy percent of its holdings. This action, diametrically opposed to the expectation that a major positive announcement was imminent, constitutes precisely the element most difficult to establish for showing “congruence,” yet the judgment remains silent on this point. When the temporal proximity between the “buy/sell timing” and the “call timing” supplants the correlative relationship between “trading activity” and the “information process,” the underlying factual basis for the presumption collapses from “information being transmitted and utilized” to “the information holder and the respondent communicating by telephone.”
(3) Dual tolerance of evidence and practice: evidence submitted for regulatory purposes is defined as not having been produced by the regulatory authority.
Underpinning the aforementioned substitution is a lenient approach to evidence review. With respect to communication records—central to the case—the judgment sustains their admissibility with the single statement that “they were not produced by the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the evidence‑gathering procedures complied with legal requirements,” thereby sidestepping the Requirements in the Minutes concerning the original carriers of electronic data, extraction methods, integrity checks, and related matters. The issue of evidentiary admissibility is thus reframed as a question of the entity responsible for producing the evidence, consequently relieving administrative authorities of their obligation to demonstrate the legality of the evidence’s source.
With respect to unlawful gains, the judgment justifies its approach by stating that “applying the actual‑gain method is consistent with its established enforcement standards,” thereby substituting enforcement practice for a legal basis. As for the admissibility of evidence, it adopts an indiscriminate approach: it accepts all evidence submitted by administrative authorities—“all evidence is authentic, lawful, and relevant to this case; this court admits it in accordance with the law”—while summarily rejecting the respondent’s evidence—twenty sets of evidence are “all unable to achieve their intended probative purpose and are therefore not admitted”—without providing specific reasons. This blanket acceptance combined with blanket rejection renders the “comprehensive assessment” an unverifiable conclusion. With these three avenues converging, the focus of judicial review shifts from whether the requisite elements are established to whether the conclusion is credible.
IV. The Mechanism of Emergence of Substantive Integration
First, there is a presumed structural asymmetry. Once the underlying facts are established, the burden of proof shifts to disproving the negative fact that “no information transfer occurred,” which is virtually impossible to do. Consequently, under the presumptive framework, examination of the requisite elements constitutes the only substantive defense available to the opposing party; if this defense is weakened, the plea loses its point of reference. In this case, Mr. Qiu’s argument squarely targeted the claim of “non‑conformity,” yet the judgment responded by stating that “the degree of match is relatively high,” leaving no genuine contest between the defense and the ruling.
Second, professional barriers and the partnership approach to governance. The sheer volume and technical complexity of evidence in securities cases lead courts to defer to regulatory judgments; within the policy framework of maintaining market order, courts are also inclined to see themselves as collaborators with regulators rather than as their check. The fact that the Su case broke the record for “zero substantive losses” demonstrates that integration is not an institutional inevitability but rather the result of deliberate choice.
Third, the generalization of review standards. Expressions such as “comprehensive analysis,” “obviously abnormal,” and “high degree of match” leave room for discretion in reaching conclusions and blur the boundaries between the requisite elements. When a court substitutes independent fact-finding with the statement, “This court confirms the facts found in the challenged administrative penalty decision,” the authority to determine the facts is effectively returned to the administrative agency.
V. Consequences of Non-Compliance
First, it violates the principle that the defendant bears the burden of proof. Article 34 of the Administrative Litigation Law stipulates that the defendant bears the burden of proving the legality of the administrative act; for the court to supplement factual elements that the administrative agency never established amounts to shifting the burden of proof to the court and converting “insufficient primary evidence” (Article 70) into “reasons that can be supplemented.” Second, it contravenes the rule that evidence must be collected before a decision is made. The legality of an administrative act is determined by the facts and reasons existing at the time of its issuance; the judiciary may not retroactively inject new requirements into the administrative act. Otherwise, administrative agencies would never risk losing a case, nor would they have any incentive to improve. Third, it usurps the administration’s authority to make the initial determination. Whether the requisite elements are met should originally be assessed and justified by the regulatory authority in the first instance; when the court substitutes itself for this assessment, it both exceeds its judicial competence and deprives the party concerned of the opportunity to challenge that initial determination. Fourth, there is a generalized overuse of presumptions. When “high degree of conformity” can be replaced by “temporal alignment,” “contact” becomes virtually equivalent to “knowledge,” thereby narrowing the boundaries of transactional security.
It should be emphasized that advocating for integration does not amount to rejecting coordination between supervision and judicial review. While the specialized nature of the securities market indeed warrants appropriate deference by the judiciary to regulatory oversight, such deference should manifest as humility toward professional judgment, rather than a surrender of the burden of proving essential elements. The Su case demonstrates that courts are fully capable of upholding independent examination of statutory requirements while recognizing the presumptive approach.
VI. Conclusion
Returning to this case: a penalty decision that did not establish “high degree of conformity,” through the reclassification of the legal subject, the substitution of factual indicators, and a lenient review of the evidence, acquired a reconfigured structure of constitutive elements in the judgment, thereby enabling its upholding. This process neither fabricated facts nor distorted the law; it merely filled gaps within the statutory requirements. For this very reason, it is more difficult to detect than overt illegality and thus deserves greater vigilance.
The path to correction lies not in the rhetoric of raising the standard of proof, but in three technical constraints: first, a checklist approach—judgments must address each element listed in the “Summary” individually, and “comprehensive assessment” may not substitute for the determination of specific elements; second, the prohibition of adding additional elements—if any element is missing, the court may only set aside the decision or order a retrial, and may not independently identify substitute indicators; third, the substantive opening of the rebuttal channel, clarifying that the object of “reasonable explanation” is the “correspondence between transactions and information,” rather than vague trading practices. Only when each element stands independently and is subject to independent challenge can the mutual support between adjudication and regulation avoid sliding into de facto integration.
Regrettably, as the number of securities cases I handle has grown, so too has the number of judgments in which the courts appear to be patching up deficiencies in the securities regulators’ actions. I have serious doubts as to whether administrative adjudication can effectively check regulatory agencies and whether it can truly assess their conduct in accordance with the law.
Commentary
[1] See the Supreme People’s Court’s “Minutes of the Symposium on Several Issues Concerning Evidence in the Adjudication of Securities Administrative Penalty Cases” (Fa [2011] No. 225), Parts I and V. Part V, item (v) of these minutes requires that “the individual’s securities trading activities be highly consistent with inside information.”
[2] See Beijing Financial Court, Case No. (2021) Jing 74 Xing Chu 71 Administrative Judgment; China Securities Regulatory Commission, Administrative Penalty Decision No. [2021] 42 and Administrative Review Decision No. [2021] 135.
[3] See Beijing Higher People’s Court, Administrative Judgment No. 445 of 2018 (Su v. China Securities Regulatory Commission).
[4] Peng Bing, “A Preliminary Study of Administrative Penalty Cases Involving Insider Trading,” Securities Law Review, No. 2, 2010.
[5] Miao Yinzhi, “Reconstructing the Categories of Insider Trading under Anti-Fraud Theory: A Reflection on Principles and Empirical Testing,” Jurist, No. 1, 2021.
[6] See “An Analysis of the Su Insider Trading Case—With a Discussion on the Standard of Proof in Determining Insider Trading,” Financial Law Garden, Peking University Center for Financial Law Studies, No. 103, 2020. The article points out that the terms “substantially consistent” and “highly consistent” are ambiguous in meaning and their practical application is rather chaotic.
[7] See Article 3 of the Interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on Several Issues Concerning the Specific Application of Law in Handling Criminal Cases of Insider Trading and Disclosure of Inside Information (Fa Shi [2012] No. 6), which sets out three criteria for determining “obviously abnormal related trading behavior”: the degree of temporal coincidence, the degree of deviation from normal trading patterns, and the degree of vested interest.
[8] See Guiding Case No. 65 of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (Wang et al. case of trading on non-public information). In that case, “a high degree of convergence between the trading behavior and the non-public information” served as the core basis for the presumption.
[9] Articles 34 and 70 of the Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China.
[10] The names of parties, company names, and security names cited in this article have all been anonymized; except for case numbers, all parties in the cited cases are referred to by pseudonyms.
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EMBA, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University. Member of the Securities Law Committee of the 12th Beijing Lawyers Association. Holds qualifications as an independent director of listed companies, as well as multiple professional certifications for senior management and compliance officers in the securities industry.
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