
In July 2026, the CPC Central Committee issued directives to deepen the special campaign against organized crime and evil forces, officially launching a new nationwide one-year initiative. This campaign will focus on cracking down on network‑based, evolving criminal gangs, thoroughly investigating industry‑wide protective umbrellas, and severing the economic roots of organized crime and evil forces. It represents both an iterative deepening of the ongoing effort to combat organized crime and evil forces and a call for higher standards of rule of law in defending cases involving such crimes and in ensuring the lawful protection of assets implicated therein.

No sooner had the special campaign been launched than a narrative quietly began circulating in public discourse: this round of anti‑organized‑crime efforts would be aligned with local debt resolution and the revitalization of existing assets, with funds seized from criminal and gang‑related activities used to bolster local treasuries. Although this claim has not been officially endorsed, against the backdrop of sustained fiscal pressure on some local governments, it does carry the risk of being misinterpreted and exploited for improper purposes. In practice, there are numerous instances in which criminal measures have been invoked to plug gaps in local budgets, or where the scope of asset recovery has been deliberately broadened—precisely the kind of trend that the rule of law must vigilantly guard against.
As a criminal defense attorney, my position is this: while fully cooperating with law‑based efforts to “seize assets and cut off funding” and eradicate the breeding ground for organized crime and evil forces, I am equally committed to resolutely preventing the misuse of anti‑crime campaigns to inflate convictions or to illegally appropriate the legitimate property of market entities under the guise of handling case‑related assets, thereby safeguarding both the principle of legality in criminal law and the protection of property rights. “Seizing assets and cutting off funding” is a means; eradicating organized crime and evil forces is the end. By contrast, “handling cases solely for the sake of assets” represents a fundamental inversion of priorities, turning a means into an end in itself.
I. The Rule-of-Law Foundation of This Round of Special Campaign: Combating Organized Crime and Protecting Property in Parallel
Throughout this round of intensified anti‑organized crime operations, full reliance has been placed on the Anti‑Organized Crime Law and the series of judicial interpretations issued by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, and two other ministries, ensuring that property protection is underpinned by robust legal authority.
1. Article 41 of the Anti-Organized Crime Law of the People’s Republic of China (effective May 1, 2022) stipulates that the seizure, impoundment, freezing, and disposal of property involved in a case shall be conducted strictly in accordance with statutory conditions and procedures; it shall safeguard the lawful property rights and interests of citizens and organizations; rigorously distinguish between illegal proceeds and lawful property, as well as between the property of the individual concerned and that of their family members; and minimize adverse impacts on the normal business operations of enterprises. No property unrelated to the case may be seized, impounded, or frozen, and any such unrelated property must have the coercive measures lifted and be returned within three days. This is the overarching legal red line that must not be crossed in the disposition of property involved in a case.
2. The “Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Disposition of Property in Criminal Cases Involving Evil Forces” issued by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of Justice (Fa Fa [2019] No. 4) precisely delineates the scope of property subject to recovery and confiscation: only seven categories of property may be lawfully seized, while lawful operating income of enterprises, shareholders’ legitimate capital contributions, and property independently owned by family members are excluded from such measures. Furthermore, it explicitly prohibits the pre‑emptive seizure or freezing of assets prior to the initiation of a case. It is imperative to prohibit the premature seizure of enterprises’ operational assets under the guise of case handling.
It is precisely these legal provisions that constitute the first institutional safeguard against “judging cases based on wealth.” However, whether the system can achieve its intended effectiveness depends on whether it is rigorously enforced in the course of law enforcement.
At a press briefing on this special campaign, the Central Political and Legal Commission specifically emphasized: “We must uphold the rule of law mindset and consistently advance the in-depth special campaign against organized crime and evil forces within the framework of the law,” and “We must strictly adhere to legal principles such as the principle of legality, the presumption of innocence, and evidence-based adjudication, rigorously scrutinizing the facts, evidence, procedures, and legal application in each case… Public security organs must, in strict accordance with statutory procedures, collect all types of evidence that can substantiate crimes of organized crime and evil forces, thereby enhancing the quality of investigation and evidence collection at the source.” This means that the criteria for identifying organized crime and evil forces must not be arbitrarily raised, and the legitimate property rights of market entities must be protected in accordance with the law. Eliminate the rampant practice of local authorities exploiting anti‑crime campaigns to address fiscal shortfalls and improperly seizing enterprises’ legitimate assets.
In other words, the law provides a clear institutional basis for “striking at the assets and cutting off the lifeline”—ensuring that all illegally obtained proceeds are fully recovered, while lawful property remains untouched. This precisely constitutes the legal foundation upon which lawyers collaborate with judicial authorities to accurately identify and precisely seize such assets.
II. Three Core Risks in Practice: Overly Broad Findings of Liability, Confusion of Assets, and Misaligned Recovery Measures
Carrying out asset‑seizure and financial‑disruption operations in accordance with the law hinges on precision—ensuring that genuine illicit assets are not overlooked while avoiding collateral damage to lawful property. Reviewing recent case‑handling practices, three categories of issues have emerged as particularly salient and warrant heightened vigilance in this round of intensified efforts.
(1) The crime of organizing and leading triad-like organizations has been broadly construed and elevated in its legal characterization.
They artificially construct a narrative of “stable organizational hierarchy, economic control, and violent intimidation” out of ordinary business disputes and isolated instances of illegal conduct. Private enterprise operators engaged in compliant business practices have been wrongly classified as organizers of organized crime; meanwhile, certain online “water armies” and sporadic illegal online debt-collection activities have been arbitrarily reclassified as criminal organizations of a mafia-like nature, thereby contravening the statutory criteria for such designation based on the “four characteristics.”
Take, for example, the case involving Ou and others accused of organizing and leading a triad‑type criminal organization (Guangxi Wuzhou Case No. 3), which I handled: the case involved 19 defendants, over 450 volumes of evidence, and seven counts of alleged offenses. After the public prosecution was initiated, I became involved and systematically addressed the evidentiary deficiencies pertaining to the four defining characteristics. With respect to the organizational feature, I demonstrated that there was no formal initiation ceremony or hallmark event, that the core members lacked close ties, and that no organizational rules or disciplinary regulations existed. On the economic front, I established that each defendant had independent, lawful sources of income, and that Ou did not provide any funds used to finance criminal activities. Regarding the behavioral characteristic, I proved that there was no pattern of using violence as a primary means to harm an indeterminate number of individuals. As for the harmfulness criterion, I clarified that the defendants’ business operations did not result in unlawful control over local industries. Following three pretrial conferences and 16 days of court proceedings, the court ultimately found that Ou did not meet the elements of the crime of organizing or leading a triad‑type criminal organization, nor of the other three charges. After the procuratorate filed an appeal, the second instance court upheld the original verdict. This case has become a quintessential example of the “no exaggeration, no artificial inflation” approach adopted during the three-year campaign to combat organized crime and evil forces.
(2) A blanket seizure of all assets involved in the case, with legally operated property being treated as illicit proceeds and subject to confiscation.
Some law-enforcement agencies, regardless of the source of funds, freeze an enterprise’s bank accounts, factory premises, and upstream and downstream receivables whenever the company’s principal is implicated in organized‑crime‑related leads, thereby treating lawful operating revenues alongside a small portion of illicit proceeds as a single, indistinguishable pool. Moreover, in an effort to plug local fiscal shortfalls, they deliberately broaden the scope of asset recovery, leading to business closures and widespread job losses—thus undermining the original intent of the campaign to combat organized crime and evil forces, which was to improve the business environment. In this round, the focus is on cracking down on criminal gangs that have emerged from online platforms; because online financial flows are concealed and asset commingling is even more pronounced, it has become all too easy for lawful operating funds and criminal proceeds to be conflated and subject to joint seizure and freezing, thereby significantly increasing the difficulty of mounting effective property‑related defenses.
(3) Deviations in property identification have resulted in the failure to recover “ill-gotten gains.”
Taking as an example a major organized‑crime‑related appeal case involving “routine loan” fraud currently handled by the author’s team, this case has brought to light deep‑seated problems in the disposition of assets. The original trial found that W, the second defendant and identified as the leader of the criminal organization, had invested 47 million yuan and derived illicit proceeds exceeding 223 million yuan, sentencing him to life imprisonment. W contended that he was not a genuine investor but merely a conduit exploited by Z to facilitate fund transfers. By obtaining bank statements for newly discovered accounts that the original investigating authorities had failed to uncover and meticulously tracing the sources of six separate fund flows—totaling approximately 68 million yuan—the author’s team has preliminarily established that the funds at issue originated from the幕后 figure Z, while W served only as an operative who, under instruction, provided bank cards to route the money. The funds received were almost immediately transferred out on the same day, leaving no balance in the account; moreover, prior to the incident, W was still repaying a 30,000‑yuan online loan in installments, demonstrating that he lacked any independent capacity to make such substantial investments. Meanwhile, Z used underground money‑laundering networks to transfer at least 75 million yuan in illicit proceeds overseas, and to date, not a single cent has been recovered.
This case highlights the cascading consequences of erroneous property‑ownership determinations: once the “investor” is misidentified, only the “account‑manipulator” at the end of the chain is held accountable, while the true organizers, the actual investors, and the shadowy “protective umbrellas” behind them remain unpunished, and their illicit gains are often siphoned abroad, making recovery all but impossible. For this very reason, the latest round of the special campaign to combat organized crime and evil forces should take such cases as a key entry point, ensuring precise course correction and thorough, in‑depth investigations.

III. Key Areas of Focus in Property‑Related Defense in Organized Crime Cases
“Severing the financial lifeline” in accordance with the law is the indispensable path to eradicating the economic foundations of organized crime and evil forces. The lawyer’s duty is not to defend illicit assets, but to ensure the precise application of the law. Drawing on recent practical experience and the consensus reached at the 22nd “Ten Criminal Defense Lawyers” Forum—on the challenges of asset‑related defense and the need for legislative improvements—asset‑related defense can be strategically advanced along the following four dimensions.
(1) Adhere to the “three distinctions”: between illicit proceeds and lawful property, between one’s own property and the property of third parties, and between personal property and the property of a corporate legal person.
This is the cornerstone of property‑related defense in organized‑crime cases. In practice, investigative authorities often treat the corporate assets invested by organizers of criminal organizations as “criminal‑related assets” and impose a blanket seizure on them. This constitutes a misinterpretation of the principle of corporate property independence enshrined in the Company Law and the Civil Code. Shareholders’ equity interests are personal property, whereas assets held in the name of the enterprise constitute corporate property; these are legal relationships at different levels, and it is impermissible to bypass shareholders’ equity and directly seize or freeze the company’s assets.
Lawyers must carefully clarify three key relationships: the distinction between lawful business proceeds and proceeds derived from criminal activity—corporate profits cannot automatically be deemed “illicit assets” simply because the enterprise’s owner is implicated in a crime; the separation of an individual’s personal property from that of family members—legitimate shares of a spouse in marital property and independently acquired gifts received by children must be segregated; and the delineation between personal assets and corporate legal‑person property—even if a party holds 100% of a company’s equity, assets held in the company’s name remain corporate property and may not be treated as personal property for purposes of direct disposition.
(2) Examine the substantive connection between the property involved in the case and the criminal conduct, to prevent a perfunctory “anything remotely related” approach.
Property involved in a case is not equivalent to illicit proceeds, nor does it encompass all assets held in the defendant’s name. The statutory definition of “related to the case” is overly broad and has been excessively expanded in practice: when funds linked to the case are transferred into a particular company, not only is that company’s account seized, but also other enterprises in which it has invested. Such an unqualified examination of relevance contravenes the principle of proportionality.
The specific review may proceed along three dimensions: first, in terms of timing, whether the acquisition of the property occurred during the period of the crime; second, in terms of origin, whether the property was directly derived from criminal conduct; and third, in terms of purpose, whether the property was actually used to sustain the operations of the criminal organization. In particular, for organized‑crime cases arising from online platforms—where online financial flows are concealed and lawful business funds are easily conflated with criminal proceeds—it is all the more critical to scrutinize each transaction to determine the source and destination of funds, rather than resorting to blanket presumptions.
(3) Safeguarding the procedural participation rights of third parties and preventing asset disposal conducted in “default judgment” proceedings.
In the disposition of assets in organized‑crime cases, the issue of third‑party property being inadvertently seized or confiscated is particularly acute. Third parties are neither notified to participate in the proceedings nor afforded the opportunity to present evidence or challenge the ownership of the assets; yet their property is nonetheless subject to seizure, recovery, and enforcement. Even when third parties file objections, they are limited to a written reconsideration process, lacking any substantive adjudicatory review. Moreover, judges enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether to summon third parties to appear in court, and in practice, such summonses are rarely issued.
In the course of handling cases, lawyers should proactively encourage corporate shareholders, family members, and other third parties to raise objections to property ownership based on their lawful assets, submitting relevant proof of title and evidence of independent sources of funds. For cases where judgments have already become final, lawyers should assist these third parties in seeking redress through avenues such as objections to enforcement, enforcement supervision, and procuratorial oversight. In 2025, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate launched a special supervisory campaign targeting illegal cross‑jurisdictional law enforcement and profit‑driven judicial practices; the Procuratorial Network has established a dedicated section for this initiative, allowing agents—regardless of the litigation stage—to report leads.
(4) Guard against “misaligned recovery” caused by errors in property identification, and promote precise asset recovery.
Erroneous determinations of property not only unjustly harm innocent parties but also allow genuine criminal gangs and their “protective umbrellas” to go unpunished. The appeal case described in Part Two is a typical example: when the investigating authorities mistakenly identify the “account manipulator” as the “investor,” the true organizers and financiers are able to remain hidden, while vast sums of illicit proceeds are transferred abroad and become difficult to recover.
Moreover, in practice, when organizational leaders are at large or have already died, their status as such is often established directly in the judgment—without resorting to the special procedure for confiscating illicit proceeds—and their assets are confiscated accordingly. As a result, the relevant rights holders are unable to participate in the proceedings or exercise their right of defense. This “in absentia” approach to asset disposition likewise warrants close vigilance on the part of counsel, who must raise lawful objections.
When handling such cases, lawyers should adopt a reverse‑looking approach to scrutinize the logical chain underlying property‑identification: Who is the true provider of the funds? Where did the illicit proceeds flow? And is there a genuine causal link between the subject of confiscation and the criminal conduct? By meticulously tracing each transaction, obtaining previously overlooked account records, and reconciling inconsistencies in the statements of different defendants, lawyers can often uncover significant flaws in the property‑identification process, thereby prompting the investigating authorities to reassess the overall characterization of the case.
In property‑related defense in organized‑crime cases, the goal is not to shield illicit assets but to ensure that all proceeds of crime are fully recovered while safeguarding lawful property from unwarranted seizure—this is precisely where the professional value of lawyers lies in cooperating with the judiciary to dismantle criminal financing networks in accordance with the law.
IV. Conclusion: Anti‑crime campaigns are resolute, the rule of law is compassionate, and property protection is measured.
Since 2018, the author has handled numerous cases involving organized crime and evil forces, serving as counsel for the principal defendant in the vast majority of them, and successfully secured the “removal from the blacklist” status in three cases. These practical experiences have profoundly underscored the following: Carrying out “asset seizure and financial disruption” in accordance with the law is the only viable path to eradicating the economic foundations of organized crime and evil forces. The role of lawyers is not to defend illicit assets, but to ensure the precise application of the law. The rule-of-law quality of the campaign against organized crime and evil forces is reflected not only in how many criminal organizations have been dismantled, but also in whether the legal characterization of each case can withstand judicial scrutiny and whether the disposition of every asset can stand the test of time.
The latest round of the special campaign to deepen efforts to combat organized crime and evil forces safeguards social stability and the foundations of the business environment. However, it is imperative to recognize that any large-scale law enforcement operation carries the risk of being distorted: when “striking at assets to cut off funding” is misinterpreted as “prosecuting for the sake of assets,” and when the recovery of assets involved in cases degenerates into a “cash‑withdrawal machine” for local treasuries, the very foundations of the rule of law are undermined.
As criminal defense lawyers, we must advance both procedural and substantive defenses in tandem—ensuring robust protection of defense rights during pretrial conferences, constructing a coherent evidentiary framework in court, and coordinating team‑based, collaborative efforts. Such meticulous advocacy is the fundamental approach for lawyers to uphold professional integrity. Through solid evidentiary support and rigorous application of the law, we ensure that anti‑organized crime campaigns remain firmly within the bounds of the legal system—eradicating the scourge of organized crime and evil forces while safeguarding the lawful property and security of market entities.
※ The images in this article were generated by AI.
Attorney Profile
.
Cheng Xiaolu
Beijing Starrise Law Firm
Chairman of the Partners’ Meeting
Chair of the Partners’ Meeting at Beijing Starrise Law Firm, Director of the Civil–Criminal–Administrative Integration Research Base jointly established by the School of Criminal Law and Justice at China University of Political Science and Law and Xinglai Law Firm, and a Ph.D. in Law from Renmin University of China. He previously served in the procuratorial organs of Beijing, earning the titles of “Outstanding Public Prosecutor of Beijing” and “Top Ten Research Experts.” He is a member of the 10th National Lawyers Association’s Criminal Law Committee, an appointed supervisory lawyer for detention centers under the Ministry of Public Security, Deputy Director of the Criminal Procedure Committee of the Beijing Lawyers Association, and Deputy Director of the Judicial Credibility Professional Committee of the Beijing Credit Society. He also serves as an off-campus practical mentor in criminal defense at Peking University, Renmin University of China, Central University of Finance and Economics, Shandong University, and other institutions. With more than twenty years of extensive experience in criminal justice, he has successfully handled a series of high‑profile, impactful cases involving economic crimes, organized crime, official misconduct, and complex civil–criminal intersections. He has provided specialized criminal legal services to numerous large enterprises and was recognized in Chambers Global 2026 and 2025’s “Greater China Legal Guide” under the Dispute Resolution category; on LEGALBAND’s China Top Lawyers Ranking in the “White‑Collar and Business Crimes” category; and as a Distinguished Legal Team and a Client‑Trusted Lawyer—among the Top Female Lawyers (North China)—in the LegalOne China rankings, among other accolades.
Layout: Wang Xin
Reviewed by: Shen Xinyu


Beijing Headquarters Address: 17th Floor, China Resources Building, No. 8 Jianguomen North Avenue, Dongcheng District, Beijing
Contact numbers: 010-64011566, 18811162996
Wuhan Branch Address: Room 1001, 10th Floor, Huangpu International Center, Jiang’an District, Wuhan, Hubei Province
Contact number: 027-82288828
Hefei Branch Address: Rooms 1703–1710, Building E, Weilan Business Harbor, No. 188 Qianshan Road, Shushan District, Hefei, Anhui Province
Contact numbers: 0551-68127192, 15850561916
Related News
2026-11-12
